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Gopal Das v. State

Allahabad High Court
Aug 10, 1953
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Judgment Summary: Raghubar Dayal, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Gopal Das Kapoor and another were committed to the Court of Session at Kanpur for trial on charges under Sections 409 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Judge added a further charge under Section 477A, I.P.C. Both accused persons are public servants.

On a petition under Article 228 of the Constitution the matter was transferred to this Court because it raised a substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution. The Court heard the petitioner's counsel and the Advocate General and decided to dispose of the constitutional point alone, remitting further proceedings in the trial court. The constitutional point concerned whether Section 409, I.P.C., conflicted with Article 14 (and thereby Article 13(1)) by creating discriminatory exposure to harsher punishment relative to an offence under Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, which punishes criminal breach of trust by a public servant, violates Article 14 of the Constitution (and is therefore void under Article 13(1)) because the same conduct may alternatively be charged under Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 with a lesser maximum punishment.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • It was contended that the act of a public servant dishonestly misappropriating or converting entrusted property could be prosecuted either under Section 409, I.P.C., or under Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Because Section 409 carries a potentially much heavier punishment than Section 5(1)(c), a public servant prosecuted under Section 409 would be placed in a worse position than another public servant who, for similar conduct, might be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act. This, the petitioner argued, amounted to discrimination contrary to Article 14 and rendered Section 409 void under Article 13(1).

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments from the respondent's side.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by comparing the statutory formulations. It noted that the dishonest misappropriation or conversion by a public servant of property entrusted to him falls within the language of both Section 409, I.P.C., and Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, so the same conduct could be described by either provision.

The Court then observed the difference in maximum punishments: Section 409, I.P.C., provides for transportation for life or imprisonment up to ten years and fine, whereas the offence under Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is punishable under Section 5(2) of that Act with imprisonment up to seven years, or fine, or both.

To address the contention of discriminatory exposure to harsher punishment, the Court relied on the statutory limitation in Section 71 of the Penal Code (as noted in the opinion), which provides that where an act falls within two or more separate definitions of offences, the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the court could award for any one of such offences. The Court also noted that a person cannot be convicted twice for the same act in view of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act and Article 20(2) of the Constitution (as referenced in the opinion).

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that, for conduct describable under both provisions, the offender will be punished within the lower limit applicable to either offence and cannot be subjected to cumulative or doubled punishment for the same act. On that basis the Court held that there is no discriminatory denial of equality before the law in the circumstances contended and that Section 409 does not, for that reason, violate Article 14 or become void under Article 13(1).

The Court further noted that no other constitutional point required interpretation and, having decided the constitutional question, ordered the case returned to the Sessions Judge for further proceedings in view of Article 228(b).

Holding and Implications

Holding: Section 409, I.P.C., does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution and is not void under Article 13(1) on the ground urged.

Implications:

  • The constitutional challenge to Section 409 on the basis of alleged discrimination with respect to prosecution under Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was rejected.
  • The practical consequence for the parties is that the constitutional point has been disposed of and the case is remitted to the Court of Session at Kanpur for further proceedings under Article 228(b).
  • The opinion does not indicate that a broader legal precedent was established beyond the application of the statutory limits on punishment (Section 71 of the Penal Code) and protections against double conviction (Section 26, General Clauses Act; Article 20(2) of the Constitution) as applied to the facts and contention before the Court.

Show all summary ...

Raghubar Dayal, J.:— Gopal Das Kapoor and another were committed to the Court of Session at Kanpur for trial of offences under Ss. 409 and 120B, Penal Code. The Sessions Judge added a charge under S. 477A, I.P.C, also against them. Both the accused are public servants.

2. On a petition under Article 228 of the Constitution this case was transferred to this Court as it involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Advocate General on the point and dispose of the constitutional point alone. Further proceedings in the case will be taken in the Court of the Sessions Judge. Section 409, I.P.C, which punishes “criminal breach of trust” is in these words:

“Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property in his capacity of a public servant or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with transportation for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

3. Section 405, I.P.C, which defines “criminal breach of trust” is as follows:

“Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits “criminal breach of trust”.”

4. Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act No. 2 of 1947) is—

“A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duty if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do.”

5. It would appear from the different provisions of the various sections quoted above that the act of a public servant in dishonestly misappropriating or otherwise converting for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or in allowing any other person so to do will be an offence both under Section 5(1)(c) of Act 2 of 1947 and also under Section 409 of the Penal Code.

6. The offence under Section 5(1)(c) of Act 2 of 1947 is punishable under Section 5(2) of the same Act with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both while the offence under S. 409, I.P.C, is punishable with transportation for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and the offender shall also be liable to fine.

7. In view of the absence of any provision in either of the two Acts laying the circumstances in which a public servant committing such an act would be triable under one Act or the other, it has been contended that the public servant prosecuted for an offence under S. 409, I.P.C, is in a worse position than another public servant who may just, according to the fancy of the authorities, be prosecuted for the offence under Section 5(1)(c) of the Act 2 of 1947, that therefore S. 409, I.P.C, denies equality before the law to such persons who are prosecuted for an offence under S. 409, I.P.C, and not for an offence under Section 5(1)(c) of the Act 2 of 1947, and that, therefore, the provisions of S. 409 in this respect violate the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution and should, therefore, be held void in view of Article 13(1) of the Constitution.

8. The differentiation in the punishment provided for the same conduct in either of the two provisions of law is immaterial in view of Section 71 of the Penal Code, which provides that where anything which is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the court which tries him could award for any one of such offences. For such conduct which could lead to a charge both under S. 409, I.P.C, and under Section 5(1)(c) of the Act 2 of 1947 the offender will be punished within the lower limit provided for either of the two offences. A person cannot be convicted twice for the same act in view of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, and also Article 20, Cl. (2) of the Constitution.

9. In this view of the matter there is no occasion for holding that there is any discrimination against an accused who is proceeded against for an offence under S. 409, I.P.C, and not for an offence under Section 5(1)(c) of the Act 2 of 1947. The provisions of S. 409, I.P.C, therefore, do not go against Article 14 of the Constitution and are not void in view of Article 13(1) of the Constitution.

10. No other point requiring interpretation of the Constitution has been urged before us. Having decided the constitutional point raised before us, we order that the case be returned to the court concerned for further proceedings in view of Article 228(b).

A/V.R.B

11. Case returned.