United States v. Zamora: Limits on Judicial Duty to Inquire into Last‑Minute Motions to Substitute Counsel and to Remedy Presumption‑of‑Innocence Misstatements

United States v. Zamora: Limits on Judicial Duty to Inquire into Last‑Minute Motions to Substitute Counsel and to Remedy Presumption‑of‑Innocence Misstatements

I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in United States v. Ricardo Zamora, No. 24‑1809 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025), arises from a large‑scale cocaine conspiracy prosecution in the Eastern District of Michigan. The case is doctrinally significant not because it breaks new ground, but because it applies, refines, and to some extent cabins several important strands of criminal procedure doctrine:

  • How far a district judge must go in inquiring into a defendant’s last‑minute motion to substitute appointed counsel under the four‑factor test of United States v. Mack.
  • How the court treats judicial hostility and even a judge’s on‑the‑record misstatement that a defendant is “guilty” when evaluating a motion for mistrial.
  • The interaction between timeliness rules for Rule 33 motions, plain‑error review, and invited error in preserving issues for appeal.
  • Practical limits on Brady/Giglio claims where the defense cannot articulate specifically what evidence was actually suppressed.

Although designated “Not Recommended for Publication,” the opinion is a detailed, candid application of Sixth Circuit doctrine to a trial that was, in several respects, procedurally troubled—especially in terms of the presiding judge’s conduct. The panel (Chief Judge Sutton and Judges Gibbons and White, with Judge Gibbons writing) nevertheless affirms Zamora’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, and explicitly reserves ineffective assistance of counsel claims for collateral review.

II. Overview of the Case

A. Parties and Charges

Zamora was charged in a July 2020 indictment with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. The conspiracy period alleged was March 2016 to August 2017. The government also filed a § 851 notice to seek an enhanced penalty based on a prior state cocaine conviction, thereby potentially increasing Zamora’s mandatory minimum exposure.

B. Pretrial Proceedings and Motion to Substitute Counsel

Zamora, represented by appointed counsel Elias Escobedo, had his trial continued multiple times (from August 2021 to July 2022) by stipulation. On the evening before trial, Zamora filed a pro se “Motion to Disqualify Counsel,” asserting:

  • a “breakdown in communication and relationship” with Escobedo;
  • alleged failures to meet often enough;
  • failure to file pretrial motions such as a motion to suppress;
  • failure to adequately explain discovery and plea offers in Spanish; and
  • failure to show him a “flash drive” of case materials and Jencks materials.

The next morning, before voir dire and outside the jury’s presence, Judge Stephen Murphy III conducted a brief and highly hostile colloquy with Zamora and counsel. Convinced that a fellow inmate had drafted the motion and skeptical of Zamora’s description of his English‑language abilities, the judge:

  • called the motion a “chiste” (“joke”) and “a waste of the court’s time,”
  • accused Zamora of lying,
  • stated on the record that he wanted Zamora prosecuted for obstruction of justice for filing the motion, and
  • refused to let Zamora respond after Escobedo contradicted the motion’s factual assertions.

The court denied the motion to substitute counsel and proceeded immediately to jury selection.

C. Voir Dire and Misstatements of the Presumption of Innocence

In the presence of the venire, while explaining the nature of the case, Judge Murphy twice incorrectly referred to Zamora as “guilty”—once saying that Zamora was “presumed guilty” and once that he was “100 percent guilty.” Each time, after being prompted by the prosecutor and defense counsel, the judge immediately corrected himself, apologized, and correctly explained the presumption of innocence.

Defense counsel orally moved for a new jury; the court treated this as a motion for mistrial and later denied it.

D. Evidence at Trial

During a six‑day trial, the government’s case rested heavily on three cooperating co‑conspirators:

  • Myrna Taboada, who had previously pleaded guilty in a 2016 federal case and testified that:
    • Zamora directed her to pick up money;
    • he used her garage as a “stash house” for drugs and money coming from Texas; and
    • he watched out for police during a semi‑truck cocaine delivery.
  • Thomas Soulliere, who described:
    • an agreement to transport multiple loads of cocaine from Texas to Michigan for Zamora; and
    • his own arrest while carrying several kilograms of cocaine.
  • Oscar Gomez‑Medina, who testified about:
    • discussions with Zamora regarding bringing cocaine from Texas, how it was packaged, and how the conspiracy operated “at a higher level” with weekly kilogram quantities;
    • traveling with Zamora to scout a location for a semi‑truck delivery; and
    • identifying Zamora’s voice on an audio recording about drug quality.

Federal agents corroborated portions of this testimony through pole‑camera surveillance, GPS data, and rental‑car records. DEA and FBI agents described a transportation network involving Zamora’s girlfriend, Vicky Roldan, and couriers such as Audrey Noel and Jessica Williams.

Zamora did not testify. The jury convicted him of the conspiracy count and, via special findings, established facts about his prior drug conviction that triggered an enhanced penalty under § 851 and § 841(b). He was later sentenced by a different judge, Linda V. Parker, to 180 months’ imprisonment and ten years of supervised release.

E. Post‑Trial Motions and Appeal

Zamora timely filed:

  • a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, and
  • a timely Rule 33 motion for a new trial focusing on witness credibility and jury instructions.

Both were denied by Judge Murphy. More than a year later, after Escobedo withdrew and a federal public defender was appointed, Zamora filed a “supplemental” Rule 33 motion raising numerous additional arguments (Brady, false testimony, judicial bias, evidentiary issues, § 851 procedure, etc.). Judge Murphy recused himself; Judge Parker denied the supplemental motion as untimely and later sentenced Zamora.

On appeal, Zamora raised at least seven issues:

  1. Denial of his pretrial motion to substitute counsel.
  2. Denial of his Rule 29 motion for acquittal (sufficiency of the evidence and credibility of cooperators).
  3. Denial of a new trial based on allegedly false testimony by Gomez‑Medina.
  4. Prejudice from the jury’s exposure to his prior conviction in connection with the § 851 enhancement.
  5. Alleged Brady/Giglio violations related to cooperator and confidential informant evidence.
  6. Denial of a mistrial after the judge referred to Zamora as “guilty” during voir dire and hostility surrounding the motion to substitute counsel.
  7. Evidentiary challenges to admission and use of a recorded conversation attributed to Zamora.

He also sprinkled in ineffective assistance of counsel arguments, which the panel refused to decide on direct appeal.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Zamora’s conviction on all grounds. The key takeaways, issue by issue, are:

  • Substitution of Counsel: Applying United States v. Mack, the court held that denying Zamora’s last‑minute motion to replace Escobedo was not an abuse of discretion, despite an inadequate and hostile inquiry by the trial judge. The motion was filed the day before trial, contradicted by counsel, and prepared by an anonymous inmate; the court emphasized defendants must show “good cause” for substitution.
  • Sufficiency of the Evidence / Rule 29: The panel held the evidence—especially cooperator testimony and corroborating surveillance—was sufficient for a rational juror to find Zamora guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reiterated that challenges to witness credibility are for the jury, not grounds for a judgment of acquittal.
  • Alleged False Testimony: The court rejected Zamora’s claim that Gómez‑Medina’s incorrect date range about dealing cocaine with Zamora (overlapping his incarceration) amounted to knowing use of perjured testimony. The testimony was inconsistent, promptly impeached on cross, corrected in part, and immaterial to the core conspiracy period charged.
  • Prior Conviction and § 851 Procedure: Any error in the hybrid procedure for proving the enhancement facts (splitting issues between judge and jury) was invited error, because Zamora and the government jointly proposed it. The absence of a limiting instruction on the jury’s use of prior‑conviction evidence was not plain error.
  • Brady/Giglio: The court found no Brady violation because Zamora did not identify any specific exculpatory or impeachment evidence that was actually suppressed. At most, he complained of delayed or incomplete appreciation of how a witness’s role intersected with confidential‑informant activity—insufficient as a matter of law and fact.
  • Mistrial / Presumption of Innocence: While sharply criticizing Judge Murphy’s conduct (including his “guilty” misstatements and hostility toward Zamora’s substitution motion), the panel held that his immediate corrections and subsequent proper instructions cured any prejudice. Denial of a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion.
  • Evidentiary Challenge to Audio Recording: Given Zamora’s stipulation to the admission of the recording and his failure to object, the court reviewed only for plain error and found none: co‑conspirators familiar with Zamora’s voice could properly identify it under Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(5).
  • Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The court declined to address the merits of Zamora’s ineffective assistance theories on direct appeal, directing him to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, because the record was insufficiently developed as to counsel’s strategy and reasons.

A procedural overlay runs through the opinion: many of Zamora’s arguments appeared only in his untimely supplemental Rule 33 motion, so the panel treated them as **not preserved** and reviewed (if at all) for plain error, not abuse of discretion or de novo.

IV. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Applied

1. Substitution of Counsel and Adequacy of Inquiry

  • Daniels v. Lafler, 501 F.3d 735 (6th Cir. 2007) and United States v. Iles, 906 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1990) confirm that:
    • Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to adequate representation, but indigent defendants have no right to a particular appointed lawyer.
    • An indigent defendant seeking new counsel must show “good cause” for substitution.
  • United States v. Mack, 258 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2001) supplies the familiar four‑factor abuse‑of‑discretion test for denial of a motion to withdraw or substitute counsel:
    1. Timeliness of the motion.
    2. Adequacy of the court’s inquiry.
    3. Existence and extent of attorney‑client conflict and whether it produced a “total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.”
    4. Balancing those factors with the public interest in prompt and efficient justice.
  • United States v. Chambers, 441 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2006) and United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2009) emphasize timeliness:
    • Motions filed weeks before trial can still be untimely; those filed on the eve of trial are afforded “extraordinary deference” to the trial court’s denial.
  • United States v. Jennings (Jennings I & II), 945 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1991); 83 F.3d 145 (6th Cir. 1996):
    • Jennings I remanded where the district court had not ruled on substitution motions or developed a record, underscoring the need for a meaningful inquiry.
    • Jennings II clarified that timeliness alone does not justify denial if good cause exists.
  • United States v. Liggins, 76 F.4th 500 (6th Cir. 2023)—a recent, widely discussed case involving the same district judge (Murphy)—held that:
    • When considering a motion for new counsel, the district court “should hear from the defendant” directly.
    • Judge Murphy’s repeated remarks there that the defendant “look[ed] like a criminal” and was doing “what criminals do” required recusal and a new trial.

    In Zamora, the panel cites Liggins to criticize the limited inquiry but distinguishes it because Zamora did not move for recusal and the conduct, while hostile, did not reach the same level of overt prejudice expressed in Liggins.

2. Rule 33 Timeliness and Excusable Neglect

  • Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 permits new‑trial motions:
    • within 14 days of the verdict for anything other than newly discovered evidence; and
    • within three years if based on newly discovered evidence.
  • Fed. R. Crim. P. 45 allows extension of an expired deadline upon “excusable neglect.”
  • United States v. Watts, 2022 WL 706603 (6th Cir. Mar. 9, 2022) and United States v. Munoz, 605 F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 2010) instruct district courts to consider four factors (including reasons for delay) before extending time for Rule 33 motions.
  • United States v. Sittenfeld, 128 F.4th 752 (6th Cir. 2025) is cited to support the notion that arguments raised only in an untimely motion are effectively treated as unraised and preserved, at most, for plain‑error review on appeal.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Cooperator Credibility

  • United States v. Vance, 956 F.3d 846 (6th Cir. 2020) provides the black‑letter sufficiency standard:
    • Evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution; and
    • the verdict stands if “any rational trier of fact” could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • United States v. Hamm, 952 F.3d 728 (6th Cir. 2020) articulates the elements of a § 846 drug conspiracy: an agreement to violate drug laws, knowledge and intent to join, and participation.
  • United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989 (6th Cir. 1999) is invoked to reject the claim that failure to give a special “addict‑informant” instruction on Taboada’s testimony was reversible error; thorough cross‑examination allowed the jury to assess her credibility.

4. False Testimony, Perjury, and Due Process

  • Monea v. United States, 914 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2019)—a due process violation occurs when:
    • the government knowingly presents false testimony, and
    • the falsehood is material—i.e., reasonably likely to have affected the judgment of the jury.
  • United States v. Coe, 161 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 1998) and Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2009) underscore:
    • mere inconsistencies do not equate to perjury; and
    • even knowing use of false testimony can be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if not material.
  • United States v. Ward, 190 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 1999) is cited for the principle that prompt impeachment on cross‑examination mitigates potential prejudice from inaccurate or inconsistent testimony.

5. Brady/Giglio and Discovery

  • Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) require the government to disclose:
    • exculpatory evidence (tending to show innocence) and
    • impeachment evidence (undermining government witnesses).
  • Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) and United States v. Paulus, 952 F.3d 717 (6th Cir. 2020) enumerate the three Brady elements:
    1. The evidence is favorable to the accused (exculpatory or impeaching).
    2. It was suppressed by the State (willfully or inadvertently).
    3. Prejudice ensued (a reasonable probability of a different result).
  • United States v. Tavera, 719 F.3d 705 (6th Cir. 2013) emphasizes the prosecution’s proactive duty to disclose, due to resource imbalance and due process concerns.
  • United States v. Thompson, 758 F. App’x 398 (6th Cir. 2018) clarifies that the defendant must still identify the specific evidence allegedly withheld.
  • United States v. Stamper, 91 F. App’x 445 (6th Cir. 2004) distinguishes:
    • total suppression, which implicates Brady; from
    • mere delayed disclosure, which generally does not, absent prejudice to the defense.

6. Judicial Conduct, Mistrial, and Presumption of Innocence

  • Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) underlies the requirement that the trier of fact must not be instructed or induced to presume guilt.
  • United States v. Worthington, 698 F.2d 820 (6th Cir. 1983) reflects the principle that comments made outside the jury’s presence do not directly compromise the jury’s impartiality.
  • Zuern v. Tate, 336 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2003) and United States v. Robinson, 99 F.4th 344 (6th Cir. 2024) frame the abuse‑of‑discretion standard for mistrials, focusing on:
    • how prejudicial the incident was,
    • how it arose, and
    • whether a prompt curative instruction mitigated the harm.
  • United States v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 583 (6th Cir. 1997) upholds denial of a mistrial when judicial comments about testimony are followed by a strong curative instruction and the evidence is substantial.
  • The panel also cites an Eighth Circuit case, United States v. Johnson, 540 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1976), where cautionary instructions cured arguably prejudicial judicial remarks.
  • United States v. Liggins, 76 F.4th 500 (6th Cir. 2023) reappears in this context: in Liggins, similar misstatements by Judge Murphy about the presumption of innocence helped justify recusal, whereas in Zamora they were deemed cured by immediate correction and proper jury instructions overall.

7. Invited Error, Plain Error, and Jury Instructions

  • United States v. Carter, 89 F.4th 565 (6th Cir. 2023) explains:
    • When a defendant invites an error—e.g., by affirmatively agreeing to a jury instruction—appellate review is generally barred.
    • Courts will correct invited error only to prevent manifest injustice.
  • E.E.O.C. v. New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057 (6th Cir. 2015) is cited for the plain‑error standard in unobjected‑to jury instructions.
  • Bronzino v. Dunn, 558 F. App’x 613 (6th Cir. 2014) holds that failure to issue a limiting instruction on prior convictions is not plain error in itself.

8. Authentication and Evidentiary Standards

  • Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(5) allows voice identification by a witness “based on hearing the voice at any time under circumstances that connect it with the alleged speaker.” Co‑conspirators who interacted with Zamora could therefore identify his voice on the recording.
  • United States v. Carney, 387 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004) and United States v. Macias, 387 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2004) reinforce that:
    • failure to object triggers plain‑error review, and
    • a party who stipulates to admission invites the error and generally cannot complain on appeal.

9. Ineffective Assistance and Proper Forum

  • United States v. Ferguson, 669 F.3d 756 (6th Cir. 2012) and United States v. Lopez‑Medina, 461 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2006) articulate the Sixth Circuit’s strong preference to defer ineffective assistance claims to collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, especially where the trial record does not reveal counsel’s reasoning.
  • United States v. Carthorne, 878 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2017)—cited by the panel—illustrates the interplay between plain‑error and ineffective‑assistance frameworks.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning, Issue by Issue

1. Last‑Minute Motion to Substitute Counsel (Mack Analysis)

The panel walks carefully through the four Mack factors:

  1. Timeliness. Zamora waited over a year into Escobedo’s appointment and filed the motion the night before trial, after substantial logistical preparation. Sixth Circuit cases have viewed motions filed even 1.5 months before trial as untimely; here, the timing “weighs strongly against” Zamora and entitles the district judge to “extraordinary deference” (citing Vasquez).
  2. Adequacy of the Inquiry. This is where the court most clearly expresses discomfort with Judge Murphy’s handling. The judge:
    • focused almost exclusively on who drafted the motion,
    • immediately labeled it a “joke” and “waste of time,”
    • accepted Escobedo’s denials of the motion’s factual allegations, and
    • then refused to let Zamora speak further, telling him his lawyer would “say something” for him.

    Citing Liggins, the panel reiterates that a district court should hear directly from the defendant on such motions. It concludes that the inquiry here was “less than fulsome” and “critical or even hostile,” and that this factor weighs in Zamora’s favor.

  3. Extent of Conflict / Total Breakdown. Even taking Zamora’s allegations at face value, Escobedo:
    • denied the alleged failures,
    • asserted he had communicated with Zamora in Spanish,
    • stated Zamora had the discovery on a flash drive, and
    • explained the real issue was that Zamora disliked his frank assessment of the strength of the government’s case.

    The record showed Escobedo actively participated in trial, filed appropriate motions, and cross‑examined witnesses. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, a mere disagreement over strategy or plea advice does not equate to a “total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.” This factor thus weighed against Zamora.

  4. Public Interest in Efficient Justice. With jurors summoned, confidential witness issues managed, and the judge noting that a trial continuance could delay proceedings up to a year, the institutional costs of substitution were substantial. This factor favors denying substitution.

Balancing these, the panel concludes that, although the inquiry was inadequate and the judge’s demeanor improper, the combination of:

  • extreme untimeliness,
  • lack of evidence of a total breakdown, and
  • significant public‑interest concerns

means the denial was not an abuse of discretion. The court also distinguishes Jennings I, noting that there the district court had failed to rule at all and had developed no record, whereas here there was at least some record of an inquiry, however flawed.

Doctrinally: The opinion signals a willingness to criticize inadequate judicial inquiry under Mack without automatically reversing, particularly where the remaining factors (especially timing and lack of demonstrated breakdown) weigh strongly against substitution.

2. Sufficiency of Evidence and the Addict‑Informant Instruction

Zamora’s sufficiency argument attacked the credibility of the three co‑conspirators. The panel reiterates that credibility is “a jury question” and that courts ruling on Rule 29 motions must accept the prosecution’s evidence as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor (Vance).

The panel lists substantive incriminating details from each cooperator’s testimony and concludes that a rational jury could easily find:

  • an agreement to distribute cocaine,
  • Zamora’s knowing and intentional participation, and
  • drug quantities exceeding five kilograms.

On the jury‑instruction issue, Zamora complained that the court failed to give a special instruction about Taboada as a drug‑addicted informant. But:

  • The parties jointly stipulated to the jury instructions, triggering the doctrine of invited error (Carter).
  • Defense counsel actually used cross‑examination to raise all the concerns such an instruction would have covered: addiction, cooperation, plea deals, and bias.
  • Given that, the panel finds no “manifest injustice” warranting review of invited error.

3. Alleged False Testimony by Gomez‑Medina

Gomez‑Medina initially stated that he and Zamora were “in the business” of bringing cocaine from Texas in 2010–2011—years when Zamora was actually incarcerated. Later in his testimony, especially under cross‑examination, he:

  • acknowledged that Zamora had “gone away for four or five years,” and
  • reframed his statement as working with Zamora before prison and then again after his release around 2015.

The court holds this did not meet the perjury standard:

  • The testimony reflected confusion or inconsistency about dates, not a conscious lie about the core conspiracy period.
  • Defense counsel forcefully impeached Gomez‑Medina with Zamora’s prison dates, bringing the inconsistency to the jury’s attention (Ward).
  • Any error was not material to the charged 2016–2017 conspiracy; other evidence fully supported Zamora’s involvement during that time (Coe).

Thus, no due‑process violation arose from the government’s use of this testimony.

4. Prior‑Conviction Evidence and § 851 Procedure

The government sought a sentencing enhancement based on a 2010 Michigan cocaine conviction, invoking 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), (C), 851, and 802(58). Section 851 normally contemplates a judge‑only hearing to establish prior convictions. But:

  • The parties agreed to a hybrid approach:
    • The judge would determine as a matter of law that Zamora had a qualifying prior conviction.
    • The jury would make factual findings about the sentence’s length and whether Zamora’s release date fell within 15 years of the conspiracy’s start, as required by § 802(58).
  • This approach was used because Zamora refused to stipulate and wanted the jury to decide contested factual issues about his prior sentence.

On appeal, Zamora argued this process unnecessarily and prejudicially exposed the jury to prior‑conviction evidence and that the district court should instead have followed a bifurcated procedure (conviction first, enhancement facts later) used by another district judge.

The panel’s responses:

  • Invited Error: Zamora’s own trial counsel affirmatively agreed to this hybrid procedure; under Carter and Macias, such agreement constitutes invited error, which the court declines to correct absent manifest injustice.
  • Lack of Plain Error in Instructions: Although no limiting instruction was given telling jurors to consider the prior conviction only for enhancement‑related facts, the judge:
    • explicitly told the jury that two exhibits (50 and 51) were “special exhibits for a very limited purpose”; and
    • gave overall correct instructions on considering evidence.

    Citing Bronzino, the panel notes that failure to issue a separate limiting instruction on prior convictions is not plain error.

5. Brady/Giglio and Confidential‑Informant Issues

Zamora’s Brady claim centered on a Patton Park encounter between a confidential source and Zamora. He argued:

  • the government had once represented that the confidential source would not testify;
  • Gomez‑Medina’s eventual trial testimony about Patton Park closely mirrored the confidential source account; therefore,
  • Gomez‑Medina must have been that confidential source, and the government withheld exculpatory information about him.

The Sixth Circuit rejects this, emphasizing:

  • Lack of Specificity. Zamora never identified what concrete piece of exculpatory or impeachment evidence was actually suppressed. Generic assertions that “the evidence was material” are insufficient under Strickler, Paulus, and Thompson.
  • Disclosure at Trial. The prosecution elicited testimony from Gomez‑Medina about the Patton Park encounter at trial itself. Under Stamper, Brady generally does not apply to evidence disclosed in time to be used at trial, absent a showing that the timing itself caused prejudice (e.g., prevented any meaningful use).
  • Defense Acknowledged Receipt of Discovery. At trial, Escobedo expressly agreed on the record that he had received all Rule 16 and Jencks materials related to testifying witnesses. He impeached Gomez‑Medina with prior grand jury testimony, demonstrating access to those materials.

Taken together, these points defeat both the Brady/Giglio theory and any broader discovery‑violation argument: Zamora did not show suppression of evidence, much less prejudice.

6. Judicial Hostility, Misstatements of Guilt, and Denial of Mistrial

This is the most sensitive part of the case. The panel:

  • acknowledges that Judge Murphy’s behavior was “hostile” and “inappropriate”;
  • notes particularly his direction that the government prosecute Zamora for obstruction due to the substitution motion; and
  • states that such filings are “not uncommon” and should not provoke such an emotional response.

Nevertheless, the court confines its review to the preservation of issues actually raised. Zamora did not move for recusal or appeal on that basis (as in Liggins); rather, his trial motion (and appellate argument) focused on a mistrial due to alleged taint of the jury pool.

The analysis divides the challenged conduct into two categories:

  1. Comments Outside the Jury’s Presence. The judge’s accusations of lying, threats of obstruction charges, and disparaging remarks (“chiste,” “joke”) occurred during the pre‑voir‑dire hearing on Zamora’s motion to substitute counsel, with no jurors present. Citing Worthington, the court holds these remarks, while improper, did not taint the jury and therefore did not justify a mistrial.
  2. Misstatements of the Presumption of Innocence in Front of the Venire. During case introduction, Judge Murphy mistakenly described Zamora as “presumed guilty” and “100 percent guilty.” However:
    • Each time, the judge immediately corrected himself after being prompted.
    • He expressly apologized to Zamora, his counsel, and the venire, and clearly restated that Zamora was “presumed not guilty and innocent of all these charges.”
    • Final jury instructions correctly and repeatedly emphasized the presumption of innocence and the government’s burden of proof.
    • The comments occurred before evidence was presented, and several days before deliberations.
    • The overall case against Zamora was “very substantial,” which, following Godinez and Johnson, bolsters the conclusion that the error was cured.

Balancing these factors under the abuse‑of‑discretion standard for mistrial, the panel concludes that a prompt, explicit curative instruction and a strong evidentiary record suffice to avoid reversal, even where a judge momentarily inverts the presumption of innocence on the record.

That said, the opinion strongly implies that repeated or uncorrected statements of this sort—especially combined with comments like “you look like a criminal,” as in Liggins—can and will justify relief, including recusal and reversal. Zamora thus stands as a warning: improper judicial remarks are risky, but immediate corrections, robust instructions, and a solid evidentiary record may save the conviction.

7. Authentication and Use of the Audio Recording

Zamora argued that the government used portions of an audio recording (Exhibit 27) in a way that went beyond what had been specifically authenticated as his voice. However:

  • The defense stipulated to admission of the recording itself.
  • Both Taboada and Gomez‑Medina, who had extensive contact with Zamora, identified one of the voices as his under Rule 901(b)(5).
  • No specific objection was raised at trial to either the foundation or the prosecution’s use of particular snippets during closing.

Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reviewed only for plain error and found none:

  • Identification satisfied Rule 901(b)(5), given the witnesses’ familiarity with Zamora’s voice and dealings.
  • There was no clear law requiring disaggregation of specific lines within a properly authenticated conversation when the voice itself is identified as the defendant’s.

8. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Reserved for § 2255

Zamora’s brief faulted Escobedo for, among other things:

  • not contesting the § 851 procedure more aggressively,
  • failing to request additional limiting or cautionary instructions,
  • allegedly insufficient cross‑examination of certain witnesses, and
  • overall handling of objections and trial strategy.

The panel reiterates the Sixth Circuit’s general rule: ineffective assistance claims are disfavored on direct appeal unless the record is sufficiently developed to assess counsel’s performance and prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. Here:

  • Neither Escobedo nor Zamora testified regarding trial strategy.
  • The record was silent on why certain stipulations were made or objections not raised.

Accordingly, the panel declines to reach the merits and advises that Zamora must pursue such claims in a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

C. Impact and Implications

1. Substitution Motions and Judicial Inquiry after Liggins and Zamora

Taken together, Liggins and Zamora convey a nuanced message:

  • District judges have an affirmative duty to conduct a meaningful inquiry into complaints about appointed counsel, and should hear directly from the defendant.
  • Hostility, sarcasm, or threats from the bench are strongly discouraged and can, in egregious cases, justify recusal and reversal.
  • But at the same time, the Sixth Circuit will not convert every inadequate inquiry into automatic reversible error, especially in the face of:
    • last‑minute timing,
    • no demonstrable total breakdown in communication, and
    • substantial trial preparation and public‑interest costs.

Defense counsel should draw from this that:

  • If a defendant truly has a long‑term breakdown with counsel, motions must be filed early, not on the eve of trial.
  • Where judicial hostility crosses into open prejudice (“you look like a criminal”), counsel must consider moving for recusal, not merely substitution, to preserve issues akin to those in Liggins.

2. Judicial Misstatements of the Presumption of Innocence

Zamora is one of the relatively few cases where a judge on the record told a venire that a defendant is “presumed guilty” or “100 percent guilty.” The holding is narrowly contextual:

  • Such statements are serious, but not per se structural error requiring automatic reversal.
  • Immediate correction, unambiguous apology, and consistent proper instructions throughout trial can cure the error.
  • The strength of the government’s case is relevant to assessing whether any prejudice remains after curative instructions.

Future litigants will likely cite Zamora both:

  • as a cautionary tale about judicial rhetoric; and
  • as authority that an isolated, immediately corrected misstatement of the presumption of innocence, though improper, does not automatically require a new trial.

3. Procedural Defaults, Timeliness, and Doctrinal “Escape Hatches”

A recurring theme in the opinion is the combined use of:

  • Rule 33 timeliness limits (treating arguments first raised more than a year after trial as not properly preserved);
  • plain‑error review for unobjected‑to trial errors; and
  • invited error for stipulations and agreed‑upon procedures (jury instructions, § 851 hearing method, admission of recordings).

The consequence is that many of Zamora’s potentially weighty complaints—about the § 851 procedure, addict‑informant instructions, and prior‑conviction evidence—never receive searching substantive review. This highlights the importance of:

  • timely and specific objections at trial;
  • filing fully developed Rule 29 and Rule 33 motions within deadlines; and
  • carefully evaluating the long‑term consequences of stipulations that may waive appellate rights.

4. Brady/Giglio: Specificity and Prejudice

Zamora reinforces that broad, speculative Brady claims are unlikely to succeed. Defendants must:

  • identify precise items (documents, recordings, statements) that were allegedly suppressed;
  • explain how those items are favorable (exculpatory or impeaching); and
  • demonstrate a realistic probability of a different outcome had they been timely disclosed.

Simply arguing that the government “must have” hidden something because a witness’s testimony aligns with confidential‑informant reports is insufficient without evidentiary support or documented gaps in production.

5. Pathway for Ineffective Assistance Claims

The opinion also implicitly sketches the future litigation trajectory for Zamora:

  • The panel flags multiple decisions by Escobedo that, while not reversible error on this record, may warrant further scrutiny:
    • stipulating to jury instructions;
    • agreeing to the hybrid § 851 procedure;
    • failing to request certain limiting instructions; and
    • not moving for recusal despite judicial hostility.
  • Because counsel’s reasoning is unknown, these issues are reserved for a § 2255 motion, where evidence can be developed and counsel can explain or justify trial strategy.

Practitioners should note: a loss on direct appeal does not foreclose relief where counsel’s performance may be constitutionally deficient but is not adequately illuminated by the trial record.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Drug Conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846

A defendant can be convicted of drug conspiracy even if they are not personally caught with drugs. The government must prove:

  1. There was an agreement between two or more people to distribute controlled substances.
  2. The defendant knew about the agreement and intended to join it.
  3. The defendant actually participated in it in some meaningful way (e.g., arranging shipments, managing stash locations, collecting money).

Cooperating witnesses (co‑conspirators) often provide that evidence; corroborating surveillance and records strengthen the case.

2. § 851 Enhancements and § 802(58)

  • § 851 is a procedural statute requiring the government to give advance notice if it plans to seek a higher sentence based on prior drug or violent felonies.
  • § 841(b) increases mandatory minimums and maximums when a defendant has prior qualifying convictions.
  • § 802(58) defines a “serious drug felony” as one where:
    • the defendant served more than one year in prison; and
    • the current federal offense began within 15 years of the defendant’s release.

The controversy in Zamora’s case concerned how these facts were presented to the jury and judge, and whether that exposure unfairly prejudiced the jury.

3. Rule 29 and Rule 33 Motions

  • Rule 29 (Judgment of Acquittal): Asks the court to set aside a jury verdict or halt the trial because the evidence is legally insufficient. The judge must assume the jury believed the government’s witnesses.
  • Rule 33 (New Trial): Allows a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires,” for reasons like newly discovered evidence, serious trial error, or pervasive unfairness. The motion generally must be filed within 14 days of the verdict.

4. Plain Error vs. Invited Error

  • Plain error (Rule 52(b)):
    • Applies when the defense did not object at trial.
    • Requires showing: (1) an obvious legal error, (2) that affected substantial rights, and (3) seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
  • Invited error:
    • Applies when the defense affirmatively agreed to the challenged action (e.g., a jury instruction, evidentiary admission, or procedure).
    • Courts typically will not correct invited error at all, except to avoid manifest injustice.

In Zamora’s case, many issues were subject to one doctrine or the other, sharply limiting the scope of appellate review.

5. Brady/Giglio

  • Brady requires prosecutors to disclose favorable evidence that is material to guilt or punishment, regardless of request.
  • Giglio extends this to deals, promises, or impeaching information about government witnesses that might affect their credibility.
  • To win a Brady claim, a defendant must identify:
    1. Exactly what evidence was withheld.
    2. Why it helps the defense.
    3. How its absence likely changed the outcome.

6. Mistrial and Curative Instructions

A mistrial ends a trial without a verdict so it can start over with a different jury. It is an extreme remedy, appropriate where:

  • an event (e.g., a prejudicial statement, improper evidence) so biases the jury that it cannot be cured; and
  • a warning or instruction from the judge telling the jury to disregard the event is not enough.

Courts presume that juries follow the judge’s instructions; immediate, specific corrections often prevent the need for a mistrial.

7. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel vs. Direct Appeal

Under Strickland, a defendant must show:

  1. Counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and
  2. There is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different.

Because trial records rarely reveal why counsel made certain decisions, appellate courts prefer to decide these claims in a separate post‑conviction proceeding (e.g., under § 2255), where evidence can be presented and both counsel and defendant can testify.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Zamora is less about establishing bright‑line rules than about demonstrating how existing Sixth Circuit doctrines—on substitution of counsel, mistrial, Brady, evidentiary foundation, and procedural defaults—operate in a messy, real‑world trial marked by judicial intemperance and strategic compromises.

The decision:

  • Affirms that last‑minute substitution motions, especially those contradicted by counsel and unsupported by clear evidence of breakdown, may be denied even when the judge’s inquiry is perfunctory and his tone inappropriate.
  • Clarifies that isolated misstatements of the presumption of innocence, promptly corrected by the court, are subject to harmless‑error analysis rather than automatic reversal.
  • Reinforces the importance of timely objections and avoiding invited error, as many of Zamora’s appellate issues were effectively foreclosed by trial‑level stipulations and delays.
  • Demands specific and substantiated Brady claims, not speculation about undisclosed evidence.
  • Channels potential ineffective assistance claims into collateral review, while implicitly acknowledging that some of counsel’s trial decisions may warrant further scrutiny.

In the broader legal context, Zamora stands as:

  • a caution for district judges to temper their reactions to pro se filings and to adhere carefully to the presumption of innocence in all remarks to juries; and
  • a reminder to defense counsel that preserving issues—and recording clear rationales for strategic choices—can be as important as the substance of those choices when a conviction later faces appellate and collateral review.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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