No Silent Summary Judgments: Fifth Circuit Vacates Hostile-Environment Disposition for Failure to Comply with Rule 56(a)’s Reason-Giving Requirement

Introduction

In Smith v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 24-20299 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Fifth Circuit addressed a suite of Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) claims brought by Kelli Smith, a former UPS driver, arising from her termination for dishonesty following a delivery incident. Smith alleged race, gender, and disability discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The district court initially denied summary judgment only on the hostile-work-environment claim, then later reconsidered and granted summary judgment across the board after settlement discussions broke down and Smith proceeded pro se.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the discrimination and retaliation claims and affirmed the denial of Smith’s motion to reinstate. But it vacated the grant of summary judgment on the hostile-work-environment claim and remanded, holding that the district court failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a)’s mandate to state reasons on the record for granting or denying summary judgment—especially salient where the court had previously said the claim “barely” survived.

The decision thus reemphasizes two practical pillars of federal civil practice in the Fifth Circuit: (1) district courts must articulate their summary-judgment reasoning on the record under Rule 56(a), and (2) plaintiffs pressing TCHRA discrimination and retaliation claims must supply specific, admissible evidence—particularly comparator specifics and proof of protected activity causally linked to adverse actions; vague generalities and temporal proximity alone will not suffice.

Summary of the Opinion

• Affirmed (Discrimination): Smith failed to make a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework because she identified no similarly situated comparators treated more favorably; “general” references to others in her position were insufficient.
• Affirmed (Retaliation): Smith’s complaints about “payroll discrepancies” and mechanical issues were not protected activity under the TCHRA absent allegations of discrimination. Even assuming her June 23, 2022 EEOC charge was protected, UPS articulated a legitimate reason for termination (dishonesty) and temporal proximity alone (about 10 weeks) could not prove but-for causation at the pretext stage.
• Vacated and Remanded (Hostile Work Environment): The district court’s terse oral ruling did not sufficiently state the reasons for granting summary judgment, contrary to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Fifth Circuit remanded for the court to explain its rationale; oral rulings are acceptable, and changing course is permissible under Rule 54(b), but reasons must be stated.
• Affirmed (Motion to Reinstate): The district court did not err in denying Smith’s post-judgment “motion to reinstate,” which relied on alleged errors already rejected, extra-record materials the court could not consider, and criticisms of counsel for which Smith remained bound.
• Settlement-Coercion Claim Rejected: The court’s suggestion to consider settlement was within its inherent powers; in any event, any error was harmless because Smith was permitted to disavow the agreement.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Procedural Standards:
  • Pierce v. Dep’t of U.S. Air Force, 512 F.3d 184, 186 (5th Cir. 2007): De novo review of summary judgment, drawing reasonable inferences for the nonmovant.
  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a): Requires courts to “state on the record the reasons for granting or denying” summary judgment; central to the vacatur and remand.
  • Holtzclaw v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir. 2001): Appellate court may affirm on any ground supported by the record.
  • Heller v. Namer, 666 F.2d 905, 911 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982); Myers v. Gulf Oil Corp., 731 F.2d 281, 283–84 (5th Cir. 1984); White v. Tex. Am. Bank/Galleria, 958 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1992); Mosley v. Ogden Marine, 480 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1973): Emphasize the necessity of reasoned explanations for effective appellate review, especially where multiple theories could support judgment.
  • Ueckert v. Guerra, 38 F.4th 446, 449 (5th Cir. 2022): Oral statements on the record suffice; no requirement that reasons be written.
  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b): Partial denials of summary judgment may be revised any time before final judgment—important to the panel’s acceptance of the district court’s change of position, provided reasons are stated.
  • Henslee v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting): Courts may embrace “late-coming” wisdom; change of mind is not inherently problematic.
• Substantive Law Framework:
  • Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 633–34 (Tex. 2012): TCHRA is interpreted in harmony with Title VII; federal cases guide TCHRA claims.
  • McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): Burden-shifting framework for discrimination and retaliation absent direct evidence; Smith pursued this framework below, so the Fifth Circuit confined its review accordingly.
  • Ross v. Judson Indep. Sch. Dist., 993 F.3d 315, 321–22 (5th Cir. 2021): Elements of a TCHRA prima facie discrimination case; also the principle that new direct-evidence theories cannot be debuted on appeal.
  • Little v. Republic Refin. Co., 924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991): Comparator treatment must be “nearly identical”; vague references to “others” will not do.
  • Gorman v. Verizon Wireless Tex., LLC, 753 F.3d 165, 170–71 (5th Cir. 2014); Royal v. CCC & R Tres Arboles, LLC, 736 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2013): TCHRA retaliation elements track Title VII; protected activity is opposing an unlawful practice under the TCHRA.
  • Allen v. Envirogreen Landscape Pros., Inc., 721 F. App’x 322, 329 (5th Cir. 2017): Generic pay disputes are not protected activity unless discrimination is alleged.
  • Lewis v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 134 F.4th 286, 295 (5th Cir. 2025): Filing an EEOC charge is protected activity.
  • Strong v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., LLC, 482 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir. 2007): Temporal proximity can support a prima facie case in some circumstances, but cannot alone show but-for causation at the pretext stage.
  • “Dishonesty” as a legitimate nondiscriminatory/nonretaliatory reason: Wilkey v. UPS, 740 F. App’x 51, 52 (5th Cir. 2018); Anderson v. Tupelo Reg’l Airport Auth., 568 F. App’x 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001); cross-circuit confirmation in Sigley (4th Cir. 2025), Debord (10th Cir. 2013), Seeger (6th Cir. 2012).
• Case-Management and Settlement:
  • Bell v. Schexnayder, 36 F.3d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1994): Courts possess inherent power to encourage settlement; the panel found no improper coercion.
  • Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Martin, 963 F.2d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 1992): Appellate courts generally will not consider extra-record evidence.
  • Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc., 57 F.3d 1406, 1418 (5th Cir. 1995): A litigant is bound by counsel’s acts and omissions.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied familiar structures to straightforward factual predicates, then sharpened the focus on a procedural lapse in the hostile-work-environment ruling.

• Discrimination (TCHRA):
  • Smith proceeded under McDonnell Douglas. The panel held she failed the fourth prima facie element because she offered only “general” statements about other unspecified individuals allegedly treated better, without identifying comparators or describing “nearly identical” circumstances. Without comparator detail, the court could not assess differential treatment. Summary judgment was therefore appropriate.
• Retaliation (TCHRA):
  • Protected activity: Smith’s intra-company grievances about “payroll discrepancies” and mechanical issues did not allege discrimination and thus were not protected activity under the TCHRA.
  • EEOC charge: The panel acknowledged the filing of an EEOC charge is protected but explained that even assuming a prima facie causal link based on a 10-week interval, UPS proffered a legitimate reason for termination (dishonesty). The burden shifted back to Smith to show pretext, which requires but-for causation; temporal proximity alone cannot meet that standard.
  • Legitimate reason: The court collected Fifth Circuit and sister-circuit authority recognizing dishonesty as a legitimate nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory basis for termination, foreclosing pretext absent substantive rebuttal.
• Hostile Work Environment (TCHRA):
  • The district court first said the claim “barely” survived summary judgment, but later granted judgment to UPS after reconsideration. Its entire explanation was a recitation of the general legal standard followed by the conclusory statement that Smith provided no evidence of such an atmosphere.
  • Rule 56(a) obligates the district court to “state on the record” its reasons. The panel emphasized that while oral rulings are fine and changing one’s mind pre-judgment is permissible, the rationale must be sufficiently explained to permit effective appellate review—particularly where multiple defense theories could justify summary judgment and where the court had previously indicated the claim would proceed.
  • Because the explanation was too skeletal, the court vacated and remanded for an “illumination of the court’s analysis,” without dictating the merits outcome on remand.
• Motion to Reinstate and Settlement Concerns:
  • The panel rejected Smith’s argument that the district court coerced settlement; judges may encourage settlement and, in any event, Smith was permitted to withdraw from the proposed agreement.
  • The denial of Smith’s “motion to reinstate” was affirmed because it relied on alleged errors already rejected, extra-record material that could not be considered, and complaints about counsel’s handling of discovery for which she is legally bound.

Impact

• Rule 56(a) Reason-Giving Obligation Is Not Pro Forma: The Fifth Circuit’s vacatur underscores that district courts must say enough—verbally or in writing—to reveal which arguments persuaded them and why. This is especially critical when:
  • Multiple defense theories of summary judgment are briefed (e.g., timeliness, failure of elements, employer liability);
  • The court reverses course from a prior inclination or ruling; and
  • Key factual disputes and credibility inferences are close and context-sensitive, as hostile-work-environment questions often are.
• Comparator Specificity in TCHRA Discrimination: Plaintiffs must identify “nearly identical” comparators or otherwise furnish concrete evidence of differential treatment. Generic workplace anecdotes will not establish a prima facie case.
• Retaliation Proof Tightened at Pretext Stage: Even when temporal proximity can edge a plaintiff past the prima facie threshold, it cannot by itself prove but-for causation when the employer supplies a legitimate reason for termination. Plaintiffs must marshal independent evidence undermining the stated reason (inconsistencies, shifting explanations, comparators, policy deviations).
• Scope of Protected Activity: Workplace complaints about pay or operations must explicitly connect to discrimination to qualify as protected “opposition” under the TCHRA. Absent that tie, such complaints will not support retaliation claims.
• Employer Takeaways: The opinion reinforces that termination for dishonesty is a well-accepted legitimate ground. Employers should document investigative steps and the basis for honesty-related decisions to withstand pretext challenges.
• Litigation Practice: Parties should build a clear summary-judgment record, anticipating the need for the court to articulate reasons. If summary judgment turns on close factual points, litigants may consider requesting a brief oral or written statement of reasons to aid both trial management and appellate review.
• Pro Se and Counsel Dynamics: The court will read pro se filings liberally but will not consider extra-record evidence. Litigants are bound by their counsel’s conduct in discovery; post hoc attempts to reopen proof are disfavored.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• TCHRA and Title VII: The Texas Commission on Human Rights Act mirrors Title VII. Courts apply federal Title VII precedent when interpreting TCHRA claims.
• McDonnell Douglas Framework:
  • Step 1: Prima Facie Case. Minimal showing that suggests discrimination/retaliation is plausible (e.g., protected class/qualified/adverse action/comparator or replacement; or protected activity/adverse action/causal link).
  • Step 2: Employer’s Reason. Employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason for the action.
  • Step 3: Pretext. Plaintiff must show the reason is false or not the real reason, and for retaliation must meet a “but-for” causation standard—i.e., the adverse action would not have occurred without the retaliatory motive.
• Comparator Evidence: To prove differential treatment, the compared employees should share similar roles, supervisors, standards, and misconduct—“nearly identical” circumstances.
• Protected Activity (Opposition Clause): The employee must oppose conduct made unlawful by the TCHRA (discrimination based on protected characteristics). Complaints about pay or operations that do not reference discrimination are not protected.
• Temporal Proximity: Close timing between a protected complaint and adverse action can sometimes show causation at the prima facie stage, but standing alone it cannot meet the higher pretext and but-for causation requirement once the employer gives a legitimate reason.
• Hostile Work Environment: Harassment that is because of a protected characteristic and “sufficiently severe or pervasive” to alter employment conditions. Courts assess frequency, severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, and whether it unreasonably interferes with work.
• Rule 56(a) Reason-Giving: When granting or denying summary judgment, a court must put its reasons on the record—enough to reveal the path of decision-making. Oral explanations are fine; the key is clarity.
• Rule 54(b) Flexibility: Before final judgment, courts may revise interlocutory rulings (like partial denials of summary judgment). But if they do, they still must explain why.
• Record on Appeal: The appellate court reviews the record as it existed below; parties cannot supplement with new evidence after the fact.

Conclusion

Smith v. UPS is a robust reminder of two intersecting realities in employment litigation under the TCHRA. Substantively, plaintiffs must present concrete, admissible evidence tailored to the governing frameworks: identify specific comparators for discrimination claims; connect workplace complaints to discrimination for retaliation; and, at the pretext stage, marshal evidence beyond timing alone to show but-for causation—especially where the employer cites dishonesty as the reason for termination. Procedurally, district courts must satisfy Rule 56(a)’s reason-giving requirement when adjudicating summary judgment, particularly when revisiting earlier rulings or when multiple alternative grounds are presented.

The Fifth Circuit’s affirmance of the discrimination and retaliation dispositions provides clear guideposts for litigants on proof sufficiency under the TCHRA. Its vacatur and remand of the hostile-work-environment ruling underscores that appellate review depends on articulated reasoning, not conclusory recitations. On remand, the district court remains free to reach the same or a different result, but it must explain its analysis on the record. In the broader legal context, the opinion reinforces careful case-building by parties and transparent adjudication by trial courts—both essential to fair and efficient resolution of employment disputes.