Introduction

In United States v. Limon, the Fifth Circuit issued a significant opinion clarifying the scope of mandatory restitution under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. § 1593. The court squarely addressed a question of first impression: whether, in a child sex-trafficking case, a minor victim’s legal guardian may recover the guardian’s own losses (such as lost wages and coping-related expenses) as “victim” losses under § 1593. The Fifth Circuit answered yes, holding that § 1593’s own definition of “victim” controls and encompasses guardians as victims in their own right, and that the statute’s cross-reference to 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c)(2) imports the measure of “full amount of the victim’s losses” but not § 2259’s narrower definition of “victim.”

The court also (1) rejected a plain-error challenge to the district court’s consideration of an emotionally charged victim-impact statement, reaffirming sentencing courts’ broad discretion to consider relevant information; and (2) remanded solely to correct a clerical inconsistency between the court’s oral restitution payment schedule and the written amended judgment under Rule 36.

Parties and posture: Defendant–Appellant Giovanny Xavier Limon was convicted by a jury of sex trafficking of a minor in violation of § 1591(a), (b), and (c). The district court calculated a Guidelines range of life but varied downward to 480 months’ imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release and later ordered restitution totaling $13,540.01. On appeal, Limon raised four issues: (i) the district court’s consideration of the minor victim’s entire impact statement; (ii) restitution for the mother’s $210 lost wages; (iii) restitution for $500 in “hoodies” the mother purchased to help the victim feel safe in public; and (iv) a clerical error in the written amended judgment’s payment schedule.

Summary of the Opinion

• Victim-impact statement: Applying plain-error review, the court held the district court did not plainly err by considering the entirety of the minor victim’s statement, including harsh language directed at Limon. The statement fell within the broad universe of information sentencing courts may consider and was not shown to have affected the sentence.
• Restitution—guardian’s lost wages: In a matter of first impression, the court held that under § 1593, a minor victim’s legal guardian is a “victim” who may recover her own losses proximately caused by the offense. The court affirmed $210 in lost wages for the mother.
• Restitution—non-medical coping costs: The court affirmed $500 in restitution for hoodies the mother bought to help her daughter feel safer in public after the trafficking. Necessity or medical prescription is not required under § 2259(c)(2); proximate causation and relevance suffice.
• Clerical error: The court remanded under Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 for the narrow purpose of correcting the written amended judgment to match the court’s oral pronouncement on restitution payment terms.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Sentencing discretion and victim-impact evidence:
  • Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022) — reaffirming that sentencing courts may consider a wide range of information, constrained by statute or Constitution.
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3661 — “No limitation” on information about the defendant’s background, character, and conduct at sentencing.
  • Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) — victim’s right “to be reasonably heard” at sentencing.
  • Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) — victim-impact evidence serves legitimate purposes and is admissible unless so unduly prejudicial that it renders the proceeding fundamentally unfair; Justice O’Connor’s concurrence reinforces this.
  • Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) — plain-error standard; followed by Fifth Circuit applications: United States v. Suarez, 879 F.3d 626 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v. McGavitt, 28 F.4th 571 (5th Cir. 2022); United States v. Gonzalez, 792 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Bishop, 603 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Garcia-Quintanilla, 574 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bernard, 299 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).
• TVPA restitution framework:
  • 18 U.S.C. § 1593 — mandatory restitution for offenses under Chapter 77 (including § 1591); § 1593(c) defines “victim.”
  • Cross-reference: § 1593(b)(3) imports § 2259(c)(2) (the definition of “full amount of the victim’s losses”).
  • 18 U.S.C. § 2259 — restitution in child exploitation cases; § 2259(c)(2) enumerates categories of compensable losses; § 2259(c)(4) defines “victim” for § 2259 itself.
  • Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018 (AVAA), Pub. L. No. 115–299 — amended § 2259’s “victim” definition while leaving § 1593’s definition untouched, and added the § 1593 → § 2259(c)(2) cross-reference.
  • United States v. Moore, 71 F.4th 392 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 551 (2024) — textualism: plain meaning informed by context.
  • Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979); Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124 (2024) — anti-surplusage canon applied with special force where a reading would render entire subparagraphs meaningless.
  • Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) — proximate cause limits restitution under § 2259; the same proximate cause concept informs § 1593 via § 2259(c)(2).
  • United States v. Mathew, 916 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2019) — de novo review of the legality of a restitution order.
• Distinguishing other restitution schemes:
  • United States v. Casados, 26 F.4th 845 (10th Cir. 2022) — interpreting the MVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (whose “victim” definition mirrors § 2259’s post-2018 “assume the victim’s rights” structure) to preclude a representative’s recovery of the representative’s own losses; the Fifth Circuit finds Casados inapposite to § 1593 because § 1593 defines “victim” differently.
  • United States v. Wilcox, 487 F.3d 1163 (8th Cir. 2007) — interpreting an older MVRA provision whose text specifically limited “lost income” to “such victim” who suffered bodily injury; the Fifth Circuit notes no similar limiting phrase appears in § 1593 or § 2259(c)(2).
• Clerical corrections:
  • Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 — correction of clerical errors in judgments.
  • United States v. Escajeda, 8 F.4th 423 (5th Cir. 2021) — Rule 36 is the appropriate vehicle to conform the written judgment to the oral pronouncement.

Legal Reasoning

1) Victim-impact statement. Limon did not object below to the district court’s consideration of the victim’s statement, which included pointed and angry rhetoric directed at him. Under the plain-error standard, the panel required a clear or obvious legal error that affected substantial rights and seriously impaired the integrity of the proceedings. The court emphasized sentencing judges’ broad discretion to consider relevant information (18 U.S.C. § 3661; Concepcion), and Payne’s recognition that victim-impact evidence communicates the specific harm caused by the crime and is generally admissible unless it renders the proceeding fundamentally unfair. On this record, there was no binding precedent requiring the district court to sua sponte excise portions of the statement, and the defendant showed no reasonable probability that a lower sentence would have been imposed absent the challenged remarks, particularly given the gravity of the proven conduct and the district court’s explicit consideration of countervailing character letters. No plain error was shown.

2) Restitution for the mother’s lost wages. The core interpretive question was whether § 1593’s use of “victim” permits a minor victim’s legal guardian to recover her own losses (here, three days of lost income while attending to her hospitalized daughter). Section 1593(c) defines “victim” to include the harmed individual and, in cases where the victim is under 18, “the legal guardian of the victim … or another family member, or any other person appointed as suitable by the court.” Section 1593(b)(3) instructs courts to calculate “the full amount of the victim’s losses” by incorporating § 2259(c)(2), which lists compensable categories including “lost income” and a catch-all for “any other relevant losses.”

Limon argued that § 1593’s cross-reference also imports § 2259(c)(4)’s post-2018 definition of “victim,” which frames guardians as merely assuming “the crime victim’s rights” under § 2259 rather than being “victims” with independent, compensable losses. The Fifth Circuit rejected that reading based on text, context, statutory history, and the anti-surplusage canon:

• Text and context: § 1593 provides its own definition of “victim” that expressly includes guardians and family members as “victims.” The cross-reference in § 1593(b)(3) is limited to the “full amount of the victim’s losses” in § 2259(c)(2). Nothing in § 1593 cross-references § 2259(c)(4)’s definition of “victim.”
• Statutory history: In the AVAA (2018), Congress amended § 2259’s “victim” definition but left § 1593’s “victim” definition intact and, in the same enactment, added the § 1593 → § 2259(c)(2) cross-reference. The deliberate retention of § 1593(c)’s broader definition signals intent that guardians can be “victims” for TVPA restitution purposes.
• Anti-surplusage: Importing § 2259(c)(4)’s narrower “victim” definition into § 1593 would render § 1593(c)’s victim definition meaningless. Courts must avoid readings that nullify statutory text (Reiter; Pulsifer).

Having concluded that the mother is a “victim” under § 1593, the only remaining limit on recovery is the proximate cause requirement embedded in § 2259(c)(2) (incorporated by § 1593(b)(3))—i.e., the losses must be proximately caused by the offense (Paroline). Limon did not dispute proximate causation. The court therefore affirmed the $210 award.

3) Restitution for non-medical coping costs (hoodies). Limon’s challenge to $500 awarded for the mother’s purchase of hoodies for her daughter also failed. The court held that § 2259(c)(2) does not impose a “medical necessity” requirement, and while some listed categories use the word “necessary” (e.g., “necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses”), the statute’s catch-all for “any other relevant losses” and its overarching proximate cause requirement together suffice. The government represented—and Limon did not contest—that the clothing was purchased because the child was fearful and felt exposed in public following the trafficking, making the expense a relevant, proximately caused coping cost. The court affirmed the award under the catch-all rather than any medical-services subcategory, and expressly rejected the notion that a prescription or formal medical recommendation is a precondition to recovery.

4) Clerical error. The panel remanded to correct a scrivener’s error: the oral pronouncement required payment of 50% of prison wages and $25 per month post-release, whereas the written amended judgment said $100 per month. Rule 36 permits clerical corrections to conform the written judgment to the oral pronouncement (Escajeda).

Impact and Implications

The opinion establishes an important Fifth Circuit precedent on TVPA restitution:

• Guardians and family members as “victims”: Under § 1593, guardians and certain family members are themselves “victims,” entitled to recover their own losses proximately caused by the trafficking offense. This is distinct from the MVRA and § 2259’s own internal scheme, where a guardian may “assume the victim’s rights” but is not necessarily a victim with independent losses. Practically, this will increase restitution exposure in child sex-trafficking prosecutions within the Fifth Circuit.
• Scope of compensable losses: The decision affirms a flexible, proximate-cause-plus-relevance standard for expenses not neatly categorized as medical or therapeutic, such as reasonable coping or safety-related items (e.g., clothing to reduce anxiety or perceived vulnerability). Prosecutors should document the causal chain; defendants may litigate remoteness or foreseeability.
• Statutory interpretation: The court’s textual approach constrains cross-statutory borrowing. Where Congress cross-references one subsection (here, § 2259(c)(2)), courts should resist importing other subsections (like § 2259(c)(4)’s definition of “victim”) that Congress did not incorporate, especially where doing so would render statutory text in the host provision surplusage.
• Sentencing practice: The opinion underscores sentencing judges’ wide berth to consider victim-impact statements, including emotionally charged rhetoric, absent constitutional or statutory limits and absent a showing of prejudice. Defense counsel should contemporaneously object to preserve claims and build a record of potential prejudice.
• Administrative precision: The remand to correct the clerical error reiterates the necessity for written judgments to reflect oral pronouncements and provides a clean pathway—Rule 36—for correcting mismatches.

Open questions and potential developments:

• Inter-circuit alignment: Other circuits have not squarely addressed § 1593’s victim definition in this context. If a sister circuit imports § 2259(c)(4)’s narrower definition into § 1593 despite § 1593(c), a circuit split could emerge. Limon provides a clear, text-based framework for courts confronting the issue.
• Outer bounds of “relevant losses”: While the Fifth Circuit validated clothing costs tied to a victim’s sense of safety, future disputes may test the limits (e.g., home security measures, relocation costs, protective technology). Courts will likely focus on proximate cause, reasonableness, and whether the expense meaningfully mitigates offense-related harm.
• Evidentiary showings: Although medical prescription is not required, the government still bears the burden to prove by a preponderance that the loss was incurred and proximately caused by the offense. Documentation and victim/guardian testimony will be pivotal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Plain-error review: When a party fails to object in the trial court, an appellate court will correct only a clear or obvious legal error that affected the outcome and seriously undermined the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
• Victim-impact evidence: Statements from victims or their families about harms suffered. Admissible at sentencing to inform the court about the offense’s real-world impact unless so inflammatory that they cause fundamental unfairness.
• TVPA restitution (§ 1593): In trafficking cases, restitution is mandatory. The statute defines who counts as a “victim” and points to § 2259(c)(2) to determine what kinds of losses must be compensated.
• “Victim” under § 1593 versus § 2259: § 1593 says guardians/family can be “victims.” § 2259 (for its own purposes) frames guardians as assuming the victim’s rights. Limon holds that § 1593’s definition controls in TVPA cases and is not overridden by § 2259’s definition.
• Proximate cause: A causation standard requiring a sufficiently direct connection between the offense and the loss. It filters out remote or unforeseeable claims.
• Anti-surplusage canon: Courts interpret statutes to give every word effect, avoiding readings that render statutory text meaningless or redundant.
• Catch-all provision (§ 2259(c)(2)(F)): Allows restitution for “any other relevant losses” proximately caused by the offense, beyond the specifically enumerated categories. No blanket “medical necessity” requirement.
• Rule 36 clerical corrections: When a written judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncement due to a scrivener’s error, the district court can correct the written document to match what was said in open court.

Conclusion

United States v. Limon delivers two enduring takeaways for trafficking prosecutions in the Fifth Circuit. First, the TVPA’s own definition of “victim” governs: guardians and certain family members are “victims” who may recover their own losses so long as those losses are proximately caused by the offense. This includes not only lost wages but also reasonable, non-medical coping or safety-related expenses that are relevant to addressing offense-induced harm. Second, sentencing courts have broad latitude to consider victim-impact statements; unless a defendant preserves and proves concrete prejudice, claims that the court should have sua sponte excised sharp rhetoric will not prevail under plain-error review.

The court’s textual analysis—anchored in statutory language, history, and the anti-surplusage canon—provides a clear doctrinal roadmap for future restitution disputes under § 1593. At the same time, its remand to correct the clerical error is a practical reminder to align written judgments with oral pronouncements. Limon thus meaningfully expands and clarifies the remedial reach of restitution in child sex-trafficking cases while reinforcing bedrock sentencing principles and procedural precision.