Timely Compliance with NLRB Information Orders and the Limits of the Technical Refusal-to-Bargain Defense

Commentary on Rieth-Riley Construction Co., Inc. v. NLRB, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Nov. 26, 2025)

I. Introduction

This Sixth Circuit opinion arises from a long-running labor dispute between Rieth-Riley Construction Co., Inc. (“Rieth-Riley”), a Michigan-based asphalt paving and heavy road construction contractor, and Local 324 of the International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO (“the Union”). What began as a straightforward information-request dispute under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) has evolved into collateral litigation over compliance with a court-enforced National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or “Board”) order.

The opinion addresses whether Rieth-Riley may refuse to fully comply with a Board order—already enforced by the Sixth Circuit—on the ground that producing certain information might undermine its “technical refusal-to-bargain” defense in a separate, ongoing appeal. The court grants the Board’s petition in part, holding Rieth-Riley in civil contempt for failing to provide wage and benefits information from June 16, 2022, forward, while ordering the company to show cause regarding a second, more detailed information request from May 2025.

Though not recommended for publication and thus nonprecedential in the formal sense, the decision is a significant exposition of several principles:

That a requirement to provide information “in a timely manner” can be sufficiently definite and specific to support a civil contempt finding, even without an express deadline.
That parties’ litigation positions—especially clear admissions in briefs opposing a contempt petition—can function as binding judicial admissions establishing contemptuous conduct.
That an employer’s reliance on a “technical refusal-to-bargain” strategy does not excuse noncompliance with a court-enforced NLRB order, and compliance with such an order does not waive the employer’s defense in a related appeal.
That the Board and courts can treat new refusals to provide bargaining information, post-judgment, as potential violations of existing cease-and-desist orders.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Labor Dispute

Rieth-Riley operates in Michigan and employs workers represented by the Union, which has over 14,000 members in the state. Their collective-bargaining agreement expired in May 2018. The parties’ efforts to negotiate a successor agreement stalled, primarily over subcontracting and wage issues.

In the course of bargaining, the Union sought various categories of information from Rieth-Riley, including:

Subcontracting information relating to the company’s outsourcing practices.
Bargaining-unit employee information, especially compensation and benefits data for employees doing work covered by the jurisdictional provisions of the expired contract.

When Rieth-Riley refused to provide this information, the Union filed unfair labor practice (ULP) charges in June and November 2020, alleging violations of § 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA for refusing to provide requested information relevant to bargaining.

B. Board Proceedings and the November 3, 2020 Information Request

In September 2020 and February 2021, the NLRB General Counsel issued complaints. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Rieth-Riley’s refusals violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (5), and ordered the company to provide the requested subcontracting and employee information.

In 2023, the Board affirmed the ALJ with a slight narrowing of the subcontracting-production requirement. Crucially, the Board ordered Rieth-Riley to:

Cease and desist from “failing and refusing to furnish [the Union] with requested information that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its functions as the collective-bargaining representative.”
Affirmatively furnish to the Union, “in a timely manner,” the information requested in the Union’s November 3, 2020 letter.

The November 3, 2020 request sought:

“the compensation, both wages and fringe benefits, for all employees (including their names and classifications) doing work covered by the work jurisdiction provisions of the expired [agreement] from June 1, 2020, to the present.”

C. The First Sixth Circuit Decision (2024 Enforcement)

Rieth-Riley petitioned for review of the Board’s order, and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement. In Rieth-Riley Construction Co. v. NLRB, 114 F.4th 519 (6th Cir. 2024), the court:

Denied Rieth-Riley’s petition for review.
Granted the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement in full.

The court reaffirmed a core NLRA principle: bargaining-unit employees’ wages, hours, and working conditions are “presumptively relevant” to collective bargaining, and employers have a duty to provide such information upon request.

On March 25, 2025, the court issued its mandate, making the enforcement judgment final and fully operative.

D. Post-Mandate Noncompliance and New Requests

In April 2025, roughly a month after the mandate, Rieth-Riley provided some information in response to the November 2020 request and certified that it had “provided the information which the Board’s order required.” According to the Board, the production only covered the period from June 1, 2020 to June 15, 2022.

Because the November 2020 request (and the Board’s order) clearly covered data “from June 1, 2020, to the present,” the Board contacted Rieth-Riley and asked for the missing information from June 16, 2022 onward.

Then, in May 2025, the Union made a separate, more granular request. It sought not only data through the present, but also the underlying payroll records that substantiated Rieth-Riley’s summaries, asking for:

“the underlying payroll records used to prepare the summaries you have provided, as well as the specific rates of pay, hours of work, dates worked by employees, and amounts and dates of fringe benefits paid, for each bargaining unit employee for the period of time from June 1, 2020 to present.”

Rieth-Riley did not comply with either:

The Board’s request for information post–June 15, 2022; or
The Union’s May 2025 request for detailed underlying records.

Instead, on June 12, 2025, Rieth-Riley informed the Board that it would not provide any additional information until either:

the Sixth Circuit resolved Rieth-Riley’s separate pending petition for review in a related appeal, or
the Union agreed that compliance would not waive Rieth-Riley’s “technical refusal-to-bargain” defense in that appeal.

The Board then petitioned the Sixth Circuit to:

Adjudge Rieth-Riley in civil contempt for withholding post–June 15, 2022 information responsive to the November 2020 request and for failing to respond to the Union’s May 2025 request; and
Impose sanctions.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

The court’s disposition is twofold:

Civil contempt for failure to produce information from June 16, 2022 to the present.
The court finds:
- The Board’s order—requiring production of the November 3, 2020 requested information “in a timely manner”—is sufficiently definite and specific to support a civil contempt finding, even without a precise deadline.
- Rieth-Riley had undisputed knowledge of the court’s enforcement judgment and mandate.
- Rieth-Riley’s own statements in its filings—admitting that it was deliberately withholding post–June 15, 2022 information—are binding judicial admissions that establish a clear violation of the order.
- Rieth-Riley’s asserted justification (to preserve a technical refusal-to-bargain defense in a different appeal) does not qualify as a valid “inability to comply” defense and would not result in waiver of that defense.
Consequently, the court adjudicates Rieth-Riley in civil contempt for failing to provide responsive information from June 16, 2022 onward.
Show-cause order regarding the Union’s May 2025 information request.
The court recognizes that:
- Wage, hour, and benefit information is presumptively relevant to collective bargaining.
- The Union’s May 2025 request for the underlying payroll data is “likely relevant and necessary” to the Union’s functioning.
- New refusals to provide relevant information can potentially violate an ongoing cease-and-desist order, and parties have previously been held in contempt on that basis.
However, the court concludes that it does not yet have sufficient information about the nature and completeness of Rieth-Riley’s April 2025 production to determine whether the failure to provide underlying documents itself constitutes contempt of the prior order. The court therefore issues an order to show cause, requiring Rieth-Riley to explain why it should not be held in contempt for failing to respond to the May 2025 request.

In short, the opinion both imposes civil contempt for a clearly established violation (withholding post–June 15, 2022 data) and initiates further proceedings to determine whether additional contempt has occurred (regarding the underlying payroll records).

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Civil Contempt Framework

The court relies on its modern civil contempt framework, as recently summarized in NLRB v. Bannum, Inc., 93 F.4th 973 (6th Cir. 2024) (per curiam), and earlier cases such as Elec. Workers Pension Tr. Fund of Local Union #58 v. Gary’s Elec. Serv. Co., 340 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003), and Gascho v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC, 875 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 2017).

To obtain civil contempt sanctions, the moving party (here, the Board) must show by clear and convincing evidence:

“a definite and specific order of the court requiring a party to perform or refrain from performing a particular act,”
knowledge of the order by the alleged contemnor, and
a violation of that order by the alleged contemnor.

Once these elements are established, the burden shifts to the alleged contemnor to demonstrate present inability to comply, which must be shown:

“categorically and in detail,” (a demanding standard),
that the inability is not self-induced, and
that the contemnor took all reasonable steps to comply.

Good faith alone is not a defense; the focus is on objective compliance or genuine impossibility, not on subjective intent.

B. “Timely” Compliance as a “Definite and Specific” Obligation

Rieth-Riley argued that because the order required it to provide information “in a timely manner” without specifying a concrete deadline, the order lacked the definiteness required for contempt. The court rejects this contention.

Two key points underlie the court’s reasoning:

Orders without explicit deadlines can still be definite.
The court cites NLRB v. Lynair, Inc., 380 F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1967), where an employer was held in contempt of an order that did not specify a precise time period for compliance. The absence of a date certain does not, by itself, create fatal ambiguity.
The order became fixed and enforceable upon issuance of the mandate.
The court distinguishes Gascho, where it had held that commands contingent on future events may be insufficiently final or definite for contempt purposes. Here, any conditionality evaporated when the court issued its mandate in March 2025. At that point, the requirement to furnish information “in a timely manner” became fully operative and immediately binding. Rieth-Riley was required to comply promptly.

Thus, the court finds no ambiguity: a directive to supply a clearly specified set of data “in a timely manner” is a definite and specific order when the scope of the information and the triggering event (issuance of the mandate) are clear.

C. Judicial Admissions: Using the Company’s Own Statements Against It

The court then considers whether Rieth-Riley actually violated the order. Rather than relying solely on external evidence, it uses Rieth-Riley’s own litigation statements.

The court draws on principles articulated in:

Borror Prop. Mgmt., LLC v. Oro Karric N., LLC, 979 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2020) – litigants are generally bound by their own actions and statements in pleadings and arguments.
MacDonald v. Gen. Motors Corp., 110 F.3d 337, 340 (6th Cir. 1997) – “deliberate, clear and unambiguous” statements in litigation filings are judicial admissions that bind the party.
United States v. Burns, 109 F. App’x 52, 58 (6th Cir. 2004) – brief statements can reach the level of judicial admissions.
Bannum, 93 F.4th at 979–80 – admissions in a response to a contempt motion may prove the underlying contempt.

Rieth-Riley’s briefs contained statements such as:

It has “only withheld a portion of that information temporarily.”
It would complete its production “immediately” upon resolution of a pending appeal.

These admissions show:

The information exists.
It is being deliberately withheld, not withheld because of any objective difficulty in locating or compiling it.

The court treats these statements as binding judicial admissions establishing that Rieth-Riley knowingly refused to fully comply with the order.

D. Timeliness of Employer Responses to Information Requests

Rieth-Riley contended that delay, by itself, cannot establish unlawful conduct because the Board evaluates timeliness under a “totality of the circumstances” standard. The court agrees with the characterization of the Board’s standard but finds that Rieth-Riley fares no better under that test.

The court relies on the Board’s decision in W. Penn Power Co., 339 NLRB 585 (2003), quoting its statement that:

“the duty to furnish requested information cannot be defined in terms of a per se rule. What is required is a reasonable good faith effort to respond to the request as promptly as circumstances allow.”

However, the Board further considers:

the complexity and extent of the information sought,
the availability of the data, and
the difficulty of retrieving it,

as noted in Samaritan Med. Ctr., 319 NLRB 392 (1995).

Rieth-Riley never asserted that:

the request was excessively complex,
the information was difficult to obtain, or
there were logistical obstacles to production.

Instead, it admitted intentional, strategic withholding. Given that:

the required information was defined as of November 2020,
the court’s enforcement mandate issued in March 2025, and
Rieth-Riley had still not provided post–June 15, 2022 data at least eight months later,

the court concludes that this extended delay—unjustified by any claimed complexity—is incompatible with “timely” compliance and with any “reasonable good faith effort.” The violation of the order is therefore established.

E. Rejecting the “Technical Refusal-to-Bargain” Justification

Once the Board proved a violation of a definite order, the burden shifted to Rieth-Riley to demonstrate a present inability to comply, consistent with Bannum, Gascho, and Gary’s Electric. Rieth-Riley attempted to satisfy this burden by invoking its ongoing “technical refusal-to-bargain” strategy in a separate appeal.

1. The “Technical Refusal-to-Bargain” Doctrine

Under longstanding NLRA doctrine, an employer that wishes to obtain judicial review of a union’s certification may:

Refuse to bargain with the certified union, thereby committing a technical violation of § 8(a)(5),
Allow the Board to find a ULP based on that refusal, and
Then seek judicial review of the Board’s order in a court of appeals.

However, if the employer bargains in fact with the union, it may be found to have waived its challenge to the union’s certification. The Sixth Circuit recognized this structure in Peabody Coal Co. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1984).

Here, Rieth-Riley claimed that if it produced the information requested beyond June 15, 2022, it might be deemed to have engaged in bargaining or cooperation inconsistent with its technical refusal-to-bargain stance, thereby losing its defense in its separate appeal.

2. Why the Defense Fails

The court firmly rejects this argument for several reasons:

Compliance with a court order is not optional.
Citing Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975), the court reiterates that:
“all orders and judgments of courts must be complied with promptly.”
An employer cannot unilaterally decide to disobey a court order in the name of preserving a litigation strategy in a different case.
Waiver must be knowing and voluntary.
Drawing on Kellom v. Quinn, 86 F.4th 288, 291 (6th Cir. 2023), the court emphasizes that waivers of legal rights must be knowing and voluntary. Compliance compelled by a court order is neither “optional” nor “voluntary” in the ordinary sense. Thus, merely obeying a judicially enforced NLRB order does not constitute a voluntary bargaining posture that would waive a technical refusal defense.
“Inability to comply” is narrowly construed and excludes self-induced obstacles.
The court underscores that the impossibility defense requires a contemnor to show that compliance is genuinely impossible, that the inability is not self-induced, and that all reasonable steps have been taken to comply. Here:
- Rieth-Riley admits it can produce the information.
- Its purported “inability” stems solely from its desire to maintain a litigation posture, not from any external impossibility.
That is not a recognized basis for the impossibility defense.

The court therefore holds that Rieth-Riley has not carried its “difficult burden” of proving inability to comply and is responsible for its self-induced noncompliance.

F. Ongoing Cease-and-Desist Orders and New Violations: The May 2025 Request

The Board’s original order contained a cease-and-desist directive prohibiting Rieth-Riley from refusing to furnish relevant and necessary information to the Union. That cease-and-desist provision is forward-looking and covers new, post-order refusals to supply information that falls within its scope.

The court notes that it has previously held parties in contempt for new violations of ongoing cease-and-desist orders, citing NLRB v. Teamsters Local No. 327, 592 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1979). There, the union’s later misconduct violated earlier cease-and-desist judgments and justified contempt sanctions.

Applying this framework, the court observes:

The Union’s May 2025 request for “specific rates of pay, hours of work, dates worked, and amounts and dates of fringe benefits paid” for each bargaining-unit employee is almost paradigmatically the type of information that is “presumptively relevant” under cases like NLRB v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 497 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1974) and the 2024 Rieth-Riley decision itself.
The request appears, at least prima facie, to fall within the Board’s cease-and-desist language requiring Rieth-Riley not to refuse to furnish “requested information that is relevant and necessary” to the Union’s representative functions.

However, the court stops short of an immediate contempt finding as to this May 2025 request because:

It lacks sufficient detail about the precise content and completeness of Rieth-Riley’s earlier (April 2025) summaries.
It is not yet clear whether failing to provide the underlying payroll records, in addition to summaries, actually violates the prior order or raises a new, separate information dispute.

To resolve these uncertainties, the court issues an order to show cause, directing Rieth-Riley to admit or deny specific factual allegations concerning its response (or lack thereof) to the May 2025 request. Only after further factual development will the court decide whether new contempt sanctions are appropriate.

G. Relationship to the 2024 Rieth-Riley Decision

The court’s earlier opinion, Rieth-Riley Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 114 F.4th 519 (6th Cir. 2024), laid the substantive foundation for this contempt proceeding by:

Confirming that information about wages, fringe benefits, hours, and job classifications for bargaining-unit employees is presumptively relevant to the Union’s role and must be provided upon request.
Enforcing the Board’s remedial order, including the requirement to provide the November 3, 2020 requested data “in a timely manner.”

In the present opinion, the court builds on that foundation to clarify:

How strictly such enforcement orders will be applied in civil contempt, and
That strategic resistance based on concurrent litigation will not excuse noncompliance.

Thus, this 2025 opinion can be seen as the enforcement phase sequel to the 2024 substantive ruling: the first case defined the duty to provide information; this case makes clear that the duty must be timely fulfilled and cannot be postponed for tactical reasons.

V. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Civil Contempt

Civil contempt is a coercive and/or compensatory mechanism used by courts to enforce compliance with their orders. It is distinct from criminal contempt (which is punitive and aimed at punishing past defiance).

Key features in this context:

The Board must prove the violation by clear and convincing evidence.
Once a violation of a definite order is shown, the contemnor must prove genuine inability to comply, not mere unwillingness or tactical preference.
Good faith or mistaken legal strategy is generally not a defense.

2. Court Mandate

A mandate is the formal instrument by which a court of appeals sends its judgment back to the lower court or agency and makes its decision fully effective. In this case:

The judgment granting enforcement of the NLRB’s order was issued in August 2024.
The mandate issued on March 25, 2025.
Once the mandate issued, Rieth-Riley’s obligations under the Board’s order were no longer contingent or provisional; they became immediately enforceable.

3. Cease-and-Desist Orders

A cease-and-desist order is a typical NLRB remedy requiring an employer or union to stop certain unlawful conduct and not resume it in the future. Here, the Board ordered Rieth-Riley to:

“Cease and desist from … failing and refusing to furnish [the Union] with requested information that is relevant and necessary” to the Union’s representative role.

This language is ongoing and can encompass future refusals to comply with lawful information requests, not merely the specific refusals that gave rise to the original case.

4. Presumptively Relevant Information

Under NLRA jurisprudence:

Information concerning bargaining-unit employees’ wages, hours, and working conditions is “presumptively relevant” to collective bargaining.
The Union does not need to independently prove relevance for such core categories; the employer has a duty to provide them upon request.

This principle, reaffirmed in both the 2024 and 2025 Rieth-Riley decisions, undergirds the court’s conclusion that the Union’s requests at issue here fall comfortably within the employer’s information obligations.

5. Bargaining Unit and Collective-Bargaining Representative

A bargaining unit is the group of employees represented by a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining.
The Union, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative, must have sufficient information to negotiate effectively and to monitor employer compliance with agreements and statutory obligations.

6. Technical Refusal-to-Bargain

A technical refusal-to-bargain is a deliberate strategy used by an employer who wishes to challenge a union’s certification:

The employer refuses to bargain with the certified union.
This refusal results in a technical violation of § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.
The Board finds a ULP and issues an order.
The employer petitions the court of appeals for review, thereby obtaining judicial scrutiny of the initial certification.

The risk for the employer is that if it actually bargains with the union, it may be deemed to have waived its challenge to the certification. This doctrine, however, does not authorize disobedience to a court-enforced order. The Sixth Circuit makes clear that:

Compliance with a judicial order is mandatory and not equivalent to voluntary bargaining activity.
Therefore, compliance does not waive a technical refusal defense.

7. Judicial Admissions

A judicial admission is a formal concession made by a party in litigation (in pleadings, briefs, or statements of counsel) that is:

Deliberate,
Clear, and
Unequivocal.

Such admissions are binding on the party and can be used to establish facts without further proof. In this case, Rieth-Riley’s candid statements that it had “withheld” information and would not produce it until a separate appeal was resolved were treated as judicial admissions, effectively proving the contempt.

VI. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Employers

This opinion delivers several practical messages to employers, particularly those engaged in contentious bargaining and parallel litigation:

Timely means prompt, not indefinite. When a Board order—especially as enforced by a court—requires information to be provided “in a timely manner,” employers cannot delay production for many months without risk of contempt, absent genuine, documented difficulty in obtaining or compiling the information.
Strategic litigation cannot justify defiance of a court order. Maintaining a technical refusal-to-bargain strategy or waiting for a separate appeal to conclude does not constitute a lawful basis to withhold information required by an enforceable order.
Litigation filings can bind you. Admissions in briefs—e.g., acknowledging intentional withholding—can be used as conclusive evidence of contempt. Counsel must assume that candid strategic explanations will have binding legal consequences.
Prepare for continued oversight. Once subject to a cease-and-desist order regarding information, new refusals to provide relevant data can trigger fresh contempt exposure.

B. For Unions

For unions, the decision strengthens the practical enforceability of information rights:

Wage-and-benefit data requests are strongly protected. The court reaffirms that such information is presumptively relevant and that failure to provide it promptly can lead to contempt.
Contempt is a viable tool. When an employer delays or partially complies with an enforced Board order, unions can encourage the Board to seek contempt relief, potentially accelerating compliance.
Underlying records may be within reach. Although the court did not yet hold Rieth-Riley in contempt regarding the underlying payroll records, it signaled that such granular data is “likely relevant and necessary,” suggesting that, with a proper record, such requests can be enforced.

C. For the NLRB and Courts

For the NLRB and the courts, the case has institutional implications:

Affirmation of contempt authority. The opinion reinforces the willingness of the Sixth Circuit to use contempt powers to ensure that its enforcement judgments are not treated as advisory.
Clarification of “definite and specific” standards. The court confirms that orders lacking a precise deadline but otherwise clearly defining the required conduct can support a contempt finding once the mandate issues.
Template for future contempt cases. The structured analysis—definiteness, judicial admissions, burden-shifting, and rejection of self-induced impossibility—provides a framework for future contempt proceedings involving Board orders.

D. For Appellate and Labor Practitioners

Practitioners representing employers or unions in NLRA enforcement cases should take note of:

The dangers of partial compliance. Producing some but not all required information may still result in contempt, especially when the omissions are intentional and post-mandate.
The importance of record clarity. In the second part of its ruling, the court declined immediate contempt only because factual details about the underlying records were unclear. A clearer record might have led to a broader contempt finding.
The significance of nonprecedential opinions. Although the opinion is “not recommended for publication,” it reflects how the Sixth Circuit is likely to approach similar issues, and may be persuasive in future disputes within and beyond the circuit.

VII. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Rieth-Riley Construction Co., Inc. v. NLRB underscores the uncompromising nature of judicial enforcement of NLRB orders. Once the court has enforced such an order and issued its mandate, the employer’s duty to comply—here, to furnish wage and benefit information from June 1, 2020, “to the present” in a timely manner—is neither optional nor negotiable.

The opinion clarifies that:

An obligation to act “in a timely manner” is sufficiently definite to support a civil contempt finding, particularly when the scope of the obligation is clear and a mandate has issued.
Admissions in litigation filings can function as binding judicial admissions, conclusively establishing that a party has deliberately withheld information required by a court order.
Strategic reliance on a technical refusal-to-bargain defense in separate proceedings does not create a lawful excuse for disobeying a court order, nor does compliance with that order waive the defense.
Ongoing cease-and-desist orders can reach new refusals to provide presumptively relevant bargaining information, though courts may require additional factual development before imposing contempt sanctions for those new violations.

In the broader context of labor law and judicial enforcement, this case sends a clear message: once an NLRB order is judicially enforced, the employer’s obligation to comply is immediate and non-contingent. Postponing compliance for tactical or strategic reasons invites civil contempt, and courts will not accommodate self-induced “inability” to obey. The opinion thereby strengthens the practical effectiveness of the Board’s remedial authority and the court’s role in ensuring that its judgments are respected in fact, not merely in form.

Timely Compliance with NLRB Information Orders and the Limits of the Technical Refusal-to-Bargain Defense: Commentary on Rieth-Riley Constr. Co. v. NLRB (6th Cir. 2025)