The BIA May Not Invent Extra‑Regulatory Filing Requirements: Commentary on Pineda-Guerra v. Bondi

The BIA May Not Invent Extra‑Regulatory Filing Requirements: A Detailed Commentary on Pineda-Guerra v. Bondi (6th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

In Nery Maricela Pineda-Guerra v. Pamela Bondi, No. 25‑3081 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a published decision sharply constraining the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) ability to reject filings based on ad hoc, extra‑regulatory technicalities. The case arises out of removal proceedings against three Salvadoran nationals seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

The core dispute before the Sixth Circuit did not involve the substance of the petitioners’ protection claims. Instead, it centered on BIA procedure. The petitioners timely filed a brief in support of their appeal from the immigration judge’s (IJ’s) denial of relief. The BIA rejected that brief because counsel’s mailing address on the brief did not match the mailing address listed on counsel’s notice of appearance (Form EOIR‑27). When petitioners repeatedly attempted to cure this perceived defect, the BIA ultimately denied their motion to accept a late filing and then summarily dismissed the appeal for failure to file a brief.

The Sixth Circuit held that the BIA abused its discretion in two related ways:

  • By rejecting a timely filed brief based on a nonexistent requirement that an attorney’s address on the brief must identically match the address on the EOIR‑27; and
  • By summarily dismissing the appeal for failure to file a brief, despite the fact that a timely brief had been filed and rejected on improper grounds.

Published and explicitly “recommended for publication,” this decision establishes binding precedent in the Sixth Circuit regarding the limits of the BIA’s procedural discretion. It underscores that immigration adjudication—though heavily regulated and highly technical—cannot rest on arbitrary, unwritten rules that are not grounded in statute, regulation, or clearly articulated guidance.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners, Nery Maricela Pineda‑Guerra, Santos Humberto Martinez Guerra, and Yanci Carolina Martinez‑Pineda, citizens of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2014. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings. The petitioners conceded removability but applied for:

  • Asylum,
  • Withholding of removal, and
  • Protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

On March 22, 2022, the immigration court denied all applications. Petitioners appealed to the BIA on April 21, 2022, indicating on their Notice of Appeal (Form EOIR‑26) that they intended to file a separate written brief. Counsel also filed a notice of appearance (Form EOIR‑27) listing her address as:

P.O. Box 5, Springdale, Arkansas 72765.

The BIA set a briefing schedule. After granting an extension, it required the brief to be filed by April 17, 2024. On that date, petitioners filed a brief. This first brief listed counsel’s physical address:

111 Holcomb Street, Springdale, Arkansas 72765.

Both addresses were valid mailing addresses for counsel.

The BIA rejected this timely first brief, citing a defect in counsel’s appearance:

“The attorney address we have in Case is different than the address on the brief.” “Include an E‑27 with new address.”

Petitioners then filed a second brief, received May 8, 2024, now using the P.O. Box address matching the EOIR‑27. The BIA rejected this second brief as untimely and instructed petitioners to re‑file with a “motion for consideration of [their] late-filed brief.”

Petitioners complied, filing a third brief along with a motion to accept late filing, received May 20, 2024, invoking the BIA’s discretion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(c)(1). Six months later, on November 19, 2024, the BIA denied the motion to accept the late brief, concluding petitioners’ rationale was “insufficient” and that their request did not warrant discretionary acceptance.

Finally, the BIA summarily dismissed the appeal, stating that although petitioners had indicated on their Notice of Appeal that they would file a brief, they “did not file such brief or statement” within the time set for filing. Petitioners then sought review in the Sixth Circuit.

B. Issues Before the Sixth Circuit

The Sixth Circuit framed the case as an abuse‑of‑discretion challenge to:

  1. The BIA’s rejection of the petitioners’ April 17, 2024 timely brief based on the discrepancy between counsel’s mailing address on the EOIR‑27 and on the brief; and
  2. The BIA’s subsequent summary dismissal of the appeal for failure to file a brief, despite the earlier timely filing.

C. The Sixth Circuit’s Holdings

Reviewing for abuse of discretion under Yousif v. Garland, 53 F.4th 928 (6th Cir. 2022), the court held:

  1. The BIA abused its discretion by rejecting the April 17, 2024 brief on the ground that the attorney’s address on the brief did not match the address on the notice of appearance:
    • No regulation, BIA rule, or instruction requires an exact address match between the EOIR‑27 and the brief.
    • The BIA’s Practice Manual, which does govern many aspects of filings, contains no such requirement and, in any event, “does not carry the weight of law or regulation.”
    • By inventing and enforcing this unwritten rule, the BIA “inexplicably departed from established policies” without a rational explanation.
  2. The BIA further abused its discretion by summarily dismissing the appeal for failure to file a brief under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E), because:
    • Petitioners in fact filed a timely brief on April 17, 2024.
    • Summarily dismissing an appeal on the premise that no brief was filed, when one was timely tendered and improperly rejected, was irrational and contrary to established policies.

Accordingly, the court:

  • Granted the petition for review; and
  • Reversed the BIA’s order rejecting the April 17, 2024 brief and the subsequent order summarily denying the appeal.

The decision does not itself adjudicate the underlying asylum, withholding, and CAT claims; instead, it ensures that the BIA must consider the petitioners’ appeal on the merits, with their brief accepted as properly filed.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Standard of Review: Yousif v. Garland and Ishac v. Barr

The court begins by reciting the standard of review: BIA decisions on matters like accepting late briefs are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Citing Yousif v. Garland, 53 F.4th 928, 936 (6th Cir. 2022), which itself quoted Ishac v. Barr, 775 F. App’x 782, 789 (6th Cir. 2019), the opinion restates the familiar abuse‑of‑discretion standard:

“The BIA abuses its discretion if its decision was made ‘without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination.’”

This standard is critical: it sets a high but not insurmountable bar. The court does not substitute its own judgment for the BIA’s; rather, it polices the outer bounds of discretion by requiring:

  • A rational explanation connected to the record and the governing legal framework; and
  • Consistency with established policies, including regulations, published guidance, and prior practice.

In Pineda-Guerra, the court repeatedly returns to these two components—rational explanation and consistency with established policy—as the key measures of whether the BIA’s actions were permissible.

2. Summary Dismissal Authority: 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i) and Ahmed v. Gonzales

The BIA’s power to summarily dismiss appeals is governed by regulation. The opinion focuses on 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E), which authorizes summary dismissal where:

“[A] petitioner indicates on a notice of appeal from a decision of an immigration judge that ‘he or she will file a brief or statement in support of the appeal and, thereafter, does not file such brief or statement, or reasonably explain his or her failure to do so, within the time set for filing.’”

The court also cites Ahmed v. Gonzales, 198 F. App’x 517, 520 (6th Cir. 2006), which applied this provision, reinforcing that summary dismissal is a recognized and sometimes proper tool when a party promises a brief but fails to deliver or explain the omission.

In Pineda-Guerra, the regulatory condition—not filing the promised brief—was not met. The petitioners did file a brief on time; the only reason it was not “in the record” was the BIA’s own improper rejection. The Sixth Circuit thus reasons that the BIA’s reliance on § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E) was misplaced: a prerequisite for summary dismissal was absent.

3. The BIA’s Practice Manual and Bulatovic v. Holder

The court emphasizes the role—and the limits—of the BIA Practice Manual. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(4), the BIA “may prescribe procedures governing proceedings before it.” It does so through the Practice Manual, which “provides official guidance to parties and counsel who appear before [it].” The court cites Bulatovic v. Holder, 351 F. App’x 978, 980 (6th Cir. 2009), confirming that the Manual is treated as a source of procedural guidance.

The opinion notes several specific Manual provisions:

  • Applicants must “comply with the instructions on the Notice of Appeal (Form EOIR‑26)” and submit supporting documents, including a cover page.
  • The cover page “should include a caption” listing “the name and address of the filing party.”
  • An example cover page in Appendix E shows that an attorney “should provide his or her name and complete business address.”

Crucially, however, the Manual itself states that it “does not carry the weight of law or regulation.” BIA Practice Manual § 1.1(c). The Sixth Circuit seizes on this point to underscore that:

  • The Manual may influence procedure, but it cannot independently create binding filing requirements whose violation results in dismissal or rejection; and
  • The Manual certainly cannot justify inventing a requirement (like address matching) that appears nowhere in the Manual, the regulations, or the forms’ instructions.

4. The Late-Filed Brief Regulation: 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(c)(1)

The BIA invoked its discretionary authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(c)(1) to refuse to consider the petitioners’ later brief. That provision allows the BIA to accept briefs filed after the deadline “in its discretion” upon a showing of good cause or other sufficient grounds.

Here, the Sixth Circuit’s core point is not that the BIA could not have denied a late‑filed brief in some hypothetical scenario. Instead, it is that:

  • The BIA’s own wrongful rejection of the timely April 17 brief created the “lateness” problem;
  • The BIA then refused to remedy its own error by declining to accept a “late” brief that was only late because of its erroneous prior decision; and
  • This chain of reasoning is irrational and inconsistent with the duty to exercise discretion in a reasoned manner.

5. Other BIA Rules and Forms: EOIR‑26 and Summary Dismissal

The court also surveys how the BIA typically specifies when a procedural defect will result in rejection or dismissal. It points to:

  • BIA Practice Manual § 4.16(a), (d), listing circumstances under which an appeal may be summarily dismissed;
  • BIA Practice Manual § 5.8(b), clarifying when a motion to remand may be denied (e.g., where evidence was discoverable earlier, is immaterial, or is “otherwise defective”); and
  • The Form EOIR‑26 instructions, which explicitly warn that an appeal “may be rejected or dismissed” if certain sections—such as the “Proof of Service”—are not properly completed.

These examples show that when the BIA intends to make a procedural misstep jurisdictional or dismissal‑worthy, it says so, clearly and in writing. The absence of any such warning regarding address matching on briefs is decisive in the court’s analysis.

6. Cross-Circuit Practice: Tobeth-Tangang v. Gonzales (1st Cir.)

The opinion notes that, in a case with a similar address inconsistency, the BIA did not reject a filing. In Tobeth-Tangang v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 537, 538 (1st Cir. 2006), the First Circuit described a situation where:

“[P]etitioner's counsel filed a brief with the BIA. The signature block contained a different mailing address than the address noted on his entry of appearance. On March 26, 2003, the BIA affirmed.”

There, the BIA accepted the brief and affirmed the IJ’s decision on the merits. While not binding on the Sixth Circuit, this example illustrates:

  • That the BIA has historically tolerated such discrepancies; and
  • That its rejection of the Pineda-Guerra brief represents a departure from its own prior practice.

This supports the conclusion that the BIA “inexplicably departed from established policies” without explanation—one of the key abuse‑of‑discretion indicators under Yousif.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Abuse of Discretion Framework

The court’s reasoning tracks the definition of abuse of discretion closely. It examines whether the BIA’s decisions:

  • Were grounded in a rational explanation tied to law and fact; and
  • Were consistent with established policies—regulations, written guidance, and past practice.

On both points, the court finds the BIA’s actions wanting.

2. Rejecting the April 17 Timely Brief: Creation of a Nonexistent Requirement

The court’s first major conclusion is that the BIA’s rejection of the April 17, 2024 brief for having a different attorney address from that on the EOIR‑27 was arbitrary and unlawful.

Key aspects of the court’s reasoning include:

  1. No legal or procedural basis for an address‑matching requirement.
    The court carefully canvasses:
    • The relevant regulations (8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1, 1003.3);
    • The BIA Practice Manual provisions governing briefs and cover pages; and
    • The instructions to Form EOIR‑26 and EOIR‑27.
    None of these sources:
    • Require that an attorney’s address on the brief must be identical to the address on the notice of appearance; or
    • Warn that deviation on this point may cause the BIA to reject a brief.
  2. Both addresses were valid mailing addresses.
    The court notes that:
    • The address on the EOIR‑27 was counsel’s P.O. Box; and
    • The address on the brief was counsel’s physical office address.
    Both were valid locations where counsel could receive mail. Thus, the discrepancy:
    • Did not threaten the integrity of the proceedings (e.g., by making service impossible); and
    • Did not create confusion as to counsel’s identity.
  3. The Practice Manual does not support rejection on this ground.
    While the Manual expects an address to appear on the brief’s cover page, it does not require a match. Moreover, because the Manual “does not carry the weight of law or regulation,” even an explicit practice manual requirement, without more, would be a weak basis for outright dismissal absent express authority.
  4. Creation of a new, outcome-determinative requirement was not properly communicated.
    When the BIA intends to treat certain formal mistakes as dispositive, it announces this openly—e.g., warning that failure to properly complete proof of service may result in dismissal. The lack of any similar warning about address matching suggests that:
    • The address match was not a recognized, published rule; and
    • Its sudden deployment in this case represented an unannounced tightening of an informal practice, at odds with due process‑like fairness norms and with consistent administrative practice.
  5. Inconsistent with prior practice, as illustrated by Tobeth-Tangang.
    By referencing a case where the BIA accepted a filing with mismatched addresses, the court underscores that:
    • Even if the BIA had some unwritten preference for matching addresses, it historically did not treat deviations as fatal; and
    • The unexplained shift to rejecting filings on this basis is precisely the kind of “inexplicable departure” that constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Taken together, these points lead the court to a clear conclusion: rejecting the timely April 17 brief was an abuse of discretion.

3. Summary Dismissal of the Appeal: Misapplication of § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E)

The court then turns to the BIA’s summary dismissal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E), which allows dismissal where a party:

indicates an intent to file a brief but then “does not file such brief or statement, or reasonably explain his or her failure to do so, within the time set for filing.”

The core factual premise for invoking this rule—that no brief was filed—was false:

  • Petitioners did file a brief by the extended deadline of April 17, 2024.
  • The BIA’s refusal to accept it was based on a ground that had no basis in published law or policy.

From there, the reasoning is straightforward:

  • Because a timely brief was in fact filed, the regulatory condition for summary dismissal was not met.
  • Using § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E) in this context was therefore irrational.
  • This irrationality, coupled with the earlier arbitrary rejection, amounted to an abuse of discretion under the Yousif standard.

The opinion’s blunt characterization captures this:

“But as discussed above, they did file a timely brief. Summarily rejecting petitioners’ appeal when they filed a timely brief is irrational and ‘inexplicably depart[s] from established policies.’”

4. The BIA’s Failure to Exercise Remedial Discretion Under § 1003.3(c)(1)

Although the court does not dwell at length on the details of the BIA’s denial of the motion to accept a late‑filed brief, that denial is implicit in the analysis:

  • Petitioners’ brief became “late” only because the BIA wrongfully refused to accept their timely filing.
  • Once the BIA realized it had rejected a timely brief on a dubious technicality, one would expect it to use its discretion under § 1003.3(c)(1) to cure its own error.
  • Instead, the BIA denied the motion with a conclusory statement that the rationale was “insufficient” and did not justify exercising discretion.

In effect, the BIA doubled down on the initial procedural misstep. While the court does not separately analyze this as a due process violation, the pattern contributes to its conclusion that the BIA’s overall handling of the appeal lacked rational justification and violated established norms of fair procedure.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Clarifying Limits on the BIA’s Procedural Discretion

The principal doctrinal contribution of Pineda-Guerra is a clear statement that:

The BIA may not reject filings or summarily dismiss appeals based on procedural “requirements” that do not appear in regulations, in clearly articulated binding rules, or in properly communicated guidance.

In particular, the decision establishes that:

  • Minor technical discrepancies—like using a different but valid mailing address for counsel—cannot, without clear authority, justify the rejection of a timely filed brief; and
  • When the BIA chooses to make a procedural rule outcome‑determinative (leading to rejection or dismissal), it must have a clear legal basis and must communicate the rule in advance to parties and counsel.

This serves as a significant constraint on the BIA’s ability to manage its docket through ad hoc technical disqualifications.

2. Reinforcing the Non‑Binding Nature of the Practice Manual

Although courts have long recognized that the BIA Practice Manual is not a binding regulation, Pineda-Guerra gives that point renewed force. The court uses the Manual both:

  • To show what the BIA has explicitly required (e.g., basic cover‑page contents); and
  • To illustrate what it has not required (e.g., address matching, with dismissal as a consequence).

The decision thus:

  • Discourages the BIA from treating unwritten preferences or internal administrative practices as if they were formal rules; and
  • Signals that courts of appeals will scrutinize any attempt to elevate such informal practices to dispositive grounds for rejection or dismissal.

3. Protecting the Right to Meaningful Appellate Review in Immigration Cases

The stakes in immigration appeals are especially high—often involving claims of persecution, torture, or life‑threatening conditions upon return. Summary dismissal for technical reasons can effectively end a noncitizen’s attempt to secure protection.

Pineda-Guerra advances meaningful appellate review in several ways:

  • It shields appellants from losing their appeal over obscure, unpublished technicalities.
    By holding that the BIA’s rejection was arbitrary, the court ensures that noncitizens are not deprived of merits review because of minor, non‑prejudicial defects.
  • It underscores that summary dismissal rules must be narrowly and properly applied.
    Summary dismissal is a powerful tool to weed out abandoned or frivolous appeals. But it cannot be used where an appellant has in fact complied with the core requirements, such as filing a brief on time.
  • It implicitly promotes consistency and transparency.
    When procedural pitfalls are clearly defined and predictable, counsel can avoid them; when they are ad hoc and unpublished, the risk of arbitrary deprivation of review increases. The decision pushes the BIA toward the former model.

4. Guidance for Counsel Practicing Before the BIA

For practitioners, Pineda-Guerra offers several practical implications:

  • Address Consistency Is Still Advisable—but Not Jurisdictional.
    Counsel should continue to maintain consistency across EOIR‑27s, briefs, and other filings to avoid unnecessary complications. However, if a discrepancy occurs, Pineda-Guerra provides a strong argument that it is not, standing alone, a legitimate ground for rejection.
  • Preserve Evidence of Timely Filing.
    Documenting timely submission (e.g., via mail receipts, electronic filing confirmations) is critical to rebut any assertion that no brief was filed. Here, the petitioners could show the April 17 brief was in fact tendered by the deadline.
  • Challenge Arbitrary Rejections.
    If the BIA rejects a filing for a reason not grounded in regulation, form instructions, or the Practice Manual, counsel should:
    • Promptly re‑file with a motion explaining the error; and
    • Preserve the issue for judicial review by clearly articulating how the BIA’s action departs from established rules or lacks a rational basis.

5. Broader Administrative Law Implications

Beyond immigration, the decision resonates with general administrative law principles:

  • Agencies Must Act Consistently with Their Own Rules.
    A long‑standing principle is that agencies must follow their own regulations and published procedures. Arbitrary departures from those frameworks can be set aside as unlawful.
  • Internal Guidance Versus Binding Rules.
    The case highlights the distinction between:
    • Non‑binding guidance documents, like manuals or handbooks, which inform but do not create enforceable obligations; and
    • Regulations or adjudicative precedents, which can legitimately bind parties.
  • Judicial Review as a Check on Procedural Arbitrary Action.
    Even when review is highly deferential (as with abuse‑of‑discretion), courts will intervene where agency decisions:
    • Lack a rational explanation;
    • Are inconsistent with published rules; or
    • Reflect ad hoc requirements that are not fairly disclosed to the regulated public.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

For readers less familiar with immigration procedure or administrative law, several key concepts in the opinion warrant plain‑language explanation.

1. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

The BIA is a specialized appellate body within the U.S. Department of Justice. It reviews decisions made by immigration judges across the country. Its decisions are binding on immigration courts nationwide (unless overruled by the Attorney General or a federal court of appeals).

In most removal cases, the path to the federal courts runs through the BIA: a noncitizen usually must appeal to the BIA before seeking judicial review in a circuit court.

2. Forms EOIR‑26 and EOIR‑27

  • Form EOIR‑26 – Notice of Appeal.
    This is the form used to appeal an IJ’s decision to the BIA. Among other things, it asks whether the appellant intends to file a written brief.
  • Form EOIR‑27 – Notice of Appearance.
    This form is used by attorneys to formally enter an appearance before the BIA. It includes the attorney’s mailing address, which the BIA uses for service of orders and notices.

In Pineda-Guerra, the issue arose because counsel’s mailing address on the EOIR‑27 (a P.O. Box) did not match the address on the first brief (a physical office address). The BIA treated this discrepancy as a fatal defect; the Sixth Circuit held that was improper.

3. BIA Practice Manual: Guidance, Not Law

The BIA Practice Manual is an extensive guide describing how to file documents, format briefs, request extensions, and so on. It is written by the BIA to help parties and attorneys navigate its procedures.

However, the Manual itself expressly states that it “does not carry the weight of law or regulation.” That means:

  • It is guidance, not a statute or regulation;
  • It helps interpret and implement the formal rules but cannot contradict them; and
  • Violations of “best practices” in the Manual do not automatically justify dismissals unless supported by more authoritative sources.

4. “Abuse of Discretion” Review

When a court reviews an agency’s procedural decisions—like whether to accept a late brief—it often uses an “abuse of discretion” standard. Under this deferential standard, the court does not re‑decide the issue from scratch. Instead, it asks:

  • Did the agency provide a rational explanation for its decision?
  • Did it follow its own rules and policies?
  • Did it avoid basing its decision on improper factors, like discrimination?

If the answer to any of these is “no,” the agency has abused its discretion. In Pineda-Guerra, the BIA:

  • Created a rule (address matching) not found in any binding authority;
  • Applied that rule to reject a timely brief; and
  • Then summarily dismissed the appeal on the false ground that no brief had been filed.

The Sixth Circuit found this chain of events irrational and inconsistent with established policies—hence an abuse of discretion.

5. Summary Dismissal

“Summary dismissal” means the BIA denies an appeal without a full review of the merits, usually because of a threshold procedural defect. Common grounds include:

  • Failure to adequately state reasons for the appeal on the Notice of Appeal;
  • Failure to file a promised brief; or
  • Failure to comply with certain clear procedural requirements.

In this case, the BIA used a specific ground: that petitioners said they would file a brief but did not. The Sixth Circuit concluded that this was factually incorrect because a timely brief had been filed, and legally improper because the BIA’s earlier rejection of that brief was itself arbitrary.

6. Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT Protection (Context Only)

While the underlying protections were not decided by the Sixth Circuit, a brief overview provides context:

  • Asylum protects individuals who have a well‑founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.
  • Withholding of removal offers a narrower but more mandatory form of protection, preventing removal if the person’s life or freedom would more likely than not be threatened on a protected ground.
  • CAT protection bars removal to a country where the individual would more likely than not be tortured, regardless of the persecutor’s motive.

These high‑stakes claims underscore why the availability of meaningful appellate review—free from arbitrary procedural barriers—is so important.

V. Conclusion

Pineda-Guerra v. Bondi stands as an important Sixth Circuit precedent reinforcing that the BIA’s procedural discretion has limits. The decision crystallizes several key principles:

  • No invented requirements. The BIA may not reject a timely filed brief or summarily dismiss an appeal based on a technical requirement—such as a perfect match between addresses on the notice of appearance and the brief—that appears nowhere in the governing regulations, forms, or clearly articulated guidance.
  • Consistency and rationality are mandatory. Under the abuse‑of‑discretion standard, decisions must be rationally explained and consistent with established policies. Unexplained departures from prior practice or from the BIA’s own stated rules are impermissible.
  • Procedural rules must be clearly communicated if they are to be outcome‑determinative. Where the BIA intends a procedural misstep to carry the severe consequence of rejection or dismissal, it must say so explicitly in its regulations, form instructions, or binding guidance.
  • Summary dismissal must rest on accurate premises. The BIA cannot invoke the summary dismissal rule for failure to file a brief when a timely brief was tendered and rejected only because of the BIA’s own arbitrary application of an unwritten rule.

By granting the petition for review and reversing the BIA’s orders, the Sixth Circuit ensures that the petitioners’ appeal will receive a merits-based consideration with their brief properly in the record. More broadly, the decision sends a strong signal that federal courts will not tolerate opaque, extra‑regulatory procedural hurdles that prevent noncitizens from obtaining meaningful appellate review in cases involving life‑altering consequences.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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