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Harish Chandra v. Rex
Factual and Procedural Background
Harish Chandra was convicted under Section 419 of the Penal Code after representing himself to station master Deonath Tewari as a Marketing Inspector who could procure cloth. Relying on that representation, Tewari gave Rs. 100 to pointsman Ramjee Sharma for delivery to the applicant. The applicant subsequently obtained the money and a wristwatch from Sharma and disappeared without supplying cloth. [1][2]
The trial Magistrate convicted the applicant under Sections 419 and 420 of the Penal Code. On appeal, the conviction under Section 419 was maintained, while the conviction under Section 420 was set aside. The applicant thereafter challenged the Section 419 conviction in revision. [2][3]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the applicant's conduct constituted cheating by personation under Sections 415, 416 and 419 of the Penal Code. [4][5]
- Whether cheating requires actual harm to the deceived person, or whether conduct likely to cause damage or harm is sufficient. [6]
- Whether the revisional court should interfere with the orders of the courts below. [4]
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The applicant argued that the facts did not establish an offence under Section 419 of the Penal Code. [3]
- It was contended that the delivery of Rs. 100 by the station master did not itself cause harm to him and therefore did not constitute cheating under Section 415. [6]
- Counsel relied on Emperor v. Muhammad Shah for the proposition that the harm caused, or likely to be caused, must be the necessary consequence of the deceit. [7]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Emperor v. Muhammad Shah, 20 Cr. L.J. 77 : (A.I.R. (6) 1919 Lah. 473) | Harm caused, or likely to be caused, to the deceived person must be the necessary consequence of the deceit. | The court respectfully disagreed, holding that the word “necessarily” should not be added to Section 415 when the Legislature had not used it. [7][8] |
| Cowper Essex v. Acton Local Board, (1889) 14 A.C. 153 (169) : (58 L.J.Q.B. 594) | Statutory words should not be added to or subtracted from without almost a necessity. | The principle supported the court’s refusal to insert “necessarily” before “likely” in Section 415. [9] |
| King v. Burrell, (1840) 12 A. & E. 460 (469) : (9 L.J.Q.B. 337) | The general rule is not to import into statutes words that are not found there. | The court applied this rule in rejecting the proposed addition of “necessarily” to the statutory language. [10][11] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first held that the applicant's conduct constituted an offence under Section 419 and stated that, even if the lower courts had erred in law, it would have declined to interfere in revision under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [4]
Applying the definition of cheating in Section 415, the court identified three requirements: deception; inducement by that deception to do or omit something that would otherwise not have been done or omitted; and resulting or likely damage or harm to the deceived person. [12][13][14][15][16]
The court found that Deonath Tewari had been deceived and, because of that deception, had induced Ramjee Sharma to receive Rs. 100. The applicant intended this transfer to facilitate his further deception of Sharma and acquisition of the money from him. [17]
The court rejected the argument that actual harm was indispensable. It held that harm likely to result from the induced act was sufficient, and that Tewari's parting with Rs. 100 to a person accompanying the applicant was likely to cause damage or harm. [6]
The court further found that Tewari would neither have handed over the money nor instructed Sharma to accompany the applicant but for the deception. Because the applicant pretended to be another person, the conduct amounted to cheating by personation under Section 416 and consequently supported the conviction under Section 419. [18][5]
In interpreting Section 415, the court held that its language was clear and that courts must expound statutory words as enacted rather than modify them based on perceived policy or reasonableness. Modification is permissible only in exceptional circumstances involving contradiction, absurdity, hardship or injustice that the Legislature could not have intended. [19][20][21]
The court concluded that “necessarily” could not properly qualify “likely,” because “necessarily” denotes what must happen, whereas “likely” means probable. Adding the former would therefore obscure the plain statutory meaning. [11][22]
Holding and Implications
REVISION DISMISSED. The court upheld the applicant's guilt under Section 419 of the Penal Code, directed him to surrender to bail, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence. [23][24]
The direct consequence was that the conviction under Section 419 remained undisturbed. The opinion states no broader consequences beyond its interpretation that likely harm, rather than necessarily occurring harm, is sufficient under Section 415; no new precedent was set beyond the ruling in this case. [6][23]
1. The applicant, Harish Chandra, has, been convicted of an offence under S. 419, Penal Code, on the following facts found by the Additional Sessions Judge of Jaunpur, which have not been disputed before me.
2. The applicant alighted from a train at the Dobhi station on the morning of 20-12-1916, He met Deonath Tewari, the station master of that railway station and represented to him that be was Marketing Inspector, that Lalganj and Deogaon were within his circle and that he could help the station master in getting cloth. He also suggested that he was going that way and would like to hand over the cloth if the station master sent a man with him. Believing these representations the station master called a pointsman, named Ramjee Sharma, and handed over Rs. 100 to the pointsman with the direction that sum might be given to the applicant on receipt of cloth. Another person, named Jaggan, who was working as a points-man in the same railway station, believing in the representations made by the applicant handed over a sum of Rs. 9 to the applicant in order to get cloth. The applicant along with Ramjee Sharma boarded an ekka and reached the shop of one Raghunandan at Deogaon. The applicant then told Ramjee Sharma that if he also entered the shop of Raghunandan, he would not get the cloth. On this representation he obtained the sum of Rs. 100 from Ramjee Sharma and also obtained a wrist watch from Ramjee Sharma. It is not clear why the wrist watch was handed over by Ramjee Sharma to the applicant. Possibly it was due to some further representation made by the applicant to Ramjee Sharma and a desire on the part of Ramjee Sharma to get some cloth for himself also. The applicant disappeared with the money and the watch received by him and Ramjee Sharma, in spite of efforts, could not get hold of him. On these facts the applicant was convicted by the trying Magistrate under Ss. 419 and 420, Penal Code, both. On appeal his conviction under S. 419, Penal Code, was maintained, but his conviction under S. 420, Penal Code, was set aside on the ground that he had already been convicted under S. 419, Penal Code.
3. It has been contended before me that on the facts stated above an offence under S. 419, Penal Code, has not been made out.
4. Quite apart from the fact that I am of the view that the conduct of the applicant described above constitutes an offence under S. 419, Penal Code, I am of the opinion that this is preeminently a case in which the orders passed by the Courts below should not be interfered with in a revision. Even if I have come to the conclusion that the Courts below have erred in law, in any way, in this case I would have declined to exercise the discretion vested in me under Section 439 of the Cr PC. I am, however, satisfied that on the facts stated above, the applicant is guilty of an offence under S. 419, Penal Code. The offence of cheating is defined in S. 415, Penal Code, as follows:
“Whoever, fay deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act of omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat.”
5. In order to constitute an offence of cheating three elements are required:
(1) There must be deception practised upon a person,.
(2) By that deception the person must be induced to do or omit to do something which he would not have done or omitted to do, had he not been so deceived.
(3) Such act or omission must cause, or be likely to cause, to the person deceived damage or harm in body, mind, reputation or property.
6. There is no doubt in this case that deception was practised upon the Station Master, Deonath Tewari. There is further no doubt that by reason of this deception Deonath Tewari was induced to hand-over a sum of Rs. 100 to Ramjee Sharma. I am further satisfied that the applicant intended the sum of Rs. 100 to be handed-over to Ramjee Sharma in order to facilitate his design to further deceive Ramjee Sharma and obtain the sum of Rs. 100 from him.
7. In my opinion, therefore, the applicant by deceiving Deonath Tewari, fraudulently induced him to deliver a sum of Rs. 100 to Ramjee Sharma. The learned counsel for the applicant has urged that this does not constitute an offence under S. 415, Penal Code, because this by itself did not cause any harm to Deonath Tewari in body, mind, reputation or property. It is not necessary to constitute an offence of cheating under S. 415, Penal Code, that the act which the person deceived is induced to do should actually cause harm to him. It is enough that the act which the person deceived has been induced to perform is likely to cause damage or harm to him. In the present case, having regard to all the circumstances, there is no doubt that the parting of Rs. 100 by Deonath Tewari to Ramjee Sharma, who was to accompany the applicant was an act which was likely to cause damage or harm to Deonath Tewari. This was fully known to and was intended by the applicant. The case would also come within the expression:
“… intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived….
8. Deonath Tewari would not have handed-over the sum of Rs. 100 to Ramjee Sharma and would not have asked Ramjee Sharma to accompany the applicant if he had not been deceived. Section 416, Penal Code, defines cheating by personation and provides that a person is said to cheat by personation if he cheats by pretending to be some other person. The applicant has, therefore, committed an offence of cheating by personation.
9. The learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon a case of the Punjab Chief Court, Emperor v. Muhammad Shah. 20 Cr. L.J 77 : (A.I.R (6) 1919 Lah. 473), in which it has been held that to constitute an offence of cheating under S. 415, Penal Code, the damage or harm caused, or likely to be caused to the person deceived in mind, body, reputation or property must be the necessary consequence of the act done by reason of the deceit practised, or must be necessarily likely to follow therefrom.
10. With great respect to the learned Judges, who have decided this case, I am unable to agree with this interpretation of the section. I have not been able to discover any reason to insert the word ‘necessarily’ in the section when the Legislature has not done it. In my opinion, to do so would be to violate well settled canons of interpretation.
11. The function of a Court is to interpret the language of a statute. It is not the province of a Court to scan its wisdom or policy. Its duty is not to make the law reasonable, but to expound it as it stands, according to the real sense of the words.
12. Modification of the language of a statute is permissible only under exceptional circumstances, such as mentioned in the following quotation:
“Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. This may he done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unsual meaning to particular words, by altering their collocation by rejecting them altogether, or by interpolating other words, under the influence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction that the Legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications thus made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning.” (Maxwell, on the Interpretation of Statutes, Seventh Edition, page. 198.)
13. The language of S. 415, Penal Code, dearly indicates the intention of the Legislature and does not in any way lead to the conviction that the Legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify. As observed by Lord Bramwell in Cowper Essex v. Acton Local Board, (1889) 14 A.C 153 (169) : (58 L.J.Q.B 594) “The words of a statute never should be added to or substracted from, without almost a necessity.”
14. It has been held by Patterson, J. in King v. Burrell, (1840) 12 A. & E. 460 (469) : (9 L.J.Q.B 337) that the general rule is “not to import into statutes words, which are not to be found there.”
15. I am unable to discover any necessity for supplying the word ‘necessarily’ before the word ‘likely’ or for departing from the general rule formulated by Patterson, J. It further appears to me that ‘necessarily’ is not an apposite adverb to modify the meaning of ‘likely.’ The dictionary meaning of the word ‘necessary’ is, ‘that must be; that cannot be otherwise; unavoidable.’ ‘Necessarily’ is an adverb from this word and is therefore cognate in its connotation.
16. The dictionary meaning of the word ‘likely’ is ‘probable.’ It would thus appear that the two words connote contradictory ideas. Anything which is ‘likely’ may not happen, but ‘necessarily’ requires that it must happen.
17. In my opinion, therefore, the insertion of the adverb ‘necessarily’ before the word ‘likely’ can result only in confusing the plain and simple meaning of the language used in the statute. According to the plain language of the section the evidence on the record proves the charge against the applicant. There is thus no force in this application in revision. It is accordingly rejected. The applicant shall surrender to his bail and serve out the rest of the sentence.
18. Revision dismissed.
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