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Promod Chandra Shekhar v. Rex

Allahabad High Court
Aug 1, 1949
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mootham, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant was the stenographer of the District Magistrate of Bulandshahr and was a public servant. On 19-11-1947 he received from one Pakira two ten-rupee notes. The prosecution alleged that he accepted these notes as a gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act, thereby committing an offence punishable under Section 161 of the Penal Code. The applicant admitted the receipt of the notes but stated that they had been received in exchange for notes of the same total value but of smaller denominations which he had given to Fakira.

It is not in dispute that the investigation into the alleged offence was conducted by a police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. The applicant did not give evidence on oath at trial and it was not disputed that the Court did not inform him of his right to give evidence on oath under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.

Because one or more contentions in this case were common to other matters pending before the Court, three specific legal questions were referred by the Judge to a Bench (or Full Bench) for determination.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the effect of non-compliance with the proviso to Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947?
  2. What is the meaning of the word “gratification” in Section 4 of the said Act, and what has the prosecution to prove before the presumption referred to in that section arises?
  3. What is the effect of the Court not informing the accused that he had a right, if he so wishes, to give evidence on oath in disproof of the charge made against him?

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The applicant admitted receiving the two ten-rupee notes but explained they were received in exchange for notes of the same total value but of smaller denominations given by him to Fakira.
  • The applicant contended that the prosecution must do more than prove receipt of money; specifically, it must prove that the sum was accepted as a reward or recompense before the presumption under Section 4 could arise.
  • The applicant did not give evidence on oath at trial and it is stated (and not disputed) that the Court did not inform him of his statutory right to give such evidence.

Crown's Arguments

  • The Crown contended that the presumption under Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act arises as soon as the prosecution proves that the accused was a public servant and that he accepted a sum of money.
  • Implicit in the prosecution's position is that once acceptance by a public servant is proved, the statutory presumption regarding motive or reward follows without a further evidentiary step to establish that the thing accepted was taken as a reward or recompense.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rustom Ardeshir v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1948 Bom. 163 (49 Cr. L.J. 196) The Bombay High Court tentatively expressed the view that Section 156(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is wide enough to cover an investigation into offences under S.161/S.165 of the Penal Code conducted by a police officer not authorised by the proviso to Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The present Court noted that this tentative view accords with the Court's own reading of S.156(2) and relied on it as supportive authority for treating non-compliance with the proviso to Section 3 as an irregularity within the ambit of S.156(2).
Queen-Empress v. Mehri, 1895 A.W.N. 9 Addressed a contention that contravention of a provision (S.561 sub-s. (2)) was a material irregularity affecting the merits of the case. The Court observed that the view in that case—that contravention was a material irregularity—was not accepted there, and that the case is of little assistance because no reference appears to have been made in that judgment to S.156 or S.537 of the Code.
Emperor v. Shivbhat, 52 Bom. 238 (A.I.R. 1928 Bom. 162; 29 Cr. L.J. 551) The proposition that which particular officer conducts an investigation (Inspector vs. Sub-Inspector) is of minor importance; conviction depends mainly on the evidence adduced at trial, not the rank of the investigating officer. The Court relied on the passage of Fawcett, J. in this case to support the view that investigation by a lower-ranked officer is unlikely to prejudice the accused and therefore is an irregularity of the kind contemplated by S.156(2).
R. v. Villars, (1927) 20 Cr. App. 150 Held that failure of a trial court to afford an undefended prisoner the opportunity of giving evidence vitiated the trial. The Court cited this English authority to support the proposition that the failure to inform an accused of his statutory right to give evidence on oath is a grave irregularity which may vitiate the trial if it occasioned a failure of justice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the three referred questions in turn and explained the legal reasoning it used to answer each question.

1. Effect of non-compliance with the proviso to Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act

The Court first observed that the drafting of Section 3 is inapt: the first clause classifies certain offences as cognizable while the proviso restricts investigation by police officers below a specified rank. The proviso was interpreted not as making the cognizability conditional on compliance with the proviso, but as placing a restriction on the powers of investigation of police officers below a certain rank.

The Court reasoned that if Section 3 had simply classified certain offences as cognizable, investigation would ordinarily be governed by Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr PC), under which such investigations could be conducted by officers in charge of police stations subject to jurisdictional limits. The proviso to Section 3 was therefore read as analogous to the restriction found in sub-s. (2) of Section 561 of the Penal Code and as effectively a proviso to sub-s. (1) of Section 156 Cr PC.

Crucially, the Court relied on Section 156(2) Cr PC which provides that no proceeding of a police officer in such a case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the officer was not empowered under Section 156 to investigate. The Court held that Section 156(2) is in terms wide enough to cover an investigation into an offence punishable under S.161 or S.165 of the Penal Code conducted by a police officer not authorised by the proviso to Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Drawing on authority and principle, including a passage from Emperor v. Shivbhat, the Court concluded that an investigation conducted by a lower-ranked officer is unlikely to prejudice the accused because the adequacy of the investigation will be reflected in the evidence given at trial. Accordingly, failure to comply with the proviso to Section 3 was characterised as an irregularity that falls within the ambit of Section 156(2) Cr PC, and therefore the proceedings of the investigating officer cannot be called in question on that ground.

2. Meaning of the word "gratification" in Section 4 and the prosecution's burden

The Court considered the contention (relying on a dictionary definition) that "gratification" means "reward, recompense or gratuity" and that therefore the prosecution must prove not only acceptance but also that the acceptance was as a reward or recompense before the statutory presumption would arise.

The Court rejected this contention. It observed that requiring the prosecution to prove that a sum of money was a "reward" would often require the prosecution to prove the underlying service or act which produced the reward, leaving no room for the statutory presumption. The Court noted dictionary definitions—Murray and Webster—showing that the primary meaning of "gratification" can be "the giving of pleasure or satisfaction" and concluded that in Section 4 the word is used in the sense of "satisfaction."

Reading Section 4 as a whole reinforced this conclusion: the section not only speaks of acceptance of "gratification" but also of acceptance of "any valuable thing," and it would be illogical to impose a higher initial burden on the prosecution in the one case than the other. The Court therefore held that the presumption in Section 4 arises as soon as the prosecution proves that the accused has accepted, obtained, agreed to accept, or attempted to obtain any gratification (as the Court defined it) or any valuable thing, provided in the case of "gratification" the prosecution has further proved that it was not accepted as legal remuneration.

3. Effect of the Court not informing the accused of his right to give evidence on oath

The Court emphasised the importance of the right conferred by Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which makes an accused person in such offences a competent witness for the defence and permits him to give evidence on oath in disproof of the charges. The Court described this right as "of the highest value to an innocent person" because the circumstances of particular receipts are often peculiarly within the personal knowledge of the recipient.

Citing R. v. Villars as authority that failure to afford an undefended prisoner the opportunity to give evidence vitiated the trial, the Court held that failure of a trial Court to inform an accused charged under S.161 or S.165 of the Penal Code of his right to give evidence on oath is a "grave irregularity." The effect of this irregularity depends upon whether, in the appellate Court's opinion, it has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. If it has, the trial is bad and the Court will consider whether a retrial should be ordered. If, however, the appellate Court is satisfied that there has been no failure of justice, the conviction will not be set aside on account of this irregularity.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the three referred questions as follows (answers distilled from the Opinion):

  1. Non-compliance with the proviso to Section 3 (Prevention of Corruption Act): Such non-compliance is an irregularity that falls within the ambit of Section 156(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and consequently the proceedings of the investigating officer cannot be called in question on that ground.
  2. Meaning of "gratification" and the presumption in Section 4: "Gratification" is to be understood in the sense of "satisfaction" (not limited to "reward" or "recompense"). The presumption in Section 4 arises as soon as the prosecution proves that the accused has accepted, obtained, agreed to accept, or attempted to obtain any gratification (as defined) or any valuable thing, provided that in the case of "gratification" the prosecution has proved it was not accepted as legal remuneration.
  3. Failure to inform accused of right to give evidence on oath: This omission is a grave irregularity. Its effect depends on whether it occasioned a failure of justice; if it did, the trial is vitiated and a retrial may be considered; if it did not, the conviction will not be set aside on that ground alone.

Direct Consequences for the Parties

  • The investigation being conducted by an officer below the specified rank does not, by that fact alone, permit calling the investigation into question under Section 156(2) Cr PC.
  • On the legal standard under Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, once the prosecution establishes that a public servant accepted or attempted to obtain a gratification or valuable thing (and that it was not legal remuneration in the case of gratification), the statutory presumption as to motive arises.
  • The omission of the trial Court to inform the accused of his statutory right to give evidence on oath may render the trial defective only if it is shown to have occasioned a failure of justice; otherwise the conviction stands.

The opinion concludes with the directive "Answer accordingly." The Opinion sets out statutory interpretation and procedural positions as applied to the referred questions; it does not, within the provided text, expressly claim to establish a broader precedent beyond these holdings.

Show all summary ...

Mootham, J.:— In view of the order which I propose to make in this case it is unnecessary to state the facts at any length. The applicant was the stenographer of the District Magistrate of Bulandshahr and it is not in dispute that, he is a public servant. On 19-11-1947, he received from one Pakira two ten-rupee notes. It is the case for the prosecution that he accepted these notes as a gratification other that legal remuneration, in respect of an official act, and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 161 of the Penal Code. The receipt of the notes-is admitted by the applicant, but he says that they were received by him in exchange for notes of the same total value, but of smaller denomination, given by him to Fakira.

1. Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (II [2] of 1947), provides, inter alia, that an offence punishable under Section 161 of the Penal Code, shall be deemed to be a cognisable offence for the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To this section there is a proviso in the following terms:

“Provided that a police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police shall not investigate-any such offence without the order of a Magistrate of the First Class or make any arrest therefor without a warrant.”

2. It is not in dispute in this case that the alleged offence was dealt with as a cognisable offence, and that the investigation was conducted by an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police.

3. Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, provides, inter alia, that where in any trial for an offence punishable under Section 161 of the Penal Code, it is proved that an accused person has accepted for himself any gratification (other than legal remuneration) it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted that gratification as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in S. 161 of the Code. It is contended by the Crown that this presumption arises as soon as the prosecution has proved that the accused was a public servant and that he accepted a sum of money, whereas the applicant contends that the prosecution must go further and show that the sum of money was accepted as a reward or recompense for something done or to be done.

4. Under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, any person charged with an offence punishable, inter alia, under Section 161 of the Penal Code, shall be a competent witness for the defence and may give evidence on oath in dis-proof of the charges made against him. The applicant did not give evidence on oath and it is, I understand, not in dispute that the applicant was not informed by the Court of his right to give evidence on oath.

5. I am informed that one or more of the contentions which have been raised by the applicant in this case are common to a number of other appeals or applications in revision pending in this Court and in view of their importance I refer to a Bench or a Full Bench, as his Lordship the Acting Chief Justice shall think proper, the following questions:

(1) What is the effect of non-compliance with the proviso to Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947?

(2) What is the meaning of the word “gratification” in S. 4 of the said Act, and what has the prosecution to prove before the presumption referred to in that section arises?

(3) What is the effect of the Court not informing the accused that he had a right, if he so wishes, to give evidence on oath in disproof of the charge made against him?

OPINION

Mootham, J.:— Three questions have been referred to this Bench for determination. Those questions, together with such facts as are relevant, are set out in the order of reference and need not be repeated.

6. Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (II [2] of 1947), provides that:

“3. An offence punishable under S. 161 or Section 165 of the Penal Code, shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence for the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained therein:

Provided that a police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police shall not investigate any such offence without the order of a Magistrate of the first class or make any arrest therefor without warrant.”

7. The drafting of this section is not very apt, for the fact that the second clause which is in the form of a proviso suggests that the classification of certain offences as cognisable effected by the first clause is dependent upon the investigation of those offences being conducted in the manner laid down in the second clause. We are, however, satisfied that was not the intention of the Legislature.

8. Now if Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, had done no more than place certain offences in the category of cognizable offences, then the investigation of those offences would have been governed by the provisions of Section 156 of the Cr PC, and could have been conducted (subject to the jurisdictional limits prescribed by that section) by any officer in charge of a police station without the order of a Magistrate. The proviso to S. 3 in so far as it places a restriction on the powers of investigation of police officers below a certain rank, is in effect, therefore, a proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 156 of the Code and is analogous to the provision in sub-s. (2) of S. 561 of the same Code that no police officer below the rank of police inspector shall be employed or take part in the investigation of the offence specified in sub-s. (1) of the section.

9. Sub-section (2) of S. 156 provides that no proceeding of a police officer in any such case as is referred to in sub-s. (1) shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under that section to investigate. This sub-section is, in our opinion, in terms wide enough to cover an investigation into an offence punishable under S. 161 or Section 165 of the Penal Code, which is conducted by a police officer not so authorised by the proviso to Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. This also is the view tentatively expressed by the Bombay High Court in Rustom Ardeshir v. Emperor, A.I.R(35) 1948 Bom. 163 : (49 Cr. L.J 196). In Queen-Empress v. Mehri, 1895 A.W.N 9, a case under Section 561 of the Penal Code, it was contended that a contravention of sub-s. (2) of that section was a material irregularity affecting the merits of the case. That view was not accepted by the Court, but the case is of little assistance as no reference appears to have been made in the judgment either to S. 156 or Section 537 of the Cr PC

10. It is, in our opinion, difficult to see how an investigation conducted by a police officer of lower rank than that specified in the section can prejudice the accused. The adequacy of the investigation will be reflected in the evidence given for the prosecution at the trial, and it is by that evidence that the case against the accused will be measured. As was pointed out by Fawcett, J. in Emperor v. Shivbhat, 52 Bom. 238 : (A.I.R(15) 1928 Bom. 162 : 29 Cr. L.J 551):

“…the main thing to bear in mind is that a conviction or acquittal does not depend upon the question what particular officer actually conducts the investigation which results in his trial. That is determined mainly by the evidence that is given at the trial and considered; and the question whether that evidence has, in the first place, been elicited by an Inspector or by a Sub-Inspector is of very minor importance and does not really affect the result of a trial, except to this extent that the theory is that the higher the rank of the police officer investigating, the more careful and unimpeachable his inquiry is likely to be.”

11. That was a case in which the investigation into a railway accident had not been conducted by an officer of the rank required by the rules made under the Railways Act, but the decision — that this was an irregularity of the kind contemplated by Section 537 of the Cr PC, — is also not of assistance in the present case as the rules contained no provision corresponding to sub-s. (2) of S. 156 of the Code.

12. In our opinion failure to comply with the proviso to Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, is an irregularity which falls within the ambit of sub-s. (2) of S. 156 of the Code, and accordingly the proceedings of the investigating officer cannot be called in question.

13. The second question concerns the meaning of the word “gratification” in S. 4 of the Act. It has been argued that before the presumption referred to in that section can arise it is necessary (when the allegation is that the gratification has been accepted) for the prosecution to prove not only the acceptance of the thing, tangible or intangible, constituting the gratification but also that such thing was accepted as a reward or recompense; and reliance was placed on that definition of ‘gratification’ in Webster's Dictionary as a ‘reward, recompense or gratuity.’

14. We have no doubt that this contention is not well founded. It is difficult to understand how the prosecution could ever prove, for example, that the acceptance of a sum of money was a “reward” without further proving the service or act which was the motive or consideration for such reward; and in that case there is no presumption left to be drawn. It is true that gratification may mean a reward or recompense, but that is only one of its meanings. The primary meaning of the word, as defined both in Murray's Dictionary and in Webster's Dictionary, is the giving of pleasure or satisfaction, and we are clearly of opinion that it is as satisfaction that the word is used in this section. That this is so is, in our opinion, made clear when the section is read as a whole, for it is not only the acceptance of a “gratification” which may give rise to the presumption referred to therein but also the acceptance of “any valuable thing.” It is indeed a little difficult to understand what it is which can be so defined which is not included in the general term “gratification,” but be that as it may, in the case of a valuable thing the presumption arises, if it arises at all, as soon as the prosecution proves the acceptance by the accused person (in the circumstances referred to in the section) of that thing. We cannot think that it was the intention of the legislature that the initial burden of proof imposed upon the prosecution be higher in the one case than in the other.

15. In our opinion the presumption referred to in S. 4 arises as soon as the prosecution has proved that the accused person has accepted or obtained, or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, for himself or for any other person any gratification in the sense in which we have defined it in this judgment, or any valuable thing, from any person provided (however illogical it may be) that in the former case it has further proved that such gratification was not accepted or obtained, or agreed to be accepted or attempted to be obtained, by way of legal remuneration.

16. The third question concerns the right of a person accused of an offence punishable under S. 161 or Section 165 of the Penal Code, to give evidence on his own behalf. That right is given to him by Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and we regard it of the highest value to an innocent person. The broad effect of S. 4 of the Act is to make every receipt by a public servant of anything of value to him a matter which at some later date he may be called upon to explain and justify. It is a provision which if unwisely used may be the cause of much hard-ship; and as the circumstances of particular recepits will, in many instances, be peculiarly within the personal knowledge of the recipient it is evident that the right now accorded to him to go into the witness-box and state on oath what those circumstances are is one which the Court must be zealous to safeguard.

17. As is well known the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, (61 and 62 Vict. C. 36) made every person charged in England with a criminal offence a competent witness for the defence at every stage of the case, and in R. v. Villars, (1927) 20 Cr. App. 150, the Court of Criminal Appeal held that the failure of the trial Court to afford an undefended prisoner, the opportunity of giving evidence vitiated the trial.

18. In our opinion the failure of a Court to inform an accused person charged with an offence punishable under S. 161 or Section 165 of the Penal Code, of his right to give evidence on oath in disproof of the charge is a grave irregularity the effect of which must depend upon whether, in the opinion of the appellate Court, it has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. If it has the trial is bad, and the Court will consider whether the circumstances are such that a retrial should be ordered if the Court is satisfied that there has been no failure of justice the conviction will not, on account of this irregularity, be set aside.

K.S

19. Answer accordingly.