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Mohd. Mushtaq v. Mt. Baqridan
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal was filed on 10-7-1948 against the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Bahraich dated 9-2-1948, which dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The respondents filed an application (Civil Misc. Appln. No. 883 of 1960) on 16-8-1950 challenging the maintainability of the appeal in this Court and requested that a preliminary point about jurisdiction be decided first to save time and cost.
The suit concerned a partition claim: the plaintiff claimed three pies share out of sixteen annas. The entire property was valued in the plaint at Rs. 23,000 and the plaintiff's share was valued at Rs. 359-6-0. In the trial Court no objection was taken to the valuation or forum. The Civil Judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit; an appeal was presented to this Court with the same valuation as in the trial Court.
The respondents contended that, because the plaintiff's share was valued at Rs. 359-6-0, the appeal lay to the District Judge and not to this Court; they relied on the provisions of Section 4, Suits Valuation (United Provinces Amendment) Act No. VII of 1939 and other statutory provisions cited in the opinion. The appellant contended that Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, precluded the respondents from raising a jurisdictional objection at this stage because they had not raised it in the Court of first instance.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, for the purposes of jurisdiction in a partition suit, the suit must be valued by the plaintiff's share (as provided by Section 4, Suits Valuation (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1939), and consequently whether the appeal in this case lies to the District Judge rather than to this Court.
- Whether the respondents are precluded by Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 from raising the issue of the proper forum for appeal, because they did not raise a jurisdictional objection in the Court of first instance.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 prevents a party from raising an objection to the jurisdiction of a Court of first instance or a lower appellate Court in the appellate Court, unless that objection was taken earlier in the Court of first instance or the lower appellate Court.
- The appellant relied on precedents (including Tara Chand v. Collector of Aligarh and Kanhaiya Lal v. Hamid Ali) to support the contention that jurisdictional objections not raised at trial are barred on appeal.
- Because no objection was taken in the trial Court to valuation or jurisdiction, the appellant argued the respondents cannot now challenge the maintainability of the appeal in this Court.
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents challenged the maintainability of the appeal in this Court on the ground that the plaintiff had valued his share (three pies out of sixteen annas) at Rs. 359-6-0, and, under Section 4 of the Suits Valuation (U.P. Amendment) Act, the valuation for purposes of jurisdiction should be according to the plaintiff's share in a partition suit.
- Relying on Section 4 and a prior unreported decision (Muneshwar Bakhsh v. Shrimati Chhoti), the respondents argued that the appeal lay to the District Judge and not to this Court, and therefore this Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Muneshwar Bakhsh v. Shrimati Chhoti (unreported, decision 14-10-1949) | That a suit for partition must be valued, for purposes of jurisdiction, according to the plaintiff's share. | The court treated that decision as binding and as establishing the correct view of law that valuation for partition suits is determined by the plaintiff's share; this principle supported the conclusion that the appeal lay to the District Judge. |
| Tara Chand v. Collector of Aligarh, 1989 R.D. 882 | Used to support the proposition that Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act bars raising an objection to jurisdiction in the appellate Court if it was not raised in the Court of first instance. | The court analyzed and distinguished this precedent on its facts (where valuation rules and the plaintiff's own valuation affected the forum of appeal) and held it was not controlling in the present case. |
| Kanhaiya Lal v. Hamid Ali, 1940 Oudh W. N. 462 | Cited in support of the appellant's contention that Section 11 precludes belated jurisdictional objections. | The court treated the case as one relied upon by the appellant but found that the facts and legal context meant it was distinguishable for determining the forum of appeal in the present matter. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, drawing exclusively on the material in the opinion:
- Statutory rule: The court identified Section 4 of the Suits Valuation (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1939, which requires that certain suits, including partition suits, be valued for purposes of jurisdiction by reference to the market value or the amount involved in the title affected by the relief, and specifically observed that a partition suit must be valued according to the plaintiff's share.
- Precedent support: The court noted the unreported decision in Muneshwar Bakhsh v. Shrimati Chhoti (14-10-1949) as binding authority that the plaintiff's share determines valuation for jurisdiction in partition suits.
- Application to facts: Because the plaintiff's share was valued in the plaint at Rs. 359-6-0, ordinarily the suit should have been filed in the Court of the Munsif. Notwithstanding that no objection was taken during trial, the court recognized that the value of the plaintiff's share controlled the proper forum for appeal.
- Forum for appeal: The court referred to Section 39, Oudh Courts Act, to determine that an appeal against the decree of the Civil Judge lies to the District Judge where the value does not exceed Rs. 5,000. Given the plaintiff's share valuation, the appeal ought to have been to the District Judge.
- Interaction with Section 11 (Suits Valuation Act, 1887): The appellant relied on Section 11 to argue that the respondents could not raise a jurisdictional objection on appeal because they had not raised it at trial. The court examined Section 11 and explained that it prevents an appellate Court from entertaining an objection that the lower Court lacked jurisdiction when that objection was not taken in the lower Court. However, the court clarified that the respondents were not contending that the Civil Judge's decree was void for want of jurisdiction in the trial Court; instead, they were challenging the proper forum of appeal (i.e., whether the appeal lay to the District Judge or to this Court).
- Distinguishing precedents: The court examined the cited precedents (including the Tara Chand decision) and found them distinguishable on facts and context. In Tara Chand the rules and valuations at issue led to different conclusions; the present question depended on the statutory rule that the plaintiff's share determines valuation for a partition suit and thus determines the forum of appeal.
- Conclusion of analysis: The court concluded that, in light of the statutory provision (Section 4) and the binding authority cited, the appeal was incorrectly filed in this Court; the correct forum for the appeal was the District Judge.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal was wrongly filed in this Court and must be returned to the appellant for presentation to the proper Court (the District Judge).
Consequences and implications:
- The court directed that the appeal be returned to the appellant so that it may be presented to the proper forum (the District Judge), in accordance with the valuation of the plaintiff's share.
- The respondents were awarded costs against the appellant.
- No broader new precedent was stated by the court beyond applying the settled principle (as reflected in Section 4 and the cited unreported decision) that, for partition suits, valuation for jurisdiction is determined by the plaintiff's share. The opinion confined itself to the direct effect on the parties and to distinguishing earlier authorities relied on by the appellant.
1. This appeal was filed on 10-7-1948, against the judgment and decree of the civil Judge, Bahraich dated 9-2-1948, dismissing the plaintiffs suit. An application was made (civil Misc. Appln. No. 883 of 1960) on 16-8-1950, by the respondents challenging the maintainability of the appeal in this Court and praying that the preliminary point about jurisdiction should be decided first in order to save time and cost to parties The ground of the application is that the plaintiff's suit was ore for partition of three pies share out of sixteen annas. The entire property was valued in the plaint at Rs. 23,000 and the plaintiff's share at Rs. 359-6-0. In view of the valuation put by the plaintiff on his claim for partition the appeal, according to the respondents' contention, lay to the District Judge and not to this Court. Reliance is placed upon the provisions of Section 4, Suits Valuation (United Provinces Amendment) Act No. VII [7] of 1939. That section lays down that certain suits including a suit under VI A of Section 7, Court fees Act, 1870, which is a suit for partition, shall be valued for the purposes of jurisdiction at the market value of the property involved in or affected by or the title to which is affected by the relief sought, or at the amount involved in or affected by or the title to which is affected by the relief sought, and such value shall, in the case of land, be deemed to be the value as determinable in accordance with the rules framed under Section 3. There can be no doubt that according to Section 4, the suit for partition must be valued for purposes of jurisdiction according to the share of the plaintiff. This was so held in an unreported case on 14-10-1949 by a Bench of this Court in Muneshwar Bakhsh v. Shrimati Chhoti, First civil No. 131 of 1943. That decision is binding and there can be no question that that is the correct view of law. The plaintiff's share was valued in the plaint at Rs. 359 6 0 and ordinarily that suit should have been filed in the Court of the Munsiff but no objection was taken, in the trial Court upon this point. The case proceeded to trial and the civil Judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit. An appeal against that decree lay to the Court of the District Judge for the value of the original suit did not exceed Rs. 5,000. (See Section 39, Oudh Courts Act). In the appeal filed in this Court the valuation of the appeal was the same as the valuation in the trial Court. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that though the view of law that the plaintiffs' share determines the jurisdiction cannot be contested, it is not open to the respondents in view of Section 11. Suits Valuation Act VII [7] of 1887 to raise the question of jurisdiction which they had not raised in the Court of first instance. The respondents' failure to raise the question of jurisdiction to the effect that the suit should have been filed in the Court of the Munsif and not in the Court of the civil Judge, it is contended, precludes the respondents from challenging the maintainability of the appeal in this Court. Reliance is placed in support of this contention on Tara Chand v. Collector of Aligarh, 1989 R.D. 882 and Kanhaiya Lal v. Hamid Ali, 1940 Oudh W. N. 462. All that Section 11 lays down is that an objection that by reason of the over valuation or under valuation of a suit or appeal a Court of first instance or lower appellate Court which had not jurisdiction with respect to the suit or appeal exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by an appellate Court unless the objection was taken in the Court of first instance or, in the lower appellate Court as the case may be. The object of this provision is to prevent the party from raising the objection to the jurisdiction of the Court of first instance or the lower appellate Court which he had not raised in those Courts at the proper time, but no such objection is raised here by the respondents. It is not contended on their behalf that the decree of the civil Judge is without jurisdiction because the suit should have been filed in the Court of the Munsif. If such an objection had been raised by them, no doubt they would have been precluded by the provisions of section 11 from raising it. This provision, however, cannot have the effect of determining the forum of appeal, which depends upon the valuation of the plaintiff's share in the partition suit filed by him. That question of jurisdiction must be determined upon valuation. of the plaintiff's share, as provided by Section 4, Suits Valuation Act. The cases relied upon for the appellant are distinguishable on that ground. In the first case the suit was for account under Section 33, U. P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, and was filed in the Court of the civil Judge while it should have been filed in the Court of the Munsif according to the rules framed by the High Court under the Suits Valuation Act which require that all such suits should be valued between Rs. 100 and Rs. 500 irrespective of the amount that might be due to the defendant from the plaintiff. No objection as to valuation for purposes of jurisdiction was taken by the defendant before the civil Judge. The learned Judges rightly held that each an objection was barred by virtue of the provisions of Section 11(1)(a), Suits Valuation Act No. VII [7] of 1887. The appeal to the High Court was entertained because the plaintiff had valued his suit at Rs. 6,72,988. And the appeal against the decision of the learned civil Judge was rightly held to lie to the High Court and not to the Court of the District Judge.
2. In the second case the position was different. There the suit had been filed before a Munsif and the decree of the Munsif was attacked on the ground that the suit should have been filed before a civil Judge. It was held that Section 11 barred the raising of the plea of jurisdiction. In the present appeal, the decree of the civil Judge is not attacked on the ground of jurisdiction and the point that arises before the Court is that accepting the decree to be a decree passed by the civil Judge who had jurisdiction to pass it whether the appeal against that decree lies to the Court of the District Judge or to this Court. Upon this point for the reasons given above, there cannot be the slightest doubt that having regard to the valuation put by the plaintiff on his share in the partition suit, the appeal lies to the District Judge and this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
3. I, therefore, hold that the appeal was wrongly filed in this Court I direct that the appeal be returned to the appellant for presentation to the proper Court. The respondents will be entitled to their costs from the appellant.
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