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Ajodhya Prasad Tara Chand Khekra v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Lucknow.

Allahabad High Court
Jan 20, 1967
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Judgment Summary — Manchanda, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a case stated under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The specific question referred to the court was: “Whether the assessee is entitled to development rebate on the 50 new kolhus added during the relevant previous year?”

The material facts are: the assessee is a firm engaged, inter alia, in letting out kolhus on hire. The relevant assessment year was 1960–61 (accounting year ending 30 October 1959). During the relevant previous year the firm let out 829 kolhus, of which 779 were old and 50 were newly manufactured during that previous year. The original cost of the 50 new kolhus was Rs. 15,032. Additionally, new kharad machines were added whose original cost was Rs. 4,000.

Procedurally, the assessee claimed development rebate in respect of the 50 new kolhus and the kharad machines, but the Income-tax Officer disallowed the claim. On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed development rebate on the total amount (Rs. 19,032) and directed the Income-tax Officer to allow development rebate at 25%. The department appealed to the Tribunal against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner insofar as it related to the 50 kolhus (Rs. 15,032). The Tribunal reversed the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and allowed the department's appeal. The present reference arises at the instance of the assessee under section 66(1).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the assessee is entitled to development rebate on the 50 new kolhus added during the relevant previous year?
  2. Whether a "kolhu" falls within "machinery or plant installed" for the purposes of section 10(2)(vib) of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
  3. Whether the plant or machinery must be both installed and used by the same person (i.e., must it be "used" by the assessee personally) to qualify as being "wholly used for the purposes of the business carried on by the assessee" under section 10(2)(vib)?

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The assessee claimed development rebate on the 50 new kolhus and on the new kharad machines added during the previous year.
  • The Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the assessee's claim, noting that the assessee had created the proper development rebate reserve and directing the Income-tax Officer to allow development rebate at 25% on Rs. 19,032.
  • The assessee's position, as accepted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and later argued before the court, was that the kolhus were owned by the assessee, newly manufactured, and were let out (i.e., used in the assessee's business of hiring), thereby satisfying the statutory conditions for development rebate.

Department's / Tribunal's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The department appealed against allowance of development rebate on the kolhus asserting two principal contentions: (1) a kolhu is not "machinery or plant installed" within the meaning of section 10(2)(vib); and (2) the kolhus were not plant or machinery "wholly used for the purposes of the business carried on by the assessee" (the department's case being that kolhus were used by the hirers to crush sugarcane and therefore not used by the assessee himself).
  • The Tribunal reasoned that the true interpretation of section 10(2)(vib) required that the plant or machinery should be installed in the assessee's business and wholly used for the purposes of that very business carried on by him — effectively reading an obligation that the installation and actual use must be by the same person. The Tribunal relied upon section 12(3) (which lists allowances for an assessee who lets on hire machinery) to support its conclusion that development rebate was not intended to be allowed for items let out on hire.
  • The standing counsel reiterated before the court the Tribunal's interpretation, arguing that kolhus were not "installed" by the assessee for crushing and therefore did not qualify.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1921] 12 Tax Cas. 358, 366 Principle of strict construction of taxing statutes (Rowlatt J.): in tax statutes one must look only at what is clearly said; nothing is to be read in or implied. Applied to reject the Tribunal's insertion of words into section 10(2)(vib) (i.e., the court refused to read into the provision a requirement that the assessee personally use the plant for the business).
Fomra Brothers v. Commissioner of Income-tax Authority holding that certain cars hired out by an agent for use by a principal qualified for development rebate. Relied upon as judicial support for the proposition that hired vehicles (or hired plant) can qualify for development rebate where statutory conditions are satisfied.
Commissioner of Income-Tax (Central) Bombay v. Saraspur Mills Ltd. [1959] 36 I.T.R. 580 Interpretation that "installed" can mean "inducted or introduced" and not necessarily only "fixed in position." Used to support a broader interpretation of "installed" such that motor-cars and bicycles purchased for business use qualified for development rebate.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sri Rama Vilas Service (Private) Ltd. [1960] 38 I.T.R. 25 Held that a bus or lorry can be said to be "installed" when it is set up for use or service upon being put on the road; installation is capable of being completed in the context-specific sense of the article and business. Quoted and relied upon to show that "installation" is not confined to fixing in a factory; in a hiring business placing vehicles (or plant) into service can satisfy the statutory test of installation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a textual and contextual analysis of the statutory provisions and facts. The key steps in the reasoning were:

  1. Identification of the relevant statutory provisions: section 10(1) (head of "Profits and gains of business"), section 10(2) (allowances including depreciation), sub-clause (vib) dealing with development rebate for a new ship or new machinery or plant "installed" after 31 March 1954 and "wholly used for the purposes of the business carried on by the assessee", and section 10(5) which defines "plant" to include items such as vehicles.
  2. The court observed that the words "plant and machinery" in section 10(2) must be given a wide meaning. It noted that kolhus are neither an office appliance nor a vehicle and therefore, if not "machinery" they would at least constitute "plant" and qualify for depreciation and development rebate provided the other conditions of section 10(2)(vib) are satisfied.
  3. The court listed the statutory conditions for development rebate (as applicable in the case): (1) the asset is new; (2) installed after 31 March 1954; (3) owned by the assessee; (4) used wholly for the purposes of the assessee's business; and (5) the development rebate reserve must have been created.
  4. Factual findings: the Appellate Assistant Commissioner found the reserve had been created; there was no dispute that the assessee owned the kolhus; and the kolhus were newly manufactured during the relevant previous year. Thus conditions (1), (3) and (5) were satisfied.
  5. The court focused on the two contested conditions: whether the kolhus were "installed" after 31 March 1954 and whether they were "used wholly for the purposes of the assessee's business." Noting that "installed" is not defined in the Act, the court consulted an authoritative dictionary (Webster's) which includes meanings such as "to set up and fix in position for use" and more generally "to set up or place in position for service or use." The court emphasized that what constitutes "installation" depends on the nature of the business and the article to be installed.
  6. Applying that principle to the present facts, the court held that in a business consisting of hiring out kolhus, the kolhus would be "installed" the moment they are set up or placed in position for service or use (for example, placed in the assessee's showroom and let out). The Tribunal's finding that kolhus were let out was accepted as a fact by the court.
  7. On the question of "used wholly for the purposes of the assessee's business," the court reasoned that the assessee's business was the hiring out of kolhus; therefore, kolhus that were let out were indeed used wholly for the purposes of the assessee's business. The fact that the hirer also used the kolhu for crushing did not mean the kolhu were not used for the assessee's business of hiring.
  8. The court criticized the Tribunal for effectively inserting the word "in" into the statutory phrase "used wholly for the purposes of the business carried on by the assessee" to require that the assessee himself must use the machinery for his business operations (e.g., crushing sugarcane). Relying on the Cape Brandy principle, the court held that no words should be read into a taxing statute.
  9. The court also examined the legislative scheme and related provisions (such as section 12(3) and section 56(2)(ii) as read with later corresponding provisions) to show that the legislature contemplated that income from machinery, plant or furniture let on hire could be assessed under the head "business" and not necessarily only under "other sources," thereby undermining the Tribunal's reliance on section 12(3) to exclude development rebate for hired-out plant.
  10. Finally, the court referred to earlier High Court decisions (Bombay and Madras) that supported a broader interpretation of "installed" and recognized that hired vehicles or plant could qualify for development rebate when statutory conditions were satisfied.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court answered the question in the affirmative. In statutory terms: the assessee is entitled to development rebate on the 50 new kolhus added during the relevant previous year.

Direct consequences ordered by the court (as stated in the opinion):

  • The question referred was answered in favour of the assessee.
  • The department was ordered to pay the costs of the reference assessed at Rs. 250, and counsel's fee was assessed at Rs. 250.

Implications: The immediate effect is that the assessee's claim for development rebate on the 50 new kolhus is sustained and costs are awarded against the department. The court's analysis also provides interpretative guidance on the meanings of "installed" and "used wholly for the purposes of the business" in the context of section 10(2)(vib), relying on and aligning with earlier High Court decisions; the opinion does not purport to state that it is creating a novel legislative rule beyond answering the referred question.

Show all summary ...

Manchanda, J.:— This is a case stated under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The question referred is:

“Whether the assessee is entitled to development rebate on the 50 new kolhus added during the relevant previous year?”

2. The material facts are these: The assessee is a firm which, inter alia, carries on business of letting out kolhus on hire. The relevant assessment year is 1960-61, the accounting year whereof was the year ending 30th of October, 1959. During the said previous year, the assessee let out 829 kolhus, out of which 779 kolhus were old ones and 50 were new additions manufactured during the previous year. The original cost of the said additions of kolhus amounted to Rs. 15,032. New kharad machines were also added during the previous year whose original cost was Rs. 4,000.

3. The assessee claimed development rebate in respect of the 50 new kolhus and kharad machines added during the previous year, but the claim was ignored by the Income-tax Officer. The assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and contended, inter alia, that development rebate should have been allowed on the additional kolhus and the kharad machines. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the assessee's contention observing:

“The Income-tax Officer has not given any reason why development rebate has not been allowed. The assessee has created proper reserve. Hence development rebate is allowed on this amount of Rs. 19,032. The Income-tax Officer is directed to allow development rebate at 25%.”

4. Thereupon, the department filed an appeal to the Tribunal against the aforesaid decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner so far as it pertained to the additional kolhus valued at Rs. 15,032 and contended that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had erred in allowing development rebate thereon, because: (1) kolhu is not “machinery or plant installed” within the meaning of section 10(2)(vib); and (2) it was not plant or machinery wholly used for the purposes of the business carried on by the assessee. According to the Tribunal, the true interpretation of section 10(2)(vib) was that development rebate could only be claimed by a person who satisfied two conditions: (1) that the plant or machinery should be installed in such person's business, and (2) that it should be wholly used for the purposes of that very business carried on by him. But, as the assessee carried on the business of letting kolhus on hire to others in order that they may make use of them for the purpose of their business, the Tribunal opined that it cannot be said that the kolhus were installed and used for the purposes of the assessee's business of hiring. To support the conclusion that the installation and the user of the plant or machinery must be by one and the same person, reference was made by the Tribunal to the provisions of section 12(3) of the Act, which catalogues the allowances to which an assessee who lets on hire machinery belonging to him is entitled to and, as that makes no reference to the allowance of development rebate under section 10(2)(vib), it was concluded that, even if the hiring constituted a business under section 10, the development rebate would not be admissible. The order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was accordingly reversed and the appeal allowed. Hence, this reference at the instance of the assessee.

5. As there is no case directly in point and the matter is res Integra, it will be useful to set out the relevant provisions of the Act at the very outset. Section 10(1) reads:

“The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head ‘Profits and gains of business, profession or vocation’ in respect of the profits or gains of any…. carried on by him,

(2) Such profits or gains shall be computed after making the following allowances, namely:….

(vi) in respect of depreciation of such buildings, machinery, plant or furniture being the property of the assessee, a sum equivalent,…. to such percentage….

(vib) in respect of a new ship acquired or new machinery or plant installed after the 31st day of March, 1954, which is wholly used for the purposes of the business carried on by the assessee, a sum by way of development rebate in respect of the year of acquisition of the ship or of the installation of the machinery or plant, equivalent to,….”

6. The relevant portion of section 10(5) runs:

“….‘plant’ includes vehicles, books, scientific apparatus and surgical equipment purchased for the purposes of the business, profession or vocation;….”

7. A combined reading of the provisions set out above makes it clear that the words “plant and machinery” in section 10(2) have to be given a very wide meaning. Even for the purposes of section 10(2)(vib), as it stood at the relevant time and before the Income-tax Act of 1961, wherein by section 33, which corresponded to the old section 10(2)(vib), a specific provision was added excluding office appliance or a road transport vehicle from the definition of “plant”. In any case, kolhus are neither office appliance nor “vehicles” and, therefore, if not machinery would certainly be a “plant” and as such qualify for depreciation and development rebate provided the other conditions of section 10(2)(vib) are satisfied. There cannot also be much doubt that depreciation as well as development rebate could only be claimed by the person who is the owner of the property. Sub-clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of section 10 makes it clear that depreciation can only be claimed by the person whose property is attached (sic). The words used are, “being the property of the assessee”, in other words, the owner of the property. The assessee in the present case is undoubtedly the owner of the kolhus. The conditions for qualifying for development rebate are: (1) that the asset is new, (2) installed after the 31st of March, 1954, (3) it should be owned by the assessee, (4) it is used wholly for the purposes of the assessee's business, and (5) the development rebate reserve must have been created.

8. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner found that the development rebate reserve was duly created by the assessee and that fact was not challenged or controverted by the Tribunal and, therefore, that condition must be taken to have been satisfied. It was also not doubted that the assessee was the owner of the kolhus nor that the asset was a newly manufactured one in the relevant assessment year which was after the 31st of March, 1954. Conditions Nos. 1, 3 and 5 would therefore be satisfied. The difficulty, however, only is with regard to conditions Nos. 2 and 4. That is, (1) were the kolhus “installed” after 31st of March, 1954, and (2) were they used wholly for the purposes of the assessee's business. The word “installed” is not defined in the Act and, therefore, a reference to the dictionary meaning is permissible. In Webster's New International Dictionary the word “installed” has several meanings, such as the “installation” of a person in office; more appropriately, when dealing with plant or machinery it means: “to induct; give a place to; to set up and fix in position for use as such; setting up or placing in position for service or use.” What constitutes installation will depend upon the nature of the business and the article that has to be installed. A boiler in a factoiy cannot be said to be installed until it is set up and fixed in position for use as such. On the other hand, a truck or a car which is a plant or machinery within the meaning of section 10(5) of the Act would be installed the moment it is set up or placed in position for service or use. Similarly, in the case of business which consists wholly of hiring of kolhus, the kolhus could be said to be installed the moment they are set up or placed in position for service or use. It is the last of the meanings reproduced hereinabove from the dictionary that would really be applicable. In any event, when there are two possible meanings, the meaning most favourable to the assessee in a taxing statute has to be applied. It has been found as a fact by the Tribunal, as stated in the case, that these 50 new kolhus which were added were also let out by the assessee. The kolhus on which development rebate is claimed once were admittedly let out and were, therefore, wholly used for the assessee's business which consisted of hiring out of such kolhus. The assessee was neither a crusher of sugarcane nor was that his business, and, therefore, kolhus could not have been used by him for that purpose. His business was wholly that of hiring out of kolhus. The 50 new kolhus were in fact hired out, and, therefore, they were used wholly for the purpose of the assessee's business. The fact that the person who hired the kolhus also made use of them would not make the kolhus any the less “used wholly for the purposes of the assessee's business”. The Tribunal, therefore, fell into error when interpreting section 10(2)(vib) by inserting certain words which do not find a place there. They inserted the word “in” after the word “used” and before the word “business” and thus came to the conclusion that kolhus must be used by the assessee for crushing sugarcane and no one else. This violates the fundamental canon of construction of fiscal statutes as adumbrated by Rowlatt J. in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1921] 12 Tax Cas. 358, 366. that in a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment; there is no equity about a tax; there is no presumption as to a tax: nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied, one can only look fairly at the language used.

9. The interpretation sought to be placed by the Tribunal and reiterated by the learned standing counsel before us would certainly require some words to be inserted into section 10(2)(vib) for which there can be no warraat. If the position was as simple as the Tribunal and the department would have it, then in no case would plant or machinery which is hired out ever qualify for development rebate. If that was the true position then there would have been no need to make a specific provision such as in section 12(3) of the Act nor in section 57(H) of the Act of 1961, which corresponds to the old section 12(3) of the Act when read with section 56(2)(ii). The latter makes it abundantly clear that the income from machinery, plant or furniture, belonging to the assessee and let on hire is only to be assessed under other sources “if the income is not chargeable to income tax under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’.” Therefore, the legislature clearly contemplates that income from machinery, plant or furniture hired out can be assessed under the head “business” and not necessarily only under the head “other sources”. It is not, therefore, correct for the department to say that hiring out of machinery, plant, etc., could only have been assessed under “other sources”. If the income from hiring can be assessed under the head “business” there is no reason why development rebate under section 10(2)(vib) should not be admissible to such an assessee. The Tribunal, therefore, could not have derived any support from the provisions of section 12(3) of the Act as the assessment admittedly was made under section 10 and not section 12 of the Act. The view we are taking finds some support from the decisions of the Madras and Bombay High Courts. In Fomra Brothers v. Commissioner of Income-tax where certain cars were being hired out by an agent of Burmah Shell for the use of Burmah Shell officials and development rebate on new cars purchased for this purpose was held to qualify for development rebate. In Commissioner Of Income-Tax (Central) Bombay v. Saraspur Mills Ltd.…Assessee. [1959] 36 I.T.R 580.. Shah J., as he then was, interpreted the word “installed” to also mean “inducted or introduced” and not necessarily “fixed in position” and held that a manufacturer of cloth who had purchased certain motor-cars and bicycles for use in its business was entitled to development rebate. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sri Rama Vilas Service (Private) Ltd. [1960] 38 I.T.R 25., the Madras High Court has, following the decision of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner Of Income-Tax (Central) Bombay v. Saraspur Mills Ltd.…Assessee. held, that a bus or lorry can be said to be installed when it is set up for use or service upon its being put on the road and “therefore the statutory test of installation was satisfied by the assessee because such installation as the buses and lorries were capable of was completed”. The last sentence was clutched upon by the standing counsel to show that kolhus were capable of installation unlike buses and they, not having been fixed in position for crushing by the assessee, could not be said to have been installed. There is no force in this contention, as already observed. The question of installation is not only linked up with the article as such but also with the nature of the business. In a hiring out business, the installation of a plant or machinery can only be by placing it in position for service or use. The moment the assessee placed the kolhus in his show room and actually hired them out the statutory requirement for claiming development rebate would be satisfied.

10. For the reasons given above, the question referred is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The department will pay the costs of this reference which we assess at Rs. 250. Counsel's fee is also assessed at Rs. 250.

11. Question answered in the affirmative.