Rooker–Feldman and State Guardianship Orders: Ross v. Stephens and the Jurisdictional Bar to Federal Civil-Rights Challenges

I. Introduction

In Ross v. Stephens, No. 25-50487 (5th Cir. Nov. 17, 2025) (unpublished), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a federal civil-rights action brought by a lawyer against a Texas state judge and a professional guardian. The court held that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine deprived the federal district court of subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff’s alleged injuries were caused by state-court guardianship orders and related rulings, not by independent nonjudicial conduct.

The case arises from a contested guardianship proceeding over an incapacitated woman, Shelley Thomson, and from repeated attempts by attorney Philip M. Ross to enter into contractual relationships with her—first as her lawyer, then later as her putative employer—despite the guardianship and resulting restrictions. When the state court and the court-appointed guardian blocked these arrangements, Ross turned to federal court, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of due process, equal protection, freedom of association, and retaliation for his advocacy against “State-sponsored guardianship abuse.”

The Fifth Circuit’s decision is important for at least three reasons:

It squarely applies the Rooker–Feldman jurisdictional bar to challenges arising out of a Texas guardianship proceeding and related orders.
It clarifies the distinction between injuries caused by state-court judgments (barred by Rooker–Feldman) and injuries caused by independent, nonjudicial conduct (potentially not barred), particularly in the context of guardianships and child-protection matters.
It underscores that litigants cannot “repackage” an unsuccessful state-court campaign into a federal § 1983 action simply by recharacterizing state-court decisions as “administrative acts” or by switching from official-capacity injunctive relief to individual-capacity damages.

Although the opinion is not designated for publication under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, and thus is not binding precedent, it offers a clear and practical illustration of how the court understands and applies Rooker–Feldman to guardianship-related disputes.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Parties and Background

Plaintiff–Appellant: Philip M. Ross, a lawyer (later resigning from the Texas bar in lieu of disciplinary action) who attempted to contract with Shelley Thomson, a woman adjudicated mentally incapacitated, first for legal representation and later for part-time employment. He appeared pro se in the federal action.
Defendant–Appellee (Judge): The Honorable Charles A. Stephens II, in his capacity as Judge of County Court-at-Law No. 2, Comal County, Texas, who presided over Thomson’s guardianship and issued orders voiding Ross’s attempted attorney-client agreement and restraining contact.
Defendant–Appellee (Guardian): Toni Morton, a Guardianship Specialist for the Texas Health & Human Services Commission (successor to the Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services), who served as Thomson’s guardian and refused to approve Ross’s proposed employment contract with Thomson.

In 2019, Judge Stephens adjudicated Thomson mentally incapacitated and appointed the Texas Health & Human Services Commission (the “Commission”) as her permanent guardian. Morton, as a Commission employee, acted as her guardian and placed her in a memory-care unit in New Braunfels, Texas.

Ross repeatedly attempted to enter into contractual relationships with Thomson:

First attempt (Attorney–client agreement): After the incapacitation finding, Ross attempted to represent Thomson as her attorney. Judge Stephens voided that agreement and entered a restraining order preventing Ross from contacting Thomson without Morton’s approval. Ross appealed those rulings in the state system but was unsuccessful.
Second attempt (Employment contract): In June 2024, after years of unsuccessful state appellate efforts to disrupt the guardianship, Ross and Thomson purportedly “came up with a plan” to restore her capacity and independence by entering into an employment relationship. Morton declined to approve the employment contract, and Judge Stephens allegedly “failed or refused to supervise Morton.”

Ross alleged that these actions deprived him and Thomson of due process, equal protection, and freedom of association, and constituted retaliation for his advocacy against misuse of guardianships.

B. Federal Proceedings and District Court Ruling

Ross initially brought a § 1983 action in federal district court against Judge Stephens and Morton, suing them in their official capacities and seeking injunctive relief to permit him to “employ” Thomson.

However, Thomson died five weeks after the suit was filed. In response, Ross amended his pleadings, reframing the suit as a § 1983 action for money damages against Judge Stephens and Morton in their individual capacities. He later sought leave to file a third amended complaint to add the Commission as a defendant.

Acting on a magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court:

Sua sponte dismissed Ross’s federal suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine; and
Denied Ross leave to file a third amended complaint, noting that adding the Commission would not cure the jurisdictional defect.

Ross appealed to the Fifth Circuit. The court reviewed the jurisdictional ruling de novo, as is standard for issues of subject-matter jurisdiction and for questions of law such as the application of Rooker–Feldman.

C. Holding

The Fifth Circuit affirmed. It held that:

The Rooker–Feldman doctrine applied because Ross’s alleged injuries were caused by state-court judgments and orders rendered before the federal suit, and his federal action invited the district court to review and reject those judgments.
Ross’s characterization of the challenged conduct as “administrative acts or omissions” by a judge and guardian did not take his claims outside Rooker–Feldman’s reach, because the injuries flowed directly from judicial decisions in a guardianship proceeding.
The case was distinguishable from Saloom v. Texas Department of Family & Child Protective Services, where the allegations involved independent, nonjudicial conduct that merely resulted in a state-court custody order; here, Ross would “have no injury but for” the guardianship judgment and its implementing orders.
The district court correctly denied leave to amend because adding the Commission as a defendant would not change the jurisdictional analysis.

III. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. The Rooker–Feldman Doctrine

The court anchored its analysis in the Supreme Court’s articulation of Rooker–Feldman in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005). There, the Court explained that Rooker–Feldman is:

“confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”

The Fifth Circuit broke down this test into constituent elements and applied each to Ross’s case:

“State-court loser”: Ross expressly alleged he was a “state-court loser” who had unsuccessfully challenged the guardianship and related rulings in state appellate courts.
Judgments “rendered before” the federal suit: The guardianship adjudication, the appointment of the Commission as guardian, the voiding of the attorney-client contract, and the restraining order all predated Ross’s 2024 federal filing.
Injury “caused by” state-court judgments: Ross’s operative complaint, in the Fifth Circuit’s words, “solely relate[s] to decisions made by Judge Stephens and Thomson's court-appointed guardian regarding her guardianship,” and those claims “cannot be adjudicated without second-guessing both the guardianship itself and rulings entered to effectuate it.”
Invitation to “review and reject” those judgments: By asserting that the rulings violated his and Thomson’s constitutional rights and seeking damages for the consequences of those rulings, Ross was effectively asking the federal court to declare those state-court judgments wrongful and invalid in substance.

Once those elements were satisfied, Rooker–Feldman dictated that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction. The proper avenue to challenge state-court guardianship determinations and orders is through the state appellate system and, ultimately, by petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, not by filing a federal district court suit disguised as a § 1983 action.

B. Rejecting the “Administrative Acts” Argument

A central plank of Ross’s appellate argument was that his claims challenged “administrative acts or omissions” of the judge and guardian, not the judicial guardianship judgment itself. He attempted to distinguish his case from classic Rooker–Feldman scenarios by framing the defendants’ conduct as nonjudicial and argued that such conduct could be reached through federal civil-rights litigation.

The Fifth Circuit rejected this characterization on several grounds:

Ross provided no authority supporting his assertion that a guardianship proceeding is “anything but judicial.” The adjudication of incapacity, appointment of a guardian, oversight of that guardian, and related orders (such as voiding contracts or restraining contact) are quintessential judicial acts within a court’s jurisdiction.
The alleged “administrative” misconduct—Morton’s refusal to approve the employment contract and Judge Stephens’s “failure or refusal” to supervise her—was inextricably tied to the existence and enforcement of the guardianship. These decisions flowed from the guardianship judgment and the authority it conferred.
Ross’s own description of his efforts—years of “frustrated state court appellate attempts to set aside the guardianship, restore capacity, or appoint a successor guardian”—underscored that what he really sought was to undo or circumvent the guardianship regime itself.

Accordingly, the court treated Ross’s injuries as arising “but for” the state-court guardianship orders and their enforcement. That causal connection to the judgments themselves placed the suit squarely within Rooker–Feldman.

C. Distinguishing Saloom

Ross cited Saloom v. Texas Department of Family & Child Protective Services, 578 F. App’x 426 (5th Cir. 2014), as substantive support for his position. In Saloom, the Fifth Circuit held that:

“A federal lawsuit is not barred if the alleged injuries were caused by the defendants' actions rather than by the state court judgment, even if the defendants' actions led to the state court judgment.”

In Saloom, the plaintiff’s claims focused on allegedly wrongful conduct by state actors (e.g., Department caseworkers) that occurred before a final child-custody order and which allegedly violated her rights. The later custody order may have been a consequence of that conduct, but the injury she complained of in federal court was tied to the conduct itself, not to the judgment as such. For that reason, Rooker–Feldman did not bar her suit.

The Fifth Circuit characterized Ross’s case as “the opposite”:

Ross’s alleged injuries stemmed directly from the guardianship judgment and the orders “emanating from it,” such as the voiding of his attorney-client agreement and the restraining order limiting his contact with Thomson.
Without those judicial determinations—i.e., the incapacitation ruling and the resultant guardianship—there would be no injury to Ross of the kind he alleged in federal court. His claims were thus grounded in the judgments themselves, not in independent actions that merely happened to lead to a judgment.

By explicitly contrasting the two situations, the Fifth Circuit reinforced the core distinction under Rooker–Feldman:

If the federal plaintiff’s injury exists independently of the state-court judgment—even if the judgment resulted from the same underlying conduct—Rooker–Feldman may not apply. But if the injury would not exist but for the judgment itself, the federal action is a forbidden de facto appeal.

D. Supporting Precedents: Rooker, Feldman, Liedtke, and Musslewhite

The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning is consistent with its earlier applications of Rooker–Feldman, including in the context of attorney discipline and state-court supervision of the bar:

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983): These Supreme Court cases give the doctrine its name and establish that lower federal courts lack appellate jurisdiction over state-court decisions. Only the U.S. Supreme Court, via certiorari, can review final state-court judgments on federal grounds.
Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1994): The Fifth Circuit reiterated in Liedtke that “[c]onstitutional questions arising in state proceedings are to be resolved by the state courts.” A lawyer challenging disciplinary decisions of the State Bar could not use a federal suit as a vehicle to re-litigate or overturn those state determinations.
Musslewhite v. State Bar of Texas, 32 F.3d 942 (5th Cir. 1994): In Musslewhite, the court held that it could not consider allegations that the State Bar had initiated disciplinary proceedings in retaliation, because doing so would require a collateral examination of the state court judgment, which Rooker–Feldman forbids.

By invoking Liedtke and Musslewhite, the Fifth Circuit signaled that the present case falls squarely within a familiar pattern: a disappointed state litigant—here, a lawyer—attempts to recharacterize an adverse state-court outcome (guardianship rulings, disciplinary fallout, etc.) as a federal constitutional violation. The court stressed that the substance of the claim, not its label, governs:

“[O]ur consideration of these contentions would require a collateral examination of the state court judgment. That we cannot do.”

In Ross, any examination of his alleged injuries would necessarily entail revisiting and second-guessing the guardianship adjudication, the authority of the guardian, and the propriety of orders voiding contracts and restricting contact. That kind of collateral attack is precisely what Rooker–Feldman bars.

E. Denial of Leave to Amend

Ross sought leave to file a third amended complaint to add the Commission as a defendant. The district court denied leave, and the Fifth Circuit agreed that this was correct.

The amendment would not have altered the fundamental jurisdictional problem:

The source of the injury would still be the state-court guardianship judgment and its implementing orders.
Adding the Commission—which had been appointed by the state court as Thomson’s guardian—would only reinforce the fact that the claims were inseparable from the state-court guardianship regime.

Because federal courts must dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction whenever Rooker–Feldman applies, they have no obligation to allow amendments that would be futile in curing that jurisdictional defect.

IV. Precedents and Doctrinal Context

A. The Core Rooker–Feldman Line: Rooker, Feldman, and Exxon Mobil

The opinion rests on the modern, narrow conception of Rooker–Feldman articulated in Exxon Mobil. Historically:

Rooker (1923) held that federal district courts lack power to review state-court judgments; litigants must go up through the state appellate courts and then, if needed, to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Feldman (1983) extended this rule to certain administrative-like decisions of state high courts, such as bar-admission determinations that are judicial in nature.
Exxon Mobil (2005) clarified that Rooker–Feldman is a “narrow” doctrine, not a broad preclusion rule. It only applies when: (1) the state-court judgment preceded the federal suit; (2) the federal plaintiff complains of injuries caused by that judgment; and (3) the plaintiff seeks what amounts to appellate review in the lower federal court.

The Fifth Circuit in Ross faithfully tracks this narrowed formulation, ensuring that Rooker–Feldman is not misused as a generalized abstention doctrine but is enforced where the plaintiff’s injury cannot be disentangled from the state-court judgment.

B. Fifth Circuit Applications: Liedtke, Musslewhite, and Saloom

Ross can be seen as part of a line of Fifth Circuit decisions applying Rooker–Feldman where attorney-discipline or family/guardianship judgments are attacked collaterally in federal court:

Liedtke and Musslewhite: These decisions emphasize that a litigant dissatisfied with state bar disciplinary outcomes cannot re-litigate those issues in federal district court under § 1983 or other theories. Doing so would necessarily entail review of the state-court disciplinary orders.
Saloom (child-custody context): Here, the Fifth Circuit recognized a limit: when the complaint is about independent actions by state actors that allegedly violated the plaintiff’s rights, and the injury is not the judgment itself, Rooker–Feldman does not apply even if those actions led to a later state-court order.

Ross clarifies where guardianship challenges fit along this spectrum: the opinion treats guardianship determinations and the orders “emanating from” them much like disciplinary or custody judgments—core state-court judicial actions that federal courts may not revisit under the guise of § 1983.

V. Impact and Significance

A. Practical Impact on Guardianship-Related Litigation

Although unpublished, Ross v. Stephens has clear practical implications for litigants, lawyers, and guardians involved in guardianship disputes:

Guardianship adjudications and orders are judicial acts for Rooker–Feldman purposes. Attempts to sue guardians or judges in federal court for actions taken in the course of administering or enforcing a guardianship will often be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Third parties—such as attorneys, would-be employers, or family members—who feel harmed by guardianship restrictions cannot use federal district courts as a de facto appellate forum to undo those state-court decisions.
Plaintiffs cannot evade Rooker–Feldman simply by:
- Re-labeling conduct as “administrative” rather than judicial; or
- Switching from official-capacity/injunctive claims to individual-capacity/damages claims after the ward’s death or other procedural changes.

The case thus serves as a cautionary example: federal jurisdiction cannot be manufactured through creative pleading when the real complaint is that a state court entered, and refused to overturn, an undesirable guardianship judgment.

B. Guidance for Civil-Rights Practitioners

For lawyers pursuing § 1983 actions related to family law, guardianship, or attorney discipline, Ross highlights key strategic considerations:

A federal complaint must be framed around independent constitutional wrongs (e.g., unlawful searches, fabrications of evidence, discriminatory policies) rather than around the fact, validity, or consequences of a state judgment.
When planning federal litigation that touches on state proceedings, practitioners must carefully analyze:
- What exactly is the injury?
- Would that injury exist even if the state-court judgment were removed from the picture?
If the answer is “no,” Rooker–Feldman is likely to bar the federal case.
In some fact patterns (like Saloom), there may be room for federal suits that challenge conduct leading to a judgment, but not the judgment itself. Ross underscores that this distinction must be real and not merely semantic.

C. Reinforcing the Division of Judicial Labor

More broadly, Ross reinforces the constitutional allocation of judicial authority between state courts, lower federal courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court:

State courts are the primary and final arbiters of state guardianship, custody, and disciplinary issues, subject only to potential review by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Federal district courts are not super-appellate courts over state systems; they adjudicate original federal questions but may not sit in review of state-court judgments.
The Supreme Court remains the only federal court with constitutional authority to review final state-court judgments for federal-law errors.

This structural division is at the heart of Rooker–Feldman, and Ross is a textbook application of that principle in the guardianship context.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Rooker–Feldman Doctrine (in Plain Terms)

The Rooker–Feldman doctrine is a rule about where you can appeal a state-court judgment:

If you lose in state court and you believe the judgment violated your federal rights, you must:
1. Appeal within the state-court system; and then
2. Possibly ask the U.S. Supreme Court to take your case.
You cannot bring a new lawsuit in federal district court asking it to effectively “overrule” or “undo” the state-court judgment. That is what Rooker–Feldman forbids.
The doctrine applies when:
- You are a state-court loser;
- Your alleged injury was caused by a state-court judgment; and
- You are asking the federal court, in substance, to review and reject that judgment.

B. “Collateral Attack”

A “collateral attack” means trying to undermine a judgment indirectly in a separate proceeding, instead of challenging it directly through appeals:

Example: Instead of appealing a guardianship order in the state system, you sue the judge and guardian in federal court for damages, arguing the order was unconstitutional and harmed you.
That is a collateral attack on the guardianship order, and under Rooker–Feldman, federal district courts cannot entertain it.

C. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court’s power to hear a particular type of case. If a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction:

It must dismiss the case, even if the claims might otherwise be legally or factually strong.
Jurisdictional defects cannot be waived by the parties and can be raised by the court on its own (“sua sponte”).
Rooker–Feldman operates as a jurisdictional bar: no matter how compelling the plaintiff’s story, a federal district court simply has no authority to act as an appellate tribunal over state judgments.

D. Official Capacity vs. Individual Capacity

When a government official is sued under § 1983, the capacity in which they are sued matters:

Official-capacity suit: Treated as a suit against the governmental entity (e.g., the county or state agency). Relief is typically injunctive (ordering certain actions or prohibiting others).
Individual-capacity suit: The official is personally liable for damages if they violated clearly established federal rights.

In Ross, the plaintiff initially sued the judge and guardian in their official capacities seeking injunctive relief. After Thomson’s death, he reframed the suit against them in their individual capacities seeking money damages. The Fifth Circuit’s Rooker–Feldman analysis did not turn on this distinction; what mattered was that the alleged injuries derived from state-court judgments.

E. Guardianship Proceedings

A guardianship proceeding is a judicial process in which a court determines whether a person is incapacitated and, if so, appoints a guardian to make decisions for that person. Common features include:

A judicial finding that the individual is mentally incapacitated.
Appointment of a guardian to manage personal, financial, or medical decisions.
Ongoing court oversight, including orders voiding improper contracts and regulating access to the ward.

Ross confirms that these are judicial acts, not mere administrative decisions, for purposes of the Rooker–Feldman analysis.

VII. Conclusion

Ross v. Stephens is a clear and instructive application of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine in the sensitive context of adult guardianships and attorney–client (or employment) relationships with incapacitated persons. The Fifth Circuit held that:

Ross’s alleged injuries—voided contracts, restraining orders, and the refusal to approve an employment relationship with Thomson—were caused by the state-court guardianship judgment and its implementing orders.
His federal § 1983 action amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on those state-court decisions, effectively inviting the district court to review and reject the guardianship regime.
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine therefore stripped the federal district court of subject-matter jurisdiction, requiring dismissal.
Adding the Commission as a defendant would not have cured this jurisdictional problem, making the denial of leave to amend appropriate.

In the broader legal landscape, Ross reinforces several important propositions:

Guardianship determinations and related orders are judicial for Rooker–Feldman purposes, and federal courts may not sit in review of them.
Clever pleading cannot circumvent jurisdictional limits: re-labeling judicial acts as “administrative” or shifting the capacity in which defendants are sued does not alter the underlying nature of the plaintiff’s injury.
The line drawn in Saloom remains viable but narrow: federal suits may proceed where the injury is caused by independent, nonjudicial conduct—not by the state judgment itself—but that line is rigorously policed.
State appellate processes and, ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court remain the exclusive avenues for challenging the legality of state-court guardianship judgments on federal constitutional grounds.

While unpublished, Ross v. Stephens offers a concise and instructive template for how the Fifth Circuit will likely treat future attempts to re-litigate guardianship or similar state-court determinations in federal district court. It underscores the importance of understanding jurisdictional boundaries before embarking on federal civil-rights litigation that touches on state-court judgments.