Speculation Cannot Rebut the Grand Jury Presumption of Probable Cause:
A Commentary on Calvin Lyndell Dibrell v. Rex (6th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025)

I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s unpublished opinion in Calvin Lyndell Dibrell v. Rex, No. 25‑5334 (Nov. 25, 2025), arises from a familiar modern scenario: a motorist arrested for driving on a suspended license under a state policy that was later declared unconstitutional, who then sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law after his criminal charges are dismissed.

The decision is formally “not recommended for publication,” and thus not binding precedent in the Sixth Circuit. Even so, it is highly instructive on several recurring issues:

When civil rights and state tort claims accrue, and how one-year statutes of limitations apply to arrests and prosecutions in Tennessee.
The stringent requirements for pleading and proving malicious prosecution under Tennessee law after Mynatt v. NTEU.
The powerful presumption of probable cause created by a criminal indictment and what is (and is not) sufficient to rebut that presumption in a § 1983 malicious prosecution action.
The impermissibility of using speculation, media coverage, or mere evidentiary objections to infer that an officer knowingly lied to a grand jury.

At its core, the decision underscores a central message: when a grand jury has indicted a plaintiff, a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim will not survive summary judgment unless there is concrete, non-speculative evidence that the officer knowingly or recklessly misled the grand jury. The fact that the underlying state policy (here, Tennessee’s license-revocation regime for unpaid court debt) was later declared unconstitutional does not, by itself, retroactively negate probable cause or establish police malfeasance.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The underlying events

In July 2018, Officer Roger Rex of the Alcoa Police Department responded to reports from bank employees that a man was acting suspiciously at a Regions Bank in Alcoa, Tennessee. The man left before Rex arrived, but Rex obtained information sufficient to identify him as Calvin Lyndell Dibrell.

A records check showed that Dibrell’s driver’s license had been suspended since October 30, 2016, for failure to pay court fines and costs. Two days later, the bank again reported that Dibrell had returned. When Rex arrived, Dibrell was seated in his vehicle, parked outside of a marked parking spot.

Rex approached, asked for identification, and inquired why Dibrell was there; Dibrell responded that he was at the bank to conduct business. Rex informed him that his license was suspended. According to the opinion, Dibrell replied that he was “waiting on some paperwork to come back from the courthouse to get all that worked out.”

Rex, joined by Officer Michael Westfield, directed Dibrell to exit the vehicle. When the officers attempted to handcuff him, he resisted. Despite repeated commands to stop, he continued to struggle, prompting Westfield to deploy a taser. Additional officers arrived, and Dibrell was ultimately handcuffed and transported to the Blount County Jail.

Rex filed two Affidavits of Complaint in Blount County General Sessions Court:

Driving on a suspended license.
Resisting arrest.

At a preliminary hearing on February 28, 2019, Rex testified that Dibrell’s license was suspended at the time of arrest. The General Sessions judge found probable cause and bound the charges over to the grand jury. The grand jury then heard testimony, including Rex’s, and indicted Dibrell on both charges on April 1, 2019.

B. The broader legal background: Tennessee’s license-revocation policy

In a separate case, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee in July 2018 held that Tennessee’s policy of revoking or suspending driver’s licenses for failure to pay court debts was unconstitutional. Thomas v. Haslam, 329 F. Supp. 3d 475 (M.D. Tenn. 2018), later vacated as moot in Thomas v. Lee, 776 F. App’x 910 (6th Cir. 2019).

Following Thomas, the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security agreed to (1) continue the cessation of revocations for unpaid court debt and (2) administratively lift all existing revocations for that reason.

Rex testified in his deposition that he learned of this policy change sometime after Dibrell’s arrest, but he could not recall when, nor whether he knew of it when he testified before the grand jury in early 2019.

C. Prosecution and dismissal

The criminal case proceeded following the indictment. In January 2022, however, the prosecutor dismissed all charges against Dibrell. The record does not show that the dismissal was expressly grounded in a conclusion that Dibrell was innocent; nor does it explain the prosecutor’s reasons.

D. The civil lawsuit

In June 2022, more than four years after his arrest, Dibrell filed a civil action in federal court against:

Officer Rex,
The Alcoa Police Department, and
The City of Alcoa.

He asserted a variety of federal and state-law causes of action, including:

§ 1983 claims for excessive force, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.
Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
Claims under the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA).
State-law claims for negligence, false arrest, false imprisonment, fraudulent misrepresentation, malicious harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and malicious prosecution.

In February 2024, the district court granted Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss all claims except one: a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against Rex. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment to Rex on that remaining claim in March 2025.

On appeal, Dibrell challenged:

The dismissal of several of his state and federal claims as untimely or inadequately pled.
The grant of summary judgment on his § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

The Sixth Circuit’s holding can be distilled into the following main points:

All claims except § 1983 malicious prosecution were properly dismissed at the pleading stage.
- The fraudulent misrepresentation and malicious harassment claims failed to allege essential elements (misrepresentation to, and reliance by, the plaintiff; and interference with constitutional rights).
- Federal § 1983 claims for excessive force, false arrest, and false imprisonment—and parallel Tennessee tort claims (negligence, false arrest, false imprisonment, IIED, NIED)—were barred by Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations.
- The Tennessee malicious prosecution claim failed because the complaint did not plausibly allege that the criminal case terminated in a manner that reflected Dibrell’s innocence, as required by Mynatt v. NTEU, 669 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2023).
- Appealed issues relating to § 1985, THRA, and claims against the police department and city were forfeited due to lack of developed argument on appeal.
The § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against Rex failed at summary judgment due to the presence of probable cause.
- The grand jury indictment created a presumption of probable cause under Lester v. Roberts, 986 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2021).
- That presumption may be rebutted only with evidence that the officer knowingly or recklessly made false statements to the grand jury.
- Dibrell’s evidence—media reports about Thomas v. Haslam, Rex’s vague deposition testimony about learning of the law change “sometime” after the arrest, and evidentiary objections made at the preliminary hearing and deposition—was too speculative to show that Rex knew the suspension was unlawful when he testified.
- There is no legal basis to draw an adverse inference from sustained evidentiary objections or from a refusal to disclose grand jury matters (which is prohibited by Tennessee statute).
- Because the presumption of probable cause was not rebutted, Dibrell could not satisfy the “lack of probable cause” element of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.
Dibrell could not pivot to a new “continued prosecution” theory at summary judgment.
His complaint alleged that Rex maliciously prosecuted him by testifying despite knowing no law was violated. Only in opposing summary judgment did he argue that Rex “continued” or “assisted” the prosecution after probable cause allegedly ceased. Under Renner v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F. App’x 498 (6th Cir. 2013), a plaintiff may not expand claims via new theories raised for the first time in response to summary judgment.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Pleading-stage dismissals: fraudulent misrepresentation and malicious harassment

1. Fraudulent misrepresentation under Tennessee law

To state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation in Tennessee, as set out in Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 301 (Tenn. 2008), quoting Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County v. McKinney, 852 S.W.2d 233 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), a plaintiff must plead:

A representation of an existing or past fact;
Falsity at the time it was made;
Materiality of the representation;
Knowledge of falsity, lack of belief in its truth, or reckless disregard for its truth;
Reasonable reliance by the plaintiff; and
Resulting damage.

The panel noted that the Amended Complaint did not allege:

Any false representation made by Defendants to Dibrell himself, or
Any reliance by Dibrell on any such representation.

The only alleged misrepresentations were communications to third parties (e.g., prosecutors, judicial officers). Because reasonable reliance by the plaintiff is a core element, the claim failed as a matter of law.

2. Malicious harassment under Tennessee law

The Tennessee Supreme Court in Washington v. Robertson County, 29 S.W.3d 466 (Tenn. 2000), held that malicious harassment requires:

Malice (ill-will, hatred, or spite), and
Unlawful intimidation of another from the free exercise or enjoyment of a constitutional right by injuring, threatening to injure, coercing the person, or damaging/defacing property.

The Sixth Circuit observed that Dibrell’s Amended Complaint did not (1) identify any specific constitutional right denied or interfered with, or (2) plead supporting facts. It merely asserted—in two paragraphs, without factual detail—that Defendants “maliciously harass[ed]” him.

Under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), such “bare assertions” devoid of factual enhancement cannot survive a motion to dismiss. The panel thus affirmed dismissal of this claim.

B. Time-barred claims: accrual and Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations

1. The governing limitations period

Both federal § 1983 claims and many Tennessee personal-injury torts share a one-year limitations period under Tennessee law:

Federal § 1983 claims: The applicable limitations period is borrowed from Tennessee’s one-year statute for “civil actions for compensatory or punitive damages, or both, brought under the federal civil rights statutes.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 28‑3‑104(a)(1)(B); see 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).
State torts (personal injury, false imprisonment): Tenn. Code Ann. § 28‑3‑104(a)(1)(A) provides a one-year period for actions for injuries to the person and for false imprisonment. Leach v. Taylor, 124 S.W.3d 87 (Tenn. 2004), confirms that most personal injury torts fall within this general one-year statute.

2. Accrual of § 1983 claims

While state law supplies the limitations period, the accrual date for § 1983 claims is determined by federal law. The Sixth Circuit applies a functional standard: a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action—“what event should have alerted the typical lay person to protect his or her rights.” Beaver Street Investments, LLC v. Summit County, 65 F.4th 822, 826 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. County of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 1997)).

Applying that framework:

Excessive force (§ 1983): Accrued on the date of the arrest and alleged use of force—July 11, 2018. See Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007) (a § 1983 claim for excessive force accrues at the time of arrest).
False arrest and false imprisonment (§ 1983): These claims accrue when the false imprisonment ends, which—under Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007)—is when legal process begins (e.g., first appearance or indictment). The panel relied on its own prior published decision in Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, 984 F.3d 1156, 1162 (6th Cir. 2021), holding that these claims accrue when the plaintiff is brought before a magistrate or other legal process issues.

Here, legal process had indisputably begun by February 28, 2019 (preliminary hearing and bind-over), and certainly by April 1, 2019 (indictment). Thus:

Excessive force claims accrued July 11, 2018.
False arrest and false imprisonment claims accrued, at the latest, April 1, 2019.

Because Dibrell did not file suit until June 8, 2022, more than one year after all of those dates, his § 1983 excessive force, false arrest, and false imprisonment claims were time-barred. He offered no viable tolling theory, and the court rejected his argument that accrual was delayed until the criminal charges were dismissed in January 2022.

3. Accrual of Tennessee tort claims

For Tennessee torts, the Tennessee Supreme Court in McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tenn. 1975), held that “in tort actions, . . . the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations commences to run when the injury occurs or is discovered, or when, in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, it should have been discovered.”

Accordingly:

Negligence, IIED, and NIED: All premised on the July 11, 2018 arrest and alleged use of force. The injury was known that day; the limitations period began then and expired July 11, 2019—well before the June 2022 filing.
State-law false arrest and false imprisonment: Tennessee law is somewhat unsettled on precisely when these accrue:
- Gray v. 26th Judicial Drug Task Force, 1997 WL 379141 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 1997), held they accrue on the date of arrest.
- Lovell v. Warren County, 2019 WL 6842380 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2019), applied a rule closer to Wallace, suggesting accrual when legal process is initiated.

The panel avoided resolving this tension, noting that Dibrell’s claims were untimely under either approach. Whether accrual was on:

July 11, 2018 (arrest), or
April 1, 2019 (indictment),

the one-year limitations period had expired by the June 2022 filing.

The court also addressed language in Lovell suggesting that a false imprisonment claim might accrue at the termination of the imprisonment. But in Lovell, the plaintiff remained jailed from arrest until dismissal of charges, raising access-to-courts issues. Dibrell, by contrast, was released on bond by February 2019, well over three years before he sued. The panel therefore found Lovell inapplicable on its facts, and again emphasized that the claims were untimely under any plausible accrual rule.

C. Malicious prosecution under Tennessee law: the “favorable termination” requirement post–Mynatt

To plead malicious prosecution under Tennessee law, a plaintiff must allege:

That the defendant instituted a proceeding against the plaintiff without probable cause;
With malice; and
That the proceeding terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

See Mynatt v. National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 39, 669 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tenn. 2023) (quoting Parrish v. Marquis, 172 S.W.3d 526, 530 (Tenn. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Himmelfarb v. Allain, 380 S.W.3d 35 (Tenn. 2012)).

Mynatt sharply tightened the standard for “favorable termination,” holding that a plaintiff may proceed only if:

[A]n objective examination, limited to the documents disposing of the proceeding or the applicable procedural rules, indicates the termination of the underlying criminal proceeding reflects on the merits of the case and was due to the innocence of the accused.

The Sixth Circuit found that Dibrell’s Amended Complaint:

Contained no allegations that the criminal case was terminated due to his innocence.
Did not describe the nature of the dismissal in a way that objectively tied it to innocence.

On appeal, Dibrell argued that:

He had filed motions proclaiming his innocence in the criminal case, and
The prosecutor dismissed his case with prejudice.

However:

These facts were not pled in the Amended Complaint and thus could not be considered at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. See Berry v. U.S. Department of Labor, 832 F.3d 627, 637 (6th Cir. 2016).
Even if they had been pled, they would still not demonstrate that the dismissal reflected a determination of innocence. As the Tennessee Supreme Court has observed, prosecutors dismiss cases for many reasons unrelated to the merits, such as resource constraints, witness issues, or plea negotiations in related matters. Mynatt, 669 S.W.3d at 752.

Because Dibrell did not meet his burden to plead that the termination reflected his innocence, his Tennessee malicious prosecution claim was properly dismissed.

D. Forfeited issues on appeal: § 1985, THRA, and municipal liability

Although Dibrell’s opening brief nominally appealed the entire dismissal order, he failed to develop any substantive argument regarding:

His § 1985 claim against Rex,
His Tennessee Human Rights Act claim, or
His claims against the Alcoa Police Department and City of Alcoa.

Under Sixth Circuit practice, issues raised in a perfunctory manner, without developed argumentation, are deemed forfeited on appeal. See Buetenmiller v. Macomb County Jail, 53 F.4th 939, 946 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997)). The panel therefore declined to consider these claims further.

E. § 1983 malicious prosecution: the Lester presumption and the failure of proof

1. Elements of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim

The Sixth Circuit continues to apply the four-part framework articulated in King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 580 (6th Cir. 2017), for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment. A plaintiff must show:

A criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff, and the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute;
A lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution;
A deprivation of liberty, as understood under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, apart from the initial seizure; and
A resolution of the criminal proceeding in the plaintiff’s favor.

The district court granted summary judgment based on the second element—lack of probable cause—concluding that the State had probable cause to prosecute Dibrell. The Sixth Circuit agreed.

2. The grand jury indictment and presumption of probable cause

In Lester v. Roberts, 986 F.3d 599, 608 (6th Cir. 2021), the Sixth Circuit held that:

[A] grand jury’s finding [of probable cause] creates a presumption of probable cause in later proceedings under § 1983.

This presumption is rebuttable—but only in narrow circumstances. The plaintiff must show that the defendant “knowingly or recklessly made false statements to the grand jury.” Id.

Because a grand jury had indicted Dibrell on both charges, the presumption of probable cause applied. The key question, therefore, was whether Dibrell had adduced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that Rex knowingly or recklessly lied to the grand jury about the status or legality of the license suspension.

3. Absolute immunity and forfeiture

Under Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356 (2012), witnesses ordinarily enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for their testimony before a grand jury. However, as the Sixth Circuit noted in Lester, 986 F.3d at 609, absolute immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pled, or it is forfeited. See also Parnell v. City of Detroit, 786 F. App’x 43, 47 n.3 (6th Cir. 2019).

Rex did not affirmatively plead absolute immunity, so the court treated him as potentially liable for his grand jury testimony if it could be shown to be knowingly or recklessly false. The immunity question, however, ultimately did not matter because the panel found that Dibrell failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on falsity or scienter.

4. The plaintiff’s theory: unlawful suspension and knowledge

Dibrell’s core theory was:

After Thomas v. Haslam, Tennessee’s policy of revoking licenses for unpaid court debt was unconstitutional and revoked suspensions were to be lifted.
Accordingly, any continuing suspension of his license on that basis was “unlawful.”
Rex nonetheless testified to the grand jury that the license was suspended, when he allegedly knew that the suspension was no longer lawful.
Thus, Rex’s testimony misled the grand jury, vitiating probable cause and satisfying the malicious prosecution standard.

The flaw in this argument, from the court’s perspective, was evidentiary: Dibrell had no concrete proof that Rex knew, at the time he testified, that the suspension had become legally invalid.

5. Why Dibrell’s evidence was insufficient

The court carefully reviewed the evidence offered by Dibrell and found it could not support a non-speculative inference that Rex knowingly or recklessly misled the grand jury.

a. The Thomas v. Haslam decision and media coverage

Dibrell pointed to:

The July 2018 Thomas v. Haslam decision declaring Tennessee’s revocation-for-debt policy unconstitutional, and
A July 5, 2018 news article about the resulting policy change.

However, nothing in the record indicated that Rex had actually read the decision or seen the media coverage. Inferring Rex’s knowledge merely from the existence of court decisions and news reports was too speculative. As the court reminded, a party cannot defeat summary judgment with “speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” K.V.G. Properties, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 900 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Lewis v. Philip Morris Inc., 355 F.3d 515, 533 (6th Cir. 2004)).

b. Rex’s deposition testimony

Rex testified in his deposition that:

He met with the prosecutor before the February 2019 preliminary hearing; and
He learned at some time after Dibrell’s arrest that Tennessee had changed its practice of suspending licenses for unpaid court debt.

Crucially, he could not recall when he learned of the change, and the record contained no evidence that the prosecutor had informed him of it prior to his grand jury testimony. The panel found that inferring precise timing (i.e., that he knew before the grand jury) from this vague recollection would be pure conjecture—insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact.

c. Evidentiary objections and grand jury secrecy

Dibrell also tried to rely on:

A sustained objection at the preliminary hearing to a question about whether Rex knew of the policy change at the time of arrest.
Defense counsel’s objection at the deposition to questions about “what went on in [the] grand jury proceeding,” invoking grand jury secrecy.

He argued that such objections implied that Rex had knowledge of the legal change and was seeking to conceal it.

The panel flatly rejected this reasoning. It noted:

There is no authority permitting an adverse inference from a sustained evidentiary objection.
Tennessee law, specifically Tenn. Code Ann. § 40‑12‑209(a)(3), makes it a crime to disclose grand jury proceedings; Rex’s refusal to answer those questions was consistent with statutory confidentiality requirements, not an admission of guilt.

Thus, these objections were legally and logically inadequate to show knowledge or deceit.

6. Result: presumption unrebutted, probable cause intact

Because none of Dibrell’s evidence established that Rex “knowingly or recklessly made false statements to the grand jury,” the panel held that the Lester presumption of probable cause arising from the indictment remained intact. Without a lack of probable cause, an essential element of § 1983 malicious prosecution was missing, and summary judgment for Rex was proper.

F. The unpled “continued prosecution” theory

As an alternative to the “false testimony” theory, Dibrell argued—for the first time at summary judgment—that Rex was liable because he “continued” or “substantially assisted” the continued prosecution after probable cause allegedly ceased (for example, after he supposedly learned of the law change).

The panel noted that the Amended Complaint framed the malicious prosecution only as Rex having “testified against Plaintiff, knowing that Plaintiff did not violate any laws.” It did not allege a separate theory of post-indictment conduct or ongoing participation in the prosecution.

Relying on Renner v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F. App’x 498, 504 (6th Cir. 2013), the court reaffirmed that a plaintiff cannot expand the legal theories of his case in opposition to summary judgment. Instead, new legal theories must be introduced via an amended pleading under Rule 15. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit declined to consider this late-breaking theory, leaving the summary judgment ruling undisturbed.

V. Precedents and Doctrinal Context

The opinion weaves together a series of federal and Tennessee precedents that collectively shape modern malicious prosecution and statute-of-limitations jurisprudence in the Sixth Circuit.

A. Federal accrual and limitations cases

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007)
Established that federal false arrest/false imprisonment claims accrue when the alleged false imprisonment ends, which is when the plaintiff is held pursuant to legal process.
Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, 984 F.3d 1156 (6th Cir. 2021)
Previously held, in a prior case involving this same plaintiff, that § 1983 false arrest/imprisonment claims accrue upon initiation of legal process. The present panel cites that case, somewhat poignantly, against Dibrell’s own later-filed claims.
Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 2007)
Held that excessive force claims accrue at the time of the alleged use of force.
Beaver Street Investments, LLC v. Summit County, 65 F.4th 822 (6th Cir. 2023), and Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. County of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 1997)
Articulated the general “should have known” standard for accrual: when the event would alert a typical lay person to protect his rights.

B. Malicious prosecution: federal and state

King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2017)
Provides the four-element test for § 1983 malicious prosecution claims in the Sixth Circuit.
Lester v. Roberts, 986 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2021)
Holds that a grand jury indictment creates a presumption of probable cause, rebuttable only by strong evidence of knowingly or recklessly false statements to the grand jury.
Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356 (2012)
Affords absolute immunity to grand jury witnesses from § 1983 liability for their testimony, but as the panel notes, that immunity must be pled to be preserved.
Mynatt v. National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 39, 669 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2023)
Significantly narrows the “favorable termination” requirement for Tennessee malicious prosecution claims, requiring an objective indication that the termination was due to the plaintiff’s innocence.
Parrish v. Marquis, 172 S.W.3d 526 (Tenn. 2005), and Himmelfarb v. Allain, 380 S.W.3d 35 (Tenn. 2012)
Earlier Tennessee cases defining malicious prosecution elements, partially superseded by later doctrinal refinements in Mynatt.

C. Tennessee tort accrual and limitations

McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn. 1975)
Establishes the discovery rule for accrual of tort actions.
Gray v. 26th Judicial Drug Task Force, 1997 WL 379141 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 1997)
Suggests that Tennessee false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrue at the date of arrest.
Lovell v. Warren County, 2019 WL 6842380 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2019)
Embraces a Wallace-style accrual tied to legal process and hints, in dicta, at accrual upon release from jail, especially where incarceration impedes access to courts.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 28‑3‑104
Supplies the one-year limitations period for personal injury, civil rights, and false imprisonment actions.

D. Pleading standards and forfeiture on appeal

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
Requires factual allegations sufficient to state a “plausible” claim, rejecting bare legal conclusions.
Berry v. U.S. Department of Labor, 832 F.3d 627 (6th Cir. 2016)
Limits review at the motion-to-dismiss stage to the complaint’s allegations.
Buetenmiller v. Macomb County Jail, 53 F.4th 939 (6th Cir. 2022), and McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989 (6th Cir. 1997)
Codify the principle that undeveloped or perfunctory issues on appeal are forfeited.
Renner v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F. App’x 498 (6th Cir. 2013)
Holds that plaintiffs may not effectively amend their complaint by presenting new theories in response to summary judgment.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. Practical consequences for § 1983 malicious prosecution litigation

Although unpublished, this opinion reinforces key practical lessons:

The indictment presumption is formidable. Once a grand jury has indicted a plaintiff, the presumption of probable cause will generally doom a malicious prosecution claim unless the record contains specific, admissible evidence that the officer lied or recklessly disregarded the truth.
Speculative inferences are insufficient. Plaintiffs cannot rely on:
- Media coverage of relevant legal developments,
- General awareness that “the law changed” at some point, or
- Inferences drawn from evidentiary objections or grand jury secrecy,
to show that an officer knew his testimony was false.
Unconstitutional underlying policies do not automatically negate probable cause. Even if a statewide policy rendering the initial license suspension unconstitutional is later invalidated, plaintiffs must still show that the arresting or testifying officer knew, at the relevant time, that the database information he relied on was legally invalid.

B. Statutes of limitations: a cautionary tale for arrestees

The decision is a stark reminder of the narrow window in Tennessee for bringing civil claims arising out of an arrest or prosecution:

Most such claims—federal and state—must be filed within one year of either the arrest or the initiation of legal process.
Waiting for criminal charges to be dismissed before filing all civil claims is a risky strategy; it may be necessary for malicious prosecution, but false arrest, excessive force, and related torts accrue much earlier.

Strategically, plaintiffs in Tennessee may need to:

File certain civil claims while the criminal case is still pending (subject to the Wallace/Heck coordination issues), or
Use tolling mechanisms or protective filings where appropriate.

C. Tennessee malicious prosecution after Mynatt

The decision illustrates the tightening of Tennessee’s malicious prosecution doctrine after Mynatt:

A bare allegation that the criminal case was dismissed, even with prejudice, is not enough.
The plaintiff must plead—and ultimately show—that the termination reflects the merits and is due to the plaintiff’s innocence, as objectively reflected in court records or procedural rules.

This raises the bar for state-law malicious prosecution claims significantly, especially compared to the more lenient “not inconsistent with innocence” standard now applied under federal law after the Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022).

D. Litigation strategy: plead all theories early and carefully

The rejection of Dibrell’s “continued prosecution” theory underscores the importance of:

Pleading all relevant malicious prosecution theories (false testimony, fabrication of evidence, continued participation, suppression of exculpatory evidence, etc.) in the initial complaint or via timely amendment.
Not relying on opposition briefs at summary judgment to introduce new theories; courts will treat that as an impermissible, backdoor amendment.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Accrual” of a claim

“Accrual” refers to the moment when a legal claim comes into existence and the statute of limitations clock starts running. For example:

Excessive force: accrues the day the force is used.
False imprisonment: accrues when the confinement ceases to be “false” because legal process begins (e.g., arraignment or indictment).
Malicious prosecution: generally accrues when the criminal proceeding ends in the plaintiff’s favor (e.g., acquittal or dismissal under certain conditions).

B. “Probable cause”

Probable cause is a relatively low standard. It exists when the facts and circumstances known to the officer would lead a reasonable person to believe that a crime has been, is being, or will be committed. It does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even a preponderance of the evidence.

In this case, the key question was whether Rex had probable cause to believe that:

There was a valid suspension on record, and
Dibrell was driving (or in actual physical control) of the vehicle with that suspension in place.

C. “Grand jury” and its presumption

A grand jury is a panel of citizens that hears evidence presented by the prosecutor and decides whether there is probable cause to indict (i.e., formally charge) a suspect with a crime. When a grand jury returns an indictment, it strongly suggests that probable cause existed.

In civil rights suits like this one, the grand jury’s indictment creates a presumption that probable cause existed. To overcome this presumption, a plaintiff must show that the officer misled the grand jury, typically by:

Knowingly lying, or
Recklessly ignoring obvious falsity.

Mere disagreement with the indictment, or after-the-fact changes in law, are not enough.

D. “Malicious prosecution”

Malicious prosecution is not simply “losing a case.” It is a claim that:

The criminal process was initiated or continued without probable cause,
For improper purposes (malice), and
The case ended in a way that legally counts as favorable to the accused.

Under Tennessee law, after Mynatt, “favorable” means that the termination objectively indicates the accused was innocent—not merely that the state chose not to proceed for practical or procedural reasons.

E. “Summary judgment” vs. “motion to dismiss”

Motion to dismiss (Rule 12(b)(6)):
- Filed early in the case.
- Court assumes the complaint’s factual allegations are true.
- Asks whether those facts, if proven, would state a legal claim.
Summary judgment (Rule 56):
- Filed after discovery.
- Court looks at evidence (depositions, documents, etc.).
- Asks whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact requiring a trial, or whether one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In this case, most claims were dismissed at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage for legal insufficiency or untimeliness. The § 1983 malicious prosecution claim survived that initial screening but was later rejected on summary judgment because the evidence did not support it.

VIII. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Dibrell v. Rex is a comprehensive application of existing doctrine rather than a radical reworking of the law. Nonetheless, it carries several important lessons:

A one-year statute of limitations in Tennessee leaves little room for delay in filing civil claims arising out of arrests and prosecutions.
Tennessee malicious prosecution is now under a rigorous “favorable termination” standard following Mynatt, demanding clear indications of innocence.
The grand jury indictment remains a potent shield for officers in § 1983 malicious prosecution cases, and plaintiffs must come forward with concrete, non-speculative evidence of knowingly false or reckless testimony to overcome it.
Speculative inferences from media reports, vague deposition recollections, or evidentiary objections cannot substitute for hard proof of officer misconduct.
Finally, litigants must plead all viable theories of liability early; courts will not permit them to reshape their case on the fly at the summary judgment stage.

Taken together, these points make Dibrell v. Rex a cautionary case for plaintiffs contemplating civil litigation following criminal charges, particularly in jurisdictions with short limitations periods and where a grand jury has returned an indictment. It reinforces the high evidentiary and procedural thresholds that must be surmounted to transform complaints about an arrest or prosecution into a successful civil rights judgment.

Speculation Cannot Rebut the Grand Jury Presumption of Probable Cause: A Commentary on Calvin Lyndell Dibrell v. Rex (6th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025)