Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Jogendra Nath Singh v. Hira Sahu

Allahabad High Court
May 8, 1947
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

On 26th May 1911, Fateh Bahadur Singh executed a simple mortgage for Rs. 1,700 in favor of Nandan Sahu. The mortgagee filed suit No. 325 of 1923 and obtained a preliminary decree on 7th April 1924, followed by a final decree for sale on 24th February 1925 for Rs. 37,525. Jogendra Nath Singh, son of Fateh Bahadur Singh, filed suit No. 77 of 1927 seeking a declaration that the mortgaged property was joint family property, that the mortgage lacked legal necessity, and that the joint family was not liable for the mortgage debt. During pendency, the mortgaged property was sold in execution of the decree and purchased by the decree-holder, Nandan Sahu. The trial court dismissed Jogendra Nath Singh's suit on 10th April 1928, confirmed the auction sale, and possession was delivered to the purchaser on 28th December 1928.

Jogendra Nath Singh appealed (First Appeal No. 252 of 1928), and this Court allowed the appeal on 12th April 1932, setting aside the trial court’s decree and declaring the original decree valid only for Rs. 1,700 with simple interest and that the auction sale during the pendency of the appeal was invalid. Possession was restored to the joint family on 26th April 1933.

On 2nd March 1936, Jogendra Nath Singh filed an application under sections 151 and 144 of the Civil Procedure Code seeking an order directing Nandan Sahu to pay profits from the property during his possession from 28th December 1928 to 26th April 1933. The application was opposed on the ground that section 144 did not apply where a decree had not been set aside or modified by a superior court in appeal or revision arising from the same proceedings. The Civil Judge agreed and refused to entertain the application under section 144. The Judge also declined to exercise inherent jurisdiction under section 151, holding that the applicant had not come with clean hands, as he had not paid the amount due under the decree passed in appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code applies to a case where a decree has been set aside or varied by a court other than a superior court in appeal or revision.
  2. Whether restitution of possession and mesne profits can be granted under section 144 or under the inherent jurisdiction of the court under section 151 in such circumstances.
  3. Whether an applicant seeking restitution must come to court with clean hands, especially when relying on statutory reliefs like the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act.
  4. The scope and interpretation of the terms "varied or reversed" and "court of first instance" in section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • Section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code does not apply because the decree was not set aside or modified by a superior court in appeal or revision arising out of the same proceedings.
  • Courts of equal jurisdiction cannot reverse or vary each other’s decrees; therefore, the variation or reversal contemplated by section 144 must be by a superior court.
  • Jogendra Nath Singh did not come with clean hands since he had not paid the amount due under the decree passed in appeal and had applied under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act.

Appellant's Arguments

  • The application falls within the ambit of section 144 as the decree of the subordinate judge was varied by a subsequent decree of this Court.
  • Section 144 should not be narrowly construed to restrict restitution only to cases where variation or reversal is by a superior court on appeal or revision.
  • It is the duty of the court to ensure no party suffers due to a wrong decision, and restitution can be granted under inherent jurisdiction if section 144 does not apply.
  • Reliance on statutory reliefs like the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act does not imply dishonesty or bar the court’s intervention.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath Marwari Duty of the court under section 144 to place parties in position as if the varied or reversed decree had not been made; inherent jurisdiction to act fairly. Supported the view that section 144 applies broadly and the court must ensure no injury arises from its decisions.
Bindeshri Prasad Tiwari v. Badal Singh Application of section 144 and section 47; inherent powers of the court; restitution possible even if variation or reversal not by superior court in same proceedings. Held that variation or reversal need not be confined to appeals or revisions; restitution granted under section 47 and inherent jurisdiction.
Gopal Parol v. Swarna Bewa Section 144 applies when a decree is set aside either in the suit or by a decree in another suit; broad interpretation of 'varied or reversed'. Supported liberal construction of section 144 beyond appeals or revisions.
Bhawani Shanker v. Mahmud Ali Section 144 applies where decree is reversed or varied on appeal, revision, or review; courts of equal jurisdiction cannot reverse each other. Held that variation or reversal is generally by a superior court but admitted review (by same court) also counts; observations regarded as obiter except this point.
Shivappa Dhondappa Biradar Others v. Ramlingappa Shivappa Biradar Restitution under section 144 or inherent jurisdiction requires that the decree be varied or reversed; no interference when no such variation. Distinguished cases where no decree was varied or reversed and held restitution not applicable.
Anant Baburao Kulkarni v. Vyasacharya Madhavacharya Ghalasasi Power of court to allow restitution not limited to section 144; inherent jurisdiction exists even if decree not reversed or varied. Observations treated as obiter; inherent jurisdiction recognized.
Brij Mohan Singh v. Rameshar Singh Section 151 applies when no wrongful possession delivery by court order; section 144 not applicable. Confirmed that section 144 is not limited to appeals and revisions but may not apply in all cases of restitution.
Alfred Zahir v. Sirajuddin Section 144 requires variation or reversal by court of appeal; mere invalidation of transfer not sufficient. Held application under section 144 not maintainable; restitution granted under section 151.
Tangatur Subbarayudu v. Yerram Setti Seshasani Section 144 should be liberally construed; covers cases beyond variation or reversal on appeal. Supported broad interpretation of section 144.
Chintaman Singh v. Chuni Sahu Section 144 contemplates variation or reversal by superior court; setting aside ex parte decree by same court not covered. Held section 144 inapplicable in such cases; observations regarded as obiter.
Rameshwar Lal Jhunjhunwala v. Ram Charan Prasad Sahu Section 151 applies when consideration fails entirely; section 144 not applicable. Observations on section 144 were obiter; inherent jurisdiction recognized.
Amba Lal v. Ramgopal Madho Prasad Section 144 more appropriately applies where decree varied or reversed by superior court; section 151 allows restitution otherwise. Accepted that restitution under section 151 is available; section 144 applicability left open.
Badruddin Khan v. Mahyar Khan Restitution under section 144 includes damages and mesne profits; applies where decree set aside on appeal. Allowed claim for restitution of costs and damages under section 144.
Chittoori Venkataraju v. Chekka Suryanarayana Section 144 applies to orders set aside by independent proceedings, not just appeals. Confirmed section 144 is not confined to appellate reversals; supported liberal interpretation.
Rajjabali Khan Talukdar v. Faku Bibi Restitution under section 144 or inherent jurisdiction; strangers to litigation not liable for restitution. Held no restitution against third parties who were strangers to original suit.
Sohan Bibi v. Baijnath Das Section 144 lays down procedure to ensure courts do no injury; courts must act fairly. Supported broad duty of courts under section 144 and inherent jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the applicability of section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code, which mandates restitution to place parties in the position they would have occupied but for a decree or part thereof that has been varied or reversed. The Court rejected the narrow interpretation that section 144 applies only when a superior court modifies or sets aside a decree in appeal or revision. It recognized that a decree may be varied or reversed by other courts of competent jurisdiction, including the same court on review, or by independent proceedings, and such variation or reversal suffices for the application of section 144.

The Court analyzed various precedents and statutory provisions, noting that the legislature intended a broad and liberal construction of section 144 to prevent injustice caused by erroneous decrees. It rejected the argument that the applicant lacked clean hands due to statutory relief sought under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, affirming that statutory rights do not imply dishonesty.

The Court concluded that since the decree of the Subordinate Judge was expressly varied by this Court’s subsequent decree, and the auction sale set aside, the application for restitution falls within section 144. The Court emphasized its inherent duty to ensure no party suffers from wrongful decisions and that restitution is appropriate when possession was obtained under a decree later held invalid or varied.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed. The order of the lower court refusing to entertain the application under section 144 is set aside, and the case is remanded to the lower court for determination of the amount of mesne profits recoverable by the appellant.

The direct consequence is that Jogendra Nath Singh is entitled to recover mesne profits from Nandan Sahu for the period of possession under the auction sale which was invalidated. This decision clarifies that section 144 applies broadly to cases where a decree is varied or reversed not only by superior courts on appeal or revision but also by other competent courts or proceedings, ensuring equitable restitution. No new precedent beyond the application of existing principles was established.

Show all summary ...

Malik, J.:— The facts of this case are given in the referring order dated the 15th April, 1946. One Fateh Bahadur Singh had executed a simple mortgage for Rs. 1,700, in favour of Nandan Sahu on the 26th May, 1911. The mortgagee filed a suit, No. 325 of 1923, against Fateh Bahadur Singh and obtained a preliminary decree on the 7th April, 1924. A final decree for sale was passed on the 24th February, 1925, for Rs. 37,525, and odd. Jogendra Nath Singh, son of Fateh Bahadur Singh, then filed a suit, No. 77 of 1927, for a declaration that the property included in the mortgage was joint family property, that the mortgage was without legal necessity and that the joint family was not, therefore, bound by the decree or liable for payment of the mortgage debt. During the pendency of this suit the whole of the mortgaged property was sold in execution of the decree in suit No. 325 of 1923 and was purchased by the decree-holder. The suit of Jogendra Nath Singh was dismissed by the trial court on the 10th of April, 1928, and the auction sale was thereupon confirmed and the auction purchaser got possession of the property on the 28th December, 1928.

Jogendra Nath Singh filed an appeal (First Appeal No. 252 of 1928) in this Court on the 21st June, 1928. This appeal was allowed on the 12th April, 1932. The decree of this Court, so far as it is relevant, for our purposes, is as follows:

“It is ordered and decreed that this appeal be allowed, that the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Basti be set aside and that a decree be and it hereby, is passed in favour of the plaintiff for a declaration that the decree dated 7th April, 1924, passed in suit No. 325 of 1923 by the court of the Subordinate Judge of Basti is valid for recovery of Rs. 1,700 with simple interest thereon at the rate of Rs. 18, per cent, per annum, calculated up to 7th October, 1924, the date fixed for payment of the said decree and pendente lite interest as directed in the aforesaid decree up to the date of realisation, that the filial decree which was subsequently passed in the said suit on 24th of February, 1925, is also valid for the amount calculated in the mariner stated above and capable of execution by sale of the mortgaged property in suit for satisfaction of that amount, that the aforesaid decree are invalid as regards interest in excess of the amount which will be arrived at on calculation in the manner already mentioned, above and that the auction held on the basis of the said final decree during the pendency of this appeal shall not stand.”

As a result of this decision the sale was set aside and possession was delivered back to the joint family consisting of Fateh Bahadur Singh and Jogendra Nath Singh on the 26th April, 1933.

An application was filed on the 2nd March, 1936, by Jogendra Nath Singh for the relief that Nandan Sahu be directed to pay the profits in respect of the property which he had purchased at the auction and which had remained in possession from the 29th June, 1927—which it is now admitted, was a wrong date and should have been the 28th December, 1928—up to the 26th April, 1933. This application is headed as being under sections 151 and 144 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The facts, so far set out, are not denied. It is not denied that Nandan Sahu had purchased the property at auction in execution of his decree, in suit No. 325 of 1923 and had got possession of the same on the 28th December, 1928. It is further not denied that, as a result of the decree in First Appeal No. 252 of 1928, the auction sale was set aside and he had to restore possession on the 26th April, 1933. He had., therefore, remained in possession from the 28th December, 1928, to the 26th April, 1933, under an auction sale which had been expressly set aside on the ground that the decree in execution of which the property had been sold was not binding on the joint Hindu family of Fateh Bahadur Singh and his son, Jogendra Nath Singh.

This application was opposed on the ground that section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code, did not apply to a case where a decree had not been set aside or modified by a superior court, either in appeal or revision arising out of the same proceedings.

The learned Civil Judge agreed with this contention and held that the application could not be entertained under section 144.

As regards the argument that the court should in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, restore the applicant to the position that he would have occupied if a decree had not been passed against Fateh Bahadur Singh and the property had not been sold in execution thereof and the joint family had not been dispossessed of the property, the learned Judge held that the applicant had not come to court with clean hands and had not paid the amount due from him under the decree which was passed in appeal by this Court and the court was, therefore, not prepared to aid a dishonest litigant and there was therefore no occasion for the court's interference ex debito justitiae.

Evidently the ground on which the learned Judge took this view was that Jogendra Nath Singh had applied under the U.P Encumbered Estates Act and in accordance with the provisions of that Act simple money decree would be passed, in favour of Fateh Bahadur Singh and the amount would be paid by the Collector in due course.

I do not think that the learned Judge was right in his view that, if Jogendra Nath Singh took advantage of the Debt Acts and applied under the U.P Encumbered Estates Act, as he had probably a right to do, it could be said that he did not come, to court with clean hands; nor am I prepared to uphold his view that a person trying to take advantage of a Debt Act must be deemed to be a dishonest litigant. It may be that from the higher standards of morality a man must meet his liabilities according to the terms of his contract but if the legislature, in its wisdom. Has thought it fit to give at debtor an opportunity of going back on his contract and get certain reliefs which the law gives him, the courts of law would not be justified in condemning such a debtor as dishonest.

If I were not of the opinion that section 144, Civil Procedure Code, applies to this case, I would have held that the applicant is entitled to the relief claimed under the inherent powers of the Court. The matter has been considered by their Lordships of the Judicial. Committee in several cases and their Lordships have laid down that it is not only the right but the duty of the court to see that a person does not suffer by its wrong decision.

In the leading case of Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath Marwari, their Lordships held:

“It is the duty of the court under section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code to ‘place the parties in the position which they would have occupied, but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed.’ Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved. As was said by Cairns, L.C in Rodger v. Comptoir d'Escomple de Paris. One of the first and highest duties of all courts is to take care that the act of the court does no injury to any of the suitors and when the expression ‘the act of the court’ is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary court, or of any intermediate Court of Appeal, but the act of the court as a whole from the last court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest court which finally disposes of the case.”

In the referring order we expressed some doubt whether in case the application did not lie under section 144, but relief could be granted to the applicant only under the court's inherent jurisdiction on the trial court having refused to exercise such-jurisdiction, whether the applicant could come up in appeal to this Court, the appeal being a creature of, statute and there being no special provision for an appeal against such an order. But I find that in the case of Jai Berham the Subordinate Judge had exercised his jurisdiction and ordered restitution and there was an appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Patna which upset the decision of the Subordinate Judge and there was a further appeal to His Majesty in Council who restored the decision of the trial court. Their Lordships, in the observations quoted by me above have made it clear that the duty was not only of the primary court but also of the appellate courts which had finally disposed of the case. I further notice that in the Full Bench case of Bindeshri Prasad Tiwari v. Badal Singh, though the Court did not rely on section 144 and relied on the provisions of section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and in the alternative on the inherent powers of the Court, under section 151, the jurisdiction of the appellate court was not questioned and the appeal was allowed.

As I am, however, of the opinion that this case clearly comes under section 144 and as we did not hear any arguments on the question wither an appeal would lie from an order refusing to grant restitution under the inherent powers of the Court, I do not wish to express any definite opinion on the point.

The contention of learned counsel for the respondents that section 144 does not apply in the circumstances of this case is based on the language of the section. The relevant portion of section 144 (Act V of 1908) is as follows:

“(1) Where and in so far as a decree is varied or reversed the Court of first instance shall on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed…. (2) No such suit shall be instituted for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under sub-section (1).”

The first argument is that courts of equal jurisdiction cannot ‘reverse’ or ‘vary’ each other's decree and a decree is ‘reserved’ or ‘varied’ only when it is modified or set aside in the same proceedings by a superior court. That when a court holds that a decree passed by another court is not valid or binding, in whole or in part, it only gives a declaration to that effect but it does not either ‘reverse’ or ‘vary’ the previous decree.

The second argument is that the words “court of first instance” contemplate that the variation or reversal of the decree is made by a superior court.

In support of his argument learned counsel has cited various authorities. But before I come to discuss these authorities, I may mention that a decree may be varied or reversed in various ways. The most common method is to file an appeal or, where the decree is not appealable, a revision in a superior court which may either affirm, set it aside or modify the decree. In that case, no doubt the decree has been either ‘affirmed’, ‘varied’ or ‘reversed’. A court may also review its own decree and in that case it sets aside its previous decree. It will be noticed that there is no question then of a superior and an inferior, court as the court had itself passed the decree. If a decree has been obtained by fraud or has been obtained against a person who was not properly represented or has been passed by a court that had no jurisdiction, it may be possible to have it varied or reversed by another court. There seems to be no reason why restitution under section 144 should be confined only to the case where the decree has been ‘varied’ or ‘reversed’ in appeal or revision and has not been ‘varied’ or ‘reversed’ by any court by any of the other modes.

To my mind, the words “court of first instance” in section 144 only make it clear that the application for restitution should be made to the first court and not to any of the superior courts. For example, if a suit had been dismissed by the trial court and then on appeal the plaintiff's suit had been decreed but it was later held that the decree was vitiated by fraud or want of jurisdiction or for any other cause the application for restitution, if any, would have to be made to the first court, even though the decree had been passed in favour of the plaintiff by the appellate court. I do not see why the words ‘varied’, or ‘reversed’, though commonly applicable to a case where a decree has been set aside on appeal or revision by a superior court, could not be applied to a case where the decree had been set aside or varied by some other, court even if that other court, under the exceptional circumstances some of which have been mentioned by me above, had the right to vary or set aside the decree.

Learned counsel for the respondents has drawn our attention to section 574 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) which provided that “the judgment of the appellate, court shall state, when the decree appealed against is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled.” He has urged that it is clear that it is only the appellate court that can reverse or vary the decree. I have already said that ordinarily that is so, but there is no reason why, where a decree has been held to be invalid, in whole or in part, by another court of competent jurisdiction which was entitled by reason of the peculiar circumstances under which the decree was passed to, give a decree to that effect, it should not be deemed by its order to have varied or reversed the decree. In the case before us this Court by its decree, which I have quoted, above, has expressly, purported to vary and modify the previous decree.

Our attention has also been drawn to section 583 of the old Code and it is urged that section clearly applies only to a case where a decree has been modified or reversed in appeal. Section 583 reads as follows:

“When a party entitled to any benefit (by way of restitution or otherwise) under a decree passed in an appeal under this chapter desires to obtain execution of the same, he shall apply to the court which passed the decree against which the appeal was preferred; and such court shall proceed to execute the decree passed in appeal, according to the rules hereinbefore prescribed for the execution of decrees in suits.”

This section, as I understand, refers only to execution and the court to which the application for execution has to be made, the language of section 144 of the new Code is materially different, and I do not see why, when the section, was being redrafted, the legislature should have intended to confine it only to a reversal or variation by an appellate court and not to every kind of variation or reversal wherever such reversal or variation was possible. A large number of cases have been cited at the bar, but it does not appear to be necessary to discuss all of them. In Gopal Parol v. Swarna Bewa in execution of a rent decree the plaintiff had purchased a certain holding in the year 1915. A suit was brought by certain persons claiming that the holding belonged to them and they claimed possession. The suit was dismissed by the trial court but was decreed by the lower appellate court in 1917. In 1921 the High Court allowed the appeal. The defendants after the suit was decreed by the lower appellate court had obtained possession of the holding before the High Court had allowed the appeal. The plaintiff then applied for restitution under section 144. On the facts of that case section 144 was clearly applicable as the plaintiff had to part with possession of the property under a decree which had been set aside on appeal. The observations of the learned Judges were, therefore, obiter, but Rankin, C.J, with whom C.C Ghose, J. agreed, observed: “But if decree is set aside either by a proceeding in the suit itself or if it is set aside by a decree in another suit altogether, or if without being set aside by such a decree, is ‘superseded—to use the language of Turner, L.J, in a Privy Council case —these are matters which are not within the words, of the section. ‘Varied or reversed’ has a quite definite meaning for lawyers in the country and it appears to me that the observations in the case of Tangatur Subrayudu v. Yerram Sethi Seshasani failed to take account of the correct use of language in this matter.” With great respect to the learned Judges, as I have already said, the point did not arise before them, and though I am prepared to admit that the words ‘varied’ or ‘reversed’ ordinarily apply to a case where the ‘variation or reversal is by a superior’ court, it does not follow that a decree cannot be varid or reversed by the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction where grounds exist for such variation or reversal.

In Bhawani Shanker v. Mahmud Ali, Harries, J., dealings with this point held that “the use of the phrase ‘court of first instance’ contemplates that the variation or reversal of the decree is made by a superior court” and said that the “section clearly applies where a decree has been, reversed or varied upon appeal, revision or by a review.” If I may point out with great respect, review is not granted by a superior court and, as I have already said above, to my mind, all that the legislature intended was that the application under section 144 should be filed in the court of first instance, whichever court might have passed the decree, which had been reversed or superseded. Harries, J., went on to hold that courts of equal jurisdictions could not reverse or vary each other's decrees, although in a suit a court might hold that an earlier decree passed by another court was not binding upon the plaintiff before it by reason of fraud, collusion or other cause. The result of accepting this view would be that while if a decree has been reversed on appeal or revision restitution would be granted under section 144 and the order passed would be a decree which would be appealable, while in other cases the court would have to grant it under its inherent jurisdiction. I am not prepared to hold that the result of a decision that a particular decree is void, as it is vitiated by fraud or want of jurisdiction, does not in effect amount to its variation or reversal.

In Ashutosh Nandi v. Kundaikamini Dasi the facts were very peculiar. Defendant No. 3 filed a suit for arrears of rent against defendant No. 4 and obtained a decree and in execution of the decree he purchased the holding. Defendants 1 and 2 filed a suit against defendants 3 and 4 and obtained a decree that they were the owners and not the defendant No. 3. They then filed an application under section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code as against defendants 3 and 4 that the holding of which defendant No. 3 had taken possession should be given to them. It cannot be said that any decree was in that case reversed or varied. Reliance was placed in that case on the decision of Shama Purshad Roy Chowdery v. Hurro Prasad Roy Chowdery, and the point urged was that the decree obtained by defendants 1 and 2 against defendants 3 and 4 superseded the decree obtained by defendant No. 3 against defendant No. 4. The Court, however, relied on the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bommadecara Naganna Naidu v. Ravi Venkatappayya, where their Lordships had pointed out that the decision in Shama Purshad's case depended upon the interpretation put on the Order in Council in that case and their Lordships had accepted the reasonings and conclusions set forth in the dissentient judgment of Garth, C.J, in the case of Jogesh Chunder Butt v. Kali Chum Dutt. I do not think the point now under consideration really arose for decision in Ashutosh Nandi's case.

Similarly, in the case of Shivappa Dhondappa Biradar Others…Defendants v. Ramlingappa Shivappa Biradar…Plaintiff .(4), a suit had been filed by certain persons for partition against one Somanna and his transferees and a preliminary decree was passed. The preliminary decree provided that as far as possible the lands in possession of the transferees from Somanna should be allotted to the share of Somanna. Two days after the preliminary decree Somanna sold the rest of his share to his brother-in-law Sabu who brought a separate suit for partition. Sabu obtained a decree for partition. When the preliminary decree in the first suit was sent to the Collector to effect partition, the Collector found that Somanna had transferred the entire property and therefore it was not possible to effect partition, in such a manner as to allot to the share of Somanna the lands in possession of his transferees. The Collector, therefore, divided the lands equally between Somanna and the plaintiff to that suit and a final decree for partition was passed. Then a third suit was filed. Its have the preliminary decree in the suit filed by Sabu set aside. The plaintiff to the first suit was not a party to the third suit. It was not clear whether Somanna was or was not 3 party, but ultimately this suit was decreed and the decree in the suit filed by Sabu was set aside. It was after this that an application was filed that the property should be re-partitioned in such a manner that the lands alienated to the alienees should be allotted to the share of Somanna by way of restitution under section 144. It would appear that no court had purported to interfere in any way with the decree in the first suit No. 347 of 1919 and therefore there was no question of restitution either under the inherent jurisdiction of the court or under section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Again in the case of Anant Baburao Kulkarni…Defendant 1 v. Vyasacharya Madhavacharya Ghalasasi…Plaintiff . the plaintiff had obtained a decree against defendants 1 to 6 for arrears of rent. The suit was contested by defendant No. 7 and the plaintiff withdrew his suit against this defendant. The District Judge granted the plaintiff an opportunity to bring another suit on the same cause of action. After the suit was withdrawn defendant. No. 1 filed an application for restitution under section 144 alleging that the suit had been withdrawn as against him. Under a misapprehension that the suit was withdrawn as against defendant No. 1 the trial court passed an order granting restitution. The plaintiff appealed and the order was set aside and the application for restitution was dismissed. It was against the order that defendant No. 1 filed an appeal in the High Court in which he urged that the suit had been withdrawn not only against defendant No. 7 but against all the defendants. The High Court held that the suit had been withdrawn only against defendant No. 7 and not against all the defendants and the plaintiff decree-holder had, therefore, the right to realise the amount from the other defendants and he could not be directed to restore what he had received. The observation that the power of court to allow restitution is not limited to the terms of section 144 and that the court would have inherent power to direct restitution, even though the decree was not reversed or varied in appeal, was merely obiter as the point did not arise in the case.

In the case of Brij Mohan Singh v. Rameshar Singh, the point again did not arise. In that case in execution of a simple money decree certain properties were sold and were purchased by one Rameshar Singh who got possession of the property. The sale was set aside by the Commissioner. A suit was then filed by Rameshar Singh that the Commissioner's order setting aside the sale was void. The suit was decreed by the learned Munsif but was dismissed by the Chief Court. Rameshar Singh had got possession of the property after the auction sale and had remained in possession of the property after the order of Commissioner setting aside the sale and after the decision of the learned Munsif. When the Chief Court ultimately dismissed the suit and thereby affirmed the order of the Commissioner setting aside the sale the judgment-debtors applied to the Munsif for delivery of possession under his inherent jurisdiction under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was not a case where possession had been delivered of the property by reason of a wrong order of the Munsif and it was, therefore, a case to which section 144 was really not applicable. The learned Munsif refused to grant the application and the Chief Court held that an order passed under section 151 was not an appealable order. The observations in the judgment as regards the scope of section 144 that it applies to a case where a decree or order has been varied or reversed in appeal appear to be obiter, nor has the point been discussed at any length in the judgment.

The only case cited from Lahore is Alfred Zahir v. Sirajuddin. In that case too the question did not arise. One Sirajuddin had filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights and his wife Aziz Begum had filed a suit for her dower of Rs. 1,00.0. Both the suits were decreed on the same date. The wife transferred her decree to one Miraj Din. The husband filed a suit that the transfer was fictitious. While that suit was pending Miraj Din transferred his rights to one Alfred Zahir. Both the transfers were held to be invalid. While the proceedings for holding the transfer to be invalid were pending Alfred Zahir had applied for execution. The decree was executed, certain properties were sold and they were purchased by him. After it was held that the transfers were fictitious Sirajuddin filed an application under section 144 for restitution. It is obvious from the facts stated above that no decree or order had ever been varied or reversed. All that had happened was that a transfer by the decree-holder had been held to be invalid and the High Court held that the decree not having been varied or reversed the application was not maintainable. Any observations in that judgment that the variation or reversal should be by a court of appeal are, therefore, purely obiter. The High Court; ultimately held that under section 151 Alfred Zahir should be made to restore the property which he had purchased under a fictitious and fraudulent transfer.

The facts of the above case are very similar to the facts of the case in Tangatur Subbarayudu v. Yerram Setti Seshasani. There too a decree had been transferred to the appellant. The transferee executed the decree and realised the amount under the decree. Then a suit was instituted for a declaration that the transfer was bad and the suit, was decreed. Then an application was filed for realisation of the amount which the appellant had realised in execution by reason of the transfer in his favour. The High Court held that the language of section 144 was wide enough to cover a case of that kind. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the observations in this case that the language of section 144 should be liberally construed and should not be confined to a case where the decree is varied or reversed in appeal.

Learned counsel for the respondents has also relied on the decision in Chintaman Singh v. Chuni Sahu where a decree had been passed ex parte and the decree-holder had obtained possession and realised some profits out of the property. The ex parte decree was then set aside on an application for restoration and an application was filed under section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code for refund. Chamier, C.J, and Jwalal Prasad, J., held that the section contemplated a variation or reversal by a superior court and where an ex parte decree had been set aside by that very court section 144 did not apply. When order IX gives the court a right to set aside its own ex parte decree, on sufficient cause being shown, I fail to see why the words ‘set aside’ in section 144 must be confined to the setting aside by a superior court.

In Rameshwar Lal Jhunjhunwala v. Ram Charan Prasad Sahu where an application had been filed by the auction purchaser for refund of the amount paid by him after a suit under Order XXI, rule 63 of the Civil Procedure Code had been decreed and it had been held that the property did not belong to the judgment-debtor was held to be a case to which section 144 did not apply and to which section 151 was applicable. In such a case also no decree or order is set aside, but the application for restitution is made on the ground that the consideration has failed in its entirety. Certain observations in the said judgment that the variation or reversal of a decree or order must be by a court of appeal appear to me to be obiter ands the question did not really arise for decision.

These are the cases relied on by learned counsel for the respondents and except for the decision of Harries, J., in the case of Bhawani Shanker to my mind the observations in all the other cases appear to be mere obiter.

Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the case of Tangatur Subbarayudu. I have already said above that the observations in that case, though in favour of the appellant, were also obiter

In Bindeshri Prasad Tiwari v. Badal Singh, a suit had been brought on a mortgage and a final decree for sale had been obtained. The mortgaged property was sold and was purchased by a stranger to the suit and the sale was confirmed. After the confirmation of the sale a suit was brought on behalf of a minor for a declaration that he had not been properly represented in the previous suit and that neither the mortgage, nor the decree, nor the auction sale held there under was binding on him. The suit was decreed and the minor obtained possession of the property, by an application under section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code. It would be noticed that his right to apply under section 144 was not challenged. In any case, the point did not arise before the court. The auction purchaser then applied that he having lost possession of the property was entitled to a refund of the price paid by him. This application was filed under, section 47 of the Code. The point whether a variation, or reversal under section 144 must be by a superior court in the same proceedings was not a question for decision and the point was left open, though their Lordships observed that the words were “more applicable to a proceeding by way of appeal, revision or review than to a separate suit declaring that a decree is not binding on a particular party.” Refund was, however, granted under section 47 Civil Procedure Cole and under the inherent powers of the Court. The decision in that case is, therefore, not helpful for our purposes.

In the case of Amba Lal v. Ramgopal Madho Prasad a decree had been obtained against three brothers from the Bombay High Court, but the suit had been dismissed as against the other three brothers who had before the decision of the Bombay High Court brought a suit for partition. In execution of the decree three seventh share of the judgment debtors in various items of the property were sold and were purchased by the decree-holder for Rs. 31,290, out of which Rs. 4,279-12-9 was paid to certain other decree-holders on their application for rateable distribution, but before the sale some of the items of property had been allotted to the brothers against whom they suit had been dismissed and to their mother who was not a party to the Bombay suit. The mother filed a suit that the property allotted to her could not be sold in execution of the decree and the brothers against whom the suit was dismissed by the Bombay High Court filed applications to the same effect under section 471 of the Civil Procedure Code. These objections were allowed and the suit was decreed with the result that the properties, that had been allotted to their share was exempted. The decree-holder then filed an application that as a large amount of property that had been purchased by him had now gone out of his hands he was not liable for rateable distribution to the extent of Rs. 4,279-12-9, to the other decree-holders and they must be asked to refund the amounts paid to them in excess. This application was headed under sections 144 and 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships held that it was open to the Court to grant restitution under section 151 and that it was not necessary to go into the question whether section 144 was applicable, though in one part of the judgment they were inclined to accept the view that section 144 was more appropriately applicable to a case where, the decree had been varied or reversed by a superior court in appeal or revision.

The decision of Harries and Misra, JJ., in Badruddin Khan v. Mahyar Khan, does not appear to be very relevant to the point that has arisen before us. In that case a decree had been obtained for a specific performance of a contract to sell certain property. In accordance with the terms of the decree money was deposited. The judgment-debtors however, filed certain objections to the effect that the terms of the decree had not been complied with. The first court allowed the objection with costs, with the result that the sale-deed was not executed nor was possession of the property delivered to the decree-holders who had also to pay the costs of the other side. On appeal by the decree-holders the objections were set aside and it was held that the money had been deposited in accordance with the terms of the decree. A claim was then made by the decree-holders under section 144, Civil Procedure Code, for damages, for the delay caused in the delivery of possession and the execution of the sale deed, by reason of the improper objection made by the judgment-debtors and for the repayment of the costs realised by them from the decree-holders. The High Court held that restitution under section 144 meant restoration of property which had been recovered under an erroneous decree which had been set aside and the words “damages, compensation and mesne profits” in the section related to the mesne profits for the period during which the applicants were kept out of possession. The claim for the restitution of the costs, realised by the judgment-debtors objectors under the order which was set aside on appeal, was allowed.

Two other cases have been cited which I need mention. One is the decision of Mockett and Happell, JJ., in Chittoori Venkataraju v. Chekka Suryanarayana. In that case in execution of a money decree certain properties had been attached. An objection was filed that the property did not belong to the judgment-debtors but to the objector. The objection to the attachment was rejected with costs. Thereupon a suit was filed under Order XXI, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, for a declaration that the property belonged to the objector plaintiff. The suit was decreed with costs, but no mention was made in the decree about the costs that had been paid by the objector to the attaching creditors in accordance with the order rejecting his objection under Order XXI, rule 58 of the Civil-Procedure Code, with costs. The objector filed an application for restitution under section 144 of the costs paid by him. The main decision turns on the question whether the order passed under Order XXI, rule 58, could be deemed to have been set aside by the decree in the suit under Order XXI, rule 63, and the learned Judges were of the opinion, following a decision of their Lordships, of the Judicial Committee in Phul Kumari v. Ghanshyam Misra that the decree had that result. Then they further considered the question whether the application was maintainable under section 144 as the order had not been varied or reversed on appeal, but by an independent proceeding. The Court observed: “The section does not provide that, for an order of restitution to be made, the decree must have been varied or reversed in any particular form of proceeding or by any particular Court, and the learned Subordinate Judge has rightly stated that section 144 is not confined to cases where the orders are reversed on appeal; vide Subbarayuddu v. Yerrant Setli Seshasani.” The view expressed by the Bench supports the view which has been expressed by me above.

The last case to which I need make any reference is the decision in Rajjabali Khan Talukdar v. Faku Bibi. In that case certain shares in a village property had been sold in execution of a rent decree and had been purchased by the opposite parties Nos. 1 to 11. The opposite parties 1 to 10 executed a lease of the property after the purchase in favour of Rajjabali. Rajjabali was not able to get possession of the property and he filed a suit for possession against the petitioners. He got an ex parte decree against them and then applied for delivery of possession and possession was delivered to him. After the delivery of possession Rajjabali, subiet the property to opposite parties Nos. 13 to 23 and put them in possession thereof. The petitioners then filed an application for setting aside the ex parte decree which was granted and the suit was thereafter dismissed for default. The petitioners then made an application under section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code, for restoration of possession of the property, the possession of which they had lost under the ex parte decree which had been set aside. The question whether section 144 applied was not decided as their Lordships (Mukerji and Guha, JJ.) were of the opinion that the question whether section 144 applied or whether restitution should be under the inherent jurisdiction of the court was of no practical importance in that case. They however, carefully considered the question whether restitution could be granted against the opposite parties 13 to 23 who had got a sub-lease from Rajjabali after the ex parte decree. Their Lordships held that opposite parties Nos. 13, to 23 were strangers to the litigation and were in no sense the legal representatives of Rajjabali and no order of restitution should have been made against them.

In the case before of Jogendra Nath was in possession of the property as a member of a joint Hindu family. He was dispossessed by Nandan Sahu, who had obtained a decree against Fateh Bahadur Singh, had put the property to sale and had purchased it himself. The decree having been set aside Nandan Sahu must, restore back possession, of the property to Jogendra Nath. If the property had been purchased by a third party or if Nandan Sahu had after his purchase transferred the property to a third party, the position would have been different. But Nandan Sahn having retained possession of the property, to my mind, section 144, of the Civil Procedure Code is applicable.

The result, therefore, is that, in my opinion, this appeal must be allowed, the order of the lower court must be set aside and the case sent, back to that court for determination of the amount of the mense profits recoverable by the appellant. The costs to abide the result.

Wali Ullah, J.:— I agree with the judgment of Malik, J., and the order proposed by him.

Mootham, J.:— The facts of this case have been fully, stated by Malik, J., and need not repeat them. I think it is important however to observe that, by its decree dated the 12th April, 1932, this Court did in terms vary the decree of the Civil Judge of Basti. The application for restitution made by the respondent therefore falls, prima facie, directly within the terms of section 144 of the Civil. Procedure Code.

It has however been argued that this section can have to application because the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Basti was not varied or reversed on an appeal from that decree or on an application in revision, the argument being that the use in section 144 of the expressions “varied or reversed” and “court of first instance”, which have, it is said, a well understood technical meaning, indicate that the variation or reversal contemplated by that section must be by a superior court on an appeal from, or on an application for revision of, the decree in question. This was the view taken by Harries, J., as he then was, in Bhawani Shanker v. Mahmud Ali the only express decision of this Court upon the section in question. That learned Judge concedes however that the provisions of the section will apply when a decree is varied or reversed on an application for review; but his concession appears to me, if I may say so with the greatest respect, to destroy the whole argument, for the only court which can review a decree is the court which passed it—in other words it is conceded that a decree may be varied or reversed within the meaning of section 144 by a court which is not superior to that which made the decree and otherwise than on appeal or in revision.

Every court has a paramount duty to ensure that it does no injury to any litigant, and the provisions of section 144—as was pointed out by Mukerji, J., in Sohan Bibi v. Baijnath Das,—lay down a procedure whereunder effect can be given to that general provision of the law. In my opinion the court should be slow so to construe this section as to impose a restriction upon its obligation, to act “rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved.”

In the case of Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath Marwari, a sale in execution of a decree was set aside against a purchaser who was a stranger to the decree. The purchaser was held to be entitled, before restoring, the property, to be paid the excess of the purchase price over the mesne profits. The Privy Council holding that the Court's duty to order restitution arose under section 144 as well as under its general jurisdiction. This decision is, in my opinion, authority for the view that the provisions of section 144 have not to be narrowly construed. As I have said, the decree of the subordinate judge in the present case has been Varied by a subsequent decree of this Court: and I do not think there is any good ground, either on principle or authority, for not holding that the application of the appellant for restitution comes within the ambit of section 144. I agree with the judgment of Malik, J., and the order proposed by him.

By the Court:—This appeal is allowed. The order of the lower court is set aside and the case is sent back to that court for determination of the amount of mesne profits recoverable by the appellant. The costs will abide the result.