Civil Contempt, “Timely” Compliance, and Strategic Withholding of Bargaining Information:
Commentary on Rieth-Riley Construction Co. v. NLRB (6th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Sixth Circuit’s unpublished opinion in Rieth-Riley Construction Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, Case Nos. 23‑1899/1946 (6th Cir. Nov. 26, 2025) (not recommended for publication), in which the court adjudicated an employer in civil contempt for failing to comply fully and promptly with a previously enforced National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) order requiring disclosure of bargaining information to a union.

The decision sits at the intersection of:

the Board’s doctrine regarding an employer’s duty to provide information to a bargaining representative,
the federal courts’ civil contempt power to enforce NLRB orders, and
the “technical refusal-to-bargain” strategy that employers sometimes use to obtain judicial review of union certification.

Although unpublished, the opinion lays down a clear and significant principle: an employer subject to a court-enforced NLRB order requiring it to furnish information “in a timely manner” cannot withhold that information for strategic reasons (such as preserving a technical refusal-to-bargain defense), and the absence of an explicit deadline does not render the order indefinite or unenforceable in contempt.

The case thus provides important guidance on:

what counts as a “definite and specific” order for civil contempt purposes,
how judicial admissions in contempt proceedings can establish a violation, and
the limits of employer tactics designed to preserve litigation positions in parallel NLRB proceedings.

II. Background of the Dispute

A. The Parties

Rieth-Riley Construction Co., Inc. is an asphalt paving and heavy road construction contractor operating in Michigan. Its employees include individuals represented by Local 324, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO (“the Union”), which represents over 14,000 employees in Michigan.

B. Underlying Labor Dispute and Information Requests

The Union and Rieth-Riley had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that expired in May 2018. Negotiations over a successor agreement stalled, particularly over subcontracting and wages. During negotiations, the Union requested information from Rieth-Riley that is classically central to bargaining:

Subcontracting information (requested in 2020) – related to the Union’s concerns that Rieth-Riley was subcontracting work covered by the bargaining unit.
Bargaining unit employee information – on November 3, 2020, the Union requested:
- “the compensation, both wages and fringe benefits, for all employees (including their names and classifications) doing work covered by the work jurisdiction provisions of the expired [agreement]”
- for the period “from June 1, 2020, to the present.”

The Union alleged that Rieth-Riley refused to provide this information and filed unfair labor practice charges in June and November 2020. The Board’s General Counsel issued complaints alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5), on the ground that the employer unlawfully refused to furnish information that was relevant and necessary to bargaining.

C. ALJ and Board Decisions; Prior Sixth Circuit Enforcement

In 2022, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Rieth-Riley’s refusal to provide the requested subcontracting and bargaining unit information violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (5). The ALJ ordered Rieth-Riley to furnish the Union with the requested information.

In 2023, the Board largely affirmed the ALJ’s ruling, with a minor limitation on the scope of subcontracting information. The Board’s final order required Rieth-Riley to:

Cease and desist from:
- “failing and refusing to furnish [the Union] with requested information that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its functions as the collective-bargaining representative.”
Affirmatively:
- “[f]urnish to the Union in a timely manner the information requested by the Union on November 3, 2020.”

This Board decision is reported as Rieth-Riley Construction Co., 372 NLRB No. 142 (2023). The November 3, 2020 information request was specifically for employee compensation information from June 1, 2020 “to the present.”

Rieth-Riley petitioned the Sixth Circuit for review, and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement. In August 2024, the Sixth Circuit:

Denied Rieth-Riley’s petition for review; and
Granted the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement in full.

That earlier opinion is reported at Rieth-Riley Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 114 F.4th 519 (6th Cir. 2024). On March 25, 2025, the Sixth Circuit issued its mandate, making the enforcement judgment final and executable.

D. Post-Mandate Conduct and the Contempt Petition

After the mandate issued, Rieth-Riley produced some information in April 2025 and certified to the Board that it had “provided the information which the Board’s order required.” The Board discovered that the production:

covered the period June 1, 2020 through June 15, 2022 only,
even though the order required information from June 1, 2020 “to the present.”

The Board asked Rieth-Riley to supply the missing information (June 16, 2022 through the present). In May 2025, the Union also requested:

the underlying payroll records used to prepare the summary information Rieth-Riley had provided, and
for each bargaining unit employee, “the specific rates of pay, hours of work, dates worked, and amounts and dates of fringe benefits paid” from June 1, 2020 “to the present.”

Rieth-Riley refused to provide any further information. On June 12, 2025, it informed the Board that it would not produce additional data until:

the Sixth Circuit resolved Rieth-Riley’s then-pending petition for review in a related appeal, or
the Union agreed that production would not waive the employer’s “technical refusal-to-bargain” defense in that appeal.

In response, the Board petitioned the Sixth Circuit to:

Adjudicate Rieth-Riley in civil contempt for:
- withholding information for the period June 16, 2022 to the present; and
- failing to respond to the Union’s May 2025 request for underlying payroll data.
Impose sanctions for contempt.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

Judge Cole, writing for a unanimous panel (Judges Moore, Cole, and Mathis), issued a split ruling:

Civil contempt (granted in part):
- The court found clear and convincing evidence that Rieth-Riley violated a definite and specific court order by failing to furnish the requested compensation information from June 16, 2022 to the present.
- The phrase “in a timely manner” in the Board’s order was held to be sufficiently definite for contempt purposes, even without a fixed deadline.
- Rieth-Riley’s own litigation filings contained judicial admissions that it had intentionally withheld a portion of the requested information, which the court treated as dispositive evidence of violation.
- Rieth-Riley’s asserted justification—that full compliance would allegedly waive its “technical refusal-to-bargain” defense in other litigation—did not establish an inability to comply and did not excuse contempt.
- The court thus adjudicated Rieth-Riley in civil contempt for failing to provide responsive information from June 16, 2022 forward.
Further information request (reserved; show-cause order):
- The court acknowledged that the Union’s May 2025 request for detailed underlying payroll data appeared to seek information that is “presumptively relevant” to bargaining (wages, hours, fringe benefits).
- It recognized that ongoing “cease and desist” portions of a Board order can support contempt for new violations arising after the initial judgment.
- However, the court held that the present record did not contain sufficient detail about Rieth-Riley’s actual production and the precise scope of that order to determine whether the employer’s non-response to the May 2025 request constituted contempt.
- Accordingly, the court did not yet hold Rieth-Riley in contempt on this ground and instead issued an order to show cause directing Rieth-Riley to admit or deny specific allegations concerning that May 2025 request.

In brief, Rieth-Riley was held in civil contempt for withholding information after June 15, 2022, and the court initiated further factual development regarding the employer’s failure to provide the underlying payroll records requested in May 2025.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Civil Contempt Standard Applied

The court began with the established three-part test for civil contempt, citing NLRB v. Bannum, Inc., 93 F.4th 973 (6th Cir. 2024):

There must be a definite and specific order requiring certain action or inaction.
The alleged contemnor must have knowledge of that order.
The contemnor must have violated that order.

Once a moving party (here, the Board) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the opposing party knowingly violated a definite and specific order, the burden shifts to the alleged contemnor to demonstrate:

that compliance is genuinely impossible,
that its inability is not self-induced, and
that it took all reasonable steps to comply.

This “impossibility” defense, drawn from Gary’s Electric and Gascho, must be supported with detailed, categorical evidence and is intentionally difficult to sustain. Crucially, good faith alone is not a defense to civil contempt.

Applying this framework, the court found:

The Board’s order, as enforced by the Sixth Circuit in 2024, was definite and specific.
Rieth-Riley did not contest its knowledge of the order.
Rieth-Riley’s own admissions established that it had knowingly withheld a portion of the ordered information, without any genuine impossibility of compliance.

B. The Definite and Specific Nature of the “Timely Manner” Obligation

Rieth-Riley’s primary threshold argument was that the Board’s requirement that it furnish the November 3, 2020 information “in a timely manner” was too vague to support a contempt finding. Because the order did not specify an exact deadline (e.g., “within 30 days”), the employer argued it could not be held in contempt for any delay.

The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, relying in part on:

NLRB v. Lynair, Inc., 380 F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1967) – where an employer was found in contempt of an NLRB bargaining order even though the order did not set out a specific time period for compliance.
Gascho v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC, 875 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 2017) – which cautions that ambiguous or conditional orders should not typically ground contempt, but distinguishes commands that are operative once a mandate issues.

The court emphasized that not every enforceable order needs a calendar date attached to it. The key distinction is whether the order is:

operative and unconditional—like a directive to furnish information “in a timely manner” once the court’s mandate issues; versus
conditional or contingent—e.g., an order that is triggered only upon some uncertain future event, which might be too indefinite to enforce by contempt under Gascho.

Here:

The Board’s order became final and unconditional when the Sixth Circuit’s mandate issued on March 25, 2025.
At that point, Rieth-Riley was required to make a prompt, reasonable, good-faith effort to provide all requested information.

Therefore, the court held that the order was definite and specific within the meaning of civil contempt doctrine, and any alleged ambiguity must be construed in favor of the contemnor but does not exist here.

C. Timeliness Under Board Doctrine and the Employer’s Admissions

Rieth-Riley tried to invoke Board precedent about the flexible nature of timeliness in responding to information requests. Citing Western Penn Power Co., 339 NLRB 585 (2003), the employer stressed that:

There is no per se rule for how fast an employer must respond.
The Board looks at the totality of circumstances, including the complexity and scope of the information request and the difficulty in retrieving the data.

While that general proposition is correct, the Sixth Circuit noted that the same Board doctrine also requires consideration of:

the complexity and extent of information sought,
its availability, and
the effort needed to retrieve it (citing Western Penn Power and Samaritan Medical Center, 319 NLRB 392 (1995)).

Rieth-Riley did not argue that:

the request was unusually complex,
the data were hard to retrieve, or
it lacked the capacity to assemble the data.

Instead, it admittedintentionally withholding part of the requested information for strategic reasons. In its own filings, Rieth-Riley stated, among other things, that:

it had “only withheld a portion of that information temporarily,” and
it would “complete its production ‘immediately’ upon resolution of the [pending] appeal.”

The court treated these as judicial admissions, citing:

MacDonald v. General Motors Corp., 110 F.3d 337, 340 (6th Cir. 1997) – which recognizes that “deliberate, clear and unambiguous” statements of fact in litigation bind the party as judicial admissions.
Borror Property Management, LLC v. Oro Karric N., LLC, 979 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2020) – emphasizing that parties are generally bound by statements in pleadings and by arguments of counsel.
United States v. Burns, 109 F. App’x 52, 58 (6th Cir. 2004) – recognizing that statements in briefs can reach the level of judicial admissions.
NLRB v. Bannum, Inc., 93 F.4th at 979–80 – where admissions in a response to a contempt petition were treated as binding concessions.

By conceding in its own filings that it possessed and was deliberately withholding the relevant data, Rieth-Riley effectively eliminated any factual dispute about:

its ability to comply; and
its knowing decision not to do so.

Given that the information had been withheld for at least eight months after the mandate issued, with no claimed logistical or technical obstacles, the court concluded that this delay was not “timely” within the meaning of the order or Board precedent.

D. Rejection of the “Technical Refusal-to-Bargain” Justification

Rieth-Riley’s principal substantive defense on the third prong (violation) was that it was justified in withholding the post‑June 15, 2022 information to preserve its “technical refusal‑to‑bargain” defense in a separate pending appeal concerning the Union’s status or underlying obligation to bargain.

1. The technical refusal-to-bargain doctrine

The opinion relies on Peabody Coal Co. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1984), which describes the doctrine: an employer that wishes to challenge a union’s certification in court may sometimes:

refuse to bargain with the union (a “technical” § 8(a)(5) violation),
thereby provoking a Board unfair labor practice finding, and
then seek judicial review of the Board’s underlying certification decision.

However, an employer can waive its objection to certification by engaging in conduct inconsistent with refusing to bargain—e.g., by bargaining in fact, or by taking actions that the law treats as acceptance of the union’s status.

2. Why compliance with a court order is not a waiver

Rieth-Riley argued that providing information beyond June 15, 2022 would be treated as “bargaining activity” that could waive its technical refusal-to-bargain position. The Sixth Circuit rejected this, for two reasons:

Compliance with a court order is not optional bargaining conduct. Citing Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975), the court reiterated that “all orders and judgments of courts must be complied with promptly.” A party does not have discretion to ignore a judgment while it preserves a litigation strategy.
Waiver must be knowing and voluntary. The court cited Kellom v. Quinn, 86 F.4th 288, 291 (6th Cir. 2023), for the general principle that waivers of rights must be knowing and voluntary. Complying with a binding court order is not a voluntary act of bargaining; it is compelled by law. Thus, producing information in response to an enforced NLRB order does not constitute a knowing and voluntary waiver of an appellate defense.

Because Rieth-Riley’s asserted fear of waiver was self-induced and legally unfounded, it could not support an impossibility defense under Gascho and Gary’s Electric, nor excuse noncompliance under Bannum. The company failed to:

show “categorically and in detail” that it was unable to comply,
demonstrate that this alleged inability was not of its own making, or
prove that it had taken all reasonable steps to comply.

Thus, the court concluded that Rieth-Riley did not meet its “difficult burden” to avoid contempt, and the asserted preservation of a technical refusal-to-bargain defense could not justify the continued withholding of information.

E. The May 2025 Request for Underlying Payroll Records

The Board also sought a holding of contempt based on Rieth-Riley’s failure to provide the underlying payroll data requested by the Union in May 2025. Those records would verify or supplement the summary information previously produced for June 1, 2020 through June 15, 2022, including:

individual rates of pay,
hours and dates worked, and
dates and amounts of fringe benefits paid.

1. Presumptive relevance of wages, hours, and benefits

The court reiterated its holding from the prior Rieth-Riley appeal (114 F.4th at 532), quoting NLRB v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 497 F.2d 747, 751 (6th Cir. 1974), that:

Bargaining unit employees’ wages, hours, and working conditions are “presumptively relevant” to bargaining issues.
An employer therefore has a duty to provide such information on request, without requiring the union to prove relevance in each instance.

Given this, the Union’s May 2025 request clearly sought fundamental economic data at the heart of mandatory subjects of bargaining.

2. Contempt for “new” violations of a continuing cease-and-desist order

The Board pointed to the cease-and-desist portion of the original order, which barred Rieth-Riley from “refusing to furnish [the Union] with requested information that is relevant and necessary” to its role. The Sixth Circuit noted that contempt can be based on new violations of an ongoing cease-and-desist directive, citing:

NLRB v. Teamsters Local No. 327, 592 F.2d 921, 924–25 (6th Cir. 1979), where a union was held in contempt for additional violations occurring several years after the original court judgments.

Thus, Rieth-Riley’s post‑judgment refusal to provide new, presumptively relevant information could potentially fall within the scope of the original cease‑and‑desist order and support a contempt finding.

3. Why the court did not yet find contempt on this ground

Despite recognizing that wages and benefits are presumptively relevant and that ongoing cease-and-desist orders can ground contempt for new violations, the court stopped short of immediately holding Rieth-Riley in contempt for refusing the May 2025 request.

Instead, the court concluded that it did not yet have sufficient information about:

exactly what information Rieth-Riley had already produced, and
whether the May 2025 request fell squarely within the scope of the original Board order or sought additional information arguably beyond that scope.

To preserve due process and develop a clearer factual record, the court issued an order to show cause, requiring Rieth-Riley to admit or deny specific allegations of contempt concerning the May 2025 request. Only after that process will the court decide whether a second contempt adjudication (and any associated sanctions) is warranted.

F. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. NLRB v. Bannum, Inc., 93 F.4th 973 (6th Cir. 2024)

Bannum provides the civil contempt framework the court applied here:

requiring “clear and convincing” evidence of violation of a definite and specific order,
shifting the burden to the alleged contemnor to prove impossibility, and
rejecting good faith alone as a defense.

Rieth-Riley builds on Bannum by:

using the same framework in the context of an enforced NLRB information order, and
clarifying that litigation admissions in a contempt response can themselves constitute “clear and convincing” evidence of a violation.

2. Elec. Workers Pension Tr. Fund of Local Union #58 v. Gary’s Electric Serv. Co., 340 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003)

Gary’s Electric governs the “impossibility” defense:

the contemnor must show its inability “categorically and in detail,”
that the inability is not self-created, and
that all reasonable steps were taken to comply.

In Rieth-Riley, the employer’s strategic concern about preserving a defense in a separate appeal did not meet this standard. It was neither a factual impossibility nor a non-self-induced barrier to compliance.

3. Gascho v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC, 875 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 2017)

Gascho provides two relevant principles:

Orders “conditioned on future events” may not be sufficiently definite for contempt.
The impossibility defense requires proof that noncompliance is not self-induced and that the contemnor has taken all reasonable steps to comply.

The Sixth Circuit in Rieth-Riley distinguished the Board order at issue from the conditional orders discussed in Gascho: once the mandate issued, the obligation to furnish information in a timely manner was immediate and unconditional.

4. NLRB v. Lynair, Inc., 380 F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1967)

Lynair is key to the notion that an order can be sufficiently definite for contempt even without a specific time limit. The court used it to counter Rieth-Riley’s argument that “timely manner” is inherently vague.

5. Judicial admissions cases: Borror, MacDonald, Burns

Together, these cases confirm that:

Pleadings, briefs, and litigation representations can bind a party as judicial admissions when they are clear, deliberate, and unequivocal.
Courts may rely on such admissions in adjudicating contempt without requiring additional proof.

In Rieth-Riley, this doctrine allowed the court to rely heavily on the employer’s own characterizations of its conduct (i.e., “temporary” withholding) to establish noncompliance.

6. Union information-rights precedents: Goodyear Aerospace and prior Rieth-Riley (114 F.4th 519)

Goodyear Aerospace and the 2024 Rieth-Riley decision provide the substantive foundation that:

wages, hours, and conditions of employment are presumptively relevant to bargaining;
an employer has a duty to provide such information on request to a certified bargaining representative.

This background is important for the May 2025 request issue: the court indicates that the requested underlying payroll data falls squarely within the category of information to which the Union is presumptively entitled, strengthening the Board’s argument that refusal to furnish it can violate the continuing order.

7. Peabody Coal, Maness, and Kellom on waiver and court orders

These cases together shape the court’s response to Rieth-Riley’s waiver-based justification:

Peabody Coal explains the technical refusal-to-bargain framework and waiver concepts.
Maness establishes that court orders must be obeyed; the remedy for an allegedly improper order is to seek relief from the court, not to disobey.
Kellom reiterates that waivers must be knowing and voluntary, undercutting any claim that compelled compliance is a voluntary waiver of rights.

8. Teamsters Local 327 and contempt for new violations

By citing Teamsters Local No. 327, the court signals that:

an ongoing cease-and-desist order can support contempt for new violations occurring years after the initial judgment; and
similarly, Rieth-Riley’s refusal to honor new, post-judgment information requests may constitute contempt if those requests are covered by the original cease-and-desist provision.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA

§ 8(a)(1): Prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights (e.g., to unionize, bargain collectively).
§ 8(a)(5): Requires employers to bargain in good faith with the employees’ chosen representative; refusing to provide relevant information can be a refusal to bargain in violation of § 8(a)(5).

2. Duty to Furnish Information

When a union is the certified bargaining representative, the employer must provide information that is:

relevant and necessary to the union’s performance of its duties;
wages, hours, and working conditions are treated as presumptively relevant, meaning the union does not need to prove relevance case by case.

3. Civil Contempt

Civil contempt is a court’s power to enforce its orders and judgments. In this context:

It is remedial, not criminal: its purpose is to compel compliance or compensate for harm, not to punish as such.
Standard: The moving party must show by clear and convincing evidence that a definite and specific order was knowingly violated.
Defense: The alleged contemnor can avoid contempt by proving genuine, non-self-induced impossibility and that it took all reasonable steps to comply.

4. “Technical” Refusal-to-Bargain

This is a procedural device:

An employer that objects to a union’s certification may refuse to bargain (committing a technical § 8(a)(5) violation) to trigger a Board finding and then seek judicial review of the certification in a later enforcement proceeding.
But if the employer actually bargains or undertakes conduct inconsistent with its refusal, it may be found to have waived its objection.

5. Judicial Admissions

Judicial admissions are:

conclusive concessions of fact made by a party in pleadings, briefs, or formal statements in a case;
they relieve the opposing party of the burden to prove those facts at trial or in motion practice.

In this case, Rieth-Riley’s statements that it was “temporarily” withholding information and would produce it later were treated as binding admissions that:

it had the information, and
was knowingly choosing not to provide it.

6. “Timely Manner” in Board Practice

The Board assesses timeliness based on:

the nature, scope, and complexity of the request;
the employer’s capacity to retrieve the data;
evidence of good-faith efforts to respond “as promptly as circumstances allow.”

There is no bright-line rule (e.g., “30 days”), but deliberate, prolonged withholding without logistical justification is not considered timely, especially after a court has enforced an order.

VI. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Employers Subject to NLRB Orders

The ruling sends several clear signals to employers:

“Timely” is enforceable. Orders that require information to be furnished “in a timely manner” can be sufficiently definite to support a civil contempt finding, even without a specific deadline.
Strategic withholding is dangerous. Deliberately delaying compliance to preserve litigation positions, such as a technical refusal-to-bargain defense, will not shield an employer from contempt.
Admissions matter. Statements in briefs and responses can and will be used as judicial admissions, potentially sealing a finding of contempt without extensive evidentiary development.
Compliance first, arguments later. If an employer believes that compliance with an order risks waiving a defense, the proper remedy is to seek clarification, modification, or a stay from the court—not to disobey the order.

B. For Unions and the NLRB

For unions and the Board, this opinion:

Strengthens enforcement tools. It confirms that courts will enforce NLRB information orders robustly and will use contempt to address strategic noncompliance.
Confirms presumption of relevance. It reinforces that information regarding wages, hours, and benefits is presumptively relevant and must be produced, which will aid the Board in litigating information-refusal cases.
Supports continued oversight. The willingness to issue a show-cause order on the May 2025 payroll request shows that courts will actively supervise compliance with ongoing cease-and-desist obligations, not just one-off remedial directives.

C. For Civil Contempt Doctrine

Doctrinally, Rieth-Riley clarifies and emphasizes:

Scope of “definiteness.” A qualitative term like “timely” in an order can be sufficiently definite when read in context, particularly where the nature of the obligation is clear (e.g., turn over defined information) and the order becomes unconditional upon issuance of the mandate.
Use of judicial admissions. Contempt findings may rest substantially on the contemnor’s own written admissions in responding to a contempt petition, reducing the need for protracted factual hearings.
Rigid standard for impossibility. The case reaffirms that self‑created obstacles—especially those tied to conscious litigation strategies—do not constitute “impossibility” for contempt purposes.

D. Limitations and the Nonprecedential Nature of the Opinion

The decision is explicitly “not recommended for publication,” which in the Sixth Circuit generally means it is not binding precedent in the same way published opinions are. However:

Unpublished opinions may still be cited as persuasive authority under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and local rules.
The opinion’s reasoning is firmly anchored in published Sixth Circuit precedents and Supreme Court cases, making its approach likely to influence similar disputes concerning NLRB enforcement and civil contempt.

VII. Conclusion

Rieth-Riley Construction Co. v. NLRB (6th Cir. 2025) represents an important application of civil contempt principles to the enforcement of NLRB information orders. It underscores that:

a court-enforced directive to provide bargaining information “in a timely manner” is sufficiently definite for contempt,
employers cannot withhold information to protect a technical refusal-to-bargain strategy,
compliance with a court order does not amount to a voluntary waiver of appellate defenses, and
judicial admissions in litigation can be decisive in establishing contempt.

By adjudicating Rieth-Riley in civil contempt for withholding post‑June 15, 2022 data while simultaneously issuing a show-cause order on the May 2025 payroll request, the Sixth Circuit balances firm enforcement with careful attention to the scope of the underlying order and the factual record.

In the broader legal context, the case reinforces the judiciary’s expectation that parties will promptly and fully comply with NLRB orders once they are judicially enforced, and that strategic noncompliance—particularly in the crucial area of union access to bargaining information—will not be tolerated.

Civil Contempt, “Timely” Compliance, and Strategic Withholding of Bargaining Information: Commentary on Rieth-Riley Construction Co. v. NLRB (6th Cir. 2025)