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Farid Ahmad v. Government Of The United Provinces

Allahabad High Court
Aug 25, 1949
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Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the defendants against a decree in a suit filed by the United Provinces Government (the plaintiff) for possession of a piece of land described in the plaint, said to be part of larger plot no. 73 (3.73 acres) in Mohalla Naugaza, Muttra. The Government's claim rested on the proposition that the land had once vested in the Cantonment Board and was transferred to civil authorities on 23 December 1881. The land contains very old graves, including an inscription dated to the eleventh century Hijri, and a long grave known as "Naugaza."

Relevant historical events recorded in the opinion include the conquest of Muttra in 1803 by Lord Lake's army, subsequent inclusion of plot no. 73 within the Muttra Cantonment, and a settlement inquiry in 1877 by Mr. Whiteaway (Settlement Officer) who prepared a map and register classifying plots and noting which were in military occupation and which were occupied by private persons. The register itself was said to have been destroyed, but the map and Whiteaway's report (Ex. 10, 23 June 1877) were available.

The descendants of two brothers (Lalla Shah and Husain Shah) asserted long possession and executed multiple documents from 1881 onwards. A deed of agreement between Lalla Shah and Husain Shah was executed on 30 January 1881. Subsequent transfers included a sale deed dated 7 January 1899 (challenged by Government) and later the purchaser made a waqf by waqfnama dated 10 September 1917; partition proceedings (suit no. 3 of 1913) and a commissioner’s report (19 June 1914) with decree (7 September 1914) also figure in the chain of title.

The Government's suit was filed in 1938. Defendants produced oral witnesses (ages and testimonies recorded in the opinion) attesting to continuous possession of the land by Fakirs for more than sixty years prior to the suit. The lower court had reached a conclusion adverse to the defendants; this opinion is the appellate court's treatment of the defendants' appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendants' long adverse possession (dating at least from 1877) matured into full ownership such that the Government's suit for possession filed in 1938 was barred by limitation (sixty years).
  2. Whether the Limitation Act or the Cantonment Act contains any provision preventing adverse possession from running against a Cantonment Board, and specifically when limitation could begin to run in respect of land included in a cantonment — for example, whether limitation could begin only after the land was handed over to civil authorities.
  3. Whether the conduct of the Cantonment Board and subsequent civil authorities (including non-interference and transactional dealings) could be taken as recognition by the sovereign authority of the occupiers' private rights without an express written transfer.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's (United Provinces Government) Case

  • The Government claimed ownership based on the historical vesting of the land in the Cantonment Board and an asserted transfer to civil authorities (noted as occurring on 23 December 1881).
  • The Government denied that the defendants had any proper title to the disputed land, and challenged certain transfers (notably the sale deed of 7 January 1899) as invalid against the Crown's title.

Defendants' Case

  • The defendants (Fakirs and their successors) asserted long, continuous and adverse possession of the land, with oral testimony from several witnesses who stated they had observed Fakirs in possession since childhood (witness ages and recollections are recorded in the opinion).
  • There is a chain of transfers and other documents executed by the defendants and their predecessors from 1881 up to recent times asserting ownership, including a mortgage (1885), sale (1899), partition decree (1914), and a waqf (1917). The defendants pointed to these documents and to governmental dealings (leases, compensation under Land Acquisition Act) as indicia that the Government's claim had been effectively extinguished by adverse possession and recognition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Secretary of State for India v. Raj Bai After conquest, private titles are deemed to have ended unless the new sovereign authority, by express or implied agreement, elects to respect and recognise prior rights. The court invoked this authority to explain that the original owners' private rights ceased on the 1803 conquest unless the British sovereign chose to recognise them; the court then examined evidence showing the British (through cantonment and civil authorities) effectively recognised the occupiers' rights by non-interference and by subsequent dealings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a sequence of factual findings and legal applications:

  1. Historical premise: The court accepted the general legal principle (citing Secretary of State for India v. Raj Bai) that on conquest (Muttra, 1803) private titles ordinarily ended unless the new sovereign expressly or impliedly recognised them.
  2. Factual inquiry into possession: The court relied on Mr. Whiteaway's 1877 report and map (register said to be destroyed) showing that while some plots were in military occupation, many were in long private possession. Whiteaway noted enclosures without bungalows for which no rent was paid and that some occupiers could not produce military-countersigned title deeds. The court took this as evidence that persons (later identified as Fakirs) were in adverse possession and claimed ownership in 1877.
  3. Oral evidence corroboration: The court summarized oral testimony from several witnesses (Sheikh Abdul Rahman, Daro, Salgi, Allah Din) who testified to seeing Fakirs in possession from childhood (testimonies indicated continuous possession well over sixty years). The court treated these testimonies as supporting continuous adverse possession.
  4. Conduct of authorities: The court observed that the cantonment and civil authorities did not interfere with such possession after 1877. The court inferred from Whiteaway’s report and subsequent official conduct an implied recognition by the British Government of the occupiers' rights, noting that no written sovereign transfer was necessary for this recognition to be effective.
  5. Transactions and governmental dealings: The court placed weight on multiple transfers by the occupiers, the fact that the Government itself had been party to some transactions (e.g., land taken on lease for an octroi out-post, and land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act for the B.B. & C.I. Railway with compensation paid to the Fakirs). The court treated these events as further evidence that the Government's title had been, in effect, treated as subordinated to the occupiers' claims.
  6. Limitation and legal obstacle: The court noted the admission by the Learned Standing Counsel that neither the Cantonment Act nor the Limitation Act contains any provision preventing adverse possession from running against a Cantonment Board. Accordingly, the court rejected the lower court's view (criticised in the opinion) that limitation could begin to run only after the land had been handed over to civil authorities.
  7. Conclusion on limitation: The court concluded that adverse possession beginning at least in 1877 matured into full ownership before 1937 (sixty years having expired) and thus the Government's suit filed in 1938 was time-barred.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was allowed. The court set aside the decree of the lower court and dismissed the plaintiff's suit.

DISPOSED OF: The plaintiff's suit is dismissed and the decree of the lower court is set aside; costs were awarded to the defendants in both courts.

Implications and consequences:

  • The direct effect on the parties is that the Government's claim to possession failed and the defendants' adverse possession was recognised by the court as having matured into ownership before the expiry of sixty years.
  • The court explicitly observed that there is no provision in the Cantonment Act or the Limitation Act preventing adverse possession from running against a Cantonment Board; accordingly, limitation can operate in such contexts and need not wait for a formal handing over to civil authorities.
  • The court treated governmental non-interference and subsequent transactional dealings (leases, acquisition with compensation) as sufficient for implied recognition of private rights without an express written transfer by the sovereign authority.
Appeal allowed.
Show all summary ...

Malik, C.J:— This is a defendents' appeal. The United Provinces Government filed a suit for possession of a piece of land described at the foot of the plaint, which, it is not admitted, is a part of a bigger plot no. 73 having an area of 3-73 acres and situate in Mohalla Naugaza in Muttra. The claim on behalf of the plaintiff is based on the ground that the land in suit had at one time vested in the Cantonment Board and on the 23rd December, 1881, the Cantonment Board had transferred this land along with other land to the civil authorities. Not much is known about the ancient history of this land except this that there are certain very old graves on this land, and at the time of the inspection the learned Civil Judge found one of the graves having an inscription of the eleventh century Hijri. There was a long grave on the spot known as “Naugaza” and it is mentioned in one of the judgments that it was supposed to be the grave of one of the old giants in prehistoric days who used to attain heights of about nine yards. Muttra was conquered by Lord Lake's army in 1803 from the Marathas and the British had a big cantonment there for several years. After the conquest in 1803 the plot no. 73 along with certain other plots were all included in the Muttra Cantonment. Whatever rights the original owners of the plots had in the lands, after the conquest in 1803 their rights came to an end unless by an express or implied agreement the new Sovereign Authority had elected to respect and recognise and be bound by the previous rights—[see Secretary of State for India v. Raj Bai]. We do not know any thing about this land till we come to the year 1877. In that year the cantonment authorities evidently wanted to build two bungalows. There were inquiries made through one Mr. Whiteaway Settlement Officer, who prepared a register and a map of the Muttra Cantonment. In that register he noted against each plot the names of persons who were in possession and their title. He also made a list of the plots in possession of the cantonment authorities. That register is not forthcoming and it is said on behalf of the plaintiff that the register has been destroyed. The map is, however, available. From report of the Settlement Officer, Ex. 10, dated 23rd June, 1877, as also from the inspection note of the learned Civil Judge it appears that there were a number of old graves on this plot. In his report the Settlement Officer classified the land under various heads and mentioned that there were enclosures with bungalows and buildings and there were enclosures without bungalows, and for these enclosures without bungalows rent was being paid to the military authorities in certain cases and no rent was being paid to the military authorities for others. For those for which no rent was being paid, he made inquiries as regards title and he found that there were some who were able to produce title deeds which had been countersigned by the military authorities, while there were others who, though they were in possession were not able to produce any title deeds either executed or countersignd by military authorities. Those in possession of plot no. 73 came into this latter category, that is they were persons who were not paying rent to military authorities and were not able to produce any title deeds executed or countersigned by the military authorities. Mr. Whiteaway, however, mentioned that almost all the plots were in the possession of men who had been in possession for a very long time and it was not worthwhile to interfere with those items of property as it would give rise to a great deal of heart-burning. Evidently the properties were not of much value at the time, and the Settlement Officer did not consider it worthwhile that the Cantonment Board should take steps to assert its title and eject the persons who had ancient possession but were not able to produce their title deeds. In this document the names of those who were in possession of plot no. 73 were not given. The possession of such persons was, evidently, adverse as they were claiming to be the owners of the plot though they were not able to produce any document of title countersigned by the military authorities.

In 1881 on the 30th of January a deed of agreement was executed by Lalla Shah and Husain Shah, who were brothers, who claimed that they had been in joint possession of the property and they had always been dividing the income and by this document they made arrangements about the income and how it was to be dealt with by their descendants. This document does not give any period for which prior to 1881 the two brothers were in joint possession. The pedigree of their family is quoted in the judgment of the lower court and it is not disputed. In 1885 Kalian Shah, son of Husain Shah, made a mortgage of a portion of this property. The property is said to be situate in the “Naugaza” graveyard. After that there are a series of transfers, and the transfer that is being now challenged on behalf of the Government is the sale deed dated the 7th of January, 1899, executed by Lila Shah, grandson of Lalla Shah and Mst. Mindia, daughter-in-law of Lalla Shah, of plot no. 73 in favour of Hafiz Mohammad Mohsin Khan. The vendee made a waqf of this property under a waqfnama dated the 10th of September, 1917. Before he executed this waqfnama the vendee had the plot no. 73 in his share separated by suit no. 3 of 1913 in the Subordinate Judge's Court, Muttra. A commissioner was appointed who made a report dated the 19th June, 1914, and a decree was passed in accordance with this report on the 7th of September, 1914. It is not necessary for us to discuss in detail the various documents executed by the descendants of Lalla Shah and Husain Shah relating to this property. There is a list given in the judgment of the lower court. They had executed a very large number of documents form 1881 up to recent times in which they had asserted that they were the owners of the property.

The suit was filed in the year 1938 and it was claimed on behalf of the Government that they were the owners of this property and it was denied that the defendants had anything to do with it. On behalf of the defendants certain witnesses were produced who have deposed to their possession for many more than sixty years before the date of the suit. We may discuss the evidence of some of them: Sheikh Abdul Rahman gave his age as 76 years. He was for 22 years a member of the Municipal Board and he deposed that he had seen the Fakirs in possession of this land ever since he was ten or eleven years of age. No cross-examination seems to have been directed against this part of his statement. The next witness Daro is aged 85, and he too has stated that he had seen the possession of Fakirs ever since he was aged 10 or 11. To the same effect is the evidence of Salgi, another witness who gave his age as 85 years. The last witness, Allah Din, is aged 70 years; and according to this witness the Fakirs have always been in possession of their land and he has memory of this from the time when he was thirteen or fourteen years old.

The position, therefore, is that, though on the conquest of Muttra all private titles must be deemed to have come to an end, the British did not desire to interfere with private ownerships and allowed persons to remain in possession of land which was in their possession. It is true that this land was included in the Muttra Cantonment. But from the report in 1877 it is clear that only a part of the land within the Muttra Cantonment was in the occupation of the army, while the rest of it was in the possession of others who claimed title in themselves and some encroachments had been made over the plots which had been in the possession of the cantonment authorities.

From the report of Mr. Whiteaway, made in 1877, and from the subsequent conduct of the Cantonment Board and the civil authorities in not interfering with the possession or with the ownership of the Fakirs, it may be implied that the British Government did not want to dispossess and recognised the old rights of the Fakirs. It was not necessary in 1903 that there should be a written document executed by the Sovereign Authority transferring title to the occupiers.

Apart from that, we have the fact that the Fakirs had in 1877 set up, before Mr. Whiteaway, their claim that they were owners of the land though they were not able to produce any title deeds. Though Mr. Whiteaway's report does not, mention the names of the Fakirs, since it has been mentioned in the report that the persons in possession had put forward their claim and from the oral evidence and other circumstances we have no doubt that the Fakirs were in possession of the land in 1877, we conclude that the Fakirs had claimed that they were the owners of this land. The claim made in 1877 was clearly adverse to the Cantonment Board. Mr. Whiteaway has said in his report that, though private persons had encroached on cantonment land in the past, by reason of the fact that he had prepared the map and register such encroachments would not be possible in future. This adverse possession, which started at least in 1877, must be deemed to have matured into full ownership before 1937. Between these years innumerable transfers were made by the Fakirs and in all of them they had asserted that they were the owners of the property. As a matter of fact the Government itself was a party to some of them. Land was taken on lease for the octroi out-post, and land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act for the B.B & C.I Railway for which compensation was paid to the Fakirs. The Government's right to file the suit must, therefore, be deemed to have come to an end on the expiry of the sixty years period.

Learned Standing Counsel had admitted that there is no provision in the Cantonment Act or in the Limitation Act which prevents adverse possession running against a Cantonment Board. It is not, therefore, clear why the lower court has said that the limitation could begin to run only after the land had been handed over to the civil authorities.

The appeal must, therefore, be allowed, the decree of the lower court set aside and the plaintiff's suit dismissed with costs in both the courts.

Appeal allowed.