Gender‑and‑Nationality Groups as Particular Social Groups After Cristales‑de Linares v. Bondi

Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s published decision in Elizabeth Cristales‑de Linares v. Bondi, No. 25‑3152 (6th Cir. Dec. 1, 2025), is a significant addition to the court’s asylum and withholding jurisprudence, particularly regarding “particular social group” (PSG) claims based on gender, nationality, and economic or occupational status.

Elizabeth Cristales‑de Linares, a Salvadoran salon owner, along with her two daughters, entered the United States without authorization after being extorted by men she believed to be gang affiliates in El Salvador. She sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), asserting persecution based on membership in several PSGs:

“Salvadoran women”
“single Salvadoran women who are working professionals”
“salon owners in El Salvador” (drawn from her testimony)

An immigration judge (IJ) denied all relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed on multiple independent grounds. The Sixth Circuit now denies the petition for review, clarifying and tightening the circuit’s PSG doctrine and reiterating demanding standards for internal relocation and CAT claims based on generalized country conditions and gang violence.

The decision is especially notable because it:

Expressly holds, in a published opinion, that a PSG defined as “Salvadoran women” is not cognizable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as interpreted in the Sixth Circuit.
Reaffirms that large gender‑plus‑nationality and economic/occupational categories fail the “particularity” requirement.
Clarifies that Tista‑Ruiz de Ajualip v. Garland does not require immigration courts or the BIA to invent “better” PSGs sua sponte.
Reemphasizes strict exhaustion rules and the need to explicitly raise humanitarian asylum and burden‑of‑proof arguments at the agency level.

I. Case Background and Procedural Posture

A. Factual Background

Cristales‑de Linares is a native and citizen of El Salvador. She operated a beauty salon in Santa Ana after previously living in San Salvador. Her husband, who held Temporary Protected Status in the United States, visited periodically and intended to return to El Salvador.

According to her testimony:

In 2012 she opened a salon. For about two years, she operated it without trouble.
Around 2014, men she assumed to be gang members demanded “rent” payments – a form of extortion she viewed as commonplace in El Salvador.
She paid approximately $25 weekly for two years, never reporting this to her husband or to Salvadoran authorities.
When she stopped paying in 2016, three men entered her salon, threatened her at gunpoint, and demanded $5,000, also making veiled threats against her daughters.
She then consulted a police officer acquaintance in another town, who allegedly advised her to leave the country. She and her daughters traveled through several countries and entered the United States without inspection in October 2016.

She feared that if returned to El Salvador, the extortionists (whom she believed to be part of an unspecified criminal organization) would kill her or kidnap one of her daughters. However, she:

Could not identify any specific gang.
Conceded that her belief they were gang members was based only on “how they looked” and their reference to a “boss.”
Acknowledged that neither she nor her daughters had suffered physical harm in El Salvador.
Testified that her mother and sisters still lived in El Salvador unharmed.

B. Procedural History

Removal proceedings: After her unlawful entry, she and her daughters were placed in removal proceedings and, through counsel, conceded removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
Application for relief: She applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection, listing both daughters as derivative beneficiaries for asylum only (consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3); derivative beneficiaries are not available for withholding or CAT).
IJ’s decision: The IJ found her not credible and inadequately corroborated, but also denied relief on alternative merits grounds:
- Her PSGs were not legally cognizable (overbroad and not socially salient).
- She had not shown she could not reasonably relocate within El Salvador.
- Her CAT claim failed for lack of a particularized risk of torture with government involvement or acquiescence.
BIA decision: The BIA:
- Affirmed the IJ’s alternative holdings on PSG and internal relocation.
- Concluded that the failure to meet asylum’s standards necessarily defeated withholding of removal.
- Affirmed the CAT denial under clearly erroneous review of the IJ’s factual findings.
Petition for review: She petitioned the Sixth Circuit, contesting:
- The rejection of her PSGs.
- The internal relocation analysis and burden allocation.
- The denial of CAT relief.
- Ancillary issues involving Notices to Appear and humanitarian asylum.

II. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Decision

The Sixth Circuit (Judge Hermandorfer writing, joined by Judges Griffin and Thapar) denies the petition for review, holding:

None of the petitioner’s proposed PSGs—“Salvadoran women,” “single Salvadoran women who are working professionals,” and “salon owners in El Salvador”—is a legally cognizable particular social group under the INA as interpreted by the Sixth Circuit.
The court reaffirms that “particularity” requires more than the ability to identify who is in or out of the group; it demands a sufficiently narrow, non‑amorphous class that does not sweep in large, diverse swaths of the population.
Tista‑Ruiz de Ajualip does not obligate the IJ or BIA to construct or refine PSGs beyond those proposed by the applicant; the agency need only fairly analyze the PSGs actually raised on the record.
Even assuming a cognizable PSG, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that internal relocation within El Salvador would be reasonable, independently defeating asylum and withholding.
Arguments about burden‑shifting for internal relocation (based on alleged past persecution) were not properly exhausted before the BIA and cannot be considered on review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).
Humanitarian asylum was not preserved because it was not specifically requested from the BIA, despite the petitioner’s assertion of past persecution.
The CAT claim fails because the petitioner did not establish an individualized likelihood of torture nor government acquiescence; generalized country‑conditions evidence and the government’s difficulty in controlling gangs are insufficient.

III. Analysis of the Opinion

A. Legal Framework Recited by the Court

1. Asylum

To qualify as a “refugee” eligible for asylum, an applicant must show that she cannot or will not return to her country “because of persecution or a well‑founded fear of persecution” on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).

Two core components are central here:

Protected ground: Membership in a cognizable PSG (here, the central legal dispute).
Persecution and internal relocation: Past persecution or a well‑founded fear of future persecution “on account of” that PSG, plus an inability to reasonably avoid that harm through internal relocation, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii)–(iii).

The court reviews:

PSG cognizability and other legal questions de novo.
Underlying factual findings, including on internal relocation, under the substantial evidence standard, overturning them only if any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach the opposite conclusion. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

2. Withholding of Removal

Withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), protects against removal where an applicant’s “life or freedom would be threatened” in the proposed country on account of a protected ground, including PSG membership.

Key differences:

Higher burden of proof: a “clear probability” of persecution (more likely than not), as opposed to the lower “well‑founded fear” standard for asylum.
Same protected grounds and similar nexus requirement.
Reasonable internal relocation defeats withholding, just as it does asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B), (b)(2).

Thus, if a petitioner fails asylum on PSG or nexus grounds, or fails to show a well‑founded fear, she necessarily fails withholding. The court explicitly applies this logic here, citing Vasquez‑Rivera v. Garland, 96 F.4th 903, 907–08 (6th Cir. 2024).

3. Convention Against Torture (CAT)

CAT protection requires a showing that it is “more likely than not” that the applicant will be subjected to “torture,” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2), and that the torture will be inflicted by, at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. § 1208.18(a)(1).

Because petitioner’s CAT claim is based on alleged government acquiescence, she must:

Show a particularized risk that she will be tortured; and
Demonstrate that public officials, aware of the risk, would likely turn a blind eye (fail in their duty to intervene). See Patel v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 377, 382 (6th Cir. 2025).

B. Particular Social Group Doctrine and the Court’s Reasoning

1. The Three‑Part PSG Test

The panel recites the now‑familiar three‑part test for PSGs as articulated in Mateo‑Esteban v. Garland, 125 F.4th 762, 766–67 (6th Cir. 2025):

Members share a common immutable characteristic other than being targeted for persecution.
The group is particular—defined with sufficient precision to delimit its membership and not overly broad or amorphous.
The group is socially distinct in the relevant society, meaning members are perceived by society as a group.

The court focuses on the “particularity” prong; it is there that petitioner’s groups fall short.

2. The Meaning of “Particularity”

Petitioner and her amicus argued for a relatively modest understanding of particularity: if one can determine who is in and who is out of the group with some clarity, the requirement is met. On this view, “Salvadoran women” is particular because it clearly covers all women from El Salvador.

The Sixth Circuit firmly rejects that minimalistic understanding. Drawing on a series of published and unpublished precedents, it explains that:

Particularity requires more than descriptive clarity or objective boundaries.
The group must have a unifying relationship or characteristic that narrows it to something other than a sweeping demographic or nearly universal trait. See Reyes Galeana v. Garland, 94 F.4th 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2024).
Groups that are “generalized and far‑reaching” are too broad to satisfy particularity. See Kante v. Holder, 634 F.3d 321, 327 (6th Cir. 2011); Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2005).

The opinion catalogs prior cases rejecting large demographic groups, such as:

“young male Guatemalans” (Aguilar‑Mejia v. Bondi, No. 22‑3365, 2025 WL 2337021)
“Guatemalan children under fourteen” (Gomez‑Guzman v. Holder, 485 F. App’x 64)
“young women” (Paplekaj v. Holder, 411 F. App’x 844)
“young Salvadorans who have been threatened because they refused to join the MS gang” (Umaña‑Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667)
“young, attractive Albanian women” (Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 556)
“children who are unable to leave their families” (Orellana v. Sessions, 722 F. App’x 443)
“Guatemalans afraid of kidnapping” and “women who oppose gangs” (Juan‑Mateo v. Sessions, 729 F. App’x 446)

The court also cites prior unpublished decisions squarely rejecting PSGs defined as:

“Guatemalan women” and “indigent Guatemalan women” (Rodriguez‑Lopez v. Garland, No. 20‑4087, 2021 WL 3140324)
“Honduran women” (Cabrera‑Hernandez v. Bondi, No. 25‑3123, 2025 WL 2940692)

These cases, combined with similar holdings in other circuits (e.g., Chavez‑Chilel, Jaco, Safaie), support a general rule: gender‑plus‑nationality groups covering roughly half a country’s population are too large and heterogeneous to be “particular”.

3. Application to the Proposed PSGs

a. “Salvadoran women”

The panel finds that “Salvadoran women” is a quintessential example of an overbroad PSG:

It encompasses approximately half of El Salvador’s population.
It includes women across diverse ages, classes, regions, religions, and social backgrounds.
It is even broader than other demographic groups previously rejected as too expansive.

Under the Sixth Circuit’s framework, that sheer breadth and heterogeneity defeats particularity. The court explicitly agrees with the BIA (and aligns with Matter of K‑E‑S‑G‑, discussed below) that such a group is not cognizable.

b. “Single Salvadoran women who are working professionals”

Petitioner argued this group was narrower and more tailored. The court disagrees, treating it as an overlay of three independently broad descriptors:

“Salvadoran women” – already overbroad.
“working professionals” – a vast and diffuse category encompassing many unrelated occupations across the entire economy.
“single” – applied inconsistently, as the record suggested petitioner was married but nonetheless claimed to be “single” for PSG purposes.

The court emphasizes:

The group would include essentially all Salvadoran women engaged in almost any remunerative activity—effectively anyone who has “ventured into the marketplace.” See Reyes Galeana, 94 F.4th at 559.
The “single” criterion is malleable and subjective, reminiscent of Rreshpja’s rejection of “young, attractive women” as defined by a subjective quality.

The panel further notes that the underlying unifying feature appears to be perceived wealth or access to money, a characteristic the court has repeatedly held cannot ground a PSG. See Sanchez‑Robles v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2015) (groups targeted for economic gain are not cognizable).

c. “Salon owners in El Salvador”

Derived by the IJ from her testimony, this group fares no better. Relying on cases such as:

“Mexican business owners” (Reyes Galeana)
“taxi drivers in Guatemala” (Gonzalez‑De Leon v. Barr, 932 F.3d 489)
“business owners who refuse to pay for protection from the mafia” (Khozhaynova v. Holder, 641 F.3d 187)
“small businessmen” (Jelkovski v. INS, 103 F. App’x 578)
“female home or business owners” and “upwardly mobile women trying to build a better life through business” (Mendez v. Sessions, No. 17‑3148)

the court holds that occupational or economic groups are typically “neither discrete nor definable,” sweeping in people engaged in a vast range of activities in different places and circumstances. “Salon owners in El Salvador” is indistinguishable from those rejected groups and again appears to be just another way of describing potential victims of extortion due to perceived economic resources.

4. “Alternative” PSGs and the Role of Tista‑Ruiz de Ajualip

On appeal, petitioner argued that the IJ and BIA should have considered two additional PSGs that she had not explicitly proposed:

“single Salvadoran women small business owners”
“single Salvadoran women salon owners”

She invoked Tista‑Ruiz de Ajualip v. Garland, 114 F.4th 487 (6th Cir. 2024), to suggest that the agency had a duty to look for “better defined” PSGs.

The panel carefully limits Tista‑Ruiz:

That case criticized the BIA for issuing a boilerplate, evidence‑free PSG analysis inconsistent with controlling precedent.
The remedy was a remand directing the Board to apply the existing standard correctly to the PSGs actually proposed on the record.
Nothing in Tista‑Ruiz requires the IJ or BIA to invent new PSGs or recombine components of existing ones sua sponte.

Thus, the court holds that the agency fully discharged its duty by analyzing the PSGs petitioner actually presented, based on the record as a whole. The new “alternative” PSGs first articulated in the petition for review do not bind the agency and do not show error in its analysis.

5. Interaction with Matter of K‑E‑S‑G‑ and Loper Bright

While this case was pending, the BIA issued Matter of K‑E‑S‑G‑, 29 I. & N. Dec. 145 (BIA 2025), which announced a categorical rule: a PSG defined solely by sex or sex‑plus‑nationality is overbroad and insufficiently particular.

Petitioner, in her reply brief, urged the court to disregard K‑E‑S‑G‑ as a misreading of the statute, citing Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), which overruled Chevron deference. The panel sidesteps any need to defer to K‑E‑S‑G‑:

It notes that K‑E‑S‑G‑ post‑dates the BIA decision in this case and was not the basis of the BIA’s analysis.
More importantly, it explains that existing Sixth Circuit precedent, decided without deference to the BIA, already supports rejecting “Salvadoran women” as a PSG.

In effect, the court signals that even in the post‑Loper Bright era, where courts must independently interpret the statute, its own body of PSG jurisprudence already mandates the outcome reached in K‑E‑S‑G‑ for gender‑plus‑nationality groups. Thus, the rejection of “Salvadoran women” does not depend on deference to the BIA; it is a product of circuit law.

C. Internal Relocation and Burden of Proof

1. The Legal Standard

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii), an applicant lacks a “well‑founded fear” of persecution if she can avoid persecution by reasonably relocating within her home country. For withholding, § 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B), (b)(2) establishes a similar internal‑relocation bar.

As to burden allocation:

By default, internal relocation is presumed reasonable, and the applicant bears the burden to rebut that presumption.
The burden shifts to the government only if the applicant:
- proves past persecution on account of a protected ground; or
- shows a fear of persecution by the government or government‑sponsored actors.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3); Ghanim v. Holder, 425 F. App’x 463, 467–68 (6th Cir. 2011).

2. Exhaustion of the Burden‑Shifting Argument

On review, petitioner argued that she had in fact suffered past persecution, so the burden should have been on the government to prove that internal relocation would be reasonable. She also suggested that the BIA may have (improperly) relied on an enjoined 2020 regulation changing the burden allocation.

The court does not reach the merits of this argument because it is unexhausted:

8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) requires exhaustion of “all administrative remedies available as of right.” This is a mandatory claim‑processing rule that must be enforced when properly invoked by the government.
In her BIA brief, petitioner:
- Mentioned that she suffered “past persecution.”
- Did not challenge the IJ’s past‑persecution determination or argue that this finding triggered a burden shift on internal relocation.
Under Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 2009), an issue is exhausted only if reasonably developed in briefing to the BIA.

Because the burden‑shift argument was never put before the BIA, the court refuses to consider it.

3. Substantial Evidence on Reasonableness of Relocation

On the merits, reviewed under the “highly deferential” substantial evidence standard (Hernandez‑Hernandez v. Garland, 15 F.4th 685, 687 (6th Cir. 2021)), the panel finds ample support for the BIA’s determination that petitioner failed to show that internal relocation would be unreasonable.

Key points:

Petitioner did not establish that the men extorting her were actually gang members; her belief was speculative.
She offered no evidence that those individuals had the means or inclination to pursue her throughout the country if she relocated—particularly given that she had previously resided in the capital, San Salvador.
Her own testimony undermined a claim of pervasive, individualized gender‑based danger:
- Neither she nor her daughters had ever been physically harmed.
- Her mother and sisters remained in El Salvador without threats or harm.
General evidence of gang violence, police corruption, and gender‑based violence in El Salvador, while troubling, did not compel the conclusion that this particular petitioner could not reasonably relocate.

In short, even if she had established a cognizable PSG, the failure to show that internal relocation would be unreasonable independently defeats both asylum and withholding.

D. Exhaustion and Issue Preservation Beyond Burden‑Shifting

The court reinforces a rigorous approach to exhaustion and briefing:

Notices to Appear (NTAs): Petitioner briefly labeled her NTAs “defective” in a footnote, but did not develop the argument. The court deems that “perfunctory” and therefore forfeited. See Buetenmiller v. Macomb County Jail, 53 F.4th 939, 947 (6th Cir. 2022). In any case, controlling precedent (Ramos Rafael v. Garland, 15 F.4th 797, 800–01 (6th Cir. 2021)) forecloses most NTA‑defect challenges to removal proceedings.
Humanitarian asylum: Petitioner never requested humanitarian asylum at the agency level. Although she argued that she suffered past persecution, she did not ask the IJ or BIA to exercise the discretionary humanitarian asylum authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii). The court distinguishes its prior cases:
- K.H. v. Barr, 920 F.3d 470, 479 (6th Cir. 2019): humanitarian asylum available only when past persecution is established.
- Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778, 798 (6th Cir. 2020) and Sebastian‑Sebastian v. Garland, 87 F.4th 838, 851 (6th Cir. 2023): in those cases, the applicants specifically raised humanitarian asylum to the BIA; here, petitioner did not.

Because humanitarian asylum was never asked for at the BIA, it cannot be raised for the first time in the court of appeals. See Mazariegos‑Rodas v. Garland, 122 F.4th 655, 664 (6th Cir. 2024).

E. CAT Analysis: Individualized Risk and Government Acquiescence

Petitioner’s CAT theory was that she would be tortured by gangs, and that Salvadoran authorities “turn a blind eye” to such violence, especially violence against women.

The court, deferring to the BIA’s factual findings unless compelled to conclude otherwise, emphasizes:

Petitioner relies primarily on:
- Country‑conditions reports documenting widespread gang activity and violence against women.
- Her generalized fear of being targeted again by extortionists.
She did not:
- Show that she personally faces a more‑likely‑than‑not chance of being subjected to torture, as opposed to extortion or generalized violence.
- Demonstrate that Salvadoran authorities know of her situation and would refuse or fail to intervene.
She never filed a formal police report or pursued official channels in El Salvador; she only consulted a friendly officer informally. Thus, in the court’s words, the government “never had a chance to acquiesce.” See Sabastian‑Andres v. Garland, 96 F.4th 923, 932 (6th Cir. 2024).
Under Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 502 (6th Cir. 2015), the state’s general inability to control gangs does not, by itself, amount to acquiescence to torture.

On this record, the court is not “compelled” to disagree with the BIA’s conclusion that petitioner has not met the high CAT standard.

IV. Key Precedents and Their Influence

A. Sixth Circuit PSG Precedents

The opinion synthesizes and applies a long line of Sixth Circuit cases on PSGs:

Kante v. Holder, 634 F.3d 321 (6th Cir. 2011), and Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2005): foundational cases rejecting “generalized and far‑reaching” groups – particularly those defined by large demographic features (youth, gender, attractiveness).
Umaña‑Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667 (6th Cir. 2013): rejects a PSG of “young Salvadorans threatened because they refused to join the MS gang” because it could include effectively all non‑MS Salvadoran youth.
Sanchez‑Robles v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 2015), and Reyes Galeana v. Garland, 94 F.4th 555 (6th Cir. 2024): solidify that groups based on economic status, “perceived wealth,” or business ownership (e.g., “Mexican business owners”) are not cognizable PSGs.
Unpublished but influential decisions: Rodriguez‑Lopez, Cabrera‑Hernandez, Gomez‑Guzman, Paplekaj, Juan‑Mateo, Orellana, and others, which the panel uses to illustrate how its framework consistently treats gender‑plus‑nationality and broad demographic groups.

The panel’s reasoning is faithful to, and consolidates, these precedents into a relatively clear rule: PSGs built from very large demographic or economic categories will almost always fail particularity in the Sixth Circuit.

B. Precedents on Internal Relocation, CAT, and Exhaustion

Internal relocation:
- Lin v. Garland, 81 F.4th 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2023) (internal relocation can independently defeat asylum).
- Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778, 796–97 (6th Cir. 2020) (reasonableness of relocation is a factual determination under substantial evidence review).
CAT/acquiescence:
- Patel v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 377 (6th Cir. 2025): articulates the requirement that officials be aware of the risk and fail in their duty to intervene.
- Sabastian‑Andres, 96 F.4th 923 (6th Cir. 2024), and Zaldana Menijar, 812 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2015): inability to control gangs ≠ acquiescence; failure to seek protection undermines an acquiescence claim.
Exhaustion and issue preservation:
- Mazariegos‑Rodas v. Garland, 122 F.4th 655 (6th Cir. 2024): § 1252(d)(1) exhaustion is mandatory.
- Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2009): issues must be reasonably developed before the BIA.
- Buetenmiller v. Macomb County Jail, 53 F.4th 939 (6th Cir. 2022): perfunctory assertions in a footnote are not preserved.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. “Particular Social Group” (PSG)

In asylum law, a PSG is one of the five protected grounds (along with race, religion, nationality, and political opinion). A PSG must:

Be defined by an immutable or deeply fundamental characteristic (e.g., family ties, sex, sexual orientation).
Be sufficiently narrow and concrete (particularity).
Be recognized in society as a distinct group (social distinction).

Being a crime victim, being poor, being a generic “business owner,” or being part of a country‑wide age/sex group usually is not enough.

B. “Particularity” vs. “Can I Point to Who Is In the Group?”

Particularity is not satisfied just because you can, in theory, say “this person is in” and “that person is out.” The group also must not be:

So large that it covers a major fraction of the country (e.g., “all women” in a country).
So amorphous that it includes people with no real connection other than a very broad trait.

Courts look for some meaningful limiting principle that ties the group together in a focused way.

C. Internal Relocation

Even if someone proves past or likely future harm, asylum and withholding are denied if:

They could avoid the harm by moving to another part of their country; and
Relocation would be reasonable given their circumstances (family ties, language, health, access to employment, etc.).

If the persecutors are local actors with limited reach, relocation is often considered reasonable.

D. “Exhaustion” of Administrative Remedies

Before going to a federal court of appeals, a noncitizen generally must:

Raise their legal and factual arguments clearly to the BIA.
Frame specific objections and arguments, not just general complaints.

If a point is not properly raised at the BIA, the court of appeals usually cannot consider it.

E. CAT’s “Acquiescence” Requirement

For CAT protection based on acquiescence:

It is not enough that the country has high crime rates or that police are ineffective.
The applicant must show that officials:
- Know or will likely know about the torture risk; and
- Will not take steps within their power to prevent it.

Failing to ever report threats or seek help from authorities can be a serious obstacle in proving acquiescence.

VI. Impact and Forward‑Looking Implications

A. Gender‑Based and Gender‑Plus‑Nationality PSGs in the Sixth Circuit

This opinion is a watershed in the Sixth Circuit’s gender‑based PSG jurisprudence because it:

Makes clear, in a published and precedential way, that “Salvadoran women” (and by logical extension similar “X‑nationality women” groups) are not cognizable PSGs under the court’s interpretation of particularity.
Aligns Sixth Circuit law with the BIA’s categorical position in Matter of K‑E‑S‑G‑ and similar decisions in the Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.

For practitioners, this means that:

PSGs framed as “women of [country X]” or “[country X] women who oppose gangs,” “fear domestic violence,” etc., will almost certainly be deemed overbroad in the Sixth Circuit.
More tailored groups will need to be grounded in narrower, non‑demographic characteristics—with careful attention to particularity and social distinction, and to existing circuit case law.

B. Economic and Occupational PSGs

The decision further entrenches the rule that PSGs premised on:

Business ownership,
Perceived wealth, or
Access to funds

are generally not cognizable. Future claims from business owners extorted by gangs or criminal groups will face an uphill battle if they are structured as “small business owners,” “entrepreneurs,” or similar categories without additional, legally significant characteristics.

C. Limits on the Agency’s Duty to “Fix” PSGs

By confining Tista‑Ruiz de Ajualip to its facts, the court makes clear:

The IJ and BIA must meaningfully analyze the PSGs actually proposed.
They are not required to devise alternative PSGs or reframe the applicant’s theory for her.

Practically, PSG formulation remains the responsibility of counsel. Poorly crafted PSGs will not be rescued by the agency or the courts.

D. Post‑Loper Bright Judicial Role

Though Chevron is gone, Cristales‑de Linares illustrates that:

Many courts, including the Sixth Circuit, have already developed robust, independent interpretations of asylum statutes and regulations;
Even without deference to new BIA decisions like K‑E‑S‑G‑, existing circuit precedent can independently dictate outcomes in PSG cases.

Challenges to BIA PSG doctrine will therefore often need to target the courts of appeals’ own precedent, not just the BIA’s readings.

E. Strategic Considerations for Practitioners

The decision underscores several practice points:

PSG formulation: Counsel must craft PSGs that:
- Avoid sweeping demographic categories.
- Embed genuinely limiting, non‑economic characteristics.
- Are carefully supported by country‑conditions and expert evidence of social distinction.
Exhaustion and briefing:
- Arguments about burden‑shifting, humanitarian asylum, or defects in proceedings must be expressly raised to the BIA.
- Footnotes or passing references are not enough.
Internal relocation and CAT:
- General country violence, even horrific, will rarely suffice without individualized evidence of motive, reach of persecutors, and inability to relocate safely.
- Applicants should document any efforts to seek state protection (or explain credibly why doing so was impossible or too dangerous).

VII. Conclusion

Elizabeth Cristales‑de Linares v. Bondi firmly consolidates the Sixth Circuit’s restrictive approach to PSGs and underscores the importance of particularity, individualized risk, and preservation of issues at the agency level. The court:

Rejects “Salvadoran women,” “single Salvadoran women who are working professionals,” and “salon owners in El Salvador” as overbroad and insufficiently particular PSGs.
Holds that asylum and withholding fail both for lack of a cognizable PSG and, independently, because petitioner did not show that internal relocation within El Salvador would be unreasonable.
Affirms the denial of CAT relief for lack of a particularized torture risk and absence of evidence of government acquiescence.
Reinforces strict exhaustion requirements, limiting appellate review to arguments fairly presented to the BIA.

In the broader legal context, the decision signals that gender‑plus‑nationality and economic‑based PSG theories will face formidable headwinds in the Sixth Circuit. It also illustrates that, in the post‑Loper Bright environment, circuit courts’ own precedents, rather than deference to the BIA, will often be the decisive factor in asylum and withholding cases. For asylum seekers and practitioners, the opinion underscores the imperative of precise PSG framing, careful evidentiary development, and rigorous issue preservation at every stage of the administrative process.