Reposting Judicial Accusations on Social Media Can Breach Rule 4-8.2(a): Florida Supreme Court Affirms 30-Day Suspensions and Reiterates Limits on Lawyer Speech and Judicial Inquiry

Introduction

In The Florida Bar v. Brooke Lynnette Girley and The Florida Bar v. Jerry Girley (Supreme Court of Florida, June 26, 2025), the Court addressed the ethical boundaries of attorney speech about judges in the social media era. Following a high-profile employment discrimination trial in which a jury awarded $2.75 million to plaintiff Baiywo Rop before the trial judge entered a directed verdict against him on the race-discrimination claim, attorneys Jerry and Brooke Girley made and circulated public statements accusing the presiding judge of racial bias, usurping authority, and “stealing” the verdict. The statements prompted threats against the judge and raised serious questions about the extent to which lawyer speech critical of the judiciary is protected, especially when disseminated via social media and online interviews.

A Bar referee found that both respondents violated Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 3-4.3 and 4-8.2(a) and their Oath of Admission; the referee also found Jerry violated rule 4-8.4(d) and 4-4.1(a), and recommended 30-day suspensions for both. On review, the Supreme Court approved the findings of guilt except for rule 4-4.1(a) as to Jerry, and affirmed the 30-day suspensions. The opinion clarifies that:

Lawyers’ public statements about judges—including reposted content—that impugn a judge’s integrity without an objectively reasonable factual basis violate rule 4-8.2(a).
Context can identify the judge even if the lawyer does not name the judge explicitly.
Generalized evidence of systemic inequality is not a defense to targeted accusations against specific judges; the propriety of speech is judged against the facts of the case and the judicial order “speaks for itself.”
Judges cannot be compelled to testify about their thought processes or reasons for their orders in Bar proceedings.
When lawyer statements trigger harassment and threats against a judge, the conduct may be “prejudicial to the administration of justice” under rule 4-8.4(d).
Alleged violations of rule 4-4.1(a) require clear record support that the statements were made “in the course of representing a client.”

Summary of the Opinion

- The Court approved the referee’s findings of guilt for both respondents under rules 3-4.3 and 4-8.2(a) and for violating the Oath of Admission (maintaining respect due to courts and judges).

- As to Jerry, the Court additionally approved guilt under rule 4-8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), citing the widespread dissemination of his statements and the ensuing death threats and need for added security for the judge. The Court disapproved the referee’s finding of a violation of rule 4-4.1(a) (truthfulness to others) due to insufficient findings that his statements were made in the course of representing the client.

- The Court rejected due process challenges (adequate notice and opportunity to be heard were provided), affirmed the referee’s evidentiary rulings (including excluding generalized evidence of systemic inequality and precluding the judge’s testimony), and rejected First Amendment challenges, reiterating that the state has a compelling interest in protecting judicial integrity and public confidence in the judiciary.

- Sanctions: Both respondents received 30-day suspensions. Jerry must also attend The Florida Bar’s Professionalism Workshop. Costs were assessed: $3,643.03 against Brooke and $5,357.40 against Jerry. The suspensions take effect 30 days from the opinion to permit client protection, unless accelerated by notice of non-practice. Both must accept no new business until reinstatement and comply with applicable rules governing suspension.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Ricks v. Loyola, 822 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 2002), and Gutierrez v. L. Plumbing, Inc., 516 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987): The Court cited Ricks (and Gutierrez) to underscore the accepted practice of reserving ruling on motions for directed verdict until after the jury returns a verdict, to conserve resources. This directly undercut respondents’ public assertions that the trial judge acted ultra vires in “reversing” the verdict and framed those statements as made with reckless disregard for the truth.
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941), and State v. Lewis, 656 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1994): These authorities establish that judges cannot be examined regarding their mental processes or the bases for judicial decisions, a principle the Court applied to affirm the referee’s refusal to compel the trial judge’s testimony. The judicial order “speaks for itself,” and probing the judge’s thought process would be “destructive of judicial responsibility.”
Fla. Bar v. Committe, 916 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 2005): Due process in Bar cases requires only notice of charges and an opportunity to be heard. The Court relied on this to reject respondents’ due process challenges.
Fla. Bar v. Rotstein, 835 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2002); Fla. Bar v. Tobkin, 944 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2006); Fla. Bar v. Rendina, 583 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1991); Fla. Bar v. Hollander, 607 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1992): These cases support the referee’s evidentiary discretion and that Bar proceedings are quasi-judicial, not bound by strict evidence rules.
Fla. Bar v. Alters, 260 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 2018); Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 2000); Fla. Bar v. Patterson, 257 So. 3d 56 (Fla. 2018); Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 2007): These delineate the standards of review: deferential (competent, substantial evidence) for factual findings; sufficient factual basis required for rule violations; challenger bears the burden to show lack of record support.
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871); In re Shimek, 284 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1973); Fla. Bar v. Ray, 797 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2001): These cases establish longstanding limits on out-of-court lawyer attacks on judges. They ground rule 4-8.2(a)’s function in preserving public confidence in judicial fairness and impartiality.
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015): The U.S. Supreme Court’s validation of restrictions aimed at protecting judicial integrity and public confidence provided the constitutional backbone for rejecting the First Amendment challenge to rule 4-8.2(a).
Wright v. State, 920 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1970): Preservation principles—constitutional arguments not raised below are not considered on review absent fundamental error—supported the Court’s refusal to entertain equal protection and religious freedom arguments for the first time on appeal.
Fla. Bar v. Cocalis, 959 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 2007): Applied to sustain the rule 3-4.3 violation for conduct “contrary to honesty and justice.”
Fla. Bar v. Parrish, 241 So. 3d 66 (Fla. 2018): Supports treating repeated misconduct over a short period across platforms as a “pattern of misconduct” for aggravation.
Sanctions guideposts: The Court consulted Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (notably Standard 7.1(b)) and comparable cases: Fla. Bar v. McCallum (15-day suspension for unfounded accusations against judges), Fla. Bar v. Tropp (public reprimand and probation), Fla. Bar v. Jacobs (91-day suspension for pervasive 4-8.2(a) violations), and Fla. Bar v. Norkin (two-year suspension for prolonged disparagement and disruption). The 30-day suspensions here were calibrated within this spectrum.

Legal Reasoning

Rule 4-8.2(a): Impugning judges without an objectively reasonable factual basis. The rule prohibits statements a lawyer “knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to [their] truth or falsity” concerning a judge’s qualifications or integrity. The Court found that both lawyers publicly asserted the trial judge “stole” a verdict, acted without authority, and was racially biased. Those assertions were made despite the judge’s written order explicitly invoking accepted Florida practice on reserved rulings for directed verdicts. That objective record provided no reasonable factual basis for claims of illegality or bias; the respondents’ contrary statements therefore reflected reckless disregard for truth.
Adoption and republication on social media. Brooke not only authored her own posts but also reposted third-party statements asserting the judge “stole justice.” The Court treated such reposts as her own statements for rule 4-8.2(a) purposes, emphasizing that a lawyer’s amplification of defamatory judicial accusations can itself be sanctionable.
Identification by context. Jerry argued he did not name the judge. The Court rejected this as a defense because his statements plainly referred to the presiding judge and the case’s circumstances; the audience could readily identify the target. Avoiding a name does not insulate a lawyer from 4-8.2(a).
Targeted attacks vs. systemic critique. The Court carefully distinguished generalized critique of systemic inequality from targeted accusations against specific judges. It affirmed the referee’s decision to exclude generalized evidence of inequality as irrelevant where the charged misconduct targeted a specific judge and appellate court with accusations of racial bias and lawlessness unsupported by the case record.
Oath of Admission. Because both lawyers orchestrated or led campaigns calling for the judge to be “removed,” “investigated,” and “held accountable” for purportedly lawless and racially motivated actions, the Court found violations of the Oath’s requirement to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers.
Rule 4-8.4(d): Prejudice to the administration of justice. As lead trial counsel, Jerry’s widely disseminated statements contributed to a climate that resulted in threats to the judge and the need for increased security. The Court held this caused prejudice to the administration of justice, supporting a 4-8.4(d) violation.
Rule 4-4.1(a): Truthfulness to others. The Court declined to find a 4-4.1(a) violation because the record and findings did not clearly establish that Jerry’s statements were made “in the course of representing a client,” a required element of the rule. This signals the need for clear, explicit findings tying public statements to the representation when charging under 4-4.1(a).
First Amendment. Relying on Williams-Yulee, Ray, and longstanding doctrine from Bradley v. Fisher and Shimek, the Court reaffirmed that Florida may impose narrow restraints on lawyer speech that undermines judicial integrity and public confidence, particularly statements made with reckless disregard for truth about judges.
Judicial inquiry limits. Drawing on Morgan and Lewis, the Court affirmed that parties may not compel a judge’s testimony about the basis for orders or his or her thought processes; the written order is the controlling record.
Standards and sanctions. Applying Standard 7.1(b), the Court concluded that suspensions were appropriate when lawyers knowingly engage in professional misconduct causing injury or potential injury to the public or legal system. Aggravators (pattern of misconduct, substantial experience, refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing) outweighed mitigators (no prior discipline; reputation; additional mitigators for Brooke including cooperation, absence of dishonest motive, and other penalties), justifying equal 30-day suspensions.

Impact

Social media liability for lawyers. The opinion squarely places social media activity—both original posts and reposts—within the ambit of rule 4-8.2(a). Lawyers who amplify accusations of judicial wrongdoing or bias without an objectively reasonable basis risk discipline, even if they omit the judge’s name.
Objective-basis requirement for judicial-accusation speech. The Court’s emphasis on the “objectively reasonable factual basis” test will shape future enforcement: claims that a judge lacked authority or acted out of bias must be rooted in the record and law, not speculation or rhetorical flourish.
Evidence boundaries in Bar cases. The reaffirmed rule against compelling judge testimony and the irrelevance of generalized system-level evidence to targeted accusations streamline future Bar proceedings involving alleged judicial defamation.
Rule 4-8.4(d) and real-world consequences. Where lawyer speech precipitates harassment or threats to judges, 4-8.4(d) exposure increases. The causal nexus between speech and prejudice to the administration of justice will be closely scrutinized.
Charging under rule 4-4.1(a). Bar counsel and referees are reminded to establish, with specific findings, that the speech occurred “in the course of representing a client” when charging under 4-4.1(a); otherwise, even objectionable statements may fall outside that rule.
Sanction calibration. The 30-day suspensions, plotted against McCallum, Tropp, Jacobs, and Norkin, illustrate a tiered approach: isolated or contained judicial-accusation misconduct may result in public reprimand or short suspension; pervasive, repeated, or disruptive misconduct (especially coupled with refusal to conform) draws longer suspensions.
Law firm risk management. The case highlights vicarious reputational and ethical risks: “of counsel” and firm-affiliated actors’ social media activities can expose lawyers to discipline. Firms should adopt policies for content review and training on judicial-criticism boundaries.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Reserved ruling on directed verdict: A trial judge may allow the jury to deliberate and return a verdict, then decide a previously moved-for directed verdict afterward. This conserves resources in case of appellate reversal. It is an accepted Florida practice; it is not “reversing” a verdict without authority.
Rule 4-8.2(a) “reckless disregard”: This means making serious allegations about a judge without caring whether they are true, when facts and law readily available (like the judge’s written order citing controlling precedent) show the statements lack a reasonable basis.
Oath of Admission: Florida lawyers swear to “maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers.” Public attacks on a judge’s integrity or lawfulness, without sound basis, violate that oath.
Rule 4-8.4(d) “prejudicial to the administration of justice”: Conduct that undermines the functioning or safety of the judicial system—such as prompting threats against a judge—can satisfy this rule.
Judicial thought-process privilege: Courts protect judges from being examined about why they made a decision. The written order is the authoritative record; lawyers cannot force a judge to explain or defend it in Bar proceedings.
Preservation on appeal: Arguments (including constitutional ones) generally must be raised before the referee; raising them for the first time on review is typically barred unless the error is fundamental.

Conclusion

The Florida Supreme Court’s decision sends a clear message: in the digital age, lawyers’ public speech—particularly that which impugns judges—remains constrained by ethical duties. The Court reaffirmed that accusations of judicial lawlessness or bias must rest on an objectively reasonable factual and legal foundation; rhetorical assertions untethered to the record can violate rule 4-8.2(a), breach the Oath of Admission, and, where they foment threats or harassment, constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice under rule 4-8.4(d). The opinion also underscores procedural guardrails: judges cannot be compelled to testify about their decisions, and generalized claims about systemic inequities cannot justify targeted accusations against specific judicial officers.

While the Court rejected one of the referee’s findings (rule 4-4.1(a) as to Jerry) due to insufficient linkage to client representation, it otherwise affirmed short suspensions calibrated to the gravity and dissemination of the misconduct, consistent with Florida’s sanctioning framework. Going forward, lawyers should treat social media reposts as their own speech, ensure that public criticisms of judges are firmly grounded in law and fact, and recognize that ethical duties travel beyond the courtroom to every platform where professional voices carry public weight.