Webber v. Leson Chevrolet: Limits on Title VII Social‑Media Harassment, Wrongful Termination, and Louisiana Prescription

I. Introduction

In Webber v. Leson Chevrolet Company, No. 24‑30637 (5th Cir. Nov. 18, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment against an employee who claimed a racially hostile work environment and wrongful termination under Title VII, along with several Louisiana state-law claims. The court also affirmed sanctions imposed on the plaintiff’s counsel for repeated procedural lapses during discovery.

The case arose from offensive, violence‑tinged social‑media posts made by the owner’s son, a trainee manager at the dealership, in the context of a nearby protest against police brutality. The African‑American plaintiff, a mechanic, participated in that protest and later expressed fear for his safety, insisting he could not work if the owner’s son was present. After the dealership fired the son and accommodated the plaintiff’s initial request for time off, the plaintiff nonetheless ceased reporting to work for more than two weeks without communicating with management. He was then terminated.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit addressed three core sets of issues:

The threshold for a Title VII hostile work environment claim when the alleged harassment consists of a coworker’s social‑media posts that do not directly target the plaintiff;
The application of the McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting framework and the “same‑actor” inference to a Title VII wrongful‑termination claim where the employee had a lengthy unexcused absence; and
Louisiana’s one‑year prescriptive period (limitations period) for employment‑related tort and discrimination claims, including the “continuing tort” doctrine and brief discussion of contra non valentem, as well as the standards for discovery‑related sanctions.

Although designated as non‑precedential under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, the opinion offers an instructive synthesis of existing law. It underscores the difficulty of converting generalized or “second‑hand” social‑media misconduct into an actionable hostile work environment, reiterates the rigor of the pretext showing required in Title VII wrongful‑termination cases, and confirms the strictness of Louisiana’s prescription rules in employment litigation.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Nathanial Webber, an African‑American mechanic, was hired by Leson Chevrolet Company (“LCC”), a family‑owned dealership in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, in September 2019. He was supervised and hired by service manager Timothy Colson. The dealership was owned and operated by Lisa Rebowe; her son, Leson Rebowe, worked as a trainee manager in sales. No complaints of harassment or discrimination were made by Webber until mid‑2020.

On June 4, 2020, a social‑justice protest took place at the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office, adjacent to the dealership. Webber attended that protest. The same day, Leson Rebowe posted several offensive social‑media messages advocating violence against protestors. By June 5, Webber learned of these posts and expressed fear to his supervisors (Colson and manager Johnny Brumfield) that Leson might harm him because of his participation in the protest. Webber requested a meeting with management; Brumfield suggested a direct meeting with Leson instead. Webber refused to meet Leson unless management assured him Leson would not be armed. Brumfield allegedly responded, “You are not about to do this, or this will be your last day working here.” No individual meeting occurred.

Public backlash followed. Within days, Lisa Rebowe fired her son and apologized publicly on behalf of the dealership. On June 9, she held a meeting for employees to express any concerns about the incident. Webber did not attend, having taken time off due to safety concerns (which Colson approved by email). Around June 18, Lisa spoke with Webber directly and informed him that Leson had been terminated; Webber returned to work on June 23.

On July 2, Leson briefly came to the dealership to return a company vehicle. There was no interaction between Webber and Leson, but Webber saw him. Webber then left work and texted Colson that he could not stay if Leson was present. Colson allowed him the rest of the day off. Thereafter, Webber stopped reporting to work and did not contact LCC or Colson for over two weeks. On July 20, 2020, LCC terminated Webber’s employment due to his extended unexplained absence.

Webber filed an EEOC charge in November 2020; the EEOC declined to proceed and issued a right‑to‑sue notice. In April 2022, Webber filed suit in the Eastern District of Louisiana asserting:

A Title VII racially hostile work environment claim;
A Title VII wrongful‑termination (disparate treatment) claim; and
State‑law claims for racial discrimination, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The magistrate judge also oversaw contentious discovery, during which Webber’s counsel missed multiple conferences, failed to attend the corporate deposition of LCC, and filed an unsuccessful motion for sanctions alleging defense misconduct. When counsel again failed to appear at a show‑cause hearing set on that motion, the magistrate judge denied Webber’s sanctions motion, ordered plaintiff’s counsel to show cause why she should not be sanctioned, and ultimately imposed $3,500 in sanctions. The district court adopted those rulings and later granted LCC’s motion for summary judgment on all claims.

B. Holdings

The Fifth Circuit affirmed in all respects, holding that:

Hostile work environment: Webber’s evidence—centered on a single series of offensive social‑media posts that did not identify or target him and were made by a coworker with whom he had no in‑person conflict—failed to create a triable issue on whether he experienced “extreme” harassment affecting a term, condition, or privilege of employment.
Wrongful termination under Title VII: Even assuming a prima facie case, LCC articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination (Webber’s more than two‑week unexplained absence). Webber identified no evidence sufficient to raise a genuine dispute that this reason was pretextual, especially in light of the “same‑actor” inference: the same manager both hired and fired him.
State‑law claims: All state‑law claims were time‑barred under Louisiana’s one‑year prescriptive period (even accounting for an EEOC tolling period of up to six months). Webber’s arguments for extending prescription under the “continuing tort” doctrine and contra non valentem failed.
Sanctions: The magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion:
- in denying Webber’s motion for sanctions against defense counsel arising from a dispute over deposition location and alleged deposition misconduct;
- in imposing $3,500 in sanctions on Webber’s counsel for repeated missed appearances and burdensome, repetitive filings; or
- in treating Webber’s “objections” motion as, in substance, a motion for reconsideration of his earlier sanctions motion, then denying it for lack of new law, new evidence, or clear error.
New Title VII retaliation theory: Webber’s attempt to raise a Title VII retaliation claim for the first time on appeal was rejected as waived, because it had not been pled in the district court or before the EEOC. (Leverett v. Louisville Ladder Co.)

III. Analysis

A. Hostile Work Environment and Social‑Media Harassment

1. Precedents and Doctrinal Framework

The court applied the standard five‑element prima facie test for a Title VII racial hostile work environment claim, as articulated in Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff must show:

membership in a protected class;
unwelcome harassment;
harassment based on race;
harassment that affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and
that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.

The opinion focuses on the fourth element—whether the alleged harassment was sufficiently “extreme” or “severe or pervasive” to alter the conditions of employment.

Key precedents cited and relied upon include:

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) – Harassment must be “extreme” to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) – Identifies the factors for assessing severity:
- frequency of the conduct;
- its severity;
- whether it is physically threatening or humiliating (as opposed to a mere offensive utterance); and
- whether it unreasonably interferes with the employee’s work performance.
Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir. 2007) – “Isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to” actionable harassment.
Arredondo v. Elwood Staffing Servs., Inc., 81 F.4th 419, 433 (5th Cir. 2023) – Even a derogatory epithet causing deeply offensive feelings may not suffice unless it materially changes employment conditions; and “second‑hand harassment is less objectionable than harassment directed at the plaintiff.”
EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. PRIDE Indus., Inc., 7 F.4th 392, 400–04 (5th Cir. 2021) – Examples of situations where frequent racial/religious insults and racial slurs by coworkers or supervisors crossed the line into a hostile work environment.
Okonowsky v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1166 (9th Cir. 2024) – A Ninth Circuit decision cited by Webber. There, sexually violent social‑media posts directly implicated the plaintiff over several months. The Fifth Circuit distinguishes that case sharply.

2. The Court’s Reasoning

The Fifth Circuit took the district court’s approach of assuming (without deciding) that Webber met the first three elements (protected class, unwelcome harassment, race‑based). It agreed, however, that the evidence failed on the “term, condition, or privilege of employment” element.

The court emphasized several points:

No in‑person or targeted harassment at work: Webber alleged no racially derogatory language, slurs, jokes, or other abusive conduct directed at him at the dealership. He conceded that he had no negative in‑person interactions with Leson and that they did not work together in any meaningful way.
Social‑media posts not directed at Webber: Although “abhorrent” and threatening violence against protestors, the posts did not mention or identify Webber. Critically, he acknowledged that his coworkers did not know he had attended the protest at the time Leson posted the comments. Thus, even indirectly, the posts did not target him personally.
Single, discrete episode: The court characterized the posts as “a single series of offensive posts” rather than ongoing or repeated conduct. Under Turner, such isolated incidents, absent “extreme” circumstances, do not support a hostile‑environment claim.
“Second‑hand” nature of the harm: The harassment was at best second‑hand – Webber saw posts that were not directed at him. Under Arredondo, this is “less objectionable” and more difficult to convert into a Title VII violation.
Prompt remedial action by the employer: Lisa Rebowe fired her son within days, issued a public apology, held a meeting to hear employee concerns, granted Webber time off, and personally spoke with him to reassure him that Leson was gone. Under Fifth Circuit precedent (Hudson, Skidmore, Indest, Landgraf), employers must take “prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment,” not necessarily every remedial measure the employee requests.
Brumfield’s alleged termination threat: Even if Brumfield’s comment (“this will be your last day working here”) were a genuine threat, the panel held that a single threat of termination, without more, does not establish a hostile environment. It cited Credeur v. Louisiana ex rel. Office of the Attorney General, 860 F.3d 785, 796 (5th Cir. 2017), and Roberts v. Unitrin Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 405 F. App’x 874, 880 (5th Cir. 2010), for the proposition that adverse feedback or even threats, in isolation, ordinarily do not meet the severe/pervasive threshold.

The court explicitly rejected Webber’s attempt to leverage Okonowsky. It stressed that the Ninth Circuit’s decision involved:

months of ongoing posts;
by a close coworker of the plaintiff;
that were sexually violent; and
directly implicated the plaintiff.

By contrast, Webber faced a single spate of posts that never mentioned him, by someone he did not work with directly, followed by that person’s termination. Thus, Okonowsky did not support transforming this incident into a Title VII hostile‑environment case.

3. Impact and Significance

This portion of the opinion reinforces several important points for social‑media‑based harassment claims in the Fifth Circuit:

Direct connection and targeting matter. Offensive online content—even if created by a coworker or manager—will rarely support a hostile‑environment claim unless it is directed at (or clearly implicates) the plaintiff and is tied to the workplace.
Frequency and continuity remain crucial. One isolated spate of offensive posts, no matter how disturbing in substance, is unlikely to be “severe or pervasive” absent extraordinary facts.
Employer response can cut off liability. The opinion underscores that prompt termination of the wrongdoer, apologies, meetings, and accommodations (here, time off and a direct conversation) can suffice as reasonable remedial measures, even if not every employee demand is met.
Second‑hand social‑media harassment is a weak foundation. The court’s reliance on Arredondo signals that “second‑hand” exposure to posts generally will not carry the day unless they form part of a broader pattern of targeted workplace hostility.

Although unpublished, the decision is likely to be cited by defendants defending against hostile‑environment claims grounded primarily in off‑site social‑media activity that was not directed at the plaintiff and that was followed by substantial remedial action.

B. Title VII Wrongful Termination and the McDonnell Douglas Framework

1. The Legal Framework and Precedents

The court treated Webber’s wrongful‑termination claim as an ordinary Title VII disparate‑treatment claim. Citing Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 555–56 (2016), it reiterated that such a claim has two core elements: (1) discrimination, and (2) discharge.

Under Fifth Circuit law (Harrison v. Brookhaven Sch. Dist., 82 F.4th 427, 429 (5th Cir. 2023)), a plaintiff must show that:

he is a member of a protected group;
he was qualified for the position;
he suffered an adverse employment action (here, discharge); and
he was replaced by someone outside his protected group or treated less favorably than similarly situated employees outside the protected group.

When there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the burden‑shifting approach of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), governs:

The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
The burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.
The burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that this reason is a pretext for discrimination.

The court also relied on:

McMichael v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 934 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2019) and Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 897 (5th Cir. 2002) – defining “direct evidence” as evidence that proves discriminatory intent without inference or presumption.
Strong v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., LLC, 482 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir. 2007) – temporal proximity alone generally cannot show causation or pretext when an employer offers substantial nondiscriminatory reasons.
Hudson v. Lincare, Inc., 58 F.4th 222, 232 (5th Cir. 2023) – failure to perform job tasks, such as not showing up for work, is a “classic example” of a legitimate firing reason.
Trautman v. Time Warner Cable, Tex., LLC, 756 F. App’x 421, 428 (5th Cir. 2018) – reiterating that an employee’s failure to show up for work is legitimate grounds for termination.
Musser v. Paul Quinn Coll., 944 F.3d 557, 564 (5th Cir. 2019) – inconsistent, shifting explanations for an employee’s discharge may evidence pretext.
Caldwell v. KHOU‑TV, 850 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 2017); Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 2002) – examples where starkly inconsistent explanations created sufficient evidence of pretext.
LeMaire v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 391 (5th Cir. 2007); Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 659 (5th Cir. 2012); Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir. 2009) – clarifying that comparator evidence requires “nearly identical” circumstances, including nearly identical misconduct.
Allen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 63 F.4th 292, 304 (5th Cir. 2023); Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 228 n.16 (5th Cir. 2000) – the “same‑actor inference,” which permits a reasonable inference that discrimination was not the motive when the same person both hired and fired the plaintiff.

2. Direct Evidence vs. Circumstantial Evidence

Webber tried to characterize the temporal proximity between his complaints about Leson’s posts and his subsequent termination as “direct evidence” of discrimination. The panel rejected this characterization. Citing McMichael and Sandstad, it stressed that:

Direct evidence of discrimination proves the existence of discriminatory intent without any inferences or presumptions.

Because it was undisputed that Webber was terminated only after missing more than two weeks of work with no contact, LCC possessed a facially legitimate reason for discharge that required consideration. Temporal proximity, at most, gave rise to an inference of discrimination, not direct proof of it.

Similarly, Webber pointed to Lisa Rebowe’s public apology as evidence of racial bias. The court found that this apology—given contemporaneously with firing her own son for racist posts and apologizing to employees and the public—was flatly inconsistent with a discriminatory motive toward Webber. Instead, it reflected an effort to repudiate racist conduct.

3. Pretext Analysis Under McDonnell Douglas

The panel assumed, without definitively holding, that Webber had established a prima facie case of discrimination. It therefore moved directly to steps two and three of McDonnell Douglas.

Step Two: Employer’s legitimate reason
LCC’s proffered reason for termination was straightforward: Webber failed to report to work for more than two weeks, and he did not contact his supervisor during that period. The court deemed this a classic, legitimate ground for termination.
The parties disputed whether Colson attempted to contact Webber during this absence, but the panel found that dispute immaterial because Webber’s prolonged absence without prior approval or explanation was undisputed.
Step Three: Plaintiff’s showing of pretext
Webber raised three main pretext arguments:
1. Failure to grant an individual meeting: Webber argued that LCC’s refusal to hold a one‑on‑one meeting to address his concerns (after the group meeting he missed) showed discriminatory animus. The court disagreed, noting that:
  - LCC held an all‑employee meeting (which Webber missed);
  - LCC promptly fired Leson and publicly apologized;
  - LCC granted Webber time off; and
  - Lisa personally called Webber to assure him of Leson’s termination.
  Under cases like Hudson, Skidmore, Indest, and Landgraf, an employer need only take prompt remedial action “reasonably calculated to end the harassment,” not necessarily accept every remedial suggestion proposed by the complainant. The absence of a private meeting did not cast doubt on the stated absenteeism rationale.
2. Alleged inconsistent explanations for Leson’s termination: Webber pointed to:
  - LCC’s statement to the EEOC that Leson was terminated for violating workplace conduct rules, versus
  - a Louisiana Workforce Commission (LWC) form listing “reduction of workforce” as the reason.
  The court acknowledged that inconsistent reasons for an employee’s discharge can show pretext (Musser, Caldwell, Gee). But two points were decisive:
  - Those purported inconsistencies concerned Leson’s termination, not Webber’s. For pretext, what matters is shifting explanations for the plaintiff’s own firing. LCC had consistently maintained that Webber was fired for missing work.
  - Even as to Leson, the court found the difference between a bare “reduction of workforce” entry on a one‑line form and a later more specific explanation insufficiently stark to qualify as the sort of “glaring discrepancies” that implied no real explanation at all.
3. Allegedly inadequate discipline of Leson: Webber claimed that Leson was not truly terminated but placed on a kind of leave and later rehired, indicating that LCC was lenient with a white employee while harsh with him. His only support was an affidavit from former employee Terrance Milligan.
  - The court noted the Milligan affidavit was not timely produced in discovery and therefore could not be considered under Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131–32 (5th Cir. 1992).
  - The claim also conflicted with documentary evidence, including the report of Leson’s termination to the LWC in June 2020.
  - Substantively, the panel reiterated that employers are not required to impose the harshest possible sanctions on an offending employee; they must simply stop the harassment (Landgraf).
  - Moreover, differential treatment of employees who are not “similarly situated” in “nearly identical” circumstances cannot support an inference of racial discrimination (LeMaire, Hernandez, Lee).

Finally, the court gave weight to the same‑actor inference. Webber conceded that the same manager (Colson) who hired him also fired him. Under Allen and Russell, this creates a powerful inference against discriminatory motive; while not dispositive, it reinforced the absence of any evidence that race, rather than absenteeism, drove the decision.

4. Impact and Lessons

This segment of the opinion reinforces several practical points for Title VII litigants:

Absenteeism will typically defeat pretext arguments absent compelling proof of different treatment for nearly identical misconduct by similarly situated comparators.
Temporal proximity alone is rarely enough. When an employer presents a strong, facially valid reason for discharge, proximity in time between complaints and termination cannot substitute for affirmative evidence undermining the employer’s explanation.
Comparator evidence is demanding. Plaintiffs must show “nearly identical” circumstances—similar misconduct, supervisors, and disciplinary history—to infer pretext based on differential treatment.
Same‑actor inference remains influential in the Fifth Circuit. When the same decisionmaker hires and fires a plaintiff within a relatively short period, courts are inclined to infer non‑discriminatory intent absent strong contrary evidence.

For practitioners, Webber is a cautionary example: even in emotionally charged contexts involving clear racist behavior by a coworker, plaintiffs must still meet the stringent evidentiary burdens of McDonnell Douglas and show actual causation and pretext in their own termination.

C. State-Law Claims and Louisiana Prescription

1. Prescriptive Periods and Tolling

The panel affirmed that Webber’s state‑law claims for racial discrimination, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress were prescribed (time‑barred).

Key legal points:

One‑year prescriptive period (at the time): Under La. Civ. Code art. 3492 (2022) (since repealed and replaced), delictual (tort) claims must generally be brought within one year of the alleged wrongful act. This one‑year period applied to Webber’s claims arising from his July 2020 termination.
Extension to two years, prospectively only: In 2024, Louisiana extended the general delictual prescriptive period from one year to two years via 2024 La. Acts 423, § 2, but the amendment applies only prospectively. Thus, Webber remained bound by the prior one‑year period.
Statutory tolling during EEOC proceedings: Under La. Rev. Stat. § 23:303(D), the prescriptive period for certain employment discrimination claims is suspended (tolled) during EEOC proceedings, but for no more than six months. The court observed that even assuming Webber received the maximum tolling, the total prescriptive period would be 18 months from his July 2020 termination.

Webber filed suit in April 2022, roughly 21 months after his termination. Thus, even with the maximum six‑month suspension, his state‑law claims were untimely by about three months. He did not dispute that the prescriptive period began in July 2020.

2. Contra Non Valentem (Equitable Tolling)

In the district court, Webber attempted to invoke contra non valentem, an equitable doctrine under Louisiana law that stops prescription from running in narrow circumstances. The Fifth Circuit summarized contra non valentem (citing In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) Prods. Liab. Litig., 995 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 2021)) as applying only in four exceptional situations:

Where there is some legal cause preventing the court from acting;
Where a contractual or procedural impediment prevents the plaintiff from filing;
Where the defendant’s conduct effectively prevents the plaintiff from acting; or
Where the plaintiff is reasonably unaware of his cause of action.

Webber had argued that he was “incapacitated” by fear and trauma, delaying his decision to sue. The district court rejected this theory; on appeal, Webber did not re‑urge it. The panel therefore treated it as abandoned and did not revisit the issue.

3. Continuing Tort Doctrine

Webber instead relied primarily on Louisiana’s “continuing tort” doctrine, under which prescription can be extended where:

there is at least one act of tortious conduct in the year immediately before filing suit. See Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So. 2d 532, 539 (La. 1992).

Importantly, as the Louisiana Supreme Court explained in Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 45 So. 3d 991, 1003 (La. 2010):

A continuing tort is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not the continuation of the ill effects of an original wrongful act.

Webber claimed that LCC’s issuance of a subpoena to his current employer in this litigation constituted a new tortious act within the year before he filed suit and thus extended prescription. The panel rejected this:

Webber did not argue that the subpoena was unlawful; he merely speculated that it harmed his current employment relationship.
Lawful litigation activity, even if it causes uncomfortable effects, does not constitute a “continual unlawful act.”
The alleged ongoing consequences of his 2020 termination (such as continued fear or reputational effects) are classic “ill effects” of a past act, not new torts.

Because Webber failed to identify any tortious act within the year immediately before his April 2022 filing, the continuing tort doctrine did not apply, and his claims remained prescribed.

4. Impact and Practice Implications

Practically, the opinion sends a clear message for Louisiana employment plaintiffs:

Deadlines are unforgiving. Even with EEOC tolling, claimants must be vigilant; once the six‑month maximum suspension under § 23:303(D) is exhausted, the clock resumes.
New two‑year period is not retroactive. Employees terminated before the 2024 amendment cannot rely on the new two‑year period.
Continuing tort is narrow. It requires continuing unlawful acts, not merely continuing consequences or litigation conduct. Employment litigants should not expect routine discovery steps (e.g., subpoenas) to reset prescription.
Contra non valentem remains exceptional. Psychological distress or fear, without more, is unlikely to qualify for this doctrine, which Louisiana courts interpret strictly.

D. Sanctions, Discovery Conduct, and Motions Practice

1. Standards of Review and General Principles

The Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s sanctions decisions for abuse of discretion, citing In re Mole, 822 F.3d 798, 801 (5th Cir. 2016), and noted that such decisions are afforded “great deference” (Mennella v. Kurt E. Schon E.A.I., Ltd., 979 F.2d 357, 365 n.44 (5th Cir. 1992)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court is guided by an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.

The opinion does not specify the exact basis for sanctions (e.g., Rule 16, Rule 37, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, or inherent powers), but it makes clear that the sanctionable conduct consisted of repeated missed appearances and burdensome, repetitive motion practice.

2. Denial of Webber’s Motion for Sanctions Against Defense Counsel

Webber sought sanctions against LCC’s counsel on two bases:

A dispute over the location of LCC’s corporate (Rule 30(b)(6)) deposition; and
Alleged misconduct during the deposition of Leson Rebowe.

Regarding the deposition location:

Webber’s counsel had noticed the corporate deposition in Baton Rouge, though the parties’ earlier understanding was that it would occur in New Orleans (within the Eastern District of Louisiana).
Defense counsel objected and filed a motion for protective order.
Webber’s counsel did not obtain a ruling clarifying the location and then failed to appear in New Orleans, where the deposition proceeded.
The magistrate judge eventually resolved this dispute in favor of LCC, confirming that the deposition should have been noticed in the Eastern District.

The panel concluded that the record contradicted Webber’s narrative of bad faith by defense counsel. The magistrate judge’s factual findings—that defense counsel’s conduct was consistent with procedural rules and prior understandings—were not clearly erroneous.

Regarding alleged deposition misconduct:

Webber complained about defense counsel’s “tone,” posture, and number of objections, claiming improper “coaching” of Leson’s testimony.
Reviewing the deposition transcript, the Fifth Circuit found nothing approaching the type of egregious behavior found sanctionable in cases like Carroll v. Jaques Admiralty Law Firm, P.C., 110 F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1997), where the attorney used violent threats and profanity.

Given the high bar for sanctioning deposition conduct and the deference accorded to the magistrate judge’s first‑hand assessment, the Fifth Circuit held that the denial of sanctions against defense counsel was not an abuse of discretion.

3. Sanctions Imposed on Webber’s Counsel

The magistrate judge imposed $3,500 in sanctions on Webber’s counsel for:

Missing at least three court appearances (including multiple scheduling conferences and the May 2024 show‑cause hearing);
Failing to appear at the LCC corporate deposition after unilaterally noticing it in Baton Rouge without seeking court guidance; and
Filing repetitive motions that relitigated issues already decided or declared moot, and that leveled baseless accusations against opposing counsel and, ultimately, against the magistrate judge.

Webber argued that:

Any errors by his counsel were in good faith and should not be sanctioned; and
The $3,500 sanction was excessive and punitive.

The panel rejected these arguments, noting:

The record showed a pattern of non‑appearance and burdensome motion practice, not isolated mistakes.
The magistrate judge explicitly explained that the sanction was based on this pattern and the costs it imposed on both the court and the opposing party.
Under Mercury Air Grp., Inc. v. Mansour, 237 F.3d 542, 548 (5th Cir. 2001), an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses is often regarded as the “least severe” effective sanction.
Webber offered no evidence that $3,500 was an inflated or unsupported estimate of the costs occasioned by counsel’s behavior.

Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in upholding the sanctions.

4. Treatment of the “Objections” Motion as a Motion for Reconsideration

After the magistrate judge denied Webber’s motion for sanctions and issued a show‑cause order regarding sanctions against Webber’s counsel, Webber filed a document labeled an “objections” motion. Substantively, it:

Reargued the propriety of sanctions against defense counsel;
Relitigated the corporate deposition location dispute and alleged deposition misconduct; and
Included unsupported attacks on the fairness and professionalism of both defense counsel and the magistrate judge.

The magistrate judge treated this filing as a motion for reconsideration of the prior sanctions ruling. Citing Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990), and In re Benjamin Moore & Co., 318 F.3d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 2002), the Fifth Circuit clarified that reconsideration is appropriate only when the movant shows:

an intervening change in controlling law;
new evidence previously unavailable; or
the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.

Webber attempted to introduce a short, soundless video clip from Leson’s deposition, but that evidence already existed when he first moved for sanctions and therefore was not “newly available.” He offered no change in law and no persuasive showing of clear legal error.

Thus, recharacterizing his filing as a reconsideration motion—and then denying it—was both procedurally appropriate and substantively justified. The Fifth Circuit found no error in this handling.

5. Broader Significance

The sanctions discussion underscores two recurring themes in federal practice:

Civility and diligence in discovery – Courts expect counsel to manage deposition logistics cooperatively, attend scheduled proceedings, and avoid unfounded accusations. Discovery disputes are not themselves evidence of bad faith absent clear misconduct.
Limited utility of “dueling sanctions” motions – Aggressively seeking sanctions against opposing counsel can backfire when the movant’s own conduct is deficient. Courts may react more strongly to repeated missed appearances and frivolous motions than to contested but colorable choices by opposing counsel.

E. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Hostile Work Environment Under Title VII

A hostile work environment exists when discriminatory conduct (e.g., racist comments, slurs, threats) is so severe or so frequent that it changes the conditions of an employee’s job. The behavior must:

Be based on a protected characteristic (such as race);
Be unwelcome; and
Be serious enough that a reasonable person would find the workplace hostile or abusive.

Single, isolated incidents rarely qualify unless they are extraordinarily serious (e.g., a physical assault). Mere offensiveness or hurt feelings are not enough; the conduct must materially affect the employee’s work environment.

2. Second‑Hand Harassment

“Second‑hand” harassment occurs when a person is not directly targeted by discriminatory conduct but sees or learns about harassment directed at others or about events in general. Courts generally view this as less severe than direct, personal harassment.

In Webber, the social‑media posts were directed at protestors as a group, not at Webber personally, and his coworkers did not even know he had attended the protest when the posts were made. This made his claim especially weak.

3. McDonnell Douglas Burden‑Shifting

When a plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discriminatory intent, courts use the McDonnell Douglas framework:

Plaintiff’s prima facie case – A minimal showing that discrimination is plausible.
Employer’s reason – The employer explains a non‑discriminatory reason (e.g., poor performance, absenteeism).
Pretext – The plaintiff then must show that the stated reason is a lie or cover‑up, and that discrimination was the real reason.

Evidence of pretext can include:

Inconsistent or shifting explanations for the firing;
Evidence that similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s protected class were treated better in nearly identical situations; or
Other credible evidence suggesting discriminatory animus.

4. Same‑Actor Inference

When the same supervisor or decision‑maker both hires and later fires the employee, courts draw a “same‑actor inference”: it is less likely (though not impossible) that the employer acted with discriminatory animus. The logic is that someone motivated by racial bias likely would not have hired the employee in the first place.

In Webber, the same manager (Colson) both hired and fired the plaintiff, supporting the conclusion that race was not the real reason for the termination.

5. Prescription and Tolling in Louisiana

Louisiana uses the term “prescription” where other jurisdictions speak of “statutes of limitations.” For delictual (tort-like) claims:

Pre‑2024 rule: One‑year prescriptive period (La. Civ. Code art. 3492).
Post‑2024 rule: Two‑year period (via 2024 La. Acts 423), but only for claims that arose after the effective date.
EEOC tolling: For some employment discrimination claims, prescription is paused while the EEOC investigates, but this pause is capped at six months (La. Rev. Stat. § 23:303(D)).

6. Contra Non Valentem

Contra non valentem is an equitable doctrine that stops prescription when a plaintiff is effectively unable to sue due to:

a legal impediment;
a contractual or procedural barrier;
the defendant’s misconduct preventing suit; or
a reasonable lack of knowledge of the claim.

It is rarely applied and requires a fact‑specific showing. General fear or emotional distress typically will not suffice, especially if the plaintiff clearly knows of the wrongful act and has the ability to file suit.

7. Continuing Tort Doctrine

A “continuing tort” occurs when the defendant commits ongoing wrongful acts, and each act contributes to a cumulative injury. In such cases, prescription starts or continues running only while the wrongful conduct continues.

However, continuing harm from a past act (e.g., lingering emotional distress or reputational damage) without new unlawful acts does not qualify. In Webber, issuing a subpoena in litigation was not itself alleged to be unlawful, so it could not restart prescription.

8. Motions for Reconsideration

A motion for reconsideration is not a second chance to argue the same points. It is appropriate only when:

there is a change in the governing law;
new evidence emerges that was previously unavailable despite diligence; or
the court committed a clear legal error or there is a risk of manifest injustice.

Re‑arguing the merits with evidence that was always available, or simply expressing dissatisfaction with a ruling, will not meet this standard.

IV. Conclusion

Webber v. Leson Chevrolet offers a comprehensive illustration of how the Fifth Circuit applies existing doctrines in a modern employment dispute involving social‑media misconduct and discovery‑related sanctions.

On the Title VII side, the decision:

Confirms that off‑site, generalized social‑media posts that do not target the plaintiff and are followed by meaningful employer remediation will generally not constitute a hostile work environment;
Reaffirms the rigor of the McDonnell Douglas pretext requirement and the strength of the same‑actor inference in the absence of strong comparator or direct evidence; and
Illustrates that even starkly racist conduct by a coworker does not automatically transform any subsequent employment dispute into a viable race‑discrimination claim.

On the state‑law and procedural fronts, the opinion:

Underscores the strictness of Louisiana’s prescriptive periods for employment‑related tort and discrimination claims, even considering EEOC tolling;
Clarifies the limited reach of both the continuing tort doctrine and contra non valentem in extending those periods; and
Demonstrates the deference federal courts give to magistrate judges’ management of discovery and sanctions, especially where an attorney repeatedly misses appearances and files duplicative or inflammatory motions.

Although unpublished and formally non‑precedential, Webber is likely to influence district courts within the Fifth Circuit as persuasive authority, particularly in cases involving social‑media‑based harassment allegations, absenteeism‑based terminations, and disputes over sanctions. For practitioners, it serves as a reminder that success in civil rights litigation depends not only on the underlying facts but also on timely filing, evidentiary rigor, and disciplined adherence to procedural obligations.