Fifth Circuit: Buyers of Chattel Paper Are Exempt from Louisiana UCC § 9-210 Accounting Requests, and Pro Se Litigants Risk Sanctions for Fabricated Citations

Introduction

In Miller v. Stuart, No. 25-30190 (5th Cir. Nov. 13, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a pro se consumer’s claims arising from an auto finance company’s alleged failure to respond to a letter about a vehicle loan. The case arose from a 2024 GMC Denali purchase financed through a dealership and indirectly financed by TD Auto Finance (“TD”). After her mother (the buyer) died, Robbin Y. Miller, acting under a durable power of attorney and later as successor in interest, sent TD a document she styled as an “authenticated” demand for accounting and a broad array of records (including an “original Promissory note with a wet signature” and tax filings), while also stating she was not requesting a statement of account and that she disputed the debt.

When TD did not respond, Miller sued in the Eastern District of Louisiana asserting (1) a violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 10:9-210 (Louisiana’s UCC Article 9 provision on requests for an accounting), (2) negligence per se premised on that alleged violation, and (3) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed on two independent grounds as to the Article 9 claim: TD qualifies as a “buyer of chattel paper” exempt from § 9-210’s 14-day response requirement, and Miller’s letter was not a cognizable “request for an accounting” under the statute. The court also rejected the negligence-per-se and good-faith claims and, importantly, cautioned that fabricated citations—by pro se litigants as well as attorneys—may warrant sanctions under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Summary of the Opinion

Article 9 § 10:9-210 claim: Affirmed dismissal. TD was a “buyer of chattel paper,” which the statute expressly exempts from the 14-day duty to respond to a request for accounting. Independently, Miller’s letter—disclaiming a request for a statement of account while demanding extraneous materials and disputing the debt—was not a statutory “request for an accounting.”
Negligence per se: Affirmed dismissal. The claim was wholly premised on an alleged § 9-210 violation; because no statutory violation was plausibly alleged, the negligence theory failed as well.
Good faith and fair dealing: Affirmed dismissal. Absent facts plausibly showing a breach of the underlying contract, a standalone good-faith claim could not proceed.
Appellate practice warning: The court declined to consider arguments supported by nonexistent cases and warned that future use of fabricated authorities may result in sanctions under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Pleading standards and review:
- Petersen v. Johnson, 57 F.4th 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2023) (de novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals).
- Alexander v. Philip R. Taft Psy D & Assocs., P.L.L.C., 143 F.4th 569, 578 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009): plausibility requires factual content, not speculation).
- Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2019) (complaints must do more than present conclusory assertions).
- Sw. Airlines Pilots Ass'n v. Sw. Airlines Co., 120 F.4th 474, 482 (5th Cir. 2024) (accepting complaint’s factual allegations as true on Rule 12(b)(6)).
- Sligh v. City of Conroe, 87 F.4th 290, 297–98 (5th Cir. 2023) (court may consider documents referenced in the complaint and attached to a motion to dismiss).
Choice of law: Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)) (federal courts apply state substantive law and federal procedural law in diversity).
Louisiana UCC Article 9:
- La. Stat. Ann. § 10:9-210 (requests for an accounting; 14-day response duty for “secured part[ies], other than a buyer of chattel paper”).
- La. Stat. Ann. § 10:9-102(a)(11)(A) (definition of “chattel paper”).
Good faith and fair dealing:
- Schaumburg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 421 F. App’x 434, 439 (5th Cir. 2011) (a breach of good faith requires an underlying breach of contract).
Pro se leeway and appellate rules:
- Jackson v. Reese, 608 F.2d 159, 160 (5th Cir. 1979) (pro se filings afforded some leniency).
- Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (arguments must include citations to authorities).
- Fed. R. App. P. 32 and 38 (formatting and sanctions for frivolous or abusive filings).
- Garces v. Hernandez, No. 25-50342, 2025 WL 2401001, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 2025) (fabricated authorities can violate FRAP 32 and 38; sanctions may follow).

Legal Reasoning

The court’s central analysis focused on the Louisiana implementation of UCC Article 9 § 9-210, which generally obligates a “secured party” to respond within 14 days to a debtor’s “request for an accounting” but expressly excludes “a buyer of chattel paper” from that duty. Two independent reasons sustained the dismissal of Miller’s Article 9 claim:

TD is a “buyer of chattel paper,” so the § 9-210 duty does not apply.
The retail installment sales contract (the “Contract”) for the vehicle constitutes “chattel paper” because it evidences a right to payment secured by specified goods (the GMC Denali). TD’s role—as the indirect finance company that acquired the Contract from the dealership—made it a buyer of that chattel paper. The Contract, which the court could consider at the pleading stage because it was referenced in the complaint and attached to the motion to dismiss, “undisputedly shows that TD has a right to payment of a monetary obligation secured by the Vehicle.” Under § 10:9-210(b), a secured party “other than a buyer of chattel paper” must respond; by negative implication, a buyer of chattel paper is exempt. As a matter of law, the 14-day response obligation did not bind TD.
Miller’s letter was not a statutory “request for an accounting.”
The statute defines a “request for an accounting” as a record that requests an accounting of the “unpaid obligations secured by collateral.” La. Stat. Ann. § 10:9-210(a)(2). Miller’s letter expressly disclaimed requesting a “statement of account” or an “authenticated record of the accounting” and instead disputed the debt’s validity while demanding materials far outside an Article 9 accounting—such as the original promissory note with a wet signature, “all tax filings,” and details of trades/investments/security interests associated with the account, coupled with threats of “$1,000 per day” or “$10,000 per month” penalties. The court held this was not a cognizable § 9-210 request. Thus, even if TD were not exempt as a buyer of chattel paper, no plausible statutory breach was alleged.

The remainder of the claims fell with the Article 9 theory:

Negligence per se: Because the negligence theory was “premised entirely on TD’s purported violation of § 10:9-210,” it failed for the same reasons—no duty to respond and no qualifying request. The court did not need to engage Louisiana’s distinct duty-risk framework for negligence, as the predicate statutory violation was absent either way.
Duty of good faith and fair dealing: The court affirmed dismissal because Miller failed to plead facts showing TD breached the Contract. Without a plausible breach-of-contract allegation, a standalone good-faith claim could not proceed. The court cited Schaumburg for the proposition that a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing requires a breach of contract.

Finally, the panel addressed a procedural irregularity with broader import: Miller’s briefs invoked nonexistent cases and authorities that did not support the propositions asserted. Although pro se litigants are afforded some leeway, the court emphasized that Rule 28 binds all appellants: arguments must be supported by citations to actual authorities. Reiterating its recent admonitions (citing Garces v. Hernandez), the court warned that fabricated or frivolous citations can lead to sanctions under FRAP 32 and 38 and declined to consider arguments relying on such “fictitious citations.”

Impact and Practical Implications

Although unpublished and thus nonprecedential under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, Miller v. Stuart has immediate practical significance for consumer finance litigation in Louisiana and persuasive value more broadly:

Clarification for indirect auto finance: The decision squarely places indirect auto finance companies that purchase retail installment contracts within the “buyer of chattel paper” exemption in Louisiana’s § 9-210. That narrows the class of secured parties obliged to respond to 14-day accounting requests. In typical dealer-originated, lender-purchased auto financing, the finance company will often be exempt from § 9-210’s accounting-response duty.
Scope of “request for an accounting”: Courts will look to the content of the communication. A document that denies seeking an accounting, disputes the debt, and demands extraneous items (e.g., “wet-ink” notes, tax filings, investment records) does not qualify as a § 9-210 request. This curtails reliance on pseudo-legal “debt validation” templates framed as Article 9 requests.
Negligence per se tethered to statutory breach: Where negligence is premised on a specific statutory duty, the negligence claim rises or falls with the statutory predicate. Here, no statutory duty or violation existed; the negligence claim could not survive.
Good faith claims need contract breach: The opinion reinforces that, at least as applied here, a good-faith-and-fair-dealing claim cannot stand absent a plausibly pled breach of the underlying contract.
Appellate practice and sanctions risk: The court’s express warning about fabricated authorities signals low tolerance for AI-generated or otherwise fictitious citations—by pro se litigants or lawyers. Expect heightened scrutiny of citations and a greater willingness to impose sanctions for abusive filings.
Who still owes an accounting response? Parties that are secured creditors but not “buyers of chattel paper” (for example, direct lenders who originate and retain the security interest rather than purchasing chattel paper from a dealer) may still be subject to § 9-210 duties. The line Miller draws turns on the secured party’s role vis-à-vis chattel paper.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Chattel paper: In Article 9 parlance, “chattel paper” is the record (paper or electronic) that evidences both a monetary obligation and a security interest in specific goods. A retail installment sales contract for a car—where the car secures repayment—is classic chattel paper.
Buyer of chattel paper: A party that purchases the chattel paper from the originator (e.g., an auto finance company buying the dealership’s retail installment contract). Louisiana’s § 9-210 exempts such buyers from the 14-day accounting-response rule.
Request for an accounting (UCC § 9-210): A debtor’s written request asking the secured party to state the amount of unpaid obligations secured by collateral, and in some instances to itemize. It is not a catch-all mechanism to demand “original notes,” tax returns, or trading records, nor is it a vehicle to challenge a debt’s validity.
“Authenticated record”: Under the UCC, an “authenticated” record is one signed or otherwise adopted with the intent to authenticate, including some electronic signatures. It does not imply a right to a “wet-ink” document. Demands for “wet signatures” often reflect misunderstandings of modern commercial law and electronic records statutes.
Negligence per se in Louisiana: Louisiana typically applies a duty-risk analysis rather than a rigid “negligence per se” doctrine. A statutory violation may inform duty or breach, but if no statutory duty applies or no violation is plausibly alleged, a negligence-per-se-labeled claim will not succeed.
Good faith and fair dealing: While Louisiana law imposes an obligation of good faith in contract performance, courts generally do not recognize a freestanding tort-like claim for “bad faith” absent a breach of contract (with specific statutory exceptions not relevant here, such as insurer bad faith).
FRAP 28, 32, and 38 (citations and sanctions): Federal appellate briefs must include arguments supported by real, accurate authority. Using fabricated or fictitious case citations can lead to sanctions, including monetary penalties, especially for frivolous or abusive filings.

Conclusion

Miller v. Stuart delivers two clear holdings with practical reach in Louisiana consumer finance disputes. First, indirect auto finance companies that purchase retail installment contracts qualify as “buyers of chattel paper” and are exempt from Louisiana UCC § 9-210’s 14-day accounting-response requirement. Second, a letter that disclaims requesting an accounting and instead disputes the debt while demanding extraneous documents is not a valid Article 9 accounting request. These rulings disposed of the plaintiff’s Article 9 claim and, by extension, her derivative negligence-per-se theory. Her good-faith-and-fair-dealing claim failed because she pled no plausible breach of the underlying contract.

Beyond the substantive outcome, the panel’s warning about fabricated citations underscores a vital procedural message: pro se status does not excuse noncompliance with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and reliance on nonexistent authorities risks sanctions. While unpublished and nonprecedential, this decision is a strong indicator of how the Fifth Circuit will assess Article 9 accounting disputes in the auto-finance context and how strictly it will police citation integrity on appeal.