Pleading Federal Claims and Waiving Removal Defects: Commentary on Sean Murphy v. Brixworth Homeowners Ass’n, Inc.

I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s unpublished opinion in Sean Murphy v. Brixworth Homeowners Association, Inc., No. 24‑5823 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025), is procedurally rich. Although originating in a neighborhood dispute about provocative political yard banners, the appellate decision does not address First Amendment or substantive Fair Housing Act (FHA)/Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) questions. Instead, it focuses on:

When a state‑court complaint containing federal claims can be removed to federal court;
How and when procedural defects in removal are waived;
The authority of a chief district judge to reassign “related” cases to himself under local rules;
The standards for judicial recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 and 144;
The authority of the Sixth Circuit Clerk to issue certain orders; and
The circumstances under which sanctions may be appropriate for vexatious appellate conduct.

While “NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION” and therefore non‑precedential under Sixth Circuit practice, the opinion provides a clear and instructive application of several important jurisdictional and procedural doctrines. It is especially salient for:

Litigants who plead federal statutory claims but later attempt to “re‑characterize” their lawsuit as purely state law;
Pro se or serial litigants challenging case assignments and seeking recusal of particular judges; and
Lawyers litigating removal, remand, and the scope of a circuit clerk’s delegated authority.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Dispute

Sean Murphy moved to Farragut, Tennessee, became convinced of local governmental corruption, and responded by forming a political group, podcast, and publication. He also deployed what he termed “political yard art” in his front yard—large banners criticizing local officials. One example reproduced in the record depicted Farragut’s mayor in an orange jumpsuit under the words “for prison 2023.”

Murphy lived in a neighborhood governed by the Brixworth Homeowners Association (the “Association”), which maintained restrictive covenants limiting yard signs. The Association concluded that Murphy’s banners violated those covenants. When he refused to comply, the Association barred Murphy and his political group from neighborhood amenities, including the pool and common areas, until he removed the signs.

B. The First Federal Lawsuit

Murphy first filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, naming (among others) the Association’s president as a defendant and raising claims tied to:

His political yard signs; and
His loss of access to the Association’s common amenities.

That case, Murphy v. Town of Farragut, No. 3:23‑cv‑00402 (E.D. Tenn.), was assigned to Chief Judge Travis R. McDonough, who ultimately granted a motion to dismiss on April 15, 2024.

C. The Second Lawsuit: Filed in State Court, Removed to Federal Court

Separately, on September 28, 2023, Murphy (joined by his wife and children) sued the Association itself in Tennessee state court. There, his complaint alleged:

Breach of contract (based on the Association’s covenants and actions); and
Violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), with a request for $150,000 in damages “for violation of the requirements of the FHA/ADA.”

In February 2024, the Association removed this state‑court case to the Eastern District of Tennessee, invoking federal‑question jurisdiction because the complaint pleaded federal statutory claims.

D. District Court Proceedings in the Second Case

Once removed:

Chief Judge McDonough, treating the case as “related” to the earlier federal case, reassigned it to himself pursuant to E.D. Tenn. Local Rule 3.2 and 28 U.S.C. § 137.
Murphy moved to:
- Recuse Chief Judge McDonough, arguing bias based on his handling of the first case and his prior work for the City of Chattanooga;
- Remand the case to state court on the ground that there were allegedly no federal claims in his complaint.
The Association filed a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing Murphy failed to state any viable claim.

The district court:

Denied Murphy’s motions to recuse and to remand; and
Granted the Association’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, effectively dismissing the case at the pleadings stage.

E. The Appeal

On appeal, Murphy did not meaningfully challenge the substantive dismissal of his claims. Instead, he attacked the process on multiple fronts, contending that:

The case should have been remanded to state court because there were no federal claims and removal was procedurally defective;
Chief Judge McDonough’s reassignment of the case to himself violated local rules;
Chief Judge McDonough should have recused himself under 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 and 144;
The Clerk of the Sixth Circuit lacked authority to deny his motion to stay the briefing schedule (i.e., a motion requesting abeyance); and
A special master should be appointed and the appellate record supplemented.

The Association, in turn, requested that the Sixth Circuit impose attorney’s fees and sanctions based on what it viewed as frivolous and vexatious appellate conduct.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

The Sixth Circuit (Chief Judge Sutton, joined by Judges Murphy and Bloomekatz) affirmed in all respects and resolved the issues as follows:

Subject-matter jurisdiction / removal:
- The complaint expressly asserted claims under two federal statutes—the FHA and ADA—and sought damages under them.
Reassignment of the case:
- Local Rule 3.2(d)(3) of the Eastern District of Tennessee permits the chief judge to reassign “related” cases to the judge who handled the earlier case.
- The two Murphy cases were plainly related (same plaintiff, overlapping subject matter, and a defendant in common through the Association’s president).
- Chief Judge McDonough acted within the authority granted by local rules and 28 U.S.C. § 137.
Recusal:
- Murphy did not carry his burden under 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 and 144 to show personal bias or an appearance of partiality.
- Prior involvement in related litigation and former employment with the City of Chattanooga did not create “deep‑seated favoritism or antagonism” or any improper connection to this case.
- Murphy’s § 144 argument—that the judge had to stop acting immediately after the recusal motion—was forfeited because he raised it for the first time in his reply brief, and in any event would fail for lack of a “sufficient affidavit.”
Authority of the Sixth Circuit Clerk:
- The Clerk of the Sixth Circuit had authority under Sixth Circuit Rule 45(a)(2) to deny Murphy’s motion to stay the briefing schedule.
- The court noted that it had already rejected this argument multiple times.
Supplementing the record / special master:
- The court granted Murphy’s motion to supplement the record with a copy of the removal coversheet, but emphasized that coversheets do not determine jurisdiction—complaints do.
- Because the added document was immaterial to jurisdiction, there was no need to appoint a special master or pursue related evidentiary investigations.
Sanctions:
- The court declined, at this stage, to impose attorney’s fees or sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or Fed. R. App. P. 38.
- However, it expressly warned Murphy that frivolous or “unreasonabl[e] and vexatious[]” filings may warrant sanctions in the future, citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Federal-Question Jurisdiction and Removal

1. Federal claims on the face of the complaint

The core jurisdictional issue was whether Murphy’s state‑court complaint raised federal questions sufficient for removal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441. The Sixth Circuit focused on the text of the complaint itself, in line with the “well‑pleaded complaint” rule.

Key allegations included:

Murphy alleged that he “is a member of a protected class under the Fair Housing Act” and that the Association’s enforcement of the no‑sign rule violated the FHA.
He demanded $150,000 in damages for the Association’s “violation of the requirements of the FHA/ADA.”

This pleading placed federal law claims squarely “on the face” of the complaint, which is exactly what 28 U.S.C. § 1331 requires for federal‑question jurisdiction. The court cited Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326, 1329 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc) for the proposition that jurisdiction turns on the complaint, not ancillary documents like removal coversheets.

Murphy attempted on appeal to reframe his complaint as asserting only a single state‑law “breach of contract” claim, but the court treated that as a factual mischaracterization, not a legal argument. His own earlier briefing in the district court had referred to his “ADA claims” and claims “brought under the FHA,” undercutting his appellate reframing.

2. Supplemental jurisdiction over state claims

Once the court confirmed the presence of federal claims under the FHA and ADA, it had no difficulty treating Murphy’s breach‑of‑contract claim as falling within supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which allows federal courts to hear:

“state-law claims brought alongside federal ones that ‘form part of the same case or controversy.’” (Davet v. City of Cleveland, 456 F.3d 549, 553 (6th Cir. 2006))

Murphy’s contract claim arose from the same set of facts—the Association’s enforcement of its sign covenant and ban from common amenities—so it “formed part of the same case or controversy” as the FHA/ADA claims. Thus, the court properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over it.

3. Removal mechanics and waiver of procedural defects

Beyond subject‑matter jurisdiction, Murphy attacked the procedural regularity of removal, arguing:

The Association removed “too late” under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1); and
It failed to attach all required documents to the notice of removal.

The Association responded that it did not receive notice of the lawsuit for several months and that it removed within 30 days of becoming aware of the complaint, which is consistent with § 1446(b)(1)’s 30‑day clock running from “receipt by the defendant” of the initial pleading.

The Sixth Circuit declined to resolve the factual dispute because it held that any such objections were procedurally barred. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c):

Objections to subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time; but
Objections based on any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction—i.e., procedural removal defects—must be raised in a motion to remand within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal.

Murphy did not file a timely motion arguing improper timing or incomplete documentation. When he later moved to remand, he argued only that the district court “lacks subject jurisdiction,” not that the Association removed late or incompletely. Because he did not assert these procedural defects within the 30‑day window, he forfeited them.

This portion of the opinion is a clear reaffirmation of a critical distinction:

Subject-matter defects (e.g., no federal question actually pleaded) are non‑waivable and may be raised at any time; and
Procedural defects (e.g., late removal, missing attachments) are waived if not timely raised.

For practitioners, the message is blunt: If you believe the other side botched the paperwork or timing of removal, you must move to remand on those grounds within 30 days or the issue is gone.

4. Coversheets versus complaints; supplementing the record

Murphy sought to supplement the appellate record with what he claimed was a copy of the Association’s original civil coversheet filed in an incorrect format. After the district court clerk required a properly “flattened” PDF, the Association refiled. Murphy theorized that the original coversheet was jurisdictionally significant.

The Sixth Circuit allowed supplementation—to “avoid any doubt” that it had considered Murphy’s argument—but immediately underscored that:

“Coversheets do not control subject matter jurisdiction; complaints do.” (citing Smolarek)

Because the complaint itself plainly pleaded federal statutory claims, nothing on the coversheet could change the jurisdictional analysis. This also mooted Murphy’s request for a special master; there was nothing for a special master to resolve that would affect the outcome.

The treatment of the coversheet issue performs a clean separation of form from substance: administrative filing forms do not supersede the legally operative pleading.

B. Case Reassignment: Local Rules and 28 U.S.C. § 137

Murphy next challenged Chief Judge McDonough’s decision to reassign this second case to himself. Case assignment within district courts is governed by:

28 U.S.C. § 137(a), which authorizes district courts to apportion their business; and
Local rules—in this case, E.D. Tenn. Local Rule 3.2.

Local Rule 3.2(d)(3) allows “related cases” to be assigned to the same judge to promote judicial efficiency. Related cases include actions that:

Arise out of the same transaction or occurrence; and
Involve one or more of the same parties as an earlier case.

The Second Murphy case met both criteria:

Both lawsuits were brought by the same plaintiff (Murphy).
Both concerned the same nucleus of facts: his political yard signs and the Association’s response, including the ban from neighborhood amenities.
The earlier federal suit named the Association’s president (a central figure in the second case), while the second suit was against the Association itself.

Murphy also argued that under the local rules only the clerk and magistrate judge could identify and reassign related cases. The court rejected this reading as incomplete, pointing to the express language of Rule 3.2(d)(3)(B), which provides:

“If cases are found to be related cases after assignment to different judges, they may be reassigned by the Chief Judge to the judge having the related case earliest filed.”

Thus, the chief judge was explicitly authorized to reassign related cases to himself if he had the earlier‑filed case. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the reassignment was fully consistent with both the local rule and § 137(a).

This confirms an important structural point: case assignment and reassignment, absent a colorable claim of bias or conflict, is primarily an internal administrative matter. So long as local rules and statutes are followed, litigants generally cannot successfully challenge which judge hears their case simply because they are dissatisfied with prior rulings.

C. Judicial Recusal: 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 and 144

1. Standards under § 455(a) and § 144

Murphy’s recusal efforts invoked two federal recusal provisions:

28 U.S.C. § 455(a): Requires a judge to disqualify himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The inquiry is an objective one: whether a reasonable person, knowing all the facts, would question the judge’s impartiality.
28 U.S.C. § 144: Provides that when a party files a “timely and sufficient affidavit” that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice, the judge must “proceed no further” and another judge must be assigned.

The Sixth Circuit cited United States v. Liggins, 76 F.4th 500, 506 (6th Cir. 2023), for the proposition that recusal is required only when the judge’s conduct is:

“so extreme … that it displays a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”

And it cited Consol. Rail Corp. v. Yashinsky, 170 F.3d 591, 597 (6th Cir. 1999), for the rule that the party seeking recusal bears the burden of persuasion, which is described as a “substantial burden” in other cited authority (e.g., United States v. Denton, 434 F.3d 1104, 1111 (8th Cir. 2006)).

2. Murphy’s asserted grounds for recusal

Murphy argued that recusal was required because:

Chief Judge McDonough had presided over Murphy’s prior lawsuit and dismissed it; and
He had formerly worked for the City of Chattanooga and a Chattanooga law firm, allegedly involved in “economic development in Tennessee” and “low‑income properties.”

Murphy grouped these into a generalized concern that the judge’s “prior associations and experiences may raise a reasonable question about his impartiality,” especially in a case touching on criticisms of local government.

3. Prior judicial involvement does not equal bias

The court relied on Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994), for the well‑established principle that adverse judicial rulings or familiarity with a party from earlier cases are not grounds for recusal:

Experience with related litigation is not a disqualifying bias;
Judicial rulings alone “almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”

Because Chief Judge McDonough’s only direct interaction with Murphy was through his role as presiding judge in the earlier case, this would not, without more, suggest personal animus or favoritism.

4. Prior employment and alleged political or policy “associations”

Murphy further argued that McDonough’s prior legal work for the City of Chattanooga and a local law firm involved in projects like economic development and low‑income housing somehow aligned him with opposing interests in this dispute.

The Sixth Circuit emphasized:

Murphy’s case involved the Town of Farragut, not Chattanooga;
No evidence showed that the judge had represented either the Association or any of the attorneys involved;
There was no direct or specific connection between the judge’s former work and the parties or issues in this HOA dispute.

Mere participation in public projects related to “economic development” or “low‑income properties,” without more, was too attenuated to reasonably question impartiality in an unrelated HOA covenant dispute. That sort of generalized professional background cannot be converted into a presumption of bias.

5. The § 144 argument and forfeiture

Murphy advanced an additional procedural argument under § 144—raised for the first time in his reply brief on appeal—contending that simply filing his recusal motion and affidavit required Chief Judge McDonough to “proceed no further” in the case.

The Sixth Circuit disposed of this in two steps:

Forfeiture under appellate practice. Citing Grand v. City of Univ. Heights, 2025 WL 3169604, at *7 (6th Cir. Nov. 13, 2025), the court reiterated that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited.
Substantive insufficiency. Even if not forfeited, § 144 requires a “timely and sufficient affidavit.” Murphy’s filings did not meet that standard because they did not demonstrate “personal bias” as opposed to generalized dissatisfaction or speculative associations. The court cited United States v. Story, 716 F.2d 1088, 1090 (6th Cir. 1983), and Denton for the “substantial burden” required to show actual bias.

As a result, there was no error in Chief Judge McDonough’s decision to rule on the dispositive motion and to continue presiding over the case.

D. Authority of the Sixth Circuit Clerk

Murphy also challenged an action taken at the appellate level: the Clerk of the Sixth Circuit’s denial of his motion to stay the briefing schedule (i.e., to place the appeal in abeyance).

The court noted that:

It had “already considered and rejected that argument—thrice”; and
Sixth Circuit Rule 45(a)(2) explicitly authorizes the clerk to deny motions for abeyance.

This part of the opinion reiterates a key structural feature of appellate practice: many case‑management decisions are delegated to the clerk’s office under local rules. Parties cannot nullify the clerk’s legitimate authority simply by repeatedly relitigating an issue the court has already conclusively resolved.

E. Sanctions and Warnings on Vexatious Litigation

The Association sought sanctions and attorney’s fees, pointing to Murphy’s repeated motions and arguments the court had already rejected (including his challenge to the clerk’s authority).

Two main authorities were invoked:

28 U.S.C. § 1927: Authorizes sanctions when an attorney or other person “so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.”
Fed. R. App. P. 38: Allows the court of appeals to award damages and costs for frivolous appeals.

The Sixth Circuit:

Declined to award fees or impose sanctions at this point; but
Issued a pointed warning, citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991), which recognized courts’ inherent power to punish bad‑faith or vexatious conduct.

The warning signals that continued pursuit of meritless, repetitive, or harassing filings—especially after clear adverse rulings— could eventually trigger sanctions under § 1927, Rule 38, or the court’s inherent authority.

V. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The opinion is anchored in several key cases and statutes. The following table summarizes their role:

Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc) – Cited for the proposition that subject‑matter jurisdiction is determined by the complaint, not ancillary documents like coversheets. Supports the holding that the presence of FHA/ADA claims in the complaint sufficed for federal‑question jurisdiction.
Davet v. City of Cleveland, 456 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2006) – Quoted for the standard governing supplemental jurisdiction: federal courts may adjudicate state‑law claims forming part of the same case or controversy as federal claims (28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)).
United States v. Liggins, 76 F.4th 500 (6th Cir. 2023) – Supplies the articulation of the high threshold for recusal: conduct must be so extreme that it shows “deep‑seated favoritism or antagonism.” Used to reject Murphy’s generalized allegations of bias.
Consol. Rail Corp. v. Yashinsky, 170 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 1999) – Emphasizes that the party seeking recusal bears the burden of proving “personal bias” sufficient to require disqualification.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) – Supreme Court authority confirming that prior judicial rulings and familiarity with a party or issues in earlier cases almost never suffice to show bias. Anchors the conclusion that presiding over Murphy’s prior case did not demand recusal.
United States v. Story, 716 F.2d 1088 (6th Cir. 1983) – Quoted for the requirement in § 144 that recusal be predicated on a “sufficient” affidavit of bias.
United States v. Denton, 434 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2006) – Cited for the “substantial burden” litigants face to prove personal bias under § 144.
Grand v. City of Univ. Heights, 2025 WL 3169604 (6th Cir. Nov. 13, 2025) – Cited for the procedural rule that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited.
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) – Cited to remind Murphy that courts possess inherent authority, separate from statutes and rules, to sanction bad‑faith or vexatious conduct.

In addition, the opinion heavily relies on foundational statutes and rules:

28 U.S.C. § 1331 – Federal question jurisdiction;
28 U.S.C. § 1367 – Supplemental jurisdiction over related state‑law claims;
28 U.S.C. § 137(a) – Distribution of business among district judges;
28 U.S.C. § 144 – Recusal upon “timely and sufficient affidavit” showing personal bias;
28 U.S.C. § 455 – General recusal standard (“impartiality might reasonably be questioned”);
28 U.S.C. § 1446 – Removal procedure and timing;
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) – Time limits and waiver rules for challenging removal defects;
28 U.S.C. § 1927 – Sanctions for unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings;
Fed. R. App. P. 38 – Sanctions for frivolous appeals;
E.D. Tenn. Local Rule 3.2 – Related‑case assignment and reassignment;
6th Cir. R. 45(a)(2) – Clerk’s authority to deny motions for abeyance.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

Federal-question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331)

A federal court can hear a case if the plaintiff’s complaint, on its face, claims a right to relief under the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, or treaties. Here, explicit FHA and ADA claims satisfied this requirement.

Supplemental jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1367)

When a federal court properly has jurisdiction over at least one federal claim, it can usually decide closely related state‑law claims that arise from the same events. That is why Murphy’s breach‑of‑contract claim remained in federal court.

Removal (28 U.S.C. § 1446)

If a plaintiff chooses to file in state court, a defendant may “remove” the case to federal court when the case could have been filed there initially (for example, because it contains federal claims). Removal is time‑limited and follows a specific statutory procedure.

Remand and waiver of procedural defects (28 U.S.C. § 1447(c))

If the plaintiff thinks the defendant removed too late or failed to follow procedure, he must move to send the case back to state court within 30 days. Failure to do so forfeits those procedural objections. However, lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction (e.g., no federal claim at all) can be raised at any time.

Judgment on the pleadings (Rule 12(c))

A motion for judgment on the pleadings asks the court to decide the case based purely on the written pleadings (complaint and answer) without proceeding to discovery or trial, on the ground that even if all well‑pleaded facts are accepted as true, the plaintiff still has no legally viable claim.

Related case reassignment

District courts may adopt local rules to assign related cases to the same judge. The goal is efficiency and consistent handling of overlapping disputes. This does not normally raise a recusal issue unless a separate ground for bias or conflict exists.

Recusal under §§ 455 and 144

A judge must step aside if:

Their impartiality might reasonably be questioned (§ 455(a)); or
A party files a timely, fact‑specific affidavit showing actual personal bias or prejudice (§ 144).

Merely disliking prior rulings or speculating that past employment implies bias is not enough. The law requires evidence of a genuine, specific, and non‑judicially‑derived animus or favoritism.

Forfeiture of arguments raised only in a reply brief

On appeal, parties file an opening brief, an answering (appellee’s) brief, and often a reply. New arguments raised for the first time in the reply brief are considered forfeited because the appellee had no opportunity to respond to them.

Authority of the circuit clerk

Circuit courts delegate certain case‑management powers to the clerk via local rules. In the Sixth Circuit, those powers include denying motions to put a case in abeyance. Such rulings are valid and not ultra vires so long as the clerk acts within those delegated powers.

Sanctions (28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Fed. R. App. P. 38)

Courts can impose financial penalties when a party or attorney:

Unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies proceedings; or
Pursues a frivolous appeal lacking any arguable legal or factual basis.

Chambers further confirms courts have inherent power to sanction bad‑faith conduct even beyond specific rules.

VII. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Pleading strategy and the consequences of federal claims

Murphy’s attempt to characterize his suit as purely contractual, despite clearly pleading FHA and ADA violations, underscores a recurring lesson: once a plaintiff invokes federal statutes and requests relief under them, he cannot easily “walk back” those claims simply to avoid federal jurisdiction.

The opinion reinforces that:

Pleadings are controlling; courts look to what was actually alleged and requested, not later characterizations.
Plaintiffs who want to stay in state court must draft with precision; gratuitously adding federal statutory references can open the door to removal.

B. Strict enforcement of removal/remand deadlines

The Sixth Circuit’s application of § 1447(c) continues a strong trend of enforcing the 30‑day window for raising procedural objections to removal. This has practical consequences:

Even serious procedural flaws in removal will not be corrected if plaintiff does not raise them promptly.
Lawyers must carefully audit removal notices immediately upon filing to preserve all procedural objections.

C. Recusal doctrine and judge-shopping

The court’s recusal analysis draws a sharp line between:

Legitimate grounds for recusal (personal bias, direct conflicts, nonjudicial sources of animus), and
Improper attempts at “judge‑shopping” driven by dissatisfaction with prior rulings or generalized suspicions tied to a judge’s professional background.

This has system‑wide significance. If prior service for a municipality or general involvement in public projects were enough to require recusal from any later case challenging local governance or zoning‑type issues, many judges with government backgrounds would be frequently disqualified. The court’s refusal to take that path protects both judicial independence and administrative practicality.

D. The role of clerks and administrative efficiency

By affirming the authority of the Sixth Circuit Clerk to deny motions for abeyance under Rule 45(a)(2), the opinion reinforces the importance of internal delegation in appellate courts. Robust clerk authority:

Prevents routine procedural matters from unnecessarily consuming judicial resources; and
Permits the court to focus on substantive issues, while still providing litigants an avenue for review where appropriate.

E. A cautionary signal on vexatious litigation

Although the court declined to impose sanctions, the explicit warning—grounded in § 1927, Rule 38, and Chambers—signals that continued attempts to relitigate already rejected arguments or to use the appellate process as a platform for collateral grievances may cross the line into sanctionable conduct.

For frequent or pro se litigants, the message is that persistence must be channeled through legally cognizable arguments, not repeated procedural skirmishes once the law has been clearly explained.

VIII. Conclusion

Murphy v. Brixworth Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. presents as a neighborhood battle over political expression, yet the Sixth Circuit’s opinion is largely about federal jurisdiction, procedural timing, and the integrity of the judicial process.

The key takeaways include:

Pleading federal statutory claims (here, FHA and ADA) squarely triggers federal‑question jurisdiction and supports removal, with supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims.
Procedural objections to removal—timing, documentation, and the like—are strictly governed by the 30‑day limit in § 1447(c) and are forfeited if not timely raised.
District courts, via § 137 and local rules, retain broad authority to reassign related cases to the same judge for reasons of efficiency; such reassignment does not by itself support recusal.
Recusal under §§ 455 and 144 demands a substantial showing of personal bias or a reasonable question of impartiality, not mere dissatisfaction with past rulings or speculative concerns about a judge’s prior governmental or professional roles.
Circuit clerks operate with delegated authority under local rules; their case‑management orders are valid and enforceable when issued within that authority.
While the court in this appeal chose not to impose sanctions, it clearly marked the boundary between vigorous advocacy and vexatious, sanctionable conduct.

Even as an unpublished decision, the opinion serves as a concise, practical illustration of how federal courts handle removed cases, recusal motions, and persistent procedural challenges. For litigants and practitioners, it is a reminder that strategic pleading, timely motion practice, and respect for established jurisdictional and procedural norms are critical to effective advocacy.