Rule 11(a)(2) Enforcement: Conditional Plea Requires a Court Order and a Judgment that Expressly States “Conditional”

1. Introduction

In State v. Medina, 2025 ND 234, the North Dakota Supreme Court confronted a recurring procedural problem: a defendant intends to enter a conditional guilty plea to preserve appellate review of a suppression ruling, the parties and the court proceed as if the plea is conditional, but the written record—especially the judgment—fails to reflect the conditional nature of the plea as required by rule.

The parties are the State of North Dakota (plaintiff/appellee) and Antonio Eugenio Medina (defendant/appellant). Medina appealed from a criminal judgment arguing he entered a conditional plea reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The key issue was not the merits of the suppression motion, but whether the record satisfied N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2)—particularly the post-2017 requirements that (1) the court enter an order accepting the conditional plea and (2) the resulting judgment specify it is conditional.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and remanded with instructions for up to 30 days. The district court must clarify whether it accepted Medina’s conditional plea and, if so, must (i) enter an order consistent with Rule 11(a)(2) and (ii) correct the criminal judgment so it expressly states the plea is conditional.

The Court emphasized that, after the 2017 amendment to Rule 11(a)(2), the procedure is explicit: written consent, an acceptance order, and a judgment that specifies conditional status. Because no order existed and the judgment did not specify the plea was conditional, remand was required to prevent uncertainty and future disputes.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) State v. Trevino, 2011 ND 232, ¶ 7, 807 N.W.2d 211

Trevino supplied foundational doctrine: Rule 11(a)(2) permits conditional pleas reserving specified pretrial issues for appeal, and Rule 11 does not demand “ritualistic compliance” so long as there is substantial compliance ensuring a knowing and voluntary plea. The Medina Court relied on Trevino to support the proposition that the plea-hearing transcript can, in some circumstances, sufficiently demonstrate consent and understanding.

But the Court also used Trevino as a contrast point: Trevino pre-dates the 2017 amendment that added express procedural steps (order + judgment specification). Thus, Medina treats Trevino’s “transcript sufficiency” principle as incomplete for modern Rule 11(a)(2) compliance.

2) State v. Ali, 2025 ND 73, ¶ 7, 19 N.W.3d 801

Ali was cited for the Court’s repeated admonition: strict attention to Rule 11(a)(2) prevents disputes about whether a plea was conditional. Medina echoes Ali’s emphasis that missing “conditional” language in the judgment is a serious record defect—even where participants may have acted as if the plea were conditional.

3) State v. Abuhamda, 2019 ND 44, ¶ 11, 923 N.W.2d 498

Abuhamda underscores how conditional-plea uncertainty undermines appellate posture: absent clear documentation, the record may contain only “mere hints” rather than definitive proof of a conditional plea and the specific issues reserved for appeal. Medina uses Abuhamda to frame the policy concern—ambiguity invites later contest over appellate rights.

4) State v. McCleary, 2025 ND 24, ¶ 25, 16 N.W.3d 445

McCleary provides the counterexample: even if the judgment does not use the word “conditional,” the judgment may still be sufficiently clear “on the face” that the plea was entered subject to appellate rights. Medina distinguishes its own record: Medina’s judgment did not specify conditional status, and the rule now expressly requires that it do so.

5) State v. Welch, 2019 ND 179, ¶ 7, 930 N.W.2d 615

Welch was cited for baseline judgment content requirements under N.D.R.Crim.P. 32(b): the judgment must include the plea, the verdict, and the sentence imposed. Medina builds on this: because Rule 11(a)(2) mandates the judgment “must specify it is conditional,” the conditional nature of the plea is a required attribute of the plea that must be captured in the judgment.

6) State v. Werner, 2024 ND 229, ¶ 3, 15 N.W.3d 6

Werner illustrates the remedy: amendment of the judgment to note the conditional nature of the plea under Rule 11(a)(2). Medina adopts that model by remanding to correct the record and align the judgment with the proceedings.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps grounded in the text and evolution of N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2).

1. The transcript indicates a conditional plea was intended and understood. The plea colloquy shows defense counsel requested a conditional plea, the prosecutor consented, and the court described the plea as preserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. This supports the conclusion that the participants acted consistently with a conditional plea and that Medina’s plea was knowing and voluntary.
2. Post-2017 Rule 11(a)(2) imposes explicit, mandatory record requirements. The Court treated the amended language as directive: written consents must be filed; if the court accepts the conditional plea, it must enter an order; and the judgment must specify it is conditional. Even if a transcript can show understanding, Rule 11(a)(2) aims to eliminate later uncertainty by requiring clear, durable documentation in the order and judgment.
3. The absence of the required order and judgment language triggers corrective action. Because “no order exists” and the judgment does not specify conditional status, the record fails to satisfy Rule 11(a)(2). The Court therefore remanded for clarification and correction. If the district court intended to accept a conditional plea, the omission may be treated as a correctable “clerical error” under N.D.R.Crim.P. 36, which authorizes the sentencing court to correct record errors arising from oversight or omission.

Procedurally, the Court retained jurisdiction under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3)(B), allowing the district court to fix the record without requiring a new appeal and without losing appellate control over the case.

C. Impact

State v. Medina reinforces—and operationalizes—the post-2017 compliance regime for conditional pleas:

• Trial courts are on notice that a conditional plea must generate two durable artifacts: an acceptance order and a judgment expressly stating the plea is conditional. A colloquy alone is not enough when the rule expressly requires written and judgment-level documentation.
• Prosecutors and defense counsel should expect appellate scrutiny of the record’s formal completeness (order + judgment language), not merely the parties’ shared understanding. Medina incentivizes checklists and standardized conditional-plea forms to avoid remands.
• Appellate litigation may become more streamlined: by insisting on a clear judgment specification, the Court reduces disputes about appellate jurisdiction, waiver, and what issues were preserved.
• Remedy calibration: Medina shows the Court will prefer targeted remand to correct the record (potentially as a Rule 36 clerical correction) rather than decide reserved issues on an ambiguous record or deem the plea unconditional by default.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Conditional guilty plea (Rule 11(a)(2))

A guilty plea entered while preserving the right to appeal a specific pretrial ruling (commonly denial of a motion to suppress). If the defendant wins the appeal, the defendant must be allowed to withdraw the plea.

“Consent in writing” and “specified pretrial motion”

Rule 11(a)(2) requires written consent by the defendant, defense attorney (if any), and prosecutor, and it requires that the reserved issue be specifically identified, preventing later disagreement over what was preserved.

Order accepting the conditional plea

After the 2017 amendment, acceptance is not merely implicit; the court “must enter an order” if it accepts a conditional plea. This creates a clear record that the plea was accepted as conditional, not simply discussed.

Judgment must specify it is conditional

The judgment is the formal, operative criminal disposition. Rule 11(a)(2) requires the judgment itself to state conditional status so that anyone reading the judgment (parties, appellate court, corrections officials) can identify the plea type without reconstructing intent from transcript excerpts.

Clerical error (Rule 36)

A mistake in recording what actually happened (an omission or oversight), as opposed to a substantive change in what the court decided. If the district court truly accepted a conditional plea, failing to reflect it in the judgment can be corrected as clerical.

Remand with retained jurisdiction (N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3)(B))

The Supreme Court temporarily sends the case back to the district court to perform a specific task (here, clarify acceptance and correct the order/judgment) while keeping the appeal alive, avoiding a restart of the appellate process.

5. Conclusion

State v. Medina cements a practical procedural rule for North Dakota criminal practice after the 2017 amendment to N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2): even when the transcript shows everyone intended a conditional plea, the record must include (1) an acceptance order and (2) a judgment that expressly states the plea is conditional. When those required documents are missing, the appropriate response is a limited remand—often treatable as a N.D.R.Crim.P. 36 clerical correction—so the written record accurately reflects the plea’s conditional nature and preserves the integrity of appellate review.