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Lakhmi Singh v. Mahendra Singh

Allahabad High Court
Jan 11, 1949
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Judgment Summary — Mushtaq Ahmad, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a plaintiffs' appeal against a judgment of a learned Single Judge arising out of a suit for possession by cancellation of a sale-deed dated 21st December 1931. The sale-deed was executed by the plaintiffs' elder brothers, Bhup Singh and Tilok Singh (defendants 5 and 6), in favour of one Jodhan Singh (father of defendants 1 and 2 and husband of defendants 3 and 4) for a total consideration of Rs. 2432-8-6.

The sale consideration was divided into three items: (1) Rs. 1600 left with the vendee for payment to one Kharak Singh in respect of a usufructuary mortgage made by the vendors on 23rd April, 1928; (2) Rs. 583-9-6 left with the vendee for payment to the same person on account of another mortgage dated 10th February, 1929; and (3) Rs. 248-15-0 left with the vendee to discharge a decretal debt. The courts below found that, as to items (2) and (3), only Rs. 90 of the second item had been taken for legal necessity, and no portion of the third item was justified by legal necessity.

The first item of Rs. 1600 represented antecedent debts of the plaintiffs' father, Narain Singh. The opinion records Narain Singh's successive mortgages (1905, 1917, 1921, 1923), and that defendants 5 and 6 had executed further mortgages (a simple mortgage in 1925 for Rs. 1250 to pay off certain mortgages, followed by a usufructuary mortgage on 23rd April, 1928 in favour of Kharak Singh for Rs. 1600).

Procedural history and findings below:

  • The trial Court found legal necessity for Rs. 1690 out of the sale consideration (property value found to be Rs. 1600) and that no other means existed to pay the debts; it dismissed the plaintiffs' suit.
  • The lower appellate Court disagreed in part, holding there was no "pressing" necessity to sell on account of the Rs. 1600 (since the property stood mortgaged) and, finding legal necessity for Rs. 90 in the second item, decreed possession of a half share to the plaintiffs on payment of Rs. 845. The Single Judge considered that approach legally untenable.
  • The learned Single Judge of this Court modified the lower appellate Court's decree and dismissed the entire suit, thereby restoring the trial Court's decree. The present opinion arises from the plaintiffs' appeal against that Single Judge's judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the alienation of joint family property by the elder sons (defendants 5 and 6) on 21st December 1931 was justified by legal necessity, particularly insofar as it served to discharge the father's antecedent debts (the first item of Rs. 1600).
  2. Whether an alienation of family property can be upheld where the transferor effecting the alienation is a son (rather than the father) and the object is repayment of the father's antecedent debts — specifically, the relevance of the Full Bench decision in Chiranji Lal v. Banlcey Lal to that contention.
  3. Whether, on the circumstances existing on the date of the sale deed, "the said deed was binding on the rest of the family and was not liable to be challenged by the plaintiffs?" (the precise issue remitted to the lower appellate Court as framed in the opinion).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Mr. C.S. Saran, counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants, argued that the alienation to discharge the father's antecedent debts could not be upheld because the transferor effecting the sale was not the father himself. He relied on the Full Bench decision in Chiranji Lal v. Banlcey Lal (A.I.R. (20) 1933 ALL. 273 : 55 ALL. 370 F.B.).

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of further specific arguments advanced by the respondents in this appeal beyond what is recorded as findings and positions adopted by the Courts below and the Single Judge.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chiranji Lal v. Banlcey Lal, A.I.R. (20) 1933 ALL. 273 : 55 ALL. 370 (Full Bench) Supports the contention that a son cannot validly alienate family property merely to discharge his father's antecedent debts where the transferor is not the father. The court acknowledged the authority relied upon by the appellants but observed that alienation to discharge antecedent debts may nonetheless be supported if there exists legal necessity independently of the antecedent-debt ground.
Hunooman Persaud Pandey v. Mt. Babooes Munraj Koonweree, 6 M.I.A. 393 : (1 Sar. 552 F.C.) (Privy Council) Manager (or manager-like actor) can alienate family property only "in a case of need, or for the benefit of the estate"; the test focuses on "the actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted, or the benefit to be conferred". The court invoked this dictum to emphasise that necessity must be shown and that the "actual pressure" or danger are the criteria to be regarded in justifying alienation.
Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony Pandara Sannadhi, 44 I.A. 147 : A.I.R. (4) 1917 P.C. 33 (Privy Council) Explanation of "benefit of the estate": preservation of the estate from extinction, defence against hostile litigation, protection from injury or deterioration, and similar benefits justify alienation. The court used this explanation to discuss the character of permissible necessity (defensive or protective benefits to the estate) and to note previous tendencies in interpretation.
Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das, 50 ALL. 969 : A.I.R. (15) 1928 ALL. 454 (Full Bench) Laid down that the real test is whether the transaction would have been carried out by a prudent owner with the knowledge then available to him — defensive nature is not an essential element. The court relied on this Full Bench authority to state that the matter is one of fact in each case: whether circumstances would induce a prudent owner to alienate the property.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the findings of the courts below and the legal principles applicable to alienations of joint family property. Key aspects of the reasoning are:

  • Factual findings regarding the sale consideration: the courts below agreed that only Rs. 90 of the second item was justified by legal necessity and none of the third item was justified; the first item (Rs. 1600) represented antecedent debts of the plaintiffs' father and arose from a history of mortgages and renewals recited in the opinion.
  • The trial Court found legal necessity for Rs. 1690 (which included the Rs. 1600) and that there were no other family assets to meet the debts; on that basis it dismissed the suit. The lower appellate Court took a different view regarding the necessity of selling to meet the Rs. 1600 because the property already stood mortgaged and the mortgagee could not demand payment; it nevertheless decreed a partial relief (a half-share) which the opinion considered legally untenable.
  • The Single Judge restored the trial Court's approach, holding that (a) sons are under a pious obligation to pay their father's debts, (b) aider sons acting bona fide cannot be challenged by younger sons, (c) there is no requirement that the necessity be "pressing" in the sense imagined by the lower appellate Court, and (d) the transaction could not be set aside merely because a considerable part of the sale consideration had not been proved to have been applied to legal necessity.
  • The court engaged with precedent: it accepted the general proposition in Chiranji Lal that a son cannot be allowed to alienate merely to discharge the father's antecedent debts, but explained that an alienation might still be justified if legal necessity (of the recognised type) independently existed. The opinion emphasised the test from Jagat Narain — whether a prudent owner, having the knowledge available at the time, would have carried out the transaction — and reiterated the Privy Council formulations that the "touchstone" is necessity and that necessity means a degree of pressure sufficient in law.
  • Crucially, the court noted an evidentiary gap: the lower appellate Court did not make an independent finding on whether there were truly no other means to pay the debts (a material factual question bearing on the necessity test). Because that material question had not been independently determined on appeal, the court concluded it could not finally dispose of the case on the existing record.
  • Accordingly, the court remitted a specific issue to the lower appellate Court for determination within a fixed time, and prohibited further evidence on remittal.

Holding and Implications

The court's operative action was to remit a material factual issue to the lower appellate Court rather than to decide the appeal finally. The precise issue remitted was quoted in the opinion (verbatim):

"Whether in these circumstances existing on the date of the sale deed dated 21st December 1981, the said deed was binding on the rest of the family and was not liable to be challenged by the plaintiffs?"

The court ordered that the issue be returned with a finding within three months (the usual ten days being allowed for objections) and expressly stated that no further evidence would be permitted on remittal.

Holding: Issue remitted.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The matter is not finally determined by this Court; the lower appellate Court must now answer the remitted factual question within the prescribed time.
  • No new legal precedent is laid down beyond the court's application and synthesis of existing authorities regarding the meaning of "necessity" and the test of a prudent owner; the opinion confines itself to applying those principles and identifies a factual lacuna that prevents final adjudication.
  • No further evidence is to be admitted on remittal, limiting the scope of the factual inquiry to the existing record and submissions before the lower appellate Court.

Order: Issue remitted to the lower appellate Court for a finding within three months; no further evidence permitted.

Show all summary ...

Mushtaq Ahmad, J.:— This is a plaintiffs' appeal against a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court arising out of a suit for possession by cancellation of a sale-deed dated 21st December 1931, executed by the plaintiffs' brothers Bhup Singh and Tilok Singh, defendants 5 and 6 respectively.

2. The sale-deed was executed by those defendants in favour of one Jodhan Singh, father of defendants 1 and 2 and husband of defendants 3 and 4 for Rs. 2432-8-6. The items of the sale consideration were these:

1. Rs. 1600 0 0 left with the vendee for payment to one Kharak Singh due to him on a usufructuary mortgage made by the vendors on 23rd April, 1928. 2. Rs. 583 9 6 left with the vendee for payment to the same person Kharak Singh on account of another mortgage dated 10th February, 1929, made by the vendors in his favour, and 3. Rs. 248 15 0 left with the vendee to discharge a decretal debt due by the vendors. Rs. 2432 8 6 Total.

3. So far as items 2 and 3 are concerned, there are concurrent findings by the Courts below that only Rs. 90, out of the second item had been taken for legal necessity, there being no such necessity for the balance of that item or for any portion of the third item. It is necessary to examine the position with regard to the first item of Rs. 1600 which consisted of amounts due from the plaintiffs' father Narain Singh and represent his antecedent debts.

4. On 4th April, 1905, Narain Singh had executed a simple mortgage for Rs. 500 in favour of one Tika Ram. On 17th March, 1917 this mortgage was renewed by Narain Singh for Rs. 715. Again, on 25th July, 1921, Narain executed a third mortgage for Rs. 200 and lastly on 7th December, 1923, a fourth mortgage for a similar amount.

5. On 20th March, 1925, defendants 5 and 6, the elder brothers of the plaintiffs-appellants, executed a simple mortgage for Rs. 1250 to pay off the last three mortgages made by their father Narain Singh in favour of one Chhidda Singh and a man called Gajan Singh. This was followed by a usufruotuary mortgage made by these defendants 5 and 6 on 23rd April, 1928, in favour of Kharak Singh for Rs. 1600 leaving with the latter Rs. 1567 for payment to Chhidda Singh and Gajan Singh, the mortgagees under the last mentioned deed. It will thus appear that the first item of the sale consideration represented the antecedent debt of the father of the plaintiffs and their brothers defendants 5 and 6, who had executed the sale-deed in dispute.

6. One of the questions to be considered in this appeal is how far, if at all, this item of Rs. 1600 justified the alienation of the family property under that deed. We may take it that the total amount for which there was, in the absence of other circumstances, good ground for defendants 5 and 6 to alienate the property was Rs. 1690. Of course, we shall have further to see whether the circumstances existing on the date of the sale-deed were such that an alienation of the property was the only medium of relief or whether the situation could have been avoided otherwise than by such alienation.

7. The trial Court found that out of the sale consideration of Rs. 2432-8-6 there was legal necessity for Rs. 1690, the property itself being worth only Rs. 1600. It also found that no other means existed for the payment of this debt, as the family was not possessed of any other property. On these findings, it dismissed the suit. The lower appellate Court, however, took the view that there was no “pressing” necessity to sell the property on account of the debt of Rs. 1600, as the property stood mortgaged for that amount and the mortgagee could not demand it from the debtors. Finding, further, that there was legal necessity for Rs. 90 also out of the second item of the sale consideration, the learned Civil Judge held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for possession in respect of a half share in the property on payment of Rs. 845, that is, one half of Rs. 1690. In this, he evidently overlooked that either the sale-deed was invalid as a whole or no part of it could be challenged by the plaintiffs. The learned Judge, in our opinion, took a curious view in decreeing the suit for a half share in the property and dismissing it for the remaining half, as if the elder brothers, defendants 6 and 6, though not justified in alienating the plaintiffs' share, were still within their rights in transferring their own undivided share in the joint family property. For that view, there was no warrant in law, and we find it impossible to affirm it.

8. On appeal to this Court, the learned Single Judge modified the decree of the lower appellate Court and dismissed the entire suit, thereby restoring the decree of the Court of first instance. The learned Judge found that there was legal necessity for the payment of debts payable by the family, that the sons were under a pious obligation to pay their father's debts, that the aider sons having acted bona fide, their action could not be challenged by the younger sons, that there was no legal authority for the view, as imagined by the lower appellate Court, that the necessity should be of a “pressing” character, that the elder sons had received a good offer for property worth only Rs. 1600 and that the transaction could not be set aside only because a considerable part of the sale consideration had not been proved to have been applied for legal necessity.

9. Mr. C.S Saran, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, appellants, has contended before us that so far as the alienation of the family property for discharging the antecedent debts of that father was concerned, it could not be upheld because the transferor was not the father himself. He relied in support of that contention on the Full Bench case in Chiranji Lal v. Banlcey Lal, A.I.R (20) 1933 ALL. 273 : (55 ALL. 370 F.B), which had been referred to in the judgment of the lower appellate Court also. While this contention is true, it is also a fact that the alienation of the property for discharging such debt may itself be supported on the ground of legal necessity independently of the antecedent debts. In the present case, the Courts below found that there was legal necessity to the extent of Rs. 1690. Such necessity would be deemed to exist even though the sons could not be allowed to alienate the family property merely to discharge their father's debts. There can be no doubt that the sons were under a pious obligation to pay those debts. The debts were in that sense due from the family. If to clear off such debts the adult sons decided to alienate the family property or a part of it, it cannot be said that alienation was bad simply because the object was the repayment of the father's antecedent debts. The necessity, such as may justify the alienation, apart from the question of the object being the repayment of the antecedent debts, should be, in every case, of a character as would justify the transfer. Necessity per se is not the justifying element. It must be of a type which entails a certain degree of pressure on the estate to justify the alienation. As their Lordships of the Privy Council in Hunooman Persaud Pandey v. Mt. Babooes Munraj Koonweree, 6 M.I.A 393 : (1 Sar. 552 F.C), held, that a manager could alienate the family property only “in a case of need, or for the benefit of the estate.” They further observed:

“The actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted, or the benefit to be conferred, in the particular instance, are the criteria to be regarded.”

10. The expression “benefit of the estate” was explained by their Lordships in the case of Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony Pan-dara Sannadhi, 44 I.A 147 : (A.I.R (4) 1917 P.C 33), in the following words:

“The preservation, however, of the estate from extinction, the defence against hostile litigation affecting it, the protection of it or portions from injury or deterioration by inundation, these and such like things would obviously be benefits.”

11. These words had tended to encourage a view, so far as this Court was concerned, that in each case the action of the manager in alienating the family property must be of a defensive nature; that is to say, if the underlying object was to avert some danger or to obtain relief from some distress, there would be justification for the transfer, but not where it was only, for instance, to add to the family property or to achieve soma such other object. This view, however, was not accepted by this Court in the Full Bench of Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das, 50 ALL. 969 : (A.I.R (15) 1928 ALL. 454 F.B), in which it was laid down that the transaction, being of a defensive nature, was not an essential element of justification but that

“the real test was whether the transaction would have been carried out by a prudent owner with the knowledge then available to him.”

12. In each cage, therefore, it would be a question of fact whether such circumstances exist as would induce a prudent owner or manager of a joint Hindu family property to alienate the same, either for the repayment of the debts of the family or for such other objects that could be regarded as coming within the dictum laid down in the case just quoted, that itself being only an explanation of the rule laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council. There can be no doubt that in every case, there must be, what is known ‘necessity,’ as their Lordships in one case remarked that “the touchstone of the authority is necessity.” But the word “necessity” has a somewhat special meaning in the case of a transfer of a joint Hindu family I property. It implies the kind of pressure which the law recognises as serious and sufficient.

13. This being the test, the question is whether it is satisfied according to the findings of the Courts below. It is true that the trial Court had found that there were no other means for the family to pay off the debts except by sale of the property in dispute, it being admitted that the plaintiffs had got no other property. This finding was not examined by the lower appellate Court. If it was a matter on which the lower appellate Court also had recorded a finding, we might have been in a position to consider how far the necessary test, as mentioned by us, had been satisfied in this case. It cannot be doubted I that the mere fact that the entire sale consideration was justified by necessity would rot, by itself, be a ground for upholding the alienation, nor would the mere fact that a portion of the sale consideration only was justified by necessity would be a ground for discrediting the same. The test, as we have already pointed out, would, in every case, be the presence of such circumstances as could make the act of transfer an eminently desirable or urgently called for step to case the situation existing on the date of the transfer. In the present circumstances when there is no independent finding by the lower appellate Court on this material question, we cannot finally dispose of this case.

14. We, therefore, remit the following issue to that Court for a finding to be returned within three months of this date, the usual ten days time being given for objections to the same.

15. No further evidence would be permitted.

“Whether in these circumstances existing on the date of the sale deed dated 21st December 1981, the said deed was binding on the rest of the family and was not liable to be challenged by the plaintiffs?”

16. Issue remitted.