Continuity of Drug Trafficking as Relevant Conduct and Firearm Enhancements in Federal Sentencing: Commentary on United States v. Atkins (6th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in United States v. Samuel C. Atkins, No. 25‑5104 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2025), is a significant application—though not a formal expansion—of federal sentencing law under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The case sits at the intersection of four recurrent sentencing problems in drug and firearm prosecutions:

How broadly “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 can be used to inflate drug quantity beyond the drugs charged in the counts of conviction.
When firearms found in a defendant’s home can support a firearm enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) for drug trafficking that later occurs in jail.
When non-fatal overdose injuries support an upward departure under § 5K2.2 for “significant physical injury.”
How deferential appellate review of “substantive reasonableness” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) operates in practice for very long sentences.

Atkins pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) and to two fentanyl/fluorofentanyl distribution counts arising from jailhouse dealing. Yet his sentence—396 months (33 years)—was driven decisively by:

his own admissions about large-scale drug trafficking in the months before arrest,
firearms found at his residence at the time of arrest, and
four overdoses in the county jail shortly after his incarceration.

The opinion is formally “not recommended for publication,” but it offers a clear, structured reaffirmation of the breadth of relevant conduct in drug cases, the ease with which the firearm enhancement may apply, and the ready availability of upward departures for overdose-driven “significant injury.” These themes will be persuasive in future district court practice and appellate argument throughout the Sixth Circuit.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

Atkins had outstanding gun and drug warrants from two Kentucky counties. On January 3, 2023, officers arrested him at his residence and recovered:

16 firearms,
over 4 grams of fluorofentanyl, and
17 grams of methamphetamine.

After arrest, Atkins described himself as a long-time “dope dealer.” He admitted that between May and October 2022—roughly eight months before the jail offenses—he received:

five to ten pounds of methamphetamine once or twice a month, and
a kilogram of heroin once or twice a month.

Two days after arrest, while in the Madison County Detention Center, four inmates overdosed (two required hospitalization). A search of Atkins’s cell uncovered:

~11 grams of fluorofentanyl mixture,
33 grams of fluorofentanyl/fentanyl mixture, and
27 grams of fentanyl mixture.

Atkins admitted smuggling the drugs into the jail and distributing them to those who overdosed.

B. Procedural History

A federal indictment charged five counts. Atkins pleaded guilty to:

Count 1 – felon in possession of a firearm,
Count 4 – distribution of a mixture containing fluorofentanyl, and
Count 5 – possession with intent to distribute ≥10g fluorofentanyl and ≥40g fentanyl.

He did not plead guilty to, and the government dismissed, Counts 2 and 3 (drug counts based on the residence search).

The Presentence Report (PSR) attributed, as “relevant conduct,” not only the drugs in the jail cell but also:

drugs seized at the residence, and
the large 2022 drug shipments he admitted to receiving.

Converted to guideline drug weight, the PSR attributed:

49.213 grams of fluorofentanyl,
27.532 grams of fentanyl mixture,
17 grams of methamphetamine,
30 pounds of methamphetamine mixture, and
1 kilogram of heroin.

Key guideline determinations:

Base offense level: 34 (driven by total drug weight under § 2D1.1).
+2 levels: firearm enhancement (§ 2D1.1(b)(1)) based on guns at the residence.
+2 levels: distribution in a detention facility.
−3 levels: acceptance of responsibility (§ 3E1.1).
Total offense level: 35; Criminal History Category VI → Guideline range 292–365 months.

The government moved for a six-level upward departure under § 5K2.2 (significant physical injury) due to the four overdoses. The district court found a basis to depart but applied only a two-level upward departure (which nonetheless raised the range to 360 months to life).

The court imposed a 396-month sentence, mid-range after departure. Atkins appealed, challenging:

the drug quantity calculation (relevant conduct),
the firearm enhancement,
the § 5K2.2 upward departure, and
the substantive reasonableness of the 396‑month sentence.

C. Holdings

The Sixth Circuit (Judge Griffin, joined by Judges McKeague and Mathis) affirmed on all issues:

Drug quantity / Relevant conduct: The district court properly considered Atkins’s pre-arrest drug shipments and the drugs at his residence as part of the same course of conduct or common scheme/plan as the charged jailhouse drug distribution. The three-month temporal gap and similar modus operandi supported inclusion under § 1B1.3(a)(2).
Firearm enhancement: Firearms seized at Atkins’s residence were “possessed in connection with” relevant drug-trafficking conduct substantially connected to the offense of conviction. The two-level enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) was proper, and Atkins failed to show it was “clearly improbable” the guns were connected to the offense.
§ 5K2.2 departure: A two-level upward departure for “significant physical injury” was within the district court’s discretion, given four overdoses (two requiring hospitalization) caused by Atkins’s jailhouse drug distribution.
Substantive reasonableness: The 396‑month sentence, within the post-departure range of 360 months to life, was substantively reasonable. The district court did not give undue weight to Atkins’s trafficking history and appropriately considered age, recidivism risk, deterrence, and public protection under § 3553(a).

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Relevant Conduct and Drug Quantity Under § 2D1.1 and § 1B1.3

1. Guideline framework

For drug cases, the base offense level under § 2D1.1 is driven by the quantity of drugs that are:

part of the offense of conviction, and
additional “relevant conduct” under § 1B1.3(a)(2).

Section 1B1.3(a)(2) requires courts to consider acts:

that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.

The commentary (Application Note 5(B)) explains:

“Common scheme or plan” exists where prior acts are substantially connected by at least one common factor (common victim, accomplices, purpose, or modus operandi).
“Same course of conduct” exists where acts are sufficiently connected or related to warrant treating them as a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses, usually evaluated by:
- degree of similarity,
- regularity (repetition), and
- time interval.

The Sixth Circuit has long applied this triad of factors (similarity, regularity, time) to decide whether uncharged or pre-conviction acts may be used to increase drug quantity. The key case cited in Atkins is United States v. Phillips, 516 F.3d 479, 483 (6th Cir. 2008), building on United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477 (6th Cir. 1996), and earlier cases.

2. Precedents on temporal and factual connection

Atkins relies on several key precedents:

United States v. Phillips, 516 F.3d 479 (6th Cir. 2008)
Clarifies that in assessing “same course of conduct,” courts look to similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity, without a bright-line rule. If one factor is weak, others must be stronger.
United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477 (6th Cir. 1996)
Recognizes overlap between “same course of conduct” and “common scheme or plan.” Importantly, Hill holds a lapse in time does not necessarily mean the defendant abandoned the conduct: conspiracies or trafficking sprees may be “put on hold” and later resume. Atkins uses this to justify linking pre-arrest street trafficking to post-arrest jailhouse dealing.
United States v. Kappes, 936 F.2d 227 (6th Cir. 1991)
Six-year temporal gap found “too remote” for relevant conduct. A contrast case indicating that some cut-off exists for remoteness.
United States v. Miller, 910 F.2d 1321 (6th Cir. 1990)
Twenty months was not too remote. This anchors the court’s conclusion that a three-month gap in Atkins is easily within acceptable bounds.
United States v. Penaloza, 784 F. App’x 341 (6th Cir. 2019)
Cited primarily for the proposition that a court must consider drug quantity attributable to the defendant, including relevant conduct, in setting the base offense level.

3. Application in Atkins: A “continuous” trafficking spree

Atkins argued that only the jail-cell drugs should count toward drug quantity because only Counts 4 and 5 remained after the plea. He asked the court to exclude:

the large 2022 shipments (5–10 lbs meth and 1 kg heroin monthly for six months), and
the drugs at his residence found at arrest.

The Sixth Circuit rejected this, emphasizing:

Temporal proximity: The pre-arrest shipments occurred between May and October 2022. Atkins was arrested in January 2023—a three-month gap. Citing Miller (20 months not too remote) and Kappes (6 years too remote), the court held three months is well within acceptable temporal proximity.
Similarity and regularity:
- Atkins admitted he was a career “dope dealer.”
- He repeatedly received multi-pound/multi-kilogram drug shipments over six months.
- He continued drug distribution immediately after incarceration by smuggling drugs into jail.
The court treated these as a single, ongoing drug-trafficking enterprise rather than isolated events.
Continuous course of dealing: The court explicitly rejected the idea that the arrest “broke the chain” of relevant conduct. Instead, it characterized the incarceration as simply a change of venue and customer base, not of underlying conduct:
The buyers and locale may have changed, but the seller and product stayed the same.
Drugs at the residence: The temporal link between the home seizure and the jail offenses was only two days. The court reasoned that, but for Atkins’s smuggling, some of the drugs found in the jail cell might well have remained at his home. The residence drugs, therefore, were tightly bound to the ongoing trafficking spree.

Crucially, the court stressed that relevant conduct does not need to mirror the precise statutory elements of the counts of conviction. It need only be part of the same course of conduct or common scheme. The fact that Counts 2 and 3 (covering the residence drugs) were dismissed as part of the plea did not strip those drugs of relevance at sentencing.

4. Practical significance

The Atkins approach to relevant conduct underscores several practical realities:

Self-incriminating statements about historical trafficking are dangerous at sentencing. Atkins’s own admissions about multi-pound and kilogram-level distributions massively increased his drug weight and thus his base offense level.
Arrest and custody are not “bright-line” breaks. The court’s core holding is that an arrest and subsequent incarceration did not break the “course of conduct.” This reinforces a broad, enterprise-based view of drug trafficking: the “career” drug dealer notion allows pre- and post-arrest transactions to be aggregated.
Plea dismissals do not erase conduct. Even though the counts tied to the residence were dismissed in the plea agreement, the underlying drug quantities still counted as relevant conduct. Plea bargaining over counts does not necessarily confine sentencing exposure.

As a precedent, Atkins will be cited to support including both pre-arrest and post-arrest drug activity in the same guideline calculation, especially where the defendant self-identifies as a continuous trafficker and there is no long-term hiatus between episodes.

B. Firearm Enhancement Under § 2D1.1(b)(1)

1. Legal standard

Section 2D1.1(b)(1) adds two levels if “a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed” in connection with the drug offense. The Sixth Circuit’s test, reaffirmed here (quoting United States v. Mosley, 53 F.4th 947, 966 (6th Cir. 2022)), is:

The defendant actually or constructively possessed the weapon, and
the possession occurred “during” the offense, which includes during relevant conduct tied to the offense under § 1B1.3.

Key doctrinal points:

The weapon need not be present during the exact act charged in the conviction. United States v. West, 962 F.3d 183, 187 (6th Cir. 2020) (cited in Atkins) holds the enhancement applies if the weapon was possessed “during relevant conduct that is substantially connected to the offense of conviction.”
Once the government shows weapon possession during relevant conduct, a rebuttable presumption arises that the weapon was connected to the drug offense. To defeat the enhancement, the defendant must show it is “clearly improbable” that the weapon was connected. West, 962 F.3d at 188 (quoting Guideline cmt.).

Examples of how a defendant might rebut the presumption (drawn from cases cited in Atkins):

United States v. Nance, 40 F. App’x 59 (6th Cir. 2002): showing the weapon was distant in space (“not within close proximity”) from drugs and drug operations.
United States v. Peters, 15 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1994): offering credible testimony that the weapon was used for lawful purposes or unrelated reasons.

2. How the enhancement was applied in Atkins

The firearms were:

seized at Atkins’s residence during his arrest,
physically located with drugs at the house, and
partly obtained by bartering drugs for guns (per Atkins’s own statement).

Atkins’s argument was narrow: he claimed he did not possess firearms while in jail distributing drugs (Counts 4 and 5) and that his incarceration broke any connection between the home firearms and the jailhouse drug offenses.

The court rejected this for two reasons:

Relevant conduct nexus: The guns at the residence were possessed “while he was continuing to distribute controlled substances.” The home-based drug activity and the later jailhouse drug activity were both part of a continuous trafficking spree.
Guns “flowed from” the drug trade: Atkins admitted that some of the 16 firearms at his residence were obtained through drug-for-gun trades. The court treated this as strong evidence that the guns were “in connection with” the drug trade, not incidental household possessions.

Once the government established that Atkins possessed weapons in the course of relevant drug activity, the presumption applied. Atkins:

offered no evidence that the firearms were for a separate purpose (e.g., hunting, collection, or lawful self-defense) unrelated to drugs,
did not show physical remoteness (indeed the guns were found where drugs were stored), and
relied solely on the legal argument that incarceration was an “intervening event,” which the district court and the Sixth Circuit rejected.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the two-level enhancement.

3. Doctrinal and practical implications

Firearm enhancements are not constrained by the jailhouse context. Even though the actual distribution for Counts 4 and 5 occurred inside a secure facility with no guns present, the enhancement still applied because of guns possessed during related, earlier conduct.
Guns as “currency” still count. That some weapons were acquired through gun-for-drug trades was treated as affirmative evidence that the firearms were connected to trafficking, not a mitigating factor.
Defendant’s burden is substantial once presumption attaches. The opinion reinforces that the “clearly improbable” standard is demanding. Mere argument, unaccompanied by proof of distance, alternate purpose, or absence of linkage to drugs, will not suffice.

Atkins will be a helpful citation for prosecutors arguing that weapons discovered at a residence support an enhancement even when the charged drug offenses occur later and elsewhere, so long as the overall conduct is part of a single trafficking enterprise.

C. Upward Departure for Overdose Injuries Under § 5K2.2

1. Text and structure of § 5K2.2

Section 5K2.2 allows an upward departure where:

Significant physical injury resulted.

In determining the extent of departure, the guideline instructs courts to consider:

the extent of the injury,
the degree to which the injury may prove permanent, and
whether the injury was intended or knowingly risked.

The Sixth Circuit notes (citing United States v. Prince, 749 F. App’x 396, 400 (6th Cir. 2018)) that the provision calls for a “flexible, factual inquiry,” giving sentencing judges substantial discretion.

2. Precedents on overdose injuries

Atkins builds on two prior unpublished Sixth Circuit decisions:

United States v. Prince, 749 F. App’x 396 (6th Cir. 2018)
The court upheld an upward departure where the defendant sold heroin to an individual who overdosed. Although the precise injuries are not detailed in the Atkins opinion, the case stands for using § 5K2.2 when a single overdose produces serious complications.
United States v. Gillispie, 929 F.3d 788 (6th Cir. 2019)
More directly on point: the court affirmed a § 5K2.2 departure where a fentanyl overdose caused serious ailments (again reinforcing that overdose injuries qualify as “significant physical injury”). Gillispie is cited for the core proposition that overdose-induced harm can justify upward departure.

3. Application in Atkins

Here, the departure was based on:

Atkins smuggling highly potent fentanyl/fluorofentanyl into jail,
distributing it to four inmates,
all four overdosing, two requiring hospitalization.

The district court explicitly noted:

There was “no indication” of permanent disability, and
no evidence the injuries were intentionally inflicted.

However, the court emphasized Atkins’s “blatant disregard” of the risk that non-tolerant users might overdose and die. That is, while Atkins may not have set out to injure anyone, he knowingly risked serious harm.

The procedural nuance: the government requested a six-level upward departure. The district court granted only a two-level departure, but because the advisory range “plateaus” at higher offense levels for Criminal History VI, both a two- and six-level departure would have resulted in the same range: 360 months to life.

The Sixth Circuit, applying abuse-of-discretion review, held:

A § 5K2.2 basis was clearly present: multiple overdoses, serious enough to require hospitalization.
The district court appropriately weighed extent, permanence, and risk—finding significant but not maximally severe injury—thus justifying a modest two-level increase.

4. Broader implications

Atkins confirms and extends the overdose jurisprudence in several ways:

Multiple nonfatal overdoses can justify departure even absent permanent injury. The opinion treats four overdoses (two hospitalizations) as qualifying “significant physical injury” despite the lack of permanent disability. Courts thus have broad latitude to treat serious but transient overdose events as aggravating.
Knowingly risking overdose is enough. Intent to injure is not required; knowing disregard of obvious overdose risks suffices. This is especially salient in fentanyl cases, where potency and overdose risk are widely recognized.
Jailhouse context is aggravating. While not stated as a separate ground, the fact that the injuries occurred inside a detention facility, where defendants are supposed to be under state care and control, underscores the dangerousness of the conduct and supports departure.

In practical terms, Atkins will serve as a strong template for future upward-departure motions where drug-distribution conduct (especially in a custodial setting) leads to one or more overdoses, even if all victims survive and recover.

D. Substantive Reasonableness and § 3553(a)

1. Standard of review

Substantive reasonableness review asks whether the length of the sentence is justified in light of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Under Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), and consistently with Sixth Circuit cases such as United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 661 (6th Cir. 2012), and United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 581 (6th Cir. 2007), the standard is highly deferential:

The court must give “due deference” to the sentencing court’s assessment.
A sentence is not unreasonable simply because an appellate court might have selected a different number.
Reversal occurs only if the sentence is based on impermissible factors, fails to consider relevant factors, or gives unreasonable weight to a single factor. United States v. Robinson, 892 F.3d 209, 213 (6th Cir. 2018).

United States v. Cunningham, 669 F.3d 723 (6th Cir. 2012), and United States v. Russell, 2022 WL 203330 (6th Cir. Jan. 24, 2022), both cited, reiterate that a defendant’s disagreement with the district court’s balancing of factors is not enough.

2. The district court’s reasoning in Atkins

The district court considered the core § 3553(a) factors:

Nature and seriousness of the offense:
- The court described Atkins’s conduct as “very serious,” highlighting the jailhouse overdoses.
- It emphasized that distributing “potent” fentanyl/fluorofentanyl in a detention center endangers vulnerable, often non-tolerant users.
History and characteristics of the defendant:
- Atkins’s long-standing career as a “dope dealer” and extensive criminal history (Category VI) were noted.
- The court considered his age and family support and acknowledged some degree of “reduced risk of recidivism” associated with aging, but found it did not overcome his entrenched trafficking history.
Deterrence and public protection:
- The court underscored the need for deterrence, particularly to dissuade trafficking in controlled environments like jails.
- It stressed public protection given Atkins’s unwillingness to desist even after arrest and confinement.
Sentencing disparities:
- The court addressed the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among defendants with similar records and Guideline ranges.

With a post-departure range of 360 months to life, the court selected a 396‑month sentence—above the bottom but far below the maximum. The Sixth Circuit treated this as a considered choice within the advisory range, not an arbitrary selection.

3. Atkins’s challenge and appellate response

Atkins argued that the court:

placed disproportionate weight on his history of drug trafficking, and
failed to give sufficient weight to his age and the resultant lower recidivism risk.

The Sixth Circuit rejected these arguments:

The record showed the district court expressly weighed his age and potential for reduced recidivism, even while placing heavy emphasis on the gravity of the offenses and his extensive history.
There was no indication that any impermissible factor (e.g., race, religion) was considered.
The selection of a sentence modestly above the bottom of a very high range, in light of four overdoses and long-term trafficking, was within the broad zone of reasonableness.

Quoting Russell, the court reminded that a sentence is not unreasonable “just because [the defendant] thinks the district court should have balanced the sentencing factors differently.”

4. Significance

The substantive reasonableness holding in Atkins illustrates:

Deference becomes particularly strong for within-Guidelines sentences, especially when they fall well below the statutory maximum and the judge has articulated a reasoned balancing of § 3553(a) factors.
Age and recidivism-based arguments are not automatic mitigators. Even for relatively older defendants facing very long sentences, the presence of ongoing criminality (e.g., continuing trafficking inside jail) can outweigh age-based leniency considerations.
District courts retain broad authority to “ratchet up” high-end sentences for jailhouse trafficking, and such sentences will be difficult to disturb on appeal where the judge builds a careful record.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Relevant conduct” (Guidelines § 1B1.3)

In federal sentencing, a defendant is not punished solely for the specific counts to which they plead guilty. Courts also look at “relevant conduct”:

other acts that are part of the same pattern,
ongoing activity, or
a common scheme or plan.

If the court finds that earlier or parallel activities are closely linked to the offense of conviction in time, pattern, and purpose, it may include them in calculating the Guidelines. This can dramatically raise the base offense level, especially in drug cases, because larger drug quantities are aggregated—even if they were never charged, or if the counts were dismissed in a plea agreement.

2. “Same course of conduct” and “common scheme or plan”

These phrases are two ways of describing when past conduct is close enough to the current offense to be counted:

Same course of conduct: Think of a long-running episode or spree—repeated acts of the same kind (here, drug dealing) close in time.
Common scheme or plan: Think of a broader plan—such as a continuing trafficking business—where various acts share a common objective or method.

The closer the acts are in time, the more similar they are, and the more often they occur, the more likely they will be considered part of a single “course of conduct.”

3. Firearm enhancement and “constructive possession”

You can “possess” a gun in two ways for Guidelines purposes:

Actual possession: You physically have it in your hand, waistband, or immediate control.
Constructive possession: You do not physically hold it, but you know where it is and have the power to control it (e.g., guns in your house or car that you control).

Under § 2D1.1(b)(1), if you have a gun during drug activities—even if not on your person at the moment of a particular sale—the Guidelines add two levels unless it is “clearly improbable” that the gun was connected to the drugs.

4. “Upward departure” vs. “variance”

In Guidelines terminology:

Departure: The court moves up (or down) from the Guideline range based on specific Guideline provisions (§ 5K2.2, etc.) that authorize adjustments for facts like physical injury or death.
Variance: The court imposes a sentence outside the Guideline range (either above or below) based directly on the statutory factors in § 3553(a), not on a specific departure provision.

Atkins deals with a departure, not a variance: the sentence was increased within the Guidelines framework because of significant physical injury from overdoses.

5. “Substantive reasonableness”

Appellate courts review the length of a sentence (e.g., 396 months) for “substantive reasonableness,” asking whether the sentence:

is too harsh or too lenient given the seriousness of the crime,
adequately protects the public and deters crime, and
reflects the defendant’s history and characteristics.

Because district judges hear the evidence first-hand, appellate courts are highly deferential. A sentence within the (properly calculated) Guideline range is presumed reasonable in many circuits (although the Sixth Circuit does not formally adopt a presumption, it treats such sentences as entitled to strong deference).

V. Impact and Future Significance

1. For federal drug and firearm cases

Atkins is a powerful example of how sentencing exposure in drug cases often extends well beyond the conduct named in the indictment or plea agreement:

Defendants should expect that any admitted long-term trafficking activity—even if not charged—will increase drug quantity and, thereby, the Guideline range.
Guns in the defendant’s home, particularly when stored with drugs or obtained through drug trades, almost automatically trigger the firearm enhancement, even if the charged distribution occurred elsewhere and later.

Defense counsel must carefully advise clients about the potential sentencing consequences of admissions to law enforcement and plea stipulations that acknowledge broader trafficking conduct or firearm involvement.

2. For jailhouse drug prosecutions

The case has particular resonance for jail/prison drug-distribution scenarios:

No safe harbor in custody: The court’s refusal to treat incarceration as a “break” in relevant conduct makes clear that jailhouse dealing is simply a continuation of prior trafficking, not a distinct chapter insulated from past conduct.
Enhanced punishment for overdose outcomes: Prosecutors may now routinely seek § 5K2.2 upward departures when jailhouse trafficking results in overdoses, even if all victims survive and even if permanent injury cannot be shown.

3. For sentencing advocacy and policy

From a broader policy perspective:

Sentencing inflation via relevant conduct: Atkins exemplifies how the Guidelines can ratchet up sentences drastically through uncharged conduct. The base offense level of 34 and high range (292–365 months, later 360–life) stemmed largely from self-reported pre-arrest distributions, not from the relatively small jail-cell drug quantities alone.
Overdose harms as a sentencing lever: The decision adds to a line of cases treating overdose injuries as powerful aggravators. This intersects with broader public-health and criminal-justice debates about whether criminal penalties borne by suppliers adequately or excessively respond to epidemic overdose crises.
Deference on substantive reasonableness: The affirmance of a 33-year sentence for a defendant whose post-arrest conduct involved nonfatal overdoses underscores the difficulty of challenging long sentences on appeal, particularly when district judges methodically walk through § 3553(a).

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Atkins, though unpublished, is a robust reaffirmation of several powerful tools in the federal sentencing arsenal:

It embraces an expansive view of relevant conduct, treating pre-arrest street trafficking, drugs stored at home, and post-arrest jailhouse dealing as one continuous course of conduct, thereby justifying high drug-quantity enhancements.
It confirms that the firearm enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) applies even when the guns are not present at the exact time or place of the charged distribution, so long as they are part of the broader drug enterprise.
It extends the line of cases authorizing upward departures for overdose-related injuries under § 5K2.2, holding that multiple nonfatal overdoses, with hospitalizations but no clear permanent disability, constitute “significant physical injury.”
It illustrates the continued deference to district courts in substantive reasonableness review: a mid-range 396‑month sentence, grounded in a thorough § 3553(a) analysis, stands intact against arguments that age and reduced recidivism risk warranted a lower term.

For practitioners, the case is a cautionary tale about the sweeping reach of the Guidelines, particularly in drug and firearm cases, and a reminder that admissions about prior conduct and seemingly “dismissed” facts can decisively shape the final sentence. For courts, it confirms the central role of relevant conduct, firearm enhancements, and injury-based departures in calibrating sentences amid the dual crises of gun violence and opioid overdoses.