Clarifying the “Dangerousness” Standard for Felon Disarmament After Bruen: United States v. Foster (6th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in United States v. Deaires Martez Foster, No. 24‑1488 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025), sits squarely within the post‑Bruen wave of Second Amendment litigation targeting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal felon‑in‑possession statute. While the panel explicitly recognizes that it is bound by the circuit’s earlier, published decision in United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024), Foster is important because it:

Applies the “dangerous persons” framework announced in Williams to a concrete factual record.
Explains how violent conduct and drug‑related activity virtually compel a finding of dangerousness.
Rejects an attempt to use youth and brain‑development science as a categorical way out of “dangerousness.”
Illustrates that a defendant’s current pretrial behavior can be used to demonstrate continuing dangerousness for Second Amendment purposes.

Although marked “Not Recommended for Publication,” the opinion offers a detailed and practitioner‑useful template for how district courts (and litigants) should evaluate as‑applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) in the Sixth Circuit after Williams.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Earlier RICO Case: Armed Robbery and Gang Activity

Foster’s Second Amendment claim arises against the backdrop of an earlier federal case: United States v. Hamilton, No. 2:16‑cr‑20062 (E.D. Mich.), where he was one of 13 defendants charged in a RICO conspiracy linked to the “Rollin 60s Crips,” a Detroit street gang.

The 2016 RICO indictment alleged that Foster (a.k.a. “Trigger”):

Offered a $100 bounty on Facebook for the murder of a rival gang member (July 19, 2009).
Committed an armed robbery with a sawed‑off shotgun, stealing a victim’s phone, watch, money, and jacket (April 25, 2010).
Posted on Facebook about plans to murder rival gang members (October 4, 2011).
Negotiated prices and offered to sell marijuana in mid‑2011.
Advertised marijuana prices in October 2011.
Received a handgun and a machine gun for use in robberies in 2009.

In a March 2017 Rule 11 plea agreement, Foster pled guilty to Count One (RICO conspiracy) with an agreed Guidelines range of 51–63 months. The plea agreement’s factual basis focused on:

The April 25, 2010 armed robbery with a sawed‑off shotgun.
His assistance in the sale of drugs on behalf of the gang.

In open court, Foster admitted the armed robbery and clarified that, while he personally did not sell drugs, he “gave knowledge” or advice to those who did. He also agreed in the plea agreement to forfeit his firearms, including a Marlin 12‑gauge shotgun. He was sentenced in February 2018 to 35 months’ imprisonment and completed his incarceration in October 2020 and supervised release in October 2022.

B. The 2023 Firearm Possession and New Federal Indictment

On July 29, 2023, Foster and his 11‑year‑old son were at a convenience store when two patrolling officers noticed Foster’s quick, evasive movement back into the store upon seeing their patrol car. Finding this suspicious, the officers entered the store. They saw the butt of a handgun protruding from Foster’s pants pocket and initiated a Terry-style investigative stop to determine whether Foster had a Michigan concealed pistol license (CPL).

When questioned, Foster stated he did not have his wallet with him. Concluding that his possession was likely illegal, the officers detained and disarmed him. On August 15, 2023, a federal grand jury indicted Foster under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

C. District Court Proceedings in the § 922(g)(1) Case

Foster filed two key pretrial motions:

Motion to dismiss the indictment (Dec. 22, 2023) on the ground that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied after New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).
Motion to suppress (Dec. 26, 2023) arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to approach him, conduct the Terry stop, or inquire about his CPL.

The district court denied both motions:

On the § 922(g)(1) motion, the court held that Bruen did not overrule District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and relied on Sixth Circuit precedent (United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2010)) which treated § 922(g)(1) as presumptively constitutional.
On the suppression motion, after hearing testimony and reviewing video, the court found the stop and seizure lawful under Terry v. Ohio and denied suppression.

On February 22, 2024, Foster entered a guilty plea to the felon‑in‑possession charge. At sentencing on May 30, 2024, the court:

Calculated a total offense level of 12 (base 14, minus 2 for acceptance).
Placed him in Criminal History Category II.
Determined an advisory Guideline range of 12–18 months.
Imposed a sentence of six months (time served), six months of home confinement, and 18 months of supervised release.

Foster appealed, challenging only the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). The government moved to dismiss the appeal on the theory that Foster’s unconditional guilty plea barred his constitutional challenge, but a motions panel deferred that motion to the merits panel. The merits panel ultimately denied the government’s motion as unnecessary, because it affirmed on the merits.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision proceeds in two main steps:

Facial challenge. The panel holds that Foster’s claim that § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional is foreclosed by binding circuit precedent—specifically United States v. Williams, which upheld § 922(g)(1) as facially constitutional after Bruen.
As‑applied challenge under the “dangerous persons” test. The panel then considers Foster’s argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him, because he is allegedly not “dangerous” under the Williams framework. Applying Williams, the court:
- Confirms that the defendant bears the burden of proving he is not dangerous.
- Considers Foster’s entire criminal record, including the prior RICO‑related conduct.
- Gives particular weight to his armed robbery with a sawed‑off shotgun and his involvement in drug‑trafficking activity.
- Relies on more recent findings that his drug use and noncompliance with pretrial conditions make him a danger to others.
- Rejects Foster’s argument that his youth (22 years old at the time of the RICO conviction and even younger at the time of the armed robbery) and brain development undermine his current dangerousness.

Concluding that Foster is “exactly the type of individual our history and tradition allow Congress to disarm,” the court affirms his § 922(g)(1) conviction and the district court’s denial of his constitutional challenge.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024)

Williams is the backbone of this opinion. There, the Sixth Circuit undertook a post‑Bruen analysis of § 922(g)(1) and concluded that:

§ 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional.
Historically, legislatures had authority to disarm “dangerous” or threatening individuals, not necessarily every person convicted of a felony.
Therefore, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to “dangerous people”, and firearms restrictions must be assessed under an individualized “dangerousness” inquiry when challenged.
In that as‑applied context, the defendant bears the burden of showing he is not dangerous, and courts may consult the defendant’s entire criminal record.

Foster simply cannot get past Williams on his facial claim. The panel expressly invokes the panel‑precedent rule:

“One panel of this court may not overrule the decision of another panel; only the en banc court or the United States Supreme Court may overrule the prior panel.” (citing United States v. Ferguson, 868 F.3d 514, 515 (6th Cir. 2017)).

Thus, regardless of any scholarly or doctrinal criticisms Foster raises against Williams, the panel emphasizes it is bound to treat § 922(g)(1) as facially valid and to apply the Williams “dangerousness” test to his as‑applied challenge.

2. Supreme Court Second Amendment Cases: Heller and Bruen

The district court’s opinion—on which the Sixth Circuit relies—framed its analysis through Heller and Bruen:

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms, but included an important caveat:
“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons….”
That language has long undergirded the presumption that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), refined the Second Amendment test, rejecting “means‑end” scrutiny in favor of an inquiry focused on:
1. Whether the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct (e.g., carrying a handgun); and
2. If so, whether the government can justify the regulation by pointing to a “historical tradition” of similar firearm regulation.
Bruen emphasized rights of “law‑abiding, responsible citizens,” thereby implicitly leaving space for disarming those who are not law‑abiding or who present a threat to public safety.

In Williams (and by extension in Foster), the Sixth Circuit harmonizes Heller’s “presumptively lawful felon prohibitions” language with Bruen’s historical‑tradition test by rooting § 922(g)(1)’s validity in a long tradition of disarming dangerous persons. Foster is an application of that synthesis.

3. The Panel‑Precedent Rule – United States v. Ferguson

Ferguson reiterates that a three‑judge panel of the Sixth Circuit cannot overrule another panel’s published decision; that task belongs only to the full court sitting en banc or to the Supreme Court. This is decisive for Foster’s facial challenge: whether or not Williams is correct, this panel must follow it.

4. As‑Applied Challenges and Standard of Review – Zillow v. Miller and Goins

The court cites two recent Sixth Circuit opinions to clarify procedural rules:

Zillow, Inc. v. Miller, 126 F.4th 445 (6th Cir. 2025), for the definition of an as‑applied challenge: a claim that a statute is unconstitutional specifically as it applies to the challenger’s conduct and circumstances, even if valid in other applications.
United States v. Goins, 118 F.4th 794 (6th Cir. 2024), for the proposition that appellate review of the constitutionality of a federal statute is de novo—no deference to the district court’s legal conclusion.

5. Post‑Williams “Dangerousness” Cases: Fordham, Vaughn, Oravets, Palm, Fenderson, Parham

To flesh out what counts as “dangerous,” the panel draws from several recent Sixth Circuit decisions (some unpublished) applying Williams:

United States v. Fordham, No. 24‑1491, 2025 WL 318229 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025): Armed robbery is “particularly probative” of a defendant’s dangerousness.
United States v. Vaughn, No. 23‑5790, 2024 WL 4615853 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 2024): Convictions like aggravated robbery are “highly probative” and alone can almost certainly justify a conclusion that the defendant is dangerous enough to be constitutionally disarmed.
United States v. Oravets, No. 24‑3817, 2025 WL 2682632 (6th Cir. Sept. 19, 2025): “Drug trafficking often motivates violent crime,” providing a basis for finding dangerousness.
United States v. Palm, No. 24‑1524, 2025 WL 1927724 (6th Cir. July 14, 2025): A drug‑trafficking conviction presents an “inherent threat of danger to the public.”
Fenderson v. United States, No. 24‑3643, 2024 WL 5347131 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 2024): Drug‑trafficking offenses “can pose a significant threat of danger and thus can justify a finding of danger.”
United States v. Parham, 119 F.4th 488 (6th Cir. 2024): Quoted for the proposition that some offenders are “exactly the type of individual our history and tradition allow Congress to disarm.”

These authorities are not mere window dressing. They show a developing, consistent line in the Sixth Circuit: violent offenses (especially robbery) and drug‑trafficking offenses are treated as strong—often sufficient—indicators of dangerousness under the Second Amendment framework adopted in Williams.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Disposition of the Government’s “Guilty Plea Bars Appeal” Argument

The government argued that Foster’s **unconditional guilty plea** barred his constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) on appeal. A motions panel deferred this issue to the merits panel. The merits panel states:

“Because we affirm the district court’s judgment on the merits, we deny the motion as unnecessary.”

This is a notable move. The court:

Does not resolve whether an unconditional plea precludes a post‑plea Second Amendment challenge to the statute of conviction.
Avoids potentially complicated interactions with Supreme Court cases like Class v. United States (which held some constitutional claims survive a guilty plea).
Leaves the law in the Sixth Circuit on this question unsettled, at least in this opinion.

In practice, however, the opinion will be cited primarily for the dangerousness analysis, not for plea‑waiver doctrine.

2. Facial Challenge: Bound by Williams

Foster’s broadest claim—that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional in all its applications—fails for a straightforward reason: Williams has already held the statute facially valid.

The panel explicitly invokes Ferguson’s rule that one three‑judge panel cannot overrule another’s decision. As a result:

Foster’s facial attack on § 922(g)(1) is categorically rejected by binding precedent.
His only plausible Second Amendment avenue is an as‑applied challenge under the Williams dangerousness framework.

3. As‑Applied Challenge: The Williams Dangerousness Framework

The opinion then turns to Foster’s as‑applied argument. Under Williams, a defendant can seek to show that:

Although § 922(g)(1) is facially valid, its application to this particular person, in light of his history and characteristics, violates the Second Amendment because he is not the kind of “dangerous” person whom history and tradition permitted the government to disarm.

The key features of this framework, as reiterated in Foster, are:

Individualized opportunity. A defendant must be given a meaningful opportunity to make an individualized showing that he is not actually dangerous.
Defendant’s burden. The defendant bears the burden of proving that he is not dangerous. This is a critical, defendant‑unfriendly allocation of proof.
Entire criminal record considered. Courts examine the defendant’s entire criminal record, not just the particular felony that triggered § 922(g)(1). This widens the net of relevant conduct.
Weight of violent and drug‑related crimes. Violent crimes like murder, rape, assault, and robbery are “strong evidence” of dangerousness; drug‑trafficking offenses also “pose a significant threat of danger.”

Under this model, Foster had to overcome significant built‑in presumptions of danger stemming from his past armed robbery and his role in gang‑related drug dealing.

4. Application to Foster’s Criminal Record

The court frames Foster’s criminal record as follows:

A conviction arising from his participation in a RICO conspiracy linked to a violent street gang.
An armed robbery with a sawed‑off shotgun—a paradigmatic violent offense—committed at age 16.
Participation in or assistance with the gang’s drug‑trafficking operations.

Citing Fordham and Vaughn, the panel treats armed robbery as “particularly probative” of dangerousness, and nearly sufficient in itself. It then invokes Oravets, Palm, and Fenderson for the proposition that drug‑trafficking activity is strongly associated with violence and danger, and thus contributes significantly to dangerousness.

The combined effect is that Foster’s criminal history, viewed through this lens, heavily tilts the dangerousness analysis against him before his age‑based arguments are even considered.

5. Rejecting the “Youth and Brain Development” Argument

Foster’s principal attempt to rebut dangerousness was novel: he claimed that his predicate RICO conviction occurred when he was 22, and that neuroscience shows the brain’s “impulse control, complex decision making, inhibition, and planning” functions do not fully mature until about age 25. He thus argued he should not be judged “dangerous” based on conduct committed before that age.

The court responds in two steps:

It clarifies what Foster is not arguing: he is not denying that a 22‑year‑old involved in violent gang activity is dangerous at that time.
It characterizes his argument as effectively claiming that:
“It does not matter how dangerous he was when he was 22 (or any time before he turned 25), all that matters is his dangerousness now. Put another way, Foster is arguing that an otherwise dangerous convict can shed his dangerousness by celebrating his 25th birthday.”

The court dismisses this as unsupported by “neither law nor common sense.” Crucially, the panel does not say that age and maturation are irrelevant in principle. Instead, it rejects the notion of a categorical cutoff at age 25 that somehow erases or discounts dangerousness arising from serious violent crimes committed before age 25.

In other words, youth at the time of past offenses might be a factor in an individualized dangerousness analysis, but it is not a trump card that automatically disqualifies those offenses from consideration once the defendant turns 25. Foster’s attempt to turn developmental neuroscience into a categorical rule fails.

6. Current Dangerousness: Reliance on Pretrial‑Release Violations and Drug Use

The opinion then asks: even if one indulged Foster’s premise that only his current dangerousness matters, is he now non‑dangerous? The panel answers “no,” relying on a district court order denying Foster’s motion to revoke his detention.

That order found that Foster:

Repeatedly failed to comply with electronic monitoring conditions.
Failed to provide an accurate residential address.
Failed to appear for drug testing.
Failed to remain at an inpatient treatment facility.
Had escalating drug use that significantly impaired his decision‑making.
Had substance‑abuse and mental‑health issues rendering him a possible danger to others.

From this, the district court had concluded that Foster posed both a high risk of flight and a danger to the community. The Sixth Circuit imports those factual findings into the Second Amendment dangerousness analysis and concludes that Foster’s current circumstances confirm—rather than rebut—his ongoing dangerousness.

This is significant. It shows that under the Williams framework:

Courts may consider not just old convictions, but also recent conduct, including behavior on pretrial release.
Substance abuse and mental‑health instability, especially when coupled with non‑compliance and firearms possession, are relevant indicators of dangerousness.

7. Synthesis: Why Foster “Is Exactly the Type of Individual” Who Can Be Disarmed

The panel ultimately adopts language from Fordham and Parham:

“The violent nature of [Foster]’s past felony convictions . . . indicates that [Foster] ‘is exactly the type of individual our history and tradition allow Congress to disarm.’”

The conclusion rests on three pillars:

Serious violent crime. His armed robbery with a sawed‑off shotgun is strongly indicative of a willingness to use extreme violence.
Gang‑linked drug activity. His role in facilitating the gang’s drug trafficking connects him to a trade historically associated with violence and firearms.
Ongoing noncompliance and drug‑related risk. His repeated violations of pretrial conditions and substance‑abuse issues show persistent disregard for legal constraints and ongoing risk to the community.

Against this backdrop, Foster’s claim that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him is found to be untenable.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Consolidating the Sixth Circuit’s “Dangerous Persons” Model

Foster continues the Sixth Circuit’s crystallization of Second Amendment doctrine after Bruen. The key elements of that doctrine, now reinforced, are:

§ 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional, consistent with Heller and Bruen, because history supports disarming dangerous individuals.
Defendants may pursue as‑applied Second Amendment challenges, but the burden is on them to show they fall outside the category of dangerous individuals.
Violent and drug‑trafficking offenses will almost always make those challenges extraordinarily difficult to win.

In practical terms, the Sixth Circuit is positioning § 922(g)(1) as constitutionally secure against challenges from persons with:

robbery or aggravated‑robbery convictions,
other serious violent felonies, and
significant drug‑trafficking histories, especially linked to organized crime or gangs.

B. Treatment of Youthful Offenders and Neuroscience Arguments

One of Foster’s more notable contributions is its explicit rejection of the idea that adolescent neurodevelopment research can be converted into a categorical Second Amendment rule that insulates adults from disarmament based on serious crimes committed before age 25.

While leaving room for courts to consider youth as a mitigating factor in an individualized analysis, the opinion sends a clear signal:

Courts will not adopt rigid age thresholds (like 25) as automatic “expiration dates” for dangerousness.
Serious violent and drug‑related conduct committed at 16, 18, or 22 can continue to carry weight in Second Amendment dangerousness assessments years later.

This will matter in future litigation where defendants argue for a more rehabilitative, youth‑focused view of their criminal history in the Second Amendment context.

C. Use of Pretrial‑Release and Drug‑Use Evidence in Second Amendment Analysis

Another important aspect of Foster is its reliance on evidence from a detention‑order proceeding—traditionally a bail/detention issue—within the substantive Second Amendment analysis.

The opinion suggests that:

Courts may freely use findings about pretrial noncompliance, substance use, and mental‑health instability as evidence of dangerousness in Second Amendment cases.
The dangerousness standard in bail law (under the Bail Reform Act) and dangerousness under Second Amendment doctrine are conceptually linked and can mutually inform one another.

For defendants, this means that poor performance on pretrial release is not just a bail problem; it can also materially undermine any subsequent Second Amendment challenge to firearm disarmament.

D. Inter‑Circuit Context

Though Foster focuses on Sixth Circuit precedent, it sits in a broader national debate on felon‑in‑possession laws after Bruen:

Some circuits (such as the Third Circuit in Range v. Attorney General) have been more open to as‑applied challenges in non‑violent, relatively minor cases.
The Sixth Circuit, especially after Williams and now Foster, is taking a comparatively restrictive stance, upholding § 922(g)(1) in a wide range of cases involving serious or drug‑related criminal history.

Foster thus contributes to a clear regional pattern: in the Sixth Circuit, as‑applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) will be exceptionally difficult for defendants with any meaningful history of violence or drug trafficking.

E. Practical Litigation Lessons

For practitioners litigating in the Sixth Circuit, Foster suggests that a successful as‑applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) will likely require:

No significant violent or drug‑trafficking convictions.
Substantial evidence of rehabilitation, law‑abiding conduct, and community stability.
Clean or exemplary performance on supervision and pretrial release.
Careful marshalling of favorable facts that distinguish the defendant from the “dangerous” class.

By contrast, where a defendant’s record resembles Foster’s—serious violent conduct, gang activity, drug involvement, and ongoing noncompliance—Foster provides a ready citation for the government to argue that § 922(g)(1) is constitutionally applied.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Facial vs. As‑Applied Constitutional Challenges

A facial challenge claims that a law is unconstitutional in every application. If successful, the law is effectively struck down.
An as‑applied challenge concedes that the law might be valid in many situations but argues it is unconstitutional as applied to this defendant based on his specific circumstances and conduct.

In Foster, the facial challenge fails because Williams already held § 922(g)(1) constitutional in general. The as‑applied challenge fails because Foster cannot show he is not “dangerous” under his individual facts.

B. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1): The Felon‑in‑Possession Statute

Section 922(g)(1) makes it a federal crime for a person to possess a firearm if he has been:

“Convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” (with certain exceptions).

In everyday terms, it generally forbids felons from possessing guns, subject to some narrow categorical exceptions and whatever constitutional limits the Second Amendment imposes.

C. The “Dangerous Persons” Standard After Williams

Under the Sixth Circuit’s reading of Heller and Bruen in Williams:

The Second Amendment protects the rights of “law‑abiding, responsible citizens.”
History shows a tradition of disarming people considered dangerous (e.g., those threatening public safety or authority).
§ 922(g)(1) is valid insofar as it disarms people who fall into that dangerous category.
A defendant can argue that, despite his conviction record, he is not dangerous now, but he carries the burden of proof.

Foster illustrates how hard it is to meet this burden when the criminal record includes armed robbery and drug‑related gang activity.

D. Terry Stops and CPL Checks (Briefly)

Although not central to the Second Amendment holding, Foster also involved a Fourth Amendment question about the officers’ initial stop:

A Terry stop allows police to briefly stop and question a person if they have a “reasonable suspicion” that the person is involved in criminal activity.
Here, the officers saw suspicious evasive behavior plus a visible gun butt, prompting a reasonable suspicion that Foster might be carrying a concealed firearm without a CPL.
The district court found the stop lawful, and that issue is not on appeal.

E. Rule 11 Plea Agreements and Forfeiture

A Rule 11 plea agreement is a negotiated guilty plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, often specifying the factual basis for the plea, the guidelines range, and any forfeiture obligations.
Forfeiture refers to the surrender of property used in or derived from certain crimes—in Foster’s case, his firearms, including a shotgun.

These details matter because Foster’s admissions in the plea colloquy and agreement are used to establish the violent and drug‑related aspects of his criminal record for the dangerousness analysis.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Foster reinforces and concretizes the Sixth Circuit’s post‑Bruen Second Amendment framework for evaluating § 922(g)(1). Relying squarely on Williams, the panel:

Rejects a facial challenge to the felon‑in‑possession statute as foreclosed by binding precedent.
Applies an individualized “dangerousness” test to Foster’s as‑applied challenge.
Concludes that his history of armed robbery, gang‑related drug‑trafficking activity, and current noncompliance and substance‑abuse problems make him “exactly the type of individual” whom Congress may constitutionally disarm.
Declines to recognize any rule that serious crimes committed before age 25 are categorically less probative of dangerousness because of brain development.

In the broader legal landscape, Foster signals that in the Sixth Circuit:

Second Amendment as‑applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) will remain theoretically available, but
Defendants with serious violent or drug‑related criminal histories face a steep, often insurmountable, uphill battle in attempting to show they are not “dangerous” for purposes of firearm disarmament.

Though unpublished and non‑precedential in the formal sense, Foster will likely be cited frequently by litigants and district courts as a roadmap for applying Williams and for evaluating whether a defendant’s record places him within the historically established class of persons whom Congress may constitutionally bar from possessing firearms.