Speech vs. Disruptive Conduct at Public Meetings: The Sixth Circuit’s Framework in Frenchko v. Monroe

I. Introduction

In Niki Frenchko v. Paul Monroe, No. 24-3116 (6th Cir. Nov. 26, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit confronted a highly charged clash between an elected official's speech and the government's authority to maintain order at public meetings. The case arises from the arrest of a sitting Trumbull County Commissioner, Niki Frenchko, during a Board of Commissioners meeting after she repeatedly interrupted the reading of a letter from the County Sheriff.

Frenchko sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ohio law, alleging that her arrest constituted an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment, and state-law false arrest and civil conspiracy. The district court granted her partial summary judgment on the federal claims and denied various immunity defenses asserted by the sheriff’s deputies, the sheriff, fellow commissioners, and county entities.

On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit, in a published opinion by Judge Davis (joined by Judge Clay, with Judge Nalbandian concurring in part and dissenting in part), substantially reshaped the legal landscape on several fronts:

It held that deputies had probable cause to arrest an elected official for disrupting a meeting under Ohio’s anti-disruption statute, even where the underlying speech concerned matters of public concern.
It clarified the distinction between speech and disruptive conduct within the context of public meetings and time, place, and manner restrictions.
It strictly enforced the § 1983 “personal involvement” requirement, refusing to extend federal liability to non-arresting officials based solely on a state-law conspiracy theory or loosely pleaded federal conspiracy language.
It affirmed that Ohio’s statutory immunity for public employees can be lost where evidence supports a bad-faith conspiracy to engineer a retaliatory arrest, even if the arrest itself is supported by probable cause.

The opinion thus sets an important precedent for how officials, law enforcement, and courts should analyze arrests for “disruption” at public meetings—especially where the arrestee is herself an elected official criticizing government conduct.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court’s holdings can be synthesized as follows:

Fourth Amendment (Unlawful Seizure): The deputies (Wix and Ross) had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Commissioner Frenchko for violating Ohio Rev. Code § 2917.12(A)(1) (“disrupting a lawful meeting”). Because probable cause is a “low bar” and the deputies observed repeated interruptions and refusal to yield the floor despite rulings of order, the arrest was objectively reasonable. All defendants therefore received qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim, and the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Frenchko on that claim was reversed.
First Amendment (Retaliatory Arrest):
- Non-officer defendants (Fuda, Cantalamessa, and Monroe): The court held there was insufficient evidence that these officials were personally involved in making the arrest, as required for § 1983 liability. Their comments, frustrations, and even celebratory or crude texts did not amount to “causing” the arrest. Any § 1983 conspiracy theory was deemed forfeited on appeal, so they were entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim.
- Arresting deputies (Wix and Ross) and official-capacity claims: Because the arrest was supported by probable cause, the default rule from Nieves v. Bartlett would ordinarily bar a retaliatory-arrest claim. But the court recognized two exceptions (the “similarly situated comparators” exception from Nieves and the “official policy of retaliation” exception from Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach) and remanded for the district court to decide, in the first instance, whether those exceptions save Frenchko’s First Amendment claims against the deputies and the county in their official capacities.
Ohio Statutory Immunity (False Arrest and Civil Conspiracy): Under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6), individual employees ordinarily enjoy immunity from state tort suits. That immunity is lost, however, if an employee acts “in bad faith.” Accepting the district court’s factual inferences (as required on interlocutory review), the Sixth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find that defendants conspired, in bad faith, to engineer a retaliatory arrest of Frenchko. This potential bad faith sufficed to defeat statutory immunity at the summary-judgment stage for:
- The false arrest claim against Wix and Ross; and
- The state-law civil conspiracy claim against all the individual defendants.
Interlocutory Scope: The court emphasized the limited nature of interlocutory jurisdiction: it could address only pure legal questions (such as the existence of qualified or statutory immunity on undisputed facts), not factual disputes about what actually happened.

Judge Nalbandian agreed with most of the opinion but dissented in part. He argued that the majority improperly insulated the non-officer defendants from § 1983 liability by refusing to treat the alleged conspiracy as a basis for “caus[ing]” the constitutional violation under § 1983. In his view, longstanding conspiracy principles should have allowed potential liability for the non-officer defendants, and the First Amendment retaliation claim should have gone forward against all individuals, not just the deputies.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Background

The facts of Frenchko are politically and emotionally charged:

Niki Frenchko was elected in 2021 as one of three Trumbull County Commissioners, on a platform of exposing alleged corruption and mismanagement by incumbents Fuda and Cantalamessa.
At a June 1, 2022 Board meeting, she read into the record a letter from an inmate’s mother alleging inadequate medical care at the county jail. She criticized the Sheriff’s Department and jail medical provider.
Sheriff Paul Monroe responded with a July 5, 2022 letter condemning her public airing of the allegations and requesting a public apology.
At the July 7, 2022 meeting, Commission Chair Fuda directed the clerk to read Monroe’s letter aloud (it was not on the agenda). During the reading, Frenchko repeatedly interrupted, moved closer with her phone to livestream, and continued over the clerk’s attempts to read, despite Fuda’s gaveling and audience pleas to stop distressing the visibly uncomfortable clerk.
After the letter, Fuda allowed her to respond. After about two minutes, he and Cantalamessa admonished her as being disruptive and disrespectful to the “chief law enforcement officer.” Fuda demanded an apology to the Sheriff; she instead continued rebutting the letter and then shifted to a new topic not on the agenda.
Wix and Ross, sheriff’s sergeants providing security, observed from the back. Within about thirty seconds of Fuda calling out and Ross signaling a “thumbs up” toward Cantalamessa, they approached, told her she was being “very disruptive,” removed her, and arrested her for violating Ohio Rev. Code § 2917.12(A)(1) (disrupting a lawful meeting).
She was processed at the jail and released the same day. The criminal complaint was dismissed three months later.
Text messages surfaced showing Monroe communicating with the media immediately around the time of the arrest and showing Cantalamessa exchanging celebratory and insulting messages about Frenchko’s arrest (e.g., “Handcuffed and removed,” calling her a “sh*tbag”). Some texts were allegedly lost or not preserved, spawning a spoliation dispute noted in the dissent.

Frenchko sued under § 1983 (Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure; First Amendment retaliatory arrest) and under Ohio law (false arrest, civil conspiracy, and others not at issue in the appeal). The district court:

Granted her partial summary judgment on both the Fourth Amendment and First Amendment claims against all defendants.
Denied qualified immunity and Ohio statutory immunity to the individual defendants on the overlapping state-law false arrest and conspiracy claims.

The defendants took an interlocutory appeal on:

Denial of qualified immunity on the Fourth and First Amendment claims; and
Denial of statutory immunity under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6) on the false arrest and state-law conspiracy claims.

B. Fourth Amendment: Probable Cause to Arrest for Meeting Disruption

1. Legal framework

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures. An arrest without a warrant is reasonable if supported by probable cause—defined as facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that would warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense. The court emphasized that probable cause is a “low bar” and that the analysis is objective: the officer’s subjective motives are irrelevant.

The deputies arrested Frenchko under Ohio Rev. Code § 2917.12(A)(1), which provides that no person, “with purpose to prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting, procession, or gathering,” shall “do any act which obstructs or interferes with the due conduct of such meeting, procession, or gathering.”

Key points in the court’s reading of the statute:

Mens rea (“purpose”): Ohio law defines acting “purposely” as specific intent to engage in the conduct at issue. It was undisputed that Frenchko intended to interrupt the clerk’s reading.
“Obstruct” and “interfere”: Because the statute does not define these terms, the court looked to ordinary dictionary meanings:
- “Obstruct” = to hinder, impede, or make difficult or impossible.
- “Interfere” = to obstruct normal operations or intervene/meddle in the affairs of others.
Combined with the Ohio appellate decision in Columbus v. Doyle, this meant the statute reaches a person who purposefully acts in a way that actually hinders the due conduct of a lawful meeting.

2. Application to the facts

The court treated the video of the meeting as central. From the perspective of an objectively reasonable officer, the deputies observed:

Frenchko interrupting the clerk “at least four times” while the clerk attempted to read Monroe’s letter, even causing the clerk to stop reading and respond to Frenchko’s mid-reading questions.
Repeated efforts by Chair Fuda to restore order—calling points of order, banging the gavel, telling her to stop interrupting.
Members of the public asking her to stop distressing the clerk.
Her refusal to yield even when Fuda said the meeting had to move on to the next agenda item and when she shifted to a topic not on the agenda while the chair tried to advance the meeting.

On these facts, the deputies could reasonably conclude that:

She acted with purpose to disrupt the meeting; and
Her conduct actually obstructed or interfered with the meeting’s due conduct, because the reading of the letter and transition to other business could not proceed smoothly while she continued speaking over the clerk and ignoring the chair’s rulings.

3. Comparison to Burton v. City of Detroit

The court relied heavily on its unpublished decision in Burton v. City of Detroit, 2022 WL 17177323 (6th Cir. Nov. 23, 2022), involving another elected commissioner arrested for disrupting a Board of Police Commissioners meeting under a Michigan anti-disturbance statute. In Burton:

The statute prohibited making or exciting a “disturbance” at a public meeting.
The commissioner continued speaking after being ruled out of order several times and after explicit warnings of removal.
The Sixth Circuit held those facts established probable cause to arrest under the Michigan statute.

In Frenchko, the court saw a close parallel: an elected official continuing to speak after being ruled out of order and after warnings, thereby preventing the chair from conducting the meeting. This analogy bolstered the conclusion that the deputies here also had probable cause (or at least “arguable probable cause” sufficient for qualified immunity).

4. Speech content vs. disruptive conduct

A central argument from Frenchko was that her arrest was based on the content of her speech—criticizing the sheriff and conditions in the jail—rather than the manner of her speaking. Citing Novak v. City of Parma and other cases, she argued that an arrest cannot be grounded solely in protected speech.

The court agreed with the general principle: protected speech cannot be the sole basis for probable cause. However, it drew a sharp line between:

Protected content (criticizing the government, airing allegations about jail conditions), and
Regulable conduct (speaking over others, ignoring the chair’s rulings, obstructing the meeting’s orderly progress).

It emphasized:

The statute was being treated (for purposes of this case) as a valid, content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction; the facial constitutionality challenge was abandoned on appeal.
The deputies arrested her because she was persistently interrupting and preventing the meeting from proceeding, not because of what she was saying about jail conditions.
Cases like Swiecicki v. Delgado recognize that even if the underlying content is protected, the manner in which that content is expressed can furnish probable cause when it violates a neutral public-order law.

Relatedly, the court dismissed as legally irrelevant plaintiff’s claim that the arrest was instigated by political enemies (Fuda and Cantalamessa). Even if they urged the arrest for retaliatory reasons, so long as an objectively reasonable officer could believe a crime was being committed, the presence of improper motives by others did not negate probable cause for the Fourth Amendment analysis.

5. Consequence: No Fourth Amendment violation; qualified immunity for all

Because a reasonable officer could conclude that § 2917.12(A)(1) was violated, the arrest was not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly:

No defendant violated her Fourth Amendment rights.
All defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim.
The district court’s grant of summary judgment to Frenchko on that claim was reversed and judgment directed in favor of defendants on that issue.

C. First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest

The court’s First Amendment discussion is more nuanced and partially unresolved, culminating in a remand.

1. Basic standard: Nieves and the no-probable-cause rule

Under Nieves v. Bartlett, a plaintiff alleging a retaliatory arrest for protected speech generally must plead and prove the absence of probable cause. If probable cause exists, the claim is usually barred because the arrest has an objectively legitimate basis.

Here, the court had already held that probable cause existed. So absent an exception, the First Amendment claim would fail.

2. Threshold issue: Who can be liable under § 1983?

Before reaching the Nieves exceptions, the court analyzed which defendants could be liable at all under § 1983, given the statute’s requirement that a person must have “subject[ed], or cause[d] to be subjected” the plaintiff to the constitutional violation.

The court drew a sharp line:

Deputies Wix and Ross: Unquestionably “personally involved” because they physically arrested and detained her. They remain potential defendants on the retaliatory arrest claim, subject to the Nieves exceptions on remand.
Commissioners Fuda and Cantalamessa: The court characterized them as, at most, frustrated or vocal bystanders. Their acts—banging the gavel, calling points of order, chastising her for criticizing the sheriff, remarking she could be removed, and even reacting with glee afterwards via text—did not amount to “placing her under arrest” or “causing” her arrest within the meaning of § 1983.
- They had no arrest authority.
- They took no formal action to trigger the arrest beyond exercising meeting chairmanship functions and expressing annoyance.
Sheriff Monroe: He did not attend the meeting and had no communication with the deputies about arresting her beforehand. His acts—writing the letter, discussing whether it should be read, later telling jail staff to process and release her quickly, and allegedly failing to block charges—were not enough to show that he “approved,” “directed,” or “knowingly acquiesced” in an unconstitutional arrest.

The majority underscored that § 1983 imposes liability only on those who are directly or causally responsible for the deprivation; “mere presence” and mere supervisory status are not enough. Nor is the failure to intervene or discipline after the fact sufficient to make Monroe liable.

3. Federal vs. state conspiracy and forfeiture

An important—and controversial—feature of the majority’s reasoning is its treatment of conspiracy theories:

State-law civil conspiracy: The district court recognized a state-law civil conspiracy claim and relied on that conspiracy analysis when concluding that all defendants participated in Frenchko’s “arrest” in a broad factual sense.
§ 1983 civil conspiracy: The majority concluded that any distinct § 1983 conspiracy theory had been forfeited on appeal:
- The district court did not explicitly analyze a § 1983 conspiracy claim.
- On appeal, defendants briefed only state-law conspiracy; plaintiff did not cross-appeal or separately argue § 1983 conspiracy.
- Because federal and state conspiracy claims have different elements, the court refused to treat a well-pleaded state conspiracy as automatically encompassing a federal one.

As a result, the court declined to attribute the deputies’ acts to the non-officer defendants through a § 1983 conspiracy theory. Without such a theory, there was insufficient evidence that Fuda, Cantalamessa, or Monroe were personally involved in, or caused, the arrest. They therefore obtained qualified immunity on the First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim.

4. The dissent’s criticism on conspiracy and causation

Judge Nalbandian dissented on this point. In his view:

§ 1983 by its text covers those who “cause to be subjected” a person to the deprivation of rights.
Longstanding circuit precedents (e.g., Hooks, Spadafore, Sykes, Bazzi, Crowley) recognize that co-conspirators can be liable for each other’s acts even if they did not personally execute them, where the evidence shows a shared plan and conspiratorial objective.
The record, viewed in the light most favorable to Frenchko, could support a finding that the non-officer defendants:
- Planned the use of the Sheriff’s letter as a trigger event;
- Arranged deputies’ presence at a meeting where such security was not routine;
- Communicated before, during, and after the arrest in a manner consistent with a pre-arranged plan; and
- Cheered the arrest via texts in a way suggestive of prior expectation.
The parties did raise conspiracy principles below and on appeal—albeit intertwined with the state-law conspiracy analysis—and the majority’s forfeiture ruling elevates form over substance.

For the dissent, these factors warranted allowing the First Amendment retaliation claim to proceed not only against the deputies but against all individual defendants, leaving the district court to determine on remand whether either Nieves exception applied.

5. The Nieves exceptions and Lozman

Having decided that only Wix and Ross (and the official-capacity defendants) properly remained in the federal case, the majority turned to the Nieves exceptions but declined to decide them in the first instance.

Two exceptions are recognized:

Comparator / selective enforcement exception (Nieves):
A plaintiff can overcome the probable-cause barrier by adducing objective evidence that she was arrested while similarly situated individuals not engaged in protected speech were not. As clarified in Gonzalez v. Trevino, this can include patterns or practices; it need not always be one-to-one “comparator” examples. If this exception applies, the usual First Amendment retaliation framework (causation, burden-shifting) resumes.
Official policy of retaliation exception (Lozman):
Where the arrest is an implementation of an official municipal policy of retaliation (i.e., a deliberate policy by top decisionmakers to use the arrest power to silence a critic), the absence of probable cause is not an absolute bar. This exception is limited to suits against the municipality or officials in their official capacities, not individual-capacity claims.

Because the district court never reached these questions (having erroneously found no probable cause), and because the record is voluminous and fact-intensive, the Sixth Circuit chose not to make a first-pass determination on appeal. It remanded for the district court to decide whether:

Objective evidence supports a Nieves-type comparator showing; and/or
The arrest was carried out pursuant to an official policy of retaliation as described in Lozman.

Thus, the viability of Frenchko’s First Amendment claim against Wix and Ross (and in their official capacities against the county entities) remains unresolved and will depend on further fact-finding and analysis on remand.

D. Ohio Statutory Immunity and “Bad Faith”

1. The statutory framework: Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6)

Ohio provides broad statutory immunity to employees of political subdivisions sued in their individual capacities for actions taken in the course of governmental functions. Under § 2744.03(A)(6), an employee is not liable unless one of three exceptions applies. Relevant here, immunity is lost if the employee acted:

“With malicious purpose,”
“In bad faith,” or
“In a wanton or reckless manner.”

Frenchko invoked the “bad faith” exception. Ohio courts define “bad faith” in this context as encompassing:

A dishonest purpose;
Conscious wrongdoing;
A breach of a known duty through an ulterior motive or ill will (akin to fraud or intent to mislead or deceive).

2. Interplay with civil conspiracy and false arrest

Frenchko’s relevant state-law claims are:

False arrest (against Wix and Ross): requiring intentional detention and the unlawfulness of that detention.
Civil conspiracy (against all individual defendants): defined in Ohio as “a malicious combination of two or more persons to injure another in person or property, in a way not competent for one alone, resulting in actual damages.” Here, the alleged “unlawful act” is the false arrest and retaliatory use of police power.

The district court reasoned, and the Sixth Circuit agreed for interlocutory purposes, that planning and orchestrating a retaliatory arrest of a political opponent to silence her speech would, if proven, inherently satisfy the “malicious combination” and “bad faith” standards:

Conspiring to undertake a wrongful act (an arrest aimed at punishing speech) “without lawful excuse” reflects purposeful wrongdoing.
Such a scheme would be a “conscious” breach of a known duty to respect First Amendment rights and avoid misuse of state power.

Therefore, if a jury were to credit evidence of a pre-arranged retaliatory plan, it could find that defendants acted in bad faith, thereby stripping them of statutory immunity.

3. Evidence supporting a potential finding of bad faith

Accepting the district court’s view of the record (as an appellate court must in this posture), the following pieces of evidence could support a finding of bad faith:

The coordinated use of Monroe’s letter at the July meeting, after he and Fuda had discussed it, arguably as a trap or staging device.
The assignment of deputies to provide security at a meeting where their presence was not always routine.
Cantalamessa’s contemporaneous texts during and immediately after the meeting, including celebratory and derogatory messages referencing Frenchko’s removal and arrest.
Monroe’s nearly contemporaneous communications with a reporter and his public statements about the arrest within minutes of it occurring.
(As noted only by the dissent) The potential spoliation of certain text messages by Monroe and Cantalamessa, which, while not yet sanctioned, could on remand strengthen inferences of concealment and bad faith.

With these inferences, a rational jury could conclude that defendants had, in advance, planned to engineer an arrest if Frenchko continued her criticism, and that the deputies’ application of the disruption statute was the planned instrument of that retaliation.

4. Interlocutory limits and probable cause

Several important doctrinal points flow from the court’s treatment of statutory immunity:

Limited jurisdiction: On an interlocutory appeal, the court can review only whether the immunity defense was properly rejected as a matter of law. It must accept the district court’s factual findings and reasonable inferences. It cannot re-weigh evidence or resolve factual disputes about what actually occurred.
Probable cause does not preclude bad faith: The fact that the deputies had probable cause (or arguable probable cause) to arrest does not automatically confer statutory immunity. An arrest can be legally supportable under the Fourth Amendment yet still be carried out in bad faith as part of an unlawful retaliatory plan, thereby exposing the actors to state-law liability if an immunity exception is met.
Intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is not an immunity: Defendants argued that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine—under which members of the same governmental entity cannot ordinarily “conspire” with each other—barred the civil conspiracy claim. The court held it lacked jurisdiction to consider this merits defense on an interlocutory appeal focused solely on immunity from suit. The doctrine, if applicable, must be addressed by the district court later.

Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of statutory immunity to all individual defendants on both the false arrest and civil conspiracy claims, leaving those claims to proceed to trial or further motion practice.

E. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The opinion is rich in citations, several of which play a central role in the legal analysis:

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018): Clarifies the “totality of circumstances” standard for probable cause and underscores that qualified immunity protects officers who make reasonable mistakes in close cases.
Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019): Establishes the default rule that retaliatory arrest claims require proof of lack of probable cause, with a narrow exception where objective evidence shows only speakers are arrested.
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 585 U.S. 87 (2018): Recognizes a separate path for plaintiffs to pursue retaliatory arrest claims where the arrest arises from an official municipal policy of retaliation.
Novak v. City of Parma, 33 F.4th 296 (6th Cir. 2022): Reiterates that protected speech cannot, by itself, be the basis for probable cause. The case involved parody speech and alleged retaliation by police.
Swiecicki v. Delgado, 463 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2006): Recognizes that officers may arrest based on the disruptive manner of speech even when the content is protected, so long as the statute applied is a valid time, place, and manner restriction.
Columbus v. Doyle, 776 N.E.2d 537 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002): Interprets the same Ohio disruption statute at issue, requiring purposeful action that actually obstructs or interferes with the meeting.
Sexton v. Cernuto, 18 F.4th 177 (6th Cir. 2021); Pineda v. Hamilton County, 977 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2020): Emphasize that § 1983 liability turns on the defendant’s personal involvement and a causal connection to the constitutional harm.
Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859 (Ohio 1998): Defines Ohio civil conspiracy and its “malicious combination” requirement.
Rural Bldg. of Cincinnati, LLC v. Mercer, 96 N.E.3d 882 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017): Provides the operative definition of “bad faith” under Ohio’s immunity statute.

The opinion also cites more recent Sixth Circuit decisions (e.g., Gonzalez v. Trevino, Brown v. City of Albion, Hayes v. Clariant, Two Bridges, LLC), which refine standards for retaliatory arrest, municipal liability, and interlocutory appellate jurisdiction.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is a federal statute that allows individuals to sue state and local officials who, acting “under color of” state law, violate their federal constitutional or statutory rights. It does not create rights itself; it provides the enforcement mechanism. Liability under § 1983 typically requires:

A defendant acting under color of state law; and
That defendant “subject[ing], or caus[ing] to be subjected” the plaintiff to a deprivation of a federal right.

2. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity shields government officials from personal liability for money damages unless:

They violated a constitutional right; and
That right was “clearly established” at the time, such that a reasonable official would understand that what they were doing violated the law.

If either prong is not met, the official is immune. Courts may address the prongs in any order.

3. Probable Cause

Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even that guilt is more likely than not. Instead, it asks whether the facts known to the officer would lead a reasonable person to believe a crime has been or is being committed. Importantly:

It is judged from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer on the scene.
Officers can be mistaken as long as their mistake is reasonable.

4. Retaliatory Arrest

A retaliatory arrest occurs when officials arrest someone not primarily because of a legitimate law-enforcement objective, but to punish or deter the person for exercising First Amendment rights (e.g., speaking critically of officials). After Nieves:

The existence of probable cause usually defeats such a claim.
Exceptions exist where:
- There is objective evidence of selective arrest of speakers (similarly situated non-speakers aren’t arrested); or
- The arrest is traceable to an official municipal policy of retaliation (as in Lozman).

5. Personal vs. Official Capacity

When a government official is sued:

In their individual (personal) capacity: The plaintiff seeks to hold that person personally liable for money damages; qualified immunity applies.
In their official capacity: The suit is effectively against the governmental entity itself (e.g., the county). The focus is on whether an official policy, custom, or practice caused the violation. Qualified immunity does not apply to the municipality, but separate constraints (like Monell) and Lozman’s requirements govern these claims.

6. State-Law Civil Conspiracy (Ohio)

Under Ohio law, civil conspiracy is not a standalone tort; it is derivative. The plaintiff must prove:

A malicious combination of two or more persons;
To injure another in a way not competent for one alone;
An underlying unlawful act (e.g., false arrest, defamation); and
Resulting actual damages.

7. Ohio Statutory Immunity for Employees

Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6) provides immunity to municipal and county employees acting within the scope of employment unless:

They act outside the scope of their employment;
They act with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; or
Another specific statutory exception applies.

“Bad faith” typically means deliberate wrongdoing or conduct motivated by ill will or an improper purpose—more than mere negligence or poor judgment.

8. Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine

Under this doctrine, employees of the same governmental entity, acting within the scope of their employment, are generally treated as a single legal actor and therefore cannot “conspire” with one another. It is a defense to conspiracy claims—not an immunity from suit. Because interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over state-law immunity is limited, the Sixth Circuit in Frenchko did not reach this doctrine.

V. Impact and Future Implications

1. Arrests for Disruption at Public Meetings

The Fourth Amendment holding in Frenchko sends a strong signal: law enforcement has considerable latitude to arrest individuals, including elected officials, who persistently disrupt official meetings by refusing to yield the floor or heed rules of decorum, so long as:

A content-neutral disruption statute exists (like Ohio’s § 2917.12(A)(1)); and
There is objective evidence that the person’s conduct actually hindered or obstructed the meeting’s progress.

Officials and officers can reasonably:

Issue rulings of order and warnings; and
Use arrest as a last resort when disruptions persist and prevent the meeting from proceeding.

2. Risk of chilling robust political speech

At the same time, the decision raises concerns about potential chilling effects:

Elected officials and citizens may fear that heated or persistent advocacy at public meetings—even about serious misconduct—could be framed as “disruptive” and lead to arrest.
Since probable cause is a low threshold, it can be relatively easy to justify an arrest based on behavior that straddles the line between vigorous debate and obstruction.

The unresolved First Amendment issues on remand will thus be pivotal. If courts are too reluctant to recognize the Nieves and Lozman exceptions, governments could, in practice, weaponize neutral disruption statutes to silence outspoken critics while retaining constitutional cover via the probable cause shield.

3. Litigation strategy after Frenchko

For plaintiffs challenging arrests at public meetings, Frenchko underscores:

The necessity of building strong, objective evidence that:
- Other similarly situated participants who do not engage in protected speech are allowed to be comparably disruptive without arrest; or
- The arrest is part of a broader pattern or policy of retaliation against specific speakers or viewpoints.
The importance of carefully pleading and preserving § 1983 conspiracy theories distinct from state-law conspiracy claims, to avoid forfeiture.
The value of preserving and scrutinizing digital evidence (videos, texts, emails) both to establish bad faith for state-law immunity purposes and to support federal retaliation claims.

For defendants:

It reinforces the tactical importance of asserting qualified immunity early and seeking interlocutory review when appropriate.
It highlights that even if an arrest survives federal scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment, state-law exposure may remain if evidence suggests retaliatory motives and planning.
It encourages maintaining clear policies, training, and documentation showing that enforcement actions at meetings are based on neutral decorum rules, not viewpoint discrimination.

4. State-law immunity as a separate battleground

An especially notable aspect of Frenchko is its decoupling of:

Federal constitutional liability (where probable cause and qualified immunity may defeat claims); and
State-law tort liability (where evidence of retaliatory bad faith can strip statutory immunity even if the arrest itself was constitutionally permissible).

This means public officials and officers could face:

No personal exposure under § 1983 because of qualified immunity; yet
Substantial exposure under Ohio tort law if a jury finds they acted in bad faith to retaliate against protected speech.

Thus, civil-rights litigation in Ohio (and in similar jurisdictions) may increasingly focus on state-law conspiracy, false arrest, and immunity exceptions as primary vehicles for accountability, particularly where probable cause exists but motivations are suspect.

5. Conspiracy and causation under § 1983

Finally, the sharp disagreement between the majority and dissent on conspiracy and causation under § 1983 signals an unresolved tension within the circuit:

How specifically must plaintiffs plead and preserve § 1983 conspiracy to hold non-arresting officials liable?
When district courts blend state-law and federal conspiracy theories, to what extent can (or must) appellate courts disentangle them?
Should officials who allegedly “pull the strings” behind an arrest escape federal liability merely because they did not personally “lay hands” on the plaintiff?

Future cases will likely explore these questions, and Frenchko will be a key citation in arguments over forfeiture, pleading sufficiency, and the scope of “causing” a violation under § 1983.

VI. Conclusion

Frenchko v. Monroe is a significant Sixth Circuit decision at the intersection of free speech, public-order policing, and governmental immunity. It establishes that:

Officers have broad authority, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, to arrest even elected officials who persistently violate decorum rules and obstruct public meetings, under content-neutral disruption statutes.
At the same time, such arrests may still be actionable under the First Amendment or state law if they are part of a retaliatory scheme, provided plaintiffs can surmount procedural and evidentiary hurdles such as the Nieves probable-cause rule, pleading requirements, and statutory immunity standards.
“Personal involvement” under § 1983 remains a rigorous requirement; courts will not lightly extend federal liability to non-arresting officials absent clear evidence of causal participation or a properly preserved § 1983 conspiracy claim.
Ohio’s statutory immunity is not absolute: evidence of bad-faith conspiracies to punish speech can strip public employees of protection, leaving them potentially liable for false arrest and civil conspiracy under state law.

As public meetings continue to be flashpoints for political conflict and as livestreaming and social media amplify such conflicts in real time, Frenchko offers both a blueprint and a warning: government actors may maintain order and enforce decorum, but when enforcement appears to be a tool for silencing critics, both constitutional and state-law doctrines provide avenues—albeit complex ones—for judicial scrutiny and potential liability.