Implied Participant Findings and Managerial-Role Enhancements Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b): Commentary on United States v. Wolf (6th Cir. 2025)

Implied Participant Findings and Managerial-Role Enhancements Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b):
Commentary on United States v. Chad B. Wolf (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025)

I. Introduction

United States v. Wolf, No. 24-5801 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025) (not recommended for publication), sits at the intersection of several recurring sentencing issues in federal criminal practice:

  • How strictly must a district court identify “participants” before applying a managerial-role enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b)?
  • To what extent may a sentencing court and a court of appeals rely on a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) and reasonable inferences, rather than explicit, on-the-record findings naming each participant?
  • How do defendant concessions, and a failure to object after a Bostic colloquy, shape appellate review?
  • What role does potential coercion or duress play in determining whether someone is a “participant” for Guidelines purposes?

The Sixth Circuit’s per curiam opinion affirms a three-level managerial-role enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), holding that the record sufficiently supports findings that:

  1. Chad Wolf was at least a “manager or supervisor” in a prescription-fraud conspiracy; and
  2. The criminal activity “involved five or more participants.”

Judge Karen Nelson Moore dissents, arguing that circuit precedent (United States v. Stubbs) requires district courts to identify the specific individuals who count as “participants,” and that the record here is too vague to satisfy that requirement—requiring vacatur and remand.

Although unpublished and “not recommended for publication,” the opinion provides important, practical guidance on:

  • What suffices to support a § 3B1.1(b) enhancement;
  • How the Sixth Circuit harmonizes (or attempts to harmonize) Stubbs with later cases such as Vandeberg and Elder;
  • The relationship between party concessions, PSR reliance, and appellate review.

II. Background of the Case

A. The Conspiracy

From July 2019 over a period approaching four years, Chad B. Wolf engaged in a scheme to obtain Promethazine-Codeine cough syrup (a Schedule V controlled substance) through fraudulent prescriptions:

  • Wolf and at least one coconspirator, Richard E. Rogers, Jr., obtained Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) numbers of real physicians in Michigan and Kentucky.
  • They created sham prescriptions for promethazine-codeine in the names of real, unsuspecting individuals whose personal identifying information (driver’s licenses and Social Security numbers) Wolf had stolen or purchased. The PSR reports that Wolf possessed identity information for “hundreds of people.”
  • These prescriptions were electronically or otherwise submitted to pharmacies across Kentucky without the knowledge or consent of the listed physicians or “patients.”

The operation on the ground involved two main functional roles:

  • “Escorts.” Individuals (including Wolf, Rogers, and others such as Darius Murff) who:
    • Drove “runners” to pharmacies;
    • Paid the runners, generally $100 per pickup;
    • Cut the codeine syrup with corn syrup and sold the mixture for up to $300 per ounce;
    • Shared the proceeds among themselves, with Murff taking a cut regardless of his direct participation until Wolf began organizing transactions himself.
  • “Runners.” Individuals (at least six are named in the PSR) who:
    • Entered pharmacies to retrieve the filled, fraudulent prescriptions;
    • Were paid per transaction by the escorts.

Wolf was involved in approximately 156 fraudulent transactions, using multiple escorts and at least six runners.

B. Charges and Plea

A federal grand jury indicted Wolf on:

  • One count of conspiracy to acquire possession of codeine by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, and subterfuge, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 843(a)(3) and 846; and
  • Three counts of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.

Wolf entered into a plea agreement:

  • He pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count and one count of aggravated identity theft.
  • He admitted that he:
    • Stole identity information;
    • Used it to generate fraudulent prescriptions;
    • “Sent people into pharmacies” to pick up the codeine using those prescriptions; and
    • Paid those runners for their services.

C. Presentence Report and Sentencing Positions

The PSR concluded that Wolf was an “organizer or leader” under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) and recommended a four-level enhancement, finding:

  • The criminal activity involved at least five participants or was otherwise extensive; and
  • Wolf exercised a leadership/organizational role.

With § 3B1.1(a) applied, the PSR calculated:

  • Total offense level: 10 (for the conspiracy count);
  • Criminal History Category: IV;
  • Guidelines range for the conspiracy count: 15–21 months;
  • Plus a mandatory, consecutive 24-month term for aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A), yielding an aggregate advisory range of 39–45 months.

Wolf objected only to being characterized as an “organizer or leader” under § 3B1.1(a). Crucially, in his written objections:

  • He did not dispute that the conspiracy “involved five or more participants.”
  • He conceded that a lesser enhancement might apply under § 3B1.1(b) (manager/supervisor, +3) or (c) (any organizer/leader/manager/supervisor, +2).
  • He argued that co-conspirator Darius Murff was the leader, not him.

The Government’s stance evolved:

  • PSR Response. The Government initially argued that some runners may have acted under coercion or duress, potentially negating their “criminal responsibility” and disqualifying them as “participants.” On that premise, it conceded it could not show “five or more participants” and advocated a two-level § 3B1.1(c) enhancement.
  • Sentencing Hearing. At the hearing, the Government reversed itself. It argued the runners were not truly coerced but had recklessly or negligently put themselves in criminal situations. It asked the court to apply a three-level § 3B1.1(b) enhancement for Wolf as a manager in an offense with five or more participants.

Defense counsel:

  • Did not argue that the runners were coerced;
  • Repeatedly conceded that, “if you counted the runners,” the conspiracy met the “five or more participants” threshold;
  • Continued to seek only the two-level § 3B1.1(c) enhancement.

D. District Court’s Ruling

At sentencing, the district court:

  • Considered whether some runners might have viable coercion defenses and concluded:
    • Under Sixth Circuit duress/coercion standards (drawing from the Pattern Jury Instructions and United States v. Mills and Ridner), a defendant who has “recklessly or negligently placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct” cannot successfully assert coercion.
    • “A number of” the runners had acted on multiple occasions to retrieve fraudulent prescriptions and thus had opportunities to withdraw from the criminal conduct.
    • Therefore, those repeat runners were criminally responsible “participants.”
  • Found (and noted was “not disputed”) that Wolf had at least managerial responsibilities.
  • Adopted the PSR’s factual findings.
  • Applied § 3B1.1(b)’s three-level “manager or supervisor” enhancement, rather than the four-level leader/organizer enhancement originally recommended by the PSR.

The court recalculated:

  • Total offense level: 9;
  • Criminal History Category: IV;
  • Guidelines range for conspiracy: 12–18 months; plus 24 months consecutive for aggravated identity theft.

It imposed:

  • 15 months on the conspiracy count; and
  • 24 months consecutive on the § 1028A count;
  • Total: 39 months’ imprisonment.

After pronouncing sentence, the court conducted a Bostic colloquy, expressly inviting any objections to the sentence or requests for additional findings. Defense counsel stated that Wolf had no objections to the sentence and requested no additional findings.

Wolf appealed, challenging the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, specifically the application of the § 3B1.1(b) enhancement.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

The per curiam majority affirms the sentence. Its core holdings are:

  1. Standard of Review. Although Wolf failed to object after the Bostic colloquy, the Government did not invoke plain-error review. Following United States v. Williams and Blackie, the court reviews for abuse of discretion (with underlying factual findings reviewed for clear error), rather than applying plain-error review sua sponte.
  2. Numerosity (“five or more participants”). The district court did not clearly err in concluding that the conspiracy involved at least five criminally responsible “participants.” The PSR identified multiple escorts (Wolf, Rogers, Murff) and at least six runners by name. Wolf never objected to those factual assertions and repeatedly conceded that the offense involved five or more participants if the runners were counted.
  3. Managerial Role. The record amply supports the finding that Wolf was a “manager or supervisor”:
    • He stole identity information and DEA numbers;
    • Created and submitted fraudulent prescriptions;
    • Organized transactions;
    • Transported runners to pharmacies and paid them for retrieving the fraudulently obtained codeine.
    These activities easily meet § 3B1.1(b)’s “manager/supervisor” standard, especially given prior cases holding that organizing even a single courier delivery can suffice.
  4. Need for Explicit Participant Identification. The majority distinguishes Stubbs, which had required courts to “make specific findings as to the identity of the persons involved in the criminal enterprise.” It holds that:
    • Here, unlike in Stubbs, the PSR specifically named the runners, and the district court expressly adopted the PSR’s findings.
    • Later cases such as Vandeberg and Elder permit affirmance where the record clearly supports the enhancement, even if the court did not verbally enumerate each participant at sentencing.

Judge Moore dissents, arguing:

  • Stubbs requires district courts to identify the five participants, and neither the sentencing court nor the record as a whole provides that level of specificity.
  • At most, three participants are clearly identified (Wolf, Rogers, and Murff), and it is speculative to determine which runners (and how many) qualify as participants rather than coercion victims.
  • Even under de novo review (as contemplated by Vandeberg), the record is too opaque to sustain the enhancement; the sentence should be vacated and remanded for further factfinding.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standard of Review and the Bostic Framework

In United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2004), the Sixth Circuit required sentencing judges to:

  • Ask the parties, after pronouncing sentence, whether they have any objections not previously raised; and
  • Warn that failure to object will limit appellate review to “plain error.”

Here, the district court scrupulously followed Bostic, explicitly inviting objections and offering to make additional findings. Defense counsel:

  • Raised no new objections; and
  • Requested no further findings.

Under Bostic, this would typically trigger plain-error review for any new claims of procedural error. However, the Government did not ask the Sixth Circuit to apply plain-error review. The panel cites:

  • United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d 758, 763 (6th Cir. 2011), and
  • United States v. Blackie, 548 F.3d 395, 404 (6th Cir. 2008) (Sutton, J., concurring),

for the proposition that the court will not impose a more deferential plain-error standard sua sponte where the Government has not requested it. In other words, the Sixth Circuit treats the standard-of-review question as itself subject to the adversarial process:

  • If the Government wants the benefit of plain-error review, it must affirmatively ask for it.
  • If it fails to do so, the court will apply the ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard, even where a Bostic forfeiture has occurred.

Additionally, the court notes that to the extent Wolf may have waived (rather than merely forfeited) his claim by his concessions and failure to object, the Government has forfeited any waiver argument by not invoking it (United States v. Sherrill, 972 F.3d 752, 762 (6th Cir. 2020)).

Practical implication: Standards of review are, to a significant extent, party-driven in the Sixth Circuit. Defense counsel must still object at sentencing to preserve ordinary review, but prosecutors must also affirmatively invoke plain error on appeal if they want that more deferential standard.

B. The Legal Framework: U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b)

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 enhances a defendant’s offense level for an aggravated role in the offense:

  • § 3B1.1(a) – +4 levels if the defendant was an “organizer or leader” of criminal activity involving five or more participants or that was otherwise extensive;
  • § 3B1.1(b) – +3 levels if the defendant was a “manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader)” of activity involving five or more participants or that was otherwise extensive;
  • § 3B1.1(c) – +2 levels if the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity (no numerosity requirement).

Key definitions and principles, as used in the opinion:

  • “Participant.” A person who is “criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.1.
  • Manager/supervisor requirement. The Sixth Circuit requires a showing that the defendant “managed or supervised one or more participants.” United States v. Castilla-Lugo, 699 F.3d 454, 460 (6th Cir. 2012). It is enough to supervise a single participant (United States v. Robinson, No. 22-5995, 2024 WL 4215675, at *4 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2024)).
  • Burden of proof. The Government bears the burden of establishing the enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence (United States v. Wells, 55 F.4th 1086, 1092–93 (6th Cir. 2022)).
  • Leader vs. manager. “Control over subordinates” and the degree of decision-making authority help distinguish an “organizer or leader” from a “manager or supervisor.” But the latter category does not require proof of broad, top-level control (United States v. Cannon, 552 F. App’x 512, 517 (6th Cir. 2014)).

C. Defendant’s Concessions and Their Significance

The majority places heavy weight on the fact that, in the district court, Wolf repeatedly:

  • Conceded that “a lesser enhancement may apply” under § 3B1.1(b) or (c);
  • Requested application of § 3B1.1(c), which, by its terms, applies to those who are “organizer[s], leader[s], manager[s], or supervisor[s]”;
  • Expressly stated that he did not dispute that the conspiracy involved “five or more participants”; and
  • Affirmed at sentencing that “if you counted the runners . . . that would meet the five-level threshold.”

These concessions are used in two related ways:

  1. Factual concessions. The court treats these statements as admissions that:
    • Wolf had at least a managerial or supervisory role; and
    • The conspiracy involved at least five participants.
    Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A), courts may accept undisputed PSR facts as findings of fact, and Carter and related cases endorse reliance on such uncontroverted details.
  2. Narrowing the appellate claim. On appeal, Wolf reframes his objection to contend that the district court failed to spell out who he managed and who counted as a participant, but the record shows he consistently:
    • Contested only whether he was a leader/organizer (as opposed to a manager); and
    • Did not dispute either the numerosity or that he had at least some managerial responsibilities.

This underscores a practical lesson: written objections to the PSR, and oral concessions at sentencing, can substantially limit the scope of viable appellate arguments, even where the Government’s position shifts.

D. The Numerosity Requirement and the Definition of “Participant”

1. Coercion/Duress and Criminal Responsibility

An individual can be a “participant” under § 3B1.1 only if they are “criminally responsible.” Someone whose conduct would be excused by a successful coercion or duress defense is not criminally responsible and thus not a “participant.”

The district court—and the Sixth Circuit—draw the coercion standard from:

  • Sixth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions § 6.05;
  • United States v. Mills, 126 F.4th 470, 475 (6th Cir. 2025); and
  • United States v. Ridner, 512 F.3d 846, 850 (6th Cir. 2008).

Those authorities articulate a key limitation: a defendant cannot assert a coercion defense if he “recklessly or negligently placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct.”

Applying that principle, the district court inferred that:

  • Some runners may initially have felt pressured, but
  • Those who repeatedly participated in fraudulent pickups had multiple opportunities to withdraw from the enterprise;
  • Thus, they had “recklessly or negligently” put themselves in criminal situations and would likely be unable to establish a successful coercion defense;
  • Therefore, they were criminally responsible “participants.”

The Sixth Circuit endorses this inferential approach, holding that it was reasonable—particularly since:

  • The PSR described at least six runners participating in a conspiracy that conducted about 156 fraudulent transactions;
  • Wolf denied coercing any runners; and
  • Wolf never argued that any specific runner was acting under duress.

2. The Stubbs Requirement and Its Evolution

In United States v. Stubbs, 11 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 1993), the Sixth Circuit reversed a leadership enhancement under § 3B1.1 because:

  • Neither the district court nor the PSR identified five specific participants in the criminal activity; and
  • In the absence of such findings, any conclusion as to the identity of five participants was “pure speculation.”

Stubbs announced that the court “requires a showing that the district court make specific findings as to the identity of the persons involved in the criminal enterprise” before imposing a § 3B1.1 enhancement.

Later, in United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1132 (6th Cir. 1996), the court clarified that Stubbs requires identification of “the five participants involved in the criminal activity,” but does not literally require naming them in open court if the record otherwise clearly reveals who they are.

Then in United States v. Vandeberg, 201 F.3d 805, 809–10 (6th Cir. 2000), the court held:

  • The failure to specify the factual basis for a § 3B1.1 enhancement is “not grounds for vacating the sentence” and does not constitute reversible error if the record provides factual support; and
  • When a district court does not articulate the factual basis, the court of appeals reviews the record de novo to determine whether the enhancement applies, citing United States v. Alexander, 59 F.3d 36, 39 (6th Cir. 1995).

The tension the panel must address is how to reconcile:

  • Stubbs’s apparent insistence on “specific findings as to the identity” of participants, and
  • Vandeberg’s more flexible approach, allowing affirmance where the record itself supplies the needed facts.

3. The Majority’s Approach: Adoption of PSR + Reasonable Inferences

The majority distinguishes Stubbs on two main grounds:

  1. The PSR here identified participants by role and, in most cases, by name.
    • The PSR named at least three escorts clearly involved with Wolf’s conspiracy: Wolf, Rogers, and Murff.
    • It listed at least six runners: Felicia Williams, “Stephanie LNU” (last name unknown), “Mark LNU,” “Will LNU,” “A.B.,” and Aaron Fawber.
    • The district court expressly stated that it “adopt[ed] the findings that are contained in the PSR.”
    Thus, unlike Stubbs, where the PSR and the sentencing record did not identify who the participants were, here the record itself provides that information.
  2. Later precedent allows reliance on the record without explicit on-the-record enumeration.
    • Vandeberg allows appellate courts to affirm an enhancement if the record contains clear support, even if the sentencing court failed to articulate its factual basis.
    • Elder suggests that Stubbs does not require the district court to recite all five participants’ names at sentencing; it merely requires that their identities be ascertainable from the record.
    The majority reads these cases as limiting Stubbs to situations where the record is genuinely opaque, which it says is not the situation here.

Applying this framework de novo, the majority concludes:

  • Three participants are indisputably identified: Wolf, Rogers, and Murff;
  • The PSR lists six runners who were paid to retrieve fraudulent prescriptions (and Wolf did not object to those facts);
  • Given 156 transactions and at least six runners, it is more likely than not that some runners participated multiple times and were criminally responsible;
  • At least two of those runners, in light of their repeat conduct and the coercion standard, qualify as “participants.”

Thus, the numerosity requirement (“five or more participants”) is satisfied.

The majority also dismisses the significance of the Government’s earlier suggestion that some runners might have been coerced:

  • The Government ultimately withdrew that argument at sentencing;
  • Wolf consistently maintained that the conspiracy involved five or more participants;
  • Wolf denied coercing any runners.

Consequently, the panel sees no reason to reject the district court’s classification of at least some runners as participants.

4. The Dissent’s View: Stubbs Still Controls

Judge Moore’s dissent contends that:

  • Stubbs remains binding and requires the district court to make specific findings about the identity of the five participants;
  • Vandeberg does not overrule or limit Stubbs, in part because it does not even mention it, and “one panel of this court may not overrule the decision of another panel” (United States v. Ferguson, 868 F.3d 514, 515 (6th Cir. 2017));
  • Even under Vandeberg’s de novo review, the record here does not clearly reveal which runners were repeat, non-coerced participants, or even how many such runners there were, because:
    • The district court merely spoke of “some of” the runners and a “number of” them potentially lacking coercion defenses;
    • The PSR does not specify how many times each runner participated.

For Judge Moore, this lack of specificity leaves the identity of the remaining two participants (beyond Wolf, Rogers, and Murff) in the realm of “pure speculation,” just as in Stubbs. She would therefore vacate and remand for further factfinding.

E. Managerial Role: What Counts as “Managing or Supervising”?

The majority finds that Wolf’s conduct comfortably satisfies the “manager or supervisor” criterion.

The record shows that Wolf:

  • Acquired stolen identity information and DEA numbers;
  • Created fraudulent prescriptions;
  • Submitted those prescriptions to pharmacies;
  • “Organized” transactions, including taking over that role from Murff at some point;
  • Drove runners to pharmacies and instructed them to retrieve the prescriptions;
  • Paid the runners for completing the pickups.

The court notes that in analogous cases it has upheld managerial-role enhancements where defendants:

  • Coordinated a drug delivery and payment (United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 410, 416 (6th Cir. 2000));
  • Gave directions to couriers about when deliveries should occur and served as a contact point (United States v. Gaitan-Acevedo, 148 F.3d 577, 596 (6th Cir. 1998));
  • Supplied a wider drug distribution network with contraband (United States v. Johnson, 736 F. App’x 568, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2018));
  • Coordinated even a single delivery via a courier (United States v. Mitchell, 295 F. App’x 799, 802 (6th Cir. 2008)).

The majority also points out that Wolf need not have supervised all participants; management of a single person is enough (Robinson), and the record plainly shows that he directed and paid at least some runners. One concrete example highlighted is the November 2021 incident:

  • Wolf and Rogers drove a runner, A.B., to a Costco pharmacy;
  • They sent her in to retrieve a fraudulent codeine prescription in the name of J.M., whom Wolf knew had no knowledge of the prescription;
  • Police intercepted A.B. as she left the pharmacy to return to the car.

This episode alone supports a finding that Wolf managed or supervised A.B. For § 3B1.1(b), that is sufficient.

The majority further rejects Wolf’s contention that the court had to find he “led” or had “particular control” over others. That level of control is a hallmark of an “organizer or leader” under § 3B1.1(a), but not necessary for the lesser “manager or supervisor” enhancement. The court quotes Cannon to underscore that “control over subordinates” is one factor that distinguishes leaders from managers, not a prerequisite for a § 3B1.1(b) enhancement.

F. Interaction Between Record Sufficiency, PSRs, and Appellate Review

The decision also reflects the Sixth Circuit’s practical approach to sentencing records:

  • Reliance on PSRs. Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A) and cases like United States v. Carter, 355 F.3d 920, 925 (6th Cir. 2004), sentencing courts may accept undisputed statements in the PSR as true. Here, Wolf did not dispute the PSR’s identification of escorts and runners, nor its account of 156 fraudulent transactions.
  • Reasonable inferences. In United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748, 753 (6th Cir. 2020), the court approved a district court’s use of reasonable inferences drawn from uncontested PSR facts. The Wolf panel relies on that principle to uphold the inference that some runners necessarily participated multiple times and lacked duress defenses.
  • Appellate supplementation of sparse reasoning. Following Vandeberg and Alexander, the court treats the district court’s limited on-the-record explanation as non-fatal, so long as the underlying record (PSR + plea + hearing transcript) contains adequate support for the enhancement.

Judge Moore’s dissent voices concern that this approach erodes the clarity and discipline demanded by Stubbs, but the majority leans into a more pragmatic, record-based methodology.

V. Impact and Implications

A. For Sentencing Judges

This decision, even though unpublished, provides guidance to district courts in the Sixth Circuit:

  • Courts should continue to:
    • Adopt PSR findings on the record;
    • Articulate, when feasible, the factual basis for § 3B1.1 enhancements (especially the identities and roles of participants).
  • However, failure to recite each participant’s name will not automatically require reversal if:
    • The PSR and other record materials identify who the participants are; and
    • The court explicitly adopts those findings.
  • When duress/coercion questions are raised, judges must consider:
    • Whether alleged “participants” recklessly or negligently put themselves in criminal situations;
    • The number of times they participated;
    • Whether their conduct plausibly could be excused under the coercion standard.

B. For Defense Counsel

The case illustrates several strategic lessons:

  • Be cautious with concessions. Statements that you “do not dispute” a fact (such as “five or more participants”) or that a “lesser enhancement may apply” can later be treated as admissions undermining appellate challenges.
  • Preserve issues after the Bostic colloquy. If you believe the district court’s factfinding is inadequate—for example, it fails to identify participants or to explain who was managed—ask the court to make additional findings. Failing to do so may not always trigger plain-error review (if the Government doesn’t invoke it), but it weakens the procedural reasonableness argument.
  • Challenge PSR facts when necessary. Uncontested PSR statements are deemed established facts. If you want to argue that particular individuals were coerced and thus not participants, you must say so in writing or at sentencing and, ideally, present supporting evidence.

C. For Prosecutors

The opinion offers several points of emphasis:

  • Be precise and consistent about “participants.” If you doubt whether some actors were criminally responsible (e.g., possible coercion), say so clearly—but be prepared that shifting positions may complicate the sentencing record.
  • Ask for plain-error review on appeal when appropriate. If the defense failed to object at sentencing, you must affirmatively invoke plain error to obtain that more deferential standard; the court will not automatically apply it.
  • Use the PSR effectively. Ensure that the PSR clearly identifies potential participants, their roles, and their frequency of involvement; this record will matter when supporting role enhancements on appeal.

D. For the Law of the Circuit

Although unpublished, Wolf highlights an internal tension in Sixth Circuit sentencing law:

  • The majority’s analysis leans toward a functional reconciliation of Stubbs with later cases like Elder and Vandeberg, effectively relaxing the requirement that district courts explicitly “enumerate” participants.
  • The dissent insists that Stubbs’s factfinding requirement remains fully operative and that appellate courts cannot bypass it by assuming Vandeberg silently curtailed it.

If future panels confront similar disputes in published opinions, they may:

  • Clarify exactly what Stubbs requires in light of Elder and Vandeberg; or
  • In an en banc proceeding, definitively harmonize or refine the standard for identifying participants under § 3B1.1.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Sentencing Guidelines Role Enhancements

  • What is a § 3B1.1 enhancement?
    A provision of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that increases a defendant’s offense level if they had an aggravated role in the crime—as a leader, organizer, manager, or supervisor.
  • What is the difference between §§ 3B1.1(a), (b), and (c)?
    • (a) +4 levels: Organizer or leader of a criminal activity with 5+ participants or that is “otherwise extensive.”
    • (b) +3 levels: Manager or supervisor (but not organizer/leader) of such an activity.
    • (c) +2 levels: Organizer/leader/manager/supervisor of any criminal activity, even if smaller than five participants.
  • What is a “participant”?
    A person who is legally responsible for the offense—i.e., they could themselves be charged and convicted. They do not need to have been actually charged or convicted. Someone whose conduct is legally excused (e.g., through a successful coercion/duress defense) is not a participant.
  • What is a “manager or supervisor”?
    Someone who directs, coordinates, or oversees at least some aspect of the criminal activity and at least one other participant. This can include:
    • Recruiting others;
    • Instructing them what to do;
    • Paying them for their involvement;
    • Deciding when or how illegal activity will occur.
    It does not require being “the boss” of the entire operation.

B. Standards of Review

  • Abuse of discretion.
    The appellate court defers to the district court’s judgment and will reverse only if the lower court made a serious error in judgment, misapplied the law, or relied on clearly erroneous facts.
  • Clear error.
    A standard for reviewing factual findings. The appellate court will uphold the finding unless it is left with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made, even if another view of the evidence is also plausible.
  • Plain error.
    A more deferential standard applied when a party failed to object below. The appellant must show:
    1. An error occurred;
    2. The error was “plain” (clear or obvious);
    3. The error affected substantial rights (usually meaning it likely affected the outcome); and
    4. The error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

C. Coercion/Duress and “Criminal Responsibility”

  • What is a coercion or duress defense?
    A defense that excuses otherwise criminal conduct if the defendant:
    • Committed the crime because they were forced by an immediate threat of serious harm or death;
    • Had no reasonable opportunity to escape the situation; and
    • Did not recklessly or negligently place themselves in the situation where they would likely be forced to commit the crime.
  • Why does this matter for § 3B1.1?
    If someone has a valid coercion defense, they are not “criminally responsible” and therefore do not count as a “participant” under the Guidelines.

D. The Bostic Question

  • What is a Bostic colloquy?
    A required step at the end of a sentencing hearing in the Sixth Circuit, where the judge:
    • Asks whether the parties have any objections to the sentence that have not already been raised;
    • Warns that new objections must be raised then or they may be considered forfeited on appeal.
  • Why is it important?
    If counsel fails to raise an objection in response, appellate review is generally limited to plain error—unless, as in Wolf, the Government fails to invoke plain error on appeal.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Wolf illustrates how sentencing law in the Sixth Circuit operates at the confluence of Guidelines doctrine, evidentiary sufficiency, and adversarial procedure.

On the merits, the court affirms a three-level managerial-role enhancement under § 3B1.1(b), relying on:

  • Wolf’s own concessions that he was at least a manager and that the conspiracy involved five or more participants;
  • The PSR’s identification of escorts and runners and Wolf’s failure to contest those facts;
  • Reasonable inferences from 156 fraudulent transactions and the conduct of repeat runners, rejecting broad claims of coercion; and
  • A robust body of precedent holding that directing and paying even a single courier can suffice to establish a managerial or supervisory role.

Procedurally, the case clarifies that:

  • Plain-error review will not be applied sua sponte where the Government does not request it, even if a Bostic forfeiture arguably occurred;
  • Sentencing courts may rely heavily on undisputed PSR facts and need not always enumerate every participant on the record, so long as their identities are discernible from the record as a whole.

The dissent underscores an unresolved tension in circuit law over the force of Stubbs’s requirement of explicit participant identification, suggesting that this issue may warrant future clarification in a published or en banc opinion.

For practitioners, Wolf reminds:

  • Defense counsel must be strategic and precise in concessions and in preserving objections;
  • Prosecutors must clearly articulate their positions on standards of review and the status of alleged participants;
  • Sentencing judges should, where possible, spell out who the “participants” are and whom the defendant managed, even though failure to do so will not automatically mandate reversal if the record is otherwise clear.

Although not precedential, Wolf will be a useful citation in future Sixth Circuit sentencing cases on the sufficiency of role-enhancement findings, the interplay between PSR reliance and explicit factfinding, and the pragmatic application of the party-presentation principle to standards of appellate review.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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