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Mukandi Lal v. State

Allahabad High Court

Jun 7, 1950

Judgment

Subsequent
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Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant was convicted under Section 4 of the U.P. Prevention of Adulteration Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 200 after a summary trial. The conviction rested on the applicant's own plea rather than on evidence: the record contains only the entry "pleads guilty" and does not record the applicant's words.

The applicant filed a revision petition to the Sessions Judge of Agra. The revision was heard by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, who concluded that the Magistrate had not followed the procedure required by Sections 242 and 243 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr PC), and therefore referred the case to this Court with a recommendation that the conviction and sentence be set aside.

The Magistrate submitted an explanation to the referring court disagreeing with the Additional Sessions Judge's view and opposing the revision. The opinion records and subsequently criticizes the Magistrate's explanation and attitude. The order is signed with the initials "D.B.B" in the text and concludes with "Revision allowed."

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, in a summary trial of a summons case, the Magistrate was required to follow the procedure prescribed by Sections 242 and 243 of the Cr PC when the accused's statement may amount to an admission of the offence.
Whether an entry recording merely that the accused "pleads guilty" satisfies the requirement of Section 243 that an admission be recorded "as nearly as possible in the words used by him."
Whether the conviction based on the recorded entry "pleads guilty" is sustainable when the record does not contain the accused's own words and the Magistrate did not follow Section 243 procedures.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

The applicant contended that he did not admit before the Magistrate that he had committed the offence charged. Instead, he stated that the Inspector had taken a sample of oil and that the oil was meant for burning purposes — not that it was adulterated or being sold as food.
He argued that the learned Magistrate wrongly construed his statements as a plea of guilty and failed to record any admission in his own words as required by law.

Learned Additional Sessions Judge's Position

The learned Additional Sessions Judge concluded that the Magistrate did not follow the procedure laid down by Sections 242 and 243 of the Cr PC in summary trials of summons cases and therefore referred the case to the higher Court with a recommendation to set aside the conviction and sentence.

Learned Magistrate's Explanation

The Magistrate stated that the Additional Sessions Judge's suggestion that the statement of the accused should have been recorded under Sections 242 and 243 was "incorrect" and explicitly disagreed with that view.
The Magistrate also asserted opposition to the revision on the ground that the procedure suggested by the Additional Sessions Judge would be contrary to Sections 262 to 264 of the Cr PC and against the spirit of law prescribed for summary trials of summons cases.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds through statutory interpretation and application to the facts of the summary trial:

Statutory framework for summary trials:
- Section 262 Cr PC requires that in trials under the summary chapter, the procedure for summons cases be followed in summons cases, and the procedure for warrant cases be followed in warrant cases, subject to exceptions specifically mentioned in the Code.
- The present matter was a summons case tried summarily; therefore the procedure for trials of summons cases applied unless specifically made inapplicable by other Code provisions.
Requirements of Sections 242 and 243 Cr PC:
- Section 242 requires that when an accused appears, the particulars of the offence be stated to him and he be asked if he has any cause to show why he should not be convicted.
- Section 243 provides that if the accused admits the offence, his admission shall be recorded "as nearly as possible in the words used by him," and if he shows no sufficient cause, the Magistrate may convict accordingly.
Interaction with Section 263 and other recording provisions:
- Section 263(g) provides for recording certain particulars in summary trials, including "the plea of the accused and his examination (if any)." The Court held that S. 263(g) neither conflicts with nor overrides S. 243.
- The proper construction, the Court concluded, is that where the plea amounts to an admission of the offence, that admission should be recorded as nearly as possible in the accused's own words (harmonizing S. 243 with S. 263(g)).
- The opinion refers to another provision (quoted as Section 864) which exempts summary trials from the full-recording requirements applicable to general examinations, but the Court treats S. 243 as a special provision that controls when an admission is made.
- The Court contrasted the general provision on examinations of the accused (referred to as Section 364(4) in the opinion) with the special rule in S. 243, applying the canon that a special provision overrides a general one in construction.
Policy and protective purpose:
- The Court characterized Section 243 as a salutary rule designed to protect accused persons and promote the proper administration of justice because convictions founded on an accused's admission are open to revision by superior courts, which must be able to determine whether a genuine admission occurred.
- Recording only the Magistrate's conclusion ("pleads guilty") without the accused's own words prevents a superior court from assessing whether an admission in fact occurred; hence the law does not allow such practice.
Application to the present case:
- The applicant alleged (and this allegation was reflected in the referring order) that he did not admit commission of the offence but only said that a sample was taken and that the oil was for burning purposes.
- The Magistrate did not repudiate that account in his explanation, and did not record any admission in the applicant's words as required by Section 243.
- Because the Magistrate failed to follow Section 243, the Court could not presume the applicant had admitted that the oil was adulterated or that he was selling or exposing it for sale as food. Consequently, the Court found the conviction unsustainable.
Critique of the Magistrate's conduct:
- The Court found the Magistrate's language in his explanation—specifically calling the Additional Sessions Judge "incorrect"—to be highly objectionable and indicative of disrespect and possible insubordination, since a Magistrate is subordinate to the Court of Session.
- The Court observed that it was improper for the Magistrate, in his personal explanation, to identify himself with the State in opposing the revision; doing so demonstrated ignorance of proper tribunal functions.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the revision, accepted the recommendation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, and set aside the applicant's conviction and sentence. Any fine realised from the applicant was ordered to be refunded.

Implications and consequences:

Direct effect: The applicant's conviction and the fine are set aside and any fine already realised must be refunded to him.
Procedural implication: The decision emphasizes that in summary trials of summons cases, if an accused's statement amounts to an admission of the offence, Section 243 requires that the admission be recorded as nearly as possible in the accused's own words; mere notation "pleads guilty" is inadequate for a conviction based on admission.
Broader precedent: The opinion does not discuss or claim to establish a new binding precedent beyond the Court's construction and application of the cited Code provisions in this matter; the direct effect stated above is the operative outcome for the parties.

Disposition

Revision allowed. Conviction and sentence set aside. Fine, if realised, to be refunded to the applicant.

D.B.B

Show all summary ...

1. The applicant has been convicted of an offence under Section 4 of the U.P Prevention of Adulteration Act, and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 200. He was tried summarily. His conviction is based on his own plea and not upon any evidence produced in the case. There is no note on the record of the case about what was stated by the applicant beyond “pleads guilty.” The applicant applied in revision to the Sessions Judge of Agra which was heard by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of that place. It was contended before him that the applicant did not admit before the learned Magistrate that he had committed the offence of which he was accused and that the learned Magistrate had wrongly construed his statement as a plea of guilty. According to the applicant, the learned Magistrate only asked whether the Inspector had taken sample from the oil and the applicant replied in the affirmative, adding that it was meant for burning purposes. The learned Additional Sessions Judge is of the opinion that the learned Magistrate has not followed the procedure Laid down by Sections 242 and 243 of the Cr PC, and has, therefore, referred the case to this Court, with the recommendation that the conviction of the applicant and the sentence awarded to him, be set aside.

2. Section 262 of the Cr PC requires that in summary trials, with certain exceptions, the procedure prescribed for the trial of summons cases and the warrant cases shall be followed accordingly as a case may be a summons case or a warrant case. It reads as follows:

“In trials under this Chapter, the procedure prescribed for summons cases shall be followed in summons cases and the procedure prescribed for warrant cases shall be followed in warrant cases, except as hereinafter mentioned.”

3. The present case being a summons case, the learned Magistrate was bound to follow the procedure prescribed for the trials of summons cases, except in so far as that procedure was made inapplicable by any specific provision of the Code.

4. According to Section 242 of the Cr PC:

“When the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate the particulars of the offence of which he is accused shall be stated to him and he shall be asked if he has any cause to show why he should not be convicted but it shall not be necessary to frame a formal charge.”

5. And according to Section 243 of the Cr PC.

“If the accused admits that he has committed the offence of which he is accused, his admission shall be recorded as nearly as possible in the words used by him, and, if he shows no sufficient cause why he should not be convicted, the Magistrate may convict him accordingly.”

6. I have not been able to discover anything in the Code which makes Ss. 242 and 243 inapplicable to summons cases tried summarily. It seems to me, therefore, that it was the duty of the learned Magistrate to have recorded the admission of the applicant as nearly as possible in his own words, if the learned Magistrate thought that the statement of the applicant amounted to an admission of his guilt.

7. It is true that Section 263 of the Cr PC, provides that in cases tried summarily where no appeal lies, a Magistrate or Bench of Magistrates need not record the evidence of the witnesses or frame a formal charge, but that he or they shall enter in such form as the Provincial Government may direct, certain particulars. One such particular, which is lettered as (g) is, “the plea of the accused and his examination (if any).” In my opinion, S. 263(g) is neither in conflict with the provisions of S. 243 nor does it override it. Having regard to the provisions contained in Section 24, 3 of the Cr PC, the proper construction to place upon S. 263(g) would be that the plea of the accused, if it amounts to an admission of the offence of which he is accused, should be recorded as nearly as possible in his own words. In thus construing Sections 243 and 263(g) of the Cr PC, I am not unmindful of the provisions of Section 864 of the Cr PC, which require that when an accused is examined by any Magistrate the whole of such examination, including every question put to him and every answer given by him, shall be recorded in full in the language in which he is examined, but which makes this requirement inapplicable to summary trials by providing:

“Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to the examination of an accused person under S. 263 or in the course of a trial held by a Presidency Magistrate.”

8. It is to be borne in mind that whereas S. 243 is confined to the admission of the commission of the offence only S. 364 covers a much wider field. For example, if an accused does not plead guilty and is examined under S. 342 of the Code, his examination need not be recorded in full in the language in which he is examined and every question put to him and every answer given by him need not be recorded in full. Section 364 of the Cr PC, is a general provision dealing with the examinations of the accused in general, whereas Section 243 of the Cr PC, which would be applicable to summary trials by reason of Section 263 of the Cr PC, contains a special provision. According to well settled rules of construction, this special provision should override the general provision contained in Section 364(4) of the Cr PC. I am, therefore, of the opinion that whenever an accused in a summary trial admits to have committed the offence of which he is accused his admission should be recorded as nearly as possible in his own words.

9. The rule embodied in Section 243 of the Cr PC is a very salutory rule, being necessary for the protection of the accused and the proper administration of justice. The order of a Magistrate convicting an accused person on his own admission is not a final order inasmuch as it is open to revision by a superior Court. The superior Court is entitled to be satisfied that what was treated by the Magistrate to be an admission of the offence is really such an admission. It is not difficult to conceive of cases in which the superior Court and the Magistrate may differ on the construction to be placed upon the statement of the accused person. By not recording the admission of the accused as nearly as may be in his own words and by merely recording his own conclusion from that statement—“pleads guilty” is not a record of any statement but is only a record of a conclusion from a statement—a Magistrate deprives the superior Court from examining the validity of his conclusion. Interests of justice require that he should not be permitted to do so. It is therefore a matter of satisfaction that the law does not allow him to do so.

10. In this case, as already stated, it is alleged on behalf of the applicant that he did not admit the commission of the offence of which he was accused and that the only admission made by him was that the sample of oil was taken by the Inspector. He did not stop short at this admission but added that the oil was meant for burning purposes. This allegation made on behalf of the applicant is mentioned in the referring order. The learned Magistrate has not repudiated this allegation in his explanation. In view of the fact that the learned Magistrate has not followed the procedure prescribed by Section 243 of the Cr PC, it is not possible for me to presume that it was admitted by the applicant that the oil taken from him was adulterated or that it was being sold or being exposed for sale by him as an article of food. Consequently, I am unable to hold that it was admitted by the applicant that he had committed the offence of which he was accused. The conviction of the applicant is, therefore, not sustainable.

11. Accordingly, I accept the recommendation made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and set aside the conviction of the applicant and the sentence awarded to him. Any fine realised from the applicant shall be refunded to him.

12. Before parting with this case I would like to say a few words about the explanation submitted by the learned Magistrate.

13. Referring to the opinion of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that Sections 242 and 243 of the Cr PC, requires that the statement of the accused should have been recorded, the learned Magistrate observes in his explanation:

“His suggestion that I should have recorded the statement of the accused under Sections 242 and 243 of the Cr PC, is incorrect. With due respect I differ with him on this point.”

14. I consider these observations to be highly objectionable. The learned Magistrate was in no way competent to criticism the observations, of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. He seems to have entirely forgotten that the Court of Session is a superior Court to which his Court is subordinate and that to criticism the opinion of a superior Court as “incorrect” does certainly show lamentable want of respect, if such conduct does not amount to an act of insubordination also.

15. At the end of his explanation the learned Magistrate has said:

“Under the circumstances I oppose the revision strongly on the ground that the procedure suggested by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is against the provisions of Sections 262 to 264 of the Cr PC and if it is allowed it would be against the spirit of law prescribed for trial of summons cases summarily.”

16. It is not the business of a Magistrate, who has tried the case, to support or oppose a reference. It is the function of the State to do so. In identifying himself with the State, the learned Magistrate has betrayed complete ignorance of the functions and duties of a Tribunal. The learned Magistrate was called upon to submit such explanation as he liked to submit. If he thought that his view was right, he could submit respectfully such arguments as he thought supported his view. He had no business to criticism the learned Additional Sessions Judge to whom he is subordinate and he had no business to say that he strongly opposed the revision. I cannot but deprecate the objectionable observations made by the learned Magistrate end the attitude of disrespect and insubordination adopted by him.