Sahabuddin v. Mohan Lal

Malik, C.J:— The appellant was a month to month tenant and the rent reserved was Rs. 17 only. He did not pay rent for the months of January and February, 1946. The landlord on 6th March, 1946 gave him a notice calling upon him to pay the arrears of rent and to vacate the premises on 31st March, 1946. The arrears were not paid nor were the premises vacated. A suit for ejectment and for arrears of rent was filed on the 3rd of May, 1946. The parties entered into a compromise on 8th November, 1946. The terms of the compromise were that the appellant would vacate the house within six months and he would pay Rs. 38 on account of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. It was not specified how much of it was due as arrears of rent and how much for use and occupation Rs. 38 were paid after several months. On 27th May, 1947, after expiry of six months the decree-holder applied for execution of the decree for ejectment.

2. Reliance was placed on certain provision of the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, (No. III of 1947) and it was urged that the decree was no longer executable. This Act received the assent of the Governor-General on February 28, 1947 and was published in the U.P Gazette (Extraordinary) on March 1, 1947. Sub-section (3) of Section 1, however, provides that the Act must be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of October, 1946.

3. The result, therefore, is that though the Act was passed in the year 1947 it was given retrospective effect from the 1st of October, 1946. The compromise decree being dated 8th November, 1946, it must be deemed to have been passed after the Act came into force.

4. The question, therefore, arises whether in view of the provisions of Sections 14 and 15 the compromise decree is executable.

5. From the dates mentioned above that the Act came into force on the 1st of October, 1946, and the decree was passed on the 8th November, 1946, it is clearly Section 15 which applies to the case. Section 15 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 is as follows:

In all suits for eviction of a tenant from any accommodation pending on the date of this Act, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 3.

6. Ground (a) mentioned in Section 3 is

that the tenant has wilfully failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand from the landlord.

7. A notice of demand was given on the 6th March, 1946, for rent payable in January and February, 1946. The suit was not filed till the 3rd of May, 1946, and it is not alleged that rents for the months of January and February, with respect to which notice was given on the 6th March, 1946 were paid before the suit was filed on the 3rd of May. As a matter of fact in the compromise decree dated 8th November, 1946 the judgment-debtor undertook to pay a sum of Rs. 38 towards the arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation and even this amount was not paid till the 24th February, 1947. If, therefore, Section 15 of the Act is applied the decree which was a compromise decree, was clearly valid and could be executed.

8. Learned counsel has urged that Section 14 of the Act is applicable as the decree was passed on the 8th of November, 1946, and the Act received the assent of the Governor-General on the 28th February, 1947. I do not see how this argument would help the learned counsel as the proviso to Section 14 is to the effect that a decree passed before the date of commencement of the Act shall not be executed provided the tenant agrees to pay to the landlord ‘reasonable annual rent’ or the rent payable by him before the passing of the decree, whichever is higher. The learned District Judge has said in his judgment that the judgment-debtor was not prepared to agree even before him to act in accordance with the proviso to Section 14. Section 14, to my mind, is not applicable and, in any case, it does not help the appellant.

9. Act III of 1947 was passed for the benefit of the tenants on account of house shortage and to prevent their eviction. It is open to a tenant to forego the protection given under the Act and to agree to vacate the premises on a fixed date. In the case before me the tenant entered into a compromise and he agreed to vacate the premises on the 7th May, 1947. The decree of the court is based on this compromise. I do not see how the provisions of the Act can invalidate the consent decree. In any view of the matter the appeal has no force and is dismissed with costs.

10. Appeal dismissed.