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Mst. Govindi Widow O... v. The State Of Uttar P...

Allahabad High Court
Jul 9, 1951
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Agarwala, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from one of numerous writ applications filed in the Court challenging the validity of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, No. 1 of 1951 (the "Act" or the "impugned Act"). The impugned Act's validity had recently been upheld by a Full Bench of this Court in Suryapal Singh v. The Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh. The present application renewed various grounds attacking the Act that, according to the applicant's counsel, were not argued before or considered by the Full Bench. The Court examines those points, refers to the Full Bench's earlier conclusions, and ultimately rejects the application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State Legislature could validly provide for payment of compensation for acquisition of intermediaries' property by means of bonds rather than by cash (and whether such a provision falls within State legislative competence).
  2. Whether the words "subject to the provisions of Entry 42 of List III" in Entry 36 of List II prevent a State Legislature from legislating on acquisition except after Parliament lays down principles of cash compensation.
  3. Whether Section 68's delegation to the executive to fix the proportion of compensation payable in cash or bonds is an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
  4. Whether the State Legislature could acquire only part of an intermediary's rights (i.e., whether partial acquisition of proprietary rights is permissible under Article 31).
  5. Whether the Act is confiscatory in nature and thus beyond legislative power.
  6. Whether a conflict between the State Act and the Land Acquisition Act (a Central Act) invalidates the State Act.
  7. Whether Article 31(4) merely bars a remedy or whether it cures the illegality of an otherwise invalid acquisition.
  8. Whether the Act was enacted for a public purpose where the Act provided for transfer of land to tenants.
  9. Whether the Act could be saved by Article 31(4) where, it was argued, there was no Bill pending in the State Legislature at the commencement of the Constitution.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The State Legislature lacked competence to legislate for acquisition on condition of payment by bonds; a bond is merely a promise to pay and not payment in cash, so there is effectively no compensation.
  • Entry 36 of List II is made "subject to" Entry 42 of List III, and therefore, unless Entry 42 principles (purportedly demanding cash payment) were laid down, the State could not legislate regarding acquisition.
  • Section 68 unlawfully delegates to the executive power to fix proportions of cash or bond compensation.
  • The Act unlawfully acquires only part of the intermediaries' rights (because Sir and khudkasht lands were left with intermediaries), whereas Article 31 allows acquisition only of the entirety of rights.
  • The Act is confiscatory (a culmination of earlier confiscatory measures) and therefore beyond the Legislature's power.
  • The Land Acquisition Act (Central Act) provides for compensation under Entry 42 of List III; consequently, where central law on compensation exists, the State cannot provide a different mode of payment.
  • Article 31(4) only bars a remedy and does not cure illegality; thus it cannot validate the Act.
  • There was no public purpose because the Act itself provided for transfer of land to tenants (so the State did not need the land for public purposes).
  • Article 31(4) cannot save the Act because at the commencement of the Constitution (26 Jan 1950) no State Legislature existed in Uttar Pradesh and therefore no Bill was "pending." Reference was made to repeal of earlier Acts by Article 395 and the Government of India Act, 1935.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent State's separate written or oral arguments; rather, the Court addresses the applicant's contentions by reference to constitutional provisions, earlier Full Bench conclusions, and statutory provisions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Suryapal Singh v. The Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh (Full Bench decision) The Full Bench upheld the validity of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and considered interpretations of the relationship between Entry 36 (List II) and Entry 42 (List III), delegation under Section 68, the scope of Article 31(4), and public purpose. The Court relies on the Full Bench holding repeatedly: (a) that the words "subject to" do not preclude State legislation on acquisition in the absence of Parliament's legislation; (b) that any contravention of Article 31(2) is cured by Article 31(4); and (c) that delegation under Section 68 was justified and lawful. The present application is rejected for the reasons given by that Full Bench.
United Provinces v. Atiqa Begam, 1940 F.C.R. 110 Principle that if a provincial government can legislate with respect to collection of rents, it also has power to legislate as to limitations on a landlord's power to collect rents (i.e., remission). The Court applies this principle by analogy: if legislation can be made regarding payment of compensation, it follows that legislation can include provision for non-payment or different forms of payment (e.g., bonds). This supports the State's competence to provide alternative compensation forms.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds primarily by reference to constitutional text, the Full Bench decision, and statutory provisions of the impugned Act. The key reasoning steps, as presented in the opinion, are:

  1. Interpretation of compensation by means of bonds:
    • The Court accepts that a bond is a promise to pay in the future and not present cash payment, but rejects the contention that payment by bonds amounts to no payment of compensation at all.
    • Even assuming, for argument's sake, that no effective payment is provided, the question of legislative competence remains, addressed below.
  2. Meaning of "subject to" in Entry 36 of List II vis-à-vis Entry 42 of List III:
    • The Court follows the Full Bench's conclusion that the phrase "subject to the provisions of Entry 42 of List III" does not, by itself, mean the State cannot legislate with respect to acquisition unless Parliament has legislated on Entry 42 matters.
    • The entries are characterized as "fields of legislation" rather than discrete powers: where one entry is made subject to another, it reserves the sub-field (here, principles and form of compensation) for separate legislative treatment by the appropriate legislature.
  3. Article 246 and the scope of State legislative power:
    • Article 246 grants State Legislatures power to legislate "with respect to" matters in List II and also in List III subject to Parliament's legislation. Because there was no Parliamentary legislation under Entry 42 at the relevant time, the State could legislate on principles of compensation, including provisions for bonds or even (theoretically) no compensation (subject to Article 31(2) considerations).
    • The phrase "with respect to" is described as of wide import, allowing any legislation that is with respect to the subject matter of an entry, provided it is not inconsistent with other constitutional provisions.
  4. Analogy from Atiqa Begam:
    • The Court adopts the reasoning that legislation relating to payment (or collection) can include limits or exceptions (e.g., remission); by analogy, legislation about compensation can include regulation of non-payment or alternative modes of payment.
  5. Article 31(2) and Article 31(4):
    • Article 31(2) limits State power to acquire property unless acquisition is for a public purpose and compensation principles are laid down. The Full Bench, however, held that any contravention of Article 31(2) is cured by Article 31(4). The Court here accepts and applies that Full Bench holding.
  6. Delegation under Section 68:
    • The specific contention that Section 68 unlawfully delegates to the executive the power to fix proportions of compensation in cash or bonds was directly addressed by the Full Bench, which held such delegation justified and lawful; the present Court follows that holding.
  7. Acquisition of proprietary rights and retention of Sir and khudkasht lands:
    • The Court reasons that, under the Act, all proprietary rights of the intermediaries have been acquired by the State; Sir and khudkasht lands were allowed to be retained only in the intermediaries' capacity as Bhumidhars, which is a new tenure created by the Act and does not vest proprietary rights in the intermediaries. Thus the contention that only part of the rights were acquired is rejected.
  8. Confiscation argument:
    • The Full Bench had observed that the Act could not be characterized as wholly confiscatory because there were provisions for compensation, even if low. Moreover, even if the Act were confiscatory, the Full Bench held that Article 31(4) protects the Act; the present Court adopts that conclusion.
  9. Alleged inconsistency with the Central Land Acquisition Act:
    • The applicant argued that central legislation under Entry 42 (the Land Acquisition Act) precluded State deviation on compensation. The Court observes that the impugned Act was reserved for the President's consideration and received his assent; under Article 254(2), where a State Act receives the President's assent, it is valid and prevails in that State over inconsistent central provisions.
  10. Bills pending at commencement of the Constitution:
    • The opinion relies on Articles 382 and 389 of the Constitution. Article 382 provides continuity of existing provincial legislatures until the new Houses are constituted. Article 389 saves pending Bills and allows them to be continued in the corresponding new legislatures or Parliament. The Court finds that on 26 January 1950 the old Legislature in Uttar Pradesh continued to function, and the Bill that later became the Zamindari Abolition Act was pending and continued into the new Parliament; therefore the contention that no Bill was pending at commencement is rejected.
  11. Conclusion of analysis:
    • For the reasons stated and largely adopting the Full Bench's reasoning, the Court rejects the present writ application.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application is APPLICATION REJECTED. The Court rejects the applicant's challenges to the validity of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, No. 1 of 1951, adopting and applying the reasoning of the Full Bench decision in Suryapal Singh.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties: The writ application challenging the Act is dismissed; the impugned legislation stands operative as against this applicant.
  • Reliance on Full Bench conclusions: The opinion reiterates and applies the Full Bench's holdings on the State's legislative competence, the effect of Article 31(4), the lawfulness of delegation under Section 68, and the constitutionality of the Act despite arguments of confiscation or partial acquisition.
  • Statutory supremacy in the State after presidential assent: Because the Act received the President's assent under the procedure applied, Article 254(2) makes the State Act valid and prevailing (in that State) even where central legislation on compensation exists.
  • Procedural notes recorded by the Court: The Court certifies that substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution are involved, and it makes no order as to costs.
  • Precedential posture: The opinion does not purport to establish new constitutional principles beyond those already stated and applied by the Full Bench; it reinforces the Full Bench's rulings as dispositive for this application.

Orders recorded in the opinion: The Court certifies substantial constitutional questions and makes no order as to costs. Final disposition: Application rejected.

Show all summary ...

Agarwala, J.:— This is one out of numerous writ applications filed in this Court questioning the validity of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, No. 1 of 1951, hereinafter referred to as “the Act” or “the impugned Act.” The validity of the Act has been upheld in a recent decision of a Full Bench of this Court, vide Suryapal Singh v. The Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh.1

2. Sri Prem Mohan Varma, learned counsel for the applicant, however, urges that there are several points that arise in the case which were not argued before the Full Bench and hence were not dealt with by that Bench. He contends that the Act is invalid for several reasons. The first ground argued is that apart from the provisions of Art. 31(2) the State Legislature was incompetent to legislate with regard to the acquisition of the property of the intermediaries on condition of payment of compensation by means of bonds. It is urged that the condition of payment of compensation by bonds is no payment of compensation at all, inasmuch as a bond is merely a promise to pay in future and is not equivalent to payment in cash. It is further urged that the State Legislature under the powers given to it, under Entry 36 of List II of the 7th Schedule, can only legislate with regard to acquisition of property, if there had been an enactment laying down principles of cash payment under Entry 42 of List III; and as the principles of payment of compensation laid down in the impugned Act are not principles of payment of cash compensation, they are no principles at all and consequently the State Legislature could not pass the Act.

3. No doubt, Section 68 of the Zamindari Abolition Act makes it possible for the State Government to prescribe that compensation shall be payable entirely in bonds and it may be assumed that a bond is a promise to pay in future and that it does not amount to payment in cash in present. That, however, does not mean that there is no payment of compensation whatsoever. But assuming, for the sake of argument, that no payment of compensation is provided for in the Act, the question still remains whether the State Legislature had the power to pass the Act. The argument is based upon the words “subject to” that appear in Entry 36 of List II and upon the words “compensation” appearing in Entry 42 of List III. This argument was considered by the Full Bench and it was held that

the words ‘subject to the provisions of Entry 42 of List III’ do not by themselves mean that the State Legislature cannot legislate with respect to the acquisition of property unless there is a public purpose and only on payment of compensation.

4. It may be added that the various entries are not powers of legislation but fields of legislation. Where one entry is made subject to another entry, all that it means is that out of the scope of the former entry a field of legislation covered by the latter entry has been reserved to be specially dealt with by the appropriate legislature. The subject-matter of Entry 36 of List II is acquisition or requisitioning of property except for the purposes of the Union The subject-matter of Entry 42 of List III is the principles on which compensation for the property acquired or requisitioned is to be determined and the form and manner in which such compensation is to be given. Out of the field of legislation on the subject-matter of acquisition or requisition of property except for the purpose of Union, the subject-matter concerned with the principles of compensation and form and manner in which it is to be given is taken out and reserved to be legislated upon by the Union or the State. If there is no legislation under Entry 42 of List III, there is nothing to prevent the State Legislature from making any enactment with respect to the subject of acquisition or requisitioning of property. The power to legislate is given in Article 246. Under that Article a State Legislature has power to legislate “with respect to” matters enumerated in the various entries in List II and also with respect to matters mentioned in List III subject to any legislation by Parliament. Since there is no parliamentary legislation under Entry 42 of List III, the State could legislate upon the subject-matter of that entry. It could legislate with respect to principles of compensation etc. The expression “with respect to” is of wide import and any legislation can be made so long as it is with respect to the subject-matter of a particular entry (provided of course it is not inconsistent with the other provisions of the Constitution).

5. The Legislature could, therefore, enact under Entry 42 of List III in respect of the property acquired, that compensation shall be paid in bonds or even that there shall be no compensation (not taking into account the effect of Art. 31(2) for the present).

6. In United Provinces v. Atiqa Begam 1940 F.C.R 110. the question was whether legislation with regard to remission of rent could be made in the entry under the heading ‘land, including collection of rents.’ It was held,

If a Provincial Government can legislate with respect to the collection of rents, it must also have power to legislate with respect to any limitation on the power of a landlord to collect rents, that is to say, with respect to the remission of rents as well as to their collection.

7. On the same principle legislation with respect to payment of compensation includes legislation with respect to non-payment of compensation.

8. Article 31(2) provides the limitation on the power of the State to legislate with regard to acquisition of property and no property is to be acquired unless it is for public purposes and the amount of compensation or the principles of payment of compensation are laid down. But, the Full Bench has held that any contravention of this provision is cured by the provisions of Article 31(4).

9. It was next urged that under Section 68 the Legislature has delegated the power to fix the proportion of compensation payable in cash or in bonds to the executive and that this the Legislature had no power to do. This question was specifically dealt with by the Full Bench and it was held that delegation of power under Section 68 of the Act was justified and lawful.

10. Then it was urged that the State Legislature had no power to acquire the rights and interests of the intermediaries in part. It was contended that under the Act the Sir and khudkasht lands of the intermediaries have been allowed to be retained by them and this shows that their rights have not been acquired in their entirety. It is contended that under Article 31 of the Constitution the Legislature had power to acquire the entirety of the rights of a person in any property, moveable or immoveable, but it had no right to acquire some only of his rights. This argument again has no substance. Under the Act all the proprietary rights of the intermediaries have been acquired. No doubt Sir and khudkasht lands have been allowed to be retained by them in their capacity as Bhumidhars. This is a new tenure created by the Act Bhumidhars are not proprietors. The proprietary rights under the Act vest in the State. It cannot, therefore, be said that the entire proprietary rights of the intermediaries have not been acquired under the Act.

11. It was next urged that the Act was confiscatory and was culmination of a series of confiscatory Acts preceding it. It was urged that because of its confiscatory nature, the Legislature had no power to enact the Act. In the Full Bench decision it has been pointed out that it could not be stated that the Act was confiscatory. There was provision for payment of compensation and, although compensation paid to the bigger zamindars was low and may be very low, it could not be said that there was no compensation whatsoever. Assuming, however, that the Act was of a confiscatory nature, the provisions of the Act, as held by the Full Bench, are protected by Article 31(4) of the Constitution.

12. It was next urged that the State Legislature had no power to enact the Act because there was already in existence an Act of the Central Legislature, namely, the Land Acquisition Act, the provisions of which regarding compensation are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. It is pointed out that the provisions with regard to compensation under the Land Acquisition Act fall under Entry 42 of List III of the Constitution and, since there is Central legislation with regard to compensation, no State Legislature has power to provide for a different mode of payment of compensation for acquisition of property. This argument is fallacious. It is overlooked that the impugned Act was reserved for the consideration of the President and it received his assent and, as such, under the (provisions of Article 254(2) the Act is valid and so far as the State of Uttar Pradesh is concerned, the provisions of the Act prevail over the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.

13. It was next urged that Article 31(4) merely bars a remedy but does not cure the illegality of the Act. This argument was considered by the Full Bench and rejected.

14. It was next urged that there was no public purpose behind the Act inasmuch as it could not foe that the land acquired was needed for the purpose of the State when the Act itself provided that the State would transfer the land acquired from the intermediaries to tenants. The Full Bench has dealt with the question of public purpose and has held that the Act was for a public purpose. This argument, therefore, has no force.

15. Lastly, it was urged that Article 31(4) does not cure the invalidity of the Act because there was no Bill which could be said to be pending in the Legislature of a State at the commencement of the Constitution. It is pointed out that at the commencement of the Constitution, that is, on the 26th January, 1950, no Legislature was in existence in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Reference is made in this connection to Article 395 under which Indian Independence Act, 1947, and the Government of India Act, 1935, are repealed. It is urged that Legislatures created under the Government of India Act, 1935, ceased to exist when that Act was repealed. Article 382, however, provides,

Until the House or Houses of the Legislature of each State specified in Part A of the 1st Schedule has or have been duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under the provisions of this Constitution, the House or Houses of the Legislature of the corresponding Province functioning immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred by the provisions of this Constitution on the House or Houses of the Legislature of such State.

16. Article 389 provides,

A Bill which immediately before the commencement of this Constitutions was pending in the Legislature of the Dominion of India or in the Legislature of any Province or Indian State may, subject to any provision to the contrary which may be included in rules made by Parliament or the Legislature of the corresponding State under this Constitution, be continued in Parliament or the Legislature of the corresponding State, as the case may be, as if the proceedings taken with reference to the Bill in the Legislature of the Dominion of India or in the Legislature of the Province or Indian State had been taken in Parliament or in the Legislature of the corresponding State.

17. On the 26th January, 1950 the old Legislature in the State of Uttar Pradesh continued to function and the Bill, which ultimately was enacted as the impugned Act and which was pending before the 26th January, 1950 was continued in the new Parliament when it came into existence sometime in May 1950. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Bill which ultimately was enacted as the Zamindari Abolition Act was not pending on the date of the commencement of the Constitution. No other point was urged.

18. For the reasons given in the decision of the Full Bench we reject this application.

19. We certify that substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution are involved in the case. We make no order as to costs.

20. Application rejected.