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Cases cited for the legal proposition you have searched for.

...................................................................... 35 iii. Fiscal Federalism ................................................................................................ 41...expression "by law" in mind to give an appropriate interpretation to the entry. iii. Fiscal Federalism 48. Federalism is one of the...Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Private Limited,57this Court recognized fiscal federalism as...

...them as binding edicts would disrupt fiscal federalism, where both the Union and the States are conferred equal power to legislate on GST. It is not imperative that one of the federal units must...the GST Council to only have a persuasive value, particularly when interpreted along with the objective of the GST regime to foster cooperative federalism and harmony between the constituent units...always possess a higher share in the power for the federal units to make decisions. Indian federalism is a dialogue between cooperative and uncooperative federalism where the federal units are at liberty...

...them as binding edicts would disrupt fiscal federalism, where both the Union and the States are conferred equal power to legislate on GST. It is not imperative that one of the federal units must...the GST Council to only have a persuasive value, particularly when interpreted along with the objective of the GST regime to foster cooperative federalism and harmony between the constituent units...always possess a higher share in the power for the federal units to make decisions. Indian federalism is a dialogue between cooperative and uncooperative federalism where the federal units are at liberty...

...them as binding edicts would disrupt fiscal federalism, where both the Union and the States are conferred equal power to legislate on GST. It is not imperative that one of the federal units must...the GST Council to only have a persuasive value, particularly when interpreted along with the objective of the GST regime to foster cooperative federalism and harmony between the constituent units...always possess a higher share in the power for the federal units to make decisions. Indian federalism is a dialogue between cooperative and uncooperative federalism where the federal units are at liberty...

...them as binding edicts would disrupt fiscal federalism, where both the Union and the States are conferred equal power to legislate on GST. It is not imperative that one of the federal units must...the GST Council to only have a persuasive value, particularly when interpreted along with the objective of the GST regime to foster cooperative federalism and harmony between the constituent units...always possess a higher share in the power for the federal units to make decisions. Indian federalism is a dialogue between cooperative and uncooperative federalism where the federal units are at liberty...

...VAT is contrary to the principles of fiscal federalism adopted in the Constitution. In the circumstances, we find that the impugned demand of differential duty relating to value of materials supplied...

...the value on which the appellants had already paid State VAT is contrary to the principles of fiscal federalism adopted in the Constitution. In the circumstances, we find that the impugned demand of...

...simultaneous power to legislate on GST; and second, it would violate the fiscal federalism of the States since the Centre has a one-third vote share and the States collectively have a two-third vote share...important features of Indian federalism is ‘fiscal federalism’. A reading of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 2014 Amendment Bill, the Parliamentary reports and speeches indicate that Articles...would disrupt fiscal federalism, where both the Union and the States are conferred equal power to legislate on GST. It is not imperative that one of the federal units must always possess a higher share...

...a collaborative dialogue involving the Union and States. They are recommendatory in nature. To regard them as binding edicts would disrupt fiscal federalism, where both the Union and the States are... 3 cooperative federalism and harmony between the constituent units; 171.1.2. Neither does Article 279...conferred equal power to legislate on GST. It is not imperative that one of the federal units must always possess a higher share in the power for the federal units to make decisions. Indian federalism...

...disrupt fiscal federalism, where both the Union and the States are conferred equal power to legislate on GST. It is not imperative that one of the federal units must always possess a higher share in...foster cooperative federalism and harmony between the constituent units; (b) Neither does Article 279A begin with a non-obstante clause nor does Article...the power for the federal units to make decisions. Indian federalism is a dialogue between cooperative and uncooperative federalism where the federal units are at liberty to use different means of...

...disrupt fiscal federalism, where both the Union and the States are conferred equal power to legislate on GST. It is not imperative that one of the federal units must always...of the GST regime to foster cooperative federalism and harmony between the constituent units; (b) Neither does Article 279A begin with... possess a higher share in the power for the federal units to make decisions. Indian federalism is a dialogue between cooperative and uncooperative federalism where the federal...

... To regard them as binding edicts would disrupt fiscal federalism, where both the Union and the States are...objective of the GST regime to foster cooperative federalism and harmony between the constituent units; (b) Neither does Article 279A begin.... Indian federalism is a dialogue between cooperative and uncooperative federalism where the federal units are at liberty to use different means of persuasion ranging from...

...Union and States. They are recommendatory in nature. To regard them as binding edicts would disrupt fiscal federalism, where both the Union and the States are conferred equal power to legislate on GST...recommendations of the GST Council to only have a persuasive value, particularly when interpreted along with the objective of the GST regime to foster cooperative federalism and harmony between the.... It is not imperative that one of the federal units must always possess a higher share in the power for the federal units to make decisions. Indian federalism is a dialogue between cooperative and...

...them as binding edicts would disrupt fiscal federalism, where both the Union and the States are conferred equal...objective of the GST regime 2 to foster cooperative federalism... units to make decisions. Indian federalism is a dialogue between cooperative and uncooperative...

... States. They are recommendatory in nature. To regard them as binding edicts would disrupt fiscal federalism, where both the Union and the States are conferred equal power to...have a persuasive value, particularly when interpreted along with the objective of the GST regime to foster cooperative federalism and harmony between the constituent...decisions. Indian federalism is a dialogue between cooperative and uncooperative federalism where the federal units are at liberty to use different means of persuasion...

...recommendatory in nature. To regard them as binding edicts would disrupt fiscal federalism, where both the Union and the States are conferred equal power to legislate on GST. It is not imperative that one of..., (2022) 10 SCC 700 to find that the object behind the insertion of Articles 246A and 279A read with the overriding provisions in Article 254 was to promote fiscal...federalism and co-operative federalism, in which circumstance, the recommendation made by the GST Council when required, as per the provisions of the Central Act or the State Act, has to be construed to...

...on which the appellants had already paid state VAT is contrary to the principles of fiscal federalism adopted in the Constitution. In the circumstances, we find that the impugned demand of...

...recommendatory in nature. To regard them as binding edicts would disrupt fiscal federalism, where both the Union and the States are conferred equal power to legislate on GST. It is not imperative that one of..., (2022) 10 SCC 700 to find that the object behind the insertion of Articles 246A and 279A read with the overriding provisions in Article 254 was to promote fiscal...federalism and co-operative federalism, in which circumstance, the recommendation made by the GST Council when required, as per the provisions of the Central Act or the State Act, has to be construed to...

...recommendatory in nature. To regard them as binding edicts would disrupt fiscal federalism, where both the Union and the States are conferred equal power to legislate on GST. It is not imperative that one of..., (2022) 10 SCC 700 to find that the object behind the insertion of Articles 246A and 279A read with the overriding provisions in Article 254 was to promote fiscal...federalism and co-operative federalism, in which circumstance, the recommendation made by the GST Council when required, as per the provisions of the Central Act or the State Act, has to be construed to...

...recommendatory in nature. To regard them as binding edicts would disrupt fiscal federalism, where both the Union and the States are conferred equal power to legislate on GST. It is not imperative that one of..., (2022) 10 SCC 700 to find that the object behind the insertion of Articles 246A and 279A read with the overriding provisions in Article 254 was to promote fiscal...federalism and co-operative federalism, in which circumstance, the recommendation made by the GST Council when required, as per the provisions of the Central Act or the State Act, has to be construed to...