Restitution Under § 1593 Extends to Parents’ Own Proximate Losses; “Relevant Losses” Include Non‑Medical Safety Expenses — United States v. Limon (5th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

This Fifth Circuit decision arises from a conviction for sex trafficking of a minor and addresses four sentencing-related issues: (1) whether a district court must sua sponte strike “inflammatory” statements from a victim-impact statement; (2) whether, under 18 U.S.C. § 1593 (Trafficking Victims Protection Act mandatory restitution), a minor victim’s parent may recover her own lost wages as restitution; (3) whether non-medically-prescribed items (hoodies purchased to help a traumatized child feel safer in public) qualify as compensable losses; and (4) a routine request to correct a clerical discrepancy between the court’s oral pronouncement and written amended judgment.

Defendant-Appellant Giovanny Xavier Limon (“Limon”) was convicted by a jury of sex trafficking of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), (b), and (c). The district court calculated a Guidelines range of life imprisonment (offense level 43, criminal history category VI) and varied downward to 480 months’ imprisonment with 10 years of supervised release. It also ordered restitution in the amount of $13,540.01, including $210 for the mother’s lost wages while accompanying the victim at the hospital and $500 for hoodies purchased to help the victim feel safe in public after the offense.

On appeal, Limon challenged: (i) consideration of the victim’s full impact statement; (ii) restitution for the mother’s lost wages; (iii) restitution for the hoodies; and (iv) a clerical error in the written judgment concerning post-release payment terms.

Summary of the Opinion

No plain error in considering the entirety of the victim-impact statement. The court held there is no binding authority requiring district courts to sua sponte strike portions of a victim’s statement as “inflammatory,” and the statements were relevant to the victim’s trauma. Limon also failed to show any effect on his substantial rights.
As a matter of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, § 1593 permits a parent/guardian of a minor sex-trafficking victim to recover the parent’s own losses (here, $210 in lost wages) so long as those losses are proximately caused by the offense. The court relied on the text of § 1593 and its cross-reference to § 2259(c)(2), declined to import § 2259’s narrower “victim” definition, and applied the anti-surplusage canon.
Restitution for $500 in hoodies was authorized as “relevant losses” proximately caused by the offense under § 2259(c)(2)’s catchall. The statute does not require “medical necessity” or a prescription to recover such costs.
Clerical error: Remanded for the limited purpose of correcting the amended judgment to match the oral pronouncement (50% of prison earnings toward restitution; $25/month after release, not $100/month).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009); United States v. Suarez, 879 F.3d 626 (5th Cir. 2018). These cases provide the plain-error framework: the defendant must show a clear or obvious error that affects substantial rights and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. The court used this framework to reject Limon’s unpreserved victim-impact claim.
Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022); 18 U.S.C. § 3661; 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4). Concepcion reiterates that a sentencing court may consider a broad swath of information subject only to statutory and constitutional limits. Section 3661 removes limits on the information a judge may receive about a defendant’s background and conduct; § 3771 guarantees victims the right to be reasonably heard. These authorities supported the district court’s consideration of the victim-impact statement.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). Payne recognizes victim-impact evidence as a legitimate means of informing the sentencing authority about the harm caused by the crime, unless the evidence is so unduly prejudicial that it renders proceedings fundamentally unfair. The Fifth Circuit applied Payne to conclude the victim’s harsh rhetoric was not unduly prejudicial in the context of the offense and trauma.
United States v. McGavitt, 28 F.4th 571 (5th Cir. 2022); United States v. Gonzalez, 792 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Bishop, 603 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). Together, these cases emphasize that a lack of binding authority is often dispositive against a plain-error claim; error must be clear under current law. The absence of authority requiring a sua sponte strike of victim-impact statements was decisive.
United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Garcia-Quintanilla, 574 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bernard, 299 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002). These authorities guide the “substantial rights” prong at sentencing—asking whether there is a reasonable probability of a lower sentence on remand. The court found no showing that excising the challenged phrases would have yielded a sentence below 480 months (already a downward variance from life).
United States v. Mathew, 916 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2019). Establishes de novo review for challenges to the legality of restitution orders. Applied to both restitution issues here.
United States v. Moore, 71 F.4th 392 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 551 (2024). Sets out a textualist approach: give words their ordinary meaning, consider immediate and broader statutory context, consult statutory history, and apply interpretive canons as needed. The court used this structure to interpret § 1593 and its cross-reference to § 2259.
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979); Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124 (2024). Anti-surplusage: courts must give effect to every word, and the canon applies with special force when a reading would nullify an entire subparagraph. This canon strongly supported not importing § 2259’s “victim” definition into § 1593, which already contains its own definition.
Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014). Confirms that restitution is available only to the extent losses are proximately caused by the defendant’s offense—an important limiting principle applied to both the lost wages and the hoodies.
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013); Nat’l Ass’n of Private Fund Managers v. SEC, 103 F.4th 1097 (5th Cir. 2024). Provide general interpretive principles (harmonizing statutes in pari materia). The court acknowledged these canons but found no contradiction that would compel importing § 2259’s “victim” definition into § 1593.
United States v. Casados, 26 F.4th 845 (10th Cir. 2022); United States v. Wilcox, 487 F.3d 1163 (8th Cir. 2007). Distinguished. Both involved the MVRA (§ 3663A), whose text differs materially from § 1593. Casados turned on MVRA language allowing representatives to “assume the victim’s rights,” not present in § 1593. Wilcox relied on a now-distinguishing limiting phrase in § 3663A referring to “the victim” who suffered bodily injury—language absent from § 1593 and § 2259.
United States v. Escajeda, 8 F.4th 423 (5th Cir. 2021); Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. Confirm that Rule 36 is the proper vehicle to correct clerical errors in written judgments that diverge from oral pronouncements.

Legal Reasoning

1) Victim-Impact Statement and Plain Error

The court began from the broad principle that sentencing judges may consider any relevant information, constrained only by statute or the Constitution. Victims have a statutory right to be heard. Within that framework, Payne recognizes victim-impact evidence as generally proper unless so prejudicial that it renders proceedings fundamentally unfair.

Applying plain-error review, the court found no “clear or obvious” error because there is no binding authority requiring a district judge to strike portions of a victim’s statement sua sponte. The challenged comments—though harsh—were relevant to the harms suffered and not unduly prejudicial in light of the offense. Additionally, Limon failed to show that excluding the statements would likely have yielded a lower sentence, particularly given the court’s familiarity with the offense conduct and its explicit consideration of competing character submissions. Thus, multiple plain-error prongs failed.

2) Restitution — Parent’s Lost Wages Under § 1593

This issue presented a question of first impression in the Fifth Circuit: may a parent of a minor sex-trafficking victim recover the parent’s own losses as restitution under § 1593?

The court undertook a textual analysis. Section 1593(c) defines “victim” to include, in the case of minors, “the legal guardian of the victim or…another family member.” Section 1593(b)(1) mandates restitution for “the full amount of the victim’s losses,” and § 1593(b)(3) cross-references § 2259(c)(2) for the meaning of that phrase. Section 2259(c)(2) broadly covers “any costs incurred…by the victim, as a proximate result of the offenses,” including lost income and a catchall for “any other relevant losses.”

Limon argued that because § 1593 cross-references § 2259(c)(2), the court should also import § 2259(c)(4)’s narrower definition of “victim,” which allows a guardian to “assume the crime victim’s rights” rather than to recover the guardian’s own losses. The panel rejected this argument on several grounds:

Textual specificity: § 1593 already contains a definition of “victim,” and Congress in 2018 chose to leave § 1593’s definition intact even as it amended § 2259’s definition and added a cross-reference in § 1593 to § 2259(c)(2) for the “full amount of the victim’s losses.”
Anti-surplusage: Importing § 2259’s “victim” definition into § 1593 would render § 1593(c)’s victim definition superfluous—contrary to settled interpretive canons.
Context and statutory history: The 2018 amendment (the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Act) diverged the two definitions. Congress could have narrowed § 1593’s “victim” definition or used the separately defined term “victim of trafficking” to limit recovery to the trafficked person; it did neither.
Distinguishing MVRA cases: Casados and Wilcox addressed different statutory language in § 3663A; § 1593 lacks the MVRA’s “assume the victim’s rights” clause and no similar limiting phrasing applies.

Given that Limon did not dispute proximate cause, the court affirmed restitution of the mother’s $210 lost wages.

3) Restitution — Hoodies as “Relevant Losses” Under § 2259(c)(2)

Limon’s argument that the $500 in hoodies required proof of “medical necessity” was rejected as inconsistent with the statute. Section 2259(c)(2) requires that losses be incurred as a “proximate result” of the offense, and while it enumerates categories such as medical and therapy costs, it also includes a broad catchall for “any other relevant losses incurred by the victim.” Nothing in the text imposes a prescription or medical-necessity requirement for all items outside enumerated medical categories.

Because the hoodies were purchased to address the victim’s trauma-induced inability to feel safe in public, and Limon did not dispute proximate cause or relevance, the court held that the district court acted within its statutory authority in awarding the $500.

4) Clerical Error — Rule 36 Remand

The written amended judgment required $100 monthly payments post-release, whereas the court had announced $25 per month at the restitution hearing (after 50% of prison wages toward restitution while incarcerated). Under Rule 36, clerical discrepancies are corrected to align the written judgment with the oral pronouncement. The panel remanded solely for that ministerial correction.

Impact and Implications

Key Holdings Likely to Influence Future Cases

Scope of “victim” under § 1593: In the Fifth Circuit, “victim” includes a minor’s legal guardian or family member not merely as a representative “assuming rights,” but as a person who may recover their own losses, provided proximate causation is shown. This is a significant clarification and expands the practical scope of restitution in federal sex-trafficking cases.
“Relevant losses” under § 2259(c)(2): The catchall provision is robust. Non-medically-prescribed, safety- or functioning-related expenses reasonably tied to the offense (e.g., clothing to ameliorate trauma and facilitate community reintegration) can be compensable without a medical-necessity showing. The limiting principles remain proximate cause and reasonableness/relevance.
Victim-impact statements and preservation: Defense counsel should object contemporaneously to specific statements they believe cross the line; absent objection, plain-error relief will be difficult, especially where the sentencing judge already knows the offense details and the sentence is a downward variance.
Oral vs written judgments: Oral pronouncements control. Parties should vigilantly review written judgments and seek Rule 36 corrections for any divergences.

Practical Consequences for Stakeholders

For prosecutors: Build restitution records that document parents’ and guardians’ losses with proximate-cause links to offense conduct. Categories may include lost wages, transportation, temporary housing, childcare, safety-related items, and other reasonable measures tied to trauma and recovery.
For defense: Focus on proximate cause and reasonableness. Where disputing items like clothing or relocation costs, develop evidence that breaks the causal chain, challenges necessity or relevance, or shows overbreadth. Raise objections to victim-impact statements contemporaneously and propose tailored limits if warranted.
For district courts: Make explicit proximate-cause findings when awarding restitution to non-trafficked “victims” under § 1593(c) (e.g., guardians). When relying on § 2259(c)(2)’s catchall, briefly explain relevance and causal nexus to insulate orders on appeal.
For victims and families: The decision affirms a path to recover out-of-pocket losses borne by guardians and family members caring for traumatized child victims, broadening restorative justice in trafficking cases.

Relationship to Other Restitution Statutes

The court emphasized textual differences between § 1593 (trafficking) and the MVRA (§ 3663A). Some circuits, applying MVRA’s “assume the victim’s rights” language, restrict representatives from recovering their own losses. Limon’s rule is tied to § 1593’s broader “victim” definition and its cross-reference to § 2259(c)(2). Practitioners should not assume that MVRA limitations govern § 1593 claims.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Plain error: An appellate standard for unpreserved objections. The appellant must show (1) an error, (2) that is clear or obvious under current law, (3) that affected substantial rights (likely changed the outcome), and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Failing any prong is fatal.
Victim-impact evidence: Statements by victims or their families describing harm and trauma. Generally admissible at sentencing unless so inflammatory that proceedings become fundamentally unfair.
Proximate cause (in restitution): The losses must be sufficiently connected to the offense—foreseeable and not too remote. It is a limiting principle preventing restitution for attenuated or independent harms.
Anti-surplusage canon: Courts avoid interpretations that render statutory words or provisions meaningless. In Limon, this canon supported giving independent effect to § 1593’s own “victim” definition rather than importing a conflicting definition from § 2259.
In pari materia: Statutes on similar subjects are interpreted harmoniously. But harmony does not require importing definitions across statutes when doing so would nullify explicit textual choices (as it would here).
Rule 36 corrections: A procedural mechanism to fix clerical mistakes so the written judgment matches what the judge said in open court.

Conclusion

United States v. Limon delivers three notable takeaways. First, absent a timely objection, appellate challenges to the rhetoric of a victim-impact statement face the steep climb of plain-error review; here, strong language was deemed relevant to harm and not unduly prejudicial. Second, as a matter of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, § 1593 allows restitution to a minor victim’s parent for the parent’s own losses proximately caused by the trafficking offense—an interpretation driven by § 1593’s broad “victim” definition, its cross-reference to § 2259(c)(2), and the anti-surplusage canon. Third, § 2259(c)(2)’s catchall permits recovery for non-prescribed, trauma-mitigating expenses like clothing that help a child function in public life after the offense, without any categorical “medical necessity” requirement—again, subject to proximate cause and relevance.

The court affirmed Limon’s 480-month sentence and restitution orders in all challenged respects, remanding only to conform the written amended judgment to the oral pronouncement concerning payment terms. Doctrinally, Limon solidifies a restitution-friendly reading of § 1593 in the Fifth Circuit and clarifies the broad admissibility and effect of victim-impact evidence at sentencing. Practically, it equips victims’ families and prosecutors with a clearer pathway to obtain compensation for guardians’ direct, offense-proximate losses while sharpening defense counsel’s focus on preserving objections and contesting proximate cause.