Brekelmans v. Salas: Finality, Certification, and Appellate Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy Appeals

I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit's decision in Nicolaas Brekelmans v. Max Salas (arising out of In re: Len Salas) is a technically narrow but practically important jurisdictional ruling. The court does not resolve the underlying dispute over avoidance actions and property interests. Instead, it confronts a recurring problem in bankruptcy litigation: when, and by what mechanism, may parties obtain appellate review in the court of appeals after a district court has issued a non-final order reviewing a bankruptcy court decision?

The case traces back to a tragic 2015 apartment fire in Washington, D.C., in which two tenants died. Their parents (the plaintiffs) obtained multimillion-dollar wrongful-death verdicts against both the record property owner, Len Salas (the debtor in this case), and his father and property manager, Max Salas. Both Len and Max subsequently filed for bankruptcy in different courts, spawning complex questions about property ownership, homestead exemptions, and the trustee’s avoidance powers under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544–553.

The immediate dispute in this appeal, however, is procedural: after the bankruptcy court granted partial summary judgment to Max and denied the plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs secured an interlocutory appeal to the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The district court affirmed in part and remanded for further proceedings, without certifying its own order for a further interlocutory appeal and without entering a final judgment. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Sixth Circuit.

The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Cole, holds that it lacks jurisdiction. The decision crisply organizes the possible jurisdictional pathways—final-order review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 158(d)(1), interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(b) and 158(d)(2), and partial-final-judgment review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)—and explains why none apply. The key takeaway is a clear rule: even where a district court has entertained an interlocutory appeal from a bankruptcy court, a further appeal to the court of appeals still requires either a final order or proper certification under the statutes or rules governing interlocutory review.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit dismisses the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Its reasoning proceeds in two main steps:

No final order under §§ 1291 or 158(d)(1). The district court’s order did not end the litigation. It affirmed a partial grant and denial of summary judgment and expressly remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings. Because the adversary proceeding remains unresolved and the remand requires more than purely ministerial acts, the order is not a “final decision” under the general finality rule (§ 1291) or under the more flexible bankruptcy finality rule (§ 158(d)(1)).
No certified interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b), § 158(d)(2), or Rule 54(b). While the district court properly granted an interlocutory appeal to itself under § 1292(b) to review the bankruptcy court’s partial summary judgment order, neither the parties nor the district court took the additional step of certifying the district court’s own decision for appeal to the Sixth Circuit. There was no certification under § 1292(b) or § 158(d)(2), and the district court did not enter a Rule 54(b) judgment. Without such certification, the Sixth Circuit “lack[s] discretion to accept the appeal.”

Because jurisdiction is absent on all possible routes, the Sixth Circuit dismisses the appeal.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Wrongful-Death Litigation

In 2015, a fire in a Washington, D.C. rental property killed two tenants. Their parents—the plaintiffs here—filed wrongful-death suits in D.C. trial court against:

Len Salas, the record owner of the property; and
Max Salas, Len’s father and the property manager.

A jury rendered multimillion-dollar verdicts for the plaintiffs and found Len and Max jointly and severally liable. This means each defendant is independently responsible for the full amount of the judgment; the plaintiffs can collect all of it from either or both defendants, subject to contribution issues between the defendants themselves.

B. Dual Bankruptcy Filings and Property Rights

After the verdict:

Max filed for bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia.
Len filed for bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.

In Max’s bankruptcy case, the D.C. bankruptcy court concluded that Max was entitled to an unlimited homestead exemption in the property, finding that he held both legal and beneficial interests in it. That ruling effectively insulated the property from many creditor claims in Max’s bankruptcy.

Against that backdrop, the trustee in Len’s Tennessee bankruptcy case took the following step: instead of directly pursuing avoidance and recovery actions regarding the property under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544–553, the trustee sold the estate’s interest in those claims. These provisions generally empower the trustee to:

Unwind certain prepetition transfers that are fraudulent or otherwise voidable (e.g., under § 544 and § 548); and
Recover the transferred property or its value for the benefit of the estate and its creditors (e.g., § 550).

At auction, the plaintiffs purchased the estate’s interest in these avoidance and recovery rights. In effect, they stepped into the trustee’s shoes as plaintiffs in an avoidance action against Max.

C. The Adversary Proceeding and Summary Judgment Motions

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001 requires that most avoidance claims be brought as adversary proceedings—standalone lawsuits within the bankruptcy case that closely resemble ordinary civil litigation. The plaintiffs therefore filed an adversary complaint against Max in Len’s bankruptcy, seeking to avoid certain transfers and recover the property or its value.

Both sides moved for summary judgment:

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment on all claims.
Max filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, at least on the fraudulent conveyance counts.

The bankruptcy court:

Denied the plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion on all counts; and
Granted Max’s motion in part, as to the fraudulent conveyance claims, but not as to all claims.

Crucially, therefore, the adversary proceeding remained pending on the unresolved claims.

D. The Interlocutory Appeal to the District Court

The plaintiffs sought to challenge the bankruptcy court’s partial summary judgment rulings before the adversary proceeding concluded. They moved for leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal in the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). That statute allows a district court to entertain an immediate appeal from an otherwise non-final order if:

the order involves a controlling question of law,
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, and
an immediate appeal may materially advance the termination of the litigation.

The district court found that the § 1292(b) requirements were satisfied and granted the plaintiffs’ request. On the merits, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rulings and remanded the case for further proceedings. It did not:

certify its own order for interlocutory appeal to the Sixth Circuit under § 1292(b) or § 158(d)(2), or
enter a final judgment under Rule 54(b).

Despite this, the plaintiffs then filed a notice of appeal to the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit, on its own initiative, examined whether it had jurisdiction to hear the case.

IV. The Court’s Jurisdictional Analysis

A. The Duty to Examine Jurisdiction Sua Sponte

The court begins by emphasizing that appellate jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or oversight. Citing Answers in Genesis of Kentucky, Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2009), the panel reiterates that an appellate court must assure itself of jurisdiction in every case and may raise the jurisdictional issue sua sponte (on its own motion), even if the parties do not.

B. No Final Judgment Under § 1291

The first potential jurisdictional basis is the general federal appellate jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which grants courts of appeals jurisdiction over “final decisions of the district courts acting in any capacity.” Relying on Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992), the opinion notes that § 1291 applies whether the district court sits in its usual trial capacity or as a bankruptcy appellate court.

A “final decision” under § 1291 is one that:

“ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” —Page Plus of Atlanta, Inc. v. Owl Wireless, LLC, 733 F.3d 658, 659 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945))

The Supreme Court has similarly explained that a § 1291 “final decision” is normally an order that resolves the entire case. Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 38 (2020).

Applying these standards, the Sixth Circuit concludes:

The district court’s order did not end the litigation on the merits.
Several claims in the adversary proceeding remain unresolved.
The district court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings, which may include trial on remaining claims.

Thus, the district court’s order is not final under § 1291.

C. No Final Order Under § 158(d)(1)’s “Relaxed” Bankruptcy Finality Rule

Because this case arises from a bankruptcy proceeding, another potential jurisdictional hook is 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). That provision grants the courts of appeals jurisdiction over “all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees” entered by district courts or bankruptcy appellate panels when they act as appellate courts under § 158(a) or (b).

Bankruptcy finality is more flexible than in ordinary civil litigation, reflecting the fact that a single bankruptcy case consists of many discrete disputes—claim objections, avoidance actions, stay-relief motions, plan confirmations, and more—each of which might, in isolation, be a full case. As the Supreme Court explained in Ritzen Group:

Congress adopted a relaxed finality rule “to make orders in bankruptcy cases immediately appealable if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger bankruptcy case.” 589 U.S. at 39.

The Sixth Circuit adds, quoting In re Wohleber, 833 F. App’x 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2020), that:

“orders finally resolving discrete disputes in a bankruptcy case—such as adversary proceedings—may qualify as immediately appealable final orders even though the overall bankruptcy case is ongoing.”

However, the “discrete dispute” in this context is the adversary proceeding itself. The district court’s order here did not resolve that proceeding. Instead, it affirmed the bankruptcy court’s partial summary judgment rulings and remanded for further substantive adjudication. The adversary complaint remains pending.

The court then invokes a more specific principle: under Settembre v. Fidelity & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 552 F.3d 438, 442 (6th Cir. 2009), a remand order to a bankruptcy court is not final for § 158(d)(1) purposes unless the remand is “of a ministerial character”—that is, the bankruptcy court has nothing left to do but perform a non-discretionary, automatic task (such as calculating a sum under a fixed formula or entering a purely mechanical order).

Here, the remand is plainly not ministerial: the bankruptcy court must conduct further proceedings on unresolved claims, which may include fact-finding, legal rulings, and possibly trial. Accordingly:

The district court’s order is not a final decision resolving a discrete dispute.
The remand is not “ministerial.”

Therefore, § 158(d)(1) does not confer jurisdiction.

D. No Certified Interlocutory Appeal Under § 1292(b)

The court next turns to the statutes and rules that allow interlocutory (non-final) appeals to the court of appeals. The first is 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which provides:

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an otherwise nonappealable order, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals . . . may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order.

The statute thus requires:

A written certification by the district court that the order meets the three § 1292(b) criteria; and
An application to the court of appeals within ten days, followed by a discretionary acceptance of the appeal by the court of appeals.

What happened here is more nuanced. The plaintiffs successfully invoked § 1292(b) once—at the earlier stage—in asking the district court to hear an interlocutory appeal from the bankruptcy court’s partial summary judgment order. The district court granted leave to appeal, heard the merits, and affirmed.

But after the district court decided the § 1292(b) appeal, neither:

did the district court certify its own order for further interlocutory appeal to the Sixth Circuit, nor
did the plaintiffs move the district court for such certification or apply to the Sixth Circuit for § 1292(b) review.

The Sixth Circuit underscores a critical point of practice: a § 1292(b) certification from the district court to itself for review of a bankruptcy order does not magically carry forward and create appellate jurisdiction in the court of appeals. Once the district court has issued its own interlocutory decision, that decision must independently satisfy § 1292(b)’s certification requirements before the court of appeals may exercise discretion to hear a further interlocutory appeal.

Because no such certification occurred, § 1292(b) offers no jurisdictional basis in the Sixth Circuit.

E. No Certification Under § 158(d)(2)

The court next examines 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2), a bankruptcy-specific provision enacted to facilitate direct appeals to the courts of appeals in appropriate cases. Under § 158(d)(2)(A), an appeal may be certified if:

the order “involves a question of law as to which there is no controlling decision” or a matter of public importance;
the order “involves a question of law requiring resolution of conflicting decisions”; or
an immediate appeal “may materially advance the progress” of the case.

Certification can come from:

the bankruptcy court;
the district court (or BAP) acting as an appellate court; or
the parties jointly.

Even after such certification, the court of appeals has discretion—highlighted by Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 508 (2015), and cited by the Sixth Circuit—to accept or decline the appeal.

In this case:

No court—neither the bankruptcy court nor the district court—certified any order under § 158(d)(2).
The parties did not jointly seek such certification.

Thus § 158(d)(2) cannot support jurisdiction.

F. No Partial Final Judgment Under Rule 54(b)

Lastly, the court considers Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which allows a district court to create a final, appealable judgment as to fewer than all claims or parties in a multi-claim case. As applied in bankruptcy appeals, Rule 54(b) can make an otherwise interlocutory order “final” for purposes of § 1291 and § 158(d)(1). See In re Lindsey, 726 F.3d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 2013).

But Rule 54(b) is not self-executing. It requires two express district court findings:

An express determination that there is “no just reason for delay”; and
An express direction for the entry of final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties.

The district court made no such Rule 54(b) certification here. It simply affirmed the bankruptcy court and remanded for further proceedings. Accordingly, there is no partial final judgment that could be appealed under § 1291 or § 158(d)(1).

G. The Bottom Line: No Jurisdictional Pathway Is Open

Having marched through each possible source of appellate jurisdiction—§ 1291, § 158(d)(1), § 1292(b), § 158(d)(2), and Rule 54(b)—the Sixth Circuit finds all pathways closed. There is:

No final order;
No ministerial remand;
No certified interlocutory appeal;
No partial final judgment.

Without any statutory basis to review the case, the court states succinctly: “We therefore lack discretion to accept the appeal” and dismisses it for lack of jurisdiction.

V. Precedents and Their Influence on the Decision

A. Answers in Genesis and the Duty to Police Jurisdiction

The reliance on Answers in Genesis of Kentucky, Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd. reinforces that appellate courts must examine jurisdiction even when the parties do not. This approach:

Ensures fidelity to Article III and statutory limits on jurisdiction.
Prevents parties from manipulating or waiving jurisdictional rules.

In practice, it means litigants can never safely assume that silence from the other side, or even the court, will validate a borderline appeal. The court may (and here did) raise jurisdiction sua sponte and terminate the case.

B. Catlin, Page Plus, and Classical Finality Under § 1291

Catlin v. United States provides the bedrock definition of a final decision under § 1291, and Page Plus of Atlanta, Inc. v. Owl Wireless, LLC applies that definition in the Sixth Circuit. Together, they establish a bright-line: unless the order fully resolves the case and leaves only execution of judgment, it is not final.

By invoking these cases, the Sixth Circuit signals that—even in the bankruptcy context, where finality is more flexible—ordinary § 1291 finality remains a distinct inquiry from bankruptcy-specific finality under § 158(d)(1).

C. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain: District Courts “Acting in Any Capacity”

Germain clarifies that § 1291 applies to district courts when they act both as trial courts and as appellate courts from bankruptcy courts. This is crucial: one might otherwise wonder whether the special bankruptcy finality regime displaces general § 1291 review for district court decisions in bankruptcy appeals. The court rightly treats them as coexisting but distinct routes—both of which fail in this case.

D. Ritzen Group and the “Relaxed” Bankruptcy Finality Doctrine

Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC is the Supreme Court’s modern articulation of bankruptcy finality. The Court held that certain orders within a bankruptcy case are themselves final and therefore immediately appealable if they conclusively resolve a discrete procedural unit—for example, an order denying relief from the automatic stay.

Here, the Sixth Circuit extends Ritzen’s logic to emphasize:

A discrete adversary proceeding within a bankruptcy case is itself a “unit of litigation” for finality purposes.
But an order that leaves that adversary proceeding alive—with unresolved claims and the prospect of trial—is not final, notwithstanding its significance.

E. In re Wohleber and Discrete Disputes

In re Wohleber is a Sixth Circuit application of the “discrete dispute” concept. Citing it, the court notes that adversary proceedings are generally treated as distinct disputes that can yield final orders even while the main bankruptcy case continues. This supports the proposition that, if the adversary proceeding were fully resolved, appeal would likely be permissible. But because it is not, Wohleber cuts against, not for, jurisdiction here.

F. Settembre and the Ministerial Remand Rule

Settembre v. Fidelity & Guar. Life Ins. Co. establishes the important limitation that remand orders are final only when the remaining tasks in the lower court are “ministerial.” Substantive proceedings—like resolving remaining claims, conducting trials, or making discretionary findings—defeat finality.

By relying on Settembre, the court signals that a remand to bankruptcy court almost never creates appellate jurisdiction unless the remand is a mere formality. Here, because additional merits proceedings are needed, the remand is non-ministerial and thus non-final.

G. In re Lindsey and the Role of Rule 54(b)

In re Lindsey illuminates how Rule 54(b) interacts with §§ 1291 and 158(d)(1). When some but not all claims in a multi-claim proceeding are resolved, Rule 54(b) allows the district court to expressly transform that partial resolution into an appealable final judgment. Without that express certification and direction, the order remains interlocutory.

The court’s citation to Lindsey reinforces that the district court did not follow the Rule 54(b) pathway here, leaving no partial final judgment.

H. Bullard and Discretionary Direct Appeals Under § 158(d)(2)

Finally, the opinion cites Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, which explains the discretionary nature of direct appeals under § 158(d)(2). Bullard demonstrates that even when a case presents an important or unsettled legal question, the court of appeals may decline to exercise discretionary jurisdiction. The reference in Brekelmans underscores that, absent certification under § 158(d)(2), the Sixth Circuit cannot even reach that discretionary stage.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Final vs. Interlocutory Orders

A final order:

Resolves every claim against every party in the relevant “case” or “discrete dispute.”
Leaves nothing to be done except to enforce or execute the judgment.

An interlocutory order is any order that comes in the middle of a case and does not fully dispose of it—for example:

Partial summary judgment on some but not all claims; or
Orders granting or denying motions to dismiss some claims.

Interlocutory orders are generally not immediately appealable, precisely to avoid piecemeal appeals that would fragment litigation and burden appellate courts.

B. Bankruptcy’s “Relaxed Finality”

Bankruptcy is different from ordinary litigation because one bankruptcy case can encompass dozens of discrete legal fights. Rather than waiting until everything in the entire bankruptcy is over, the law allows appeals from orders that conclusively resolve a discrete dispute—such as:

An adversary proceeding (a lawsuit within the bankruptcy case);
A motion for relief from the automatic stay;
A plan-confirmation dispute.

But the “relaxation” is limited. The discrete dispute must itself be fully decided; an order that leaves parts of that unit unresolved is not final.

C. Ministerial vs. Substantive Remands

A ministerial remand is a remand where the lower court has no real discretion or substantive work to do, such as:

Entering judgment in a specific, mandated amount;
Calculating interest according to a fixed formula;
Issuing a purely clerical order.

A substantive remand involves further decision-making, such as:

Assessing evidence;
Resolving remaining claims;
Holding additional hearings or trials.

Only ministerial remands are treated as final; substantive remands are not.

D. Interlocutory Appeals: § 1292(b) and § 158(d)(2)

Both § 1292(b) and § 158(d)(2) provide mechanisms for extraordinary, early appellate review of non-final orders. Key features:

§ 1292(b): Applies broadly to civil cases; requires district court certification that the order presents a controlling, debatable legal question whose early resolution may materially advance the case; requires timely application to the court of appeals, which has discretion to accept or decline.
§ 158(d)(2): Specific to bankruptcy; allows certification by the bankruptcy court, district court, or the parties jointly when the order raises a novel, important, or conflicting legal question, or when an immediate appeal would materially advance the case. Again, the court of appeals retains discretion.

In both regimes, certification is indispensable. Without it, the court of appeals lacks even discretionary power to hear the case.

E. Rule 54(b) Partial Final Judgments

Rule 54(b) allows a district court to treat a decision that resolves one or more claims (but not all) as a final, appealable judgment if:

The district court determines there is no just reason for delay; and
The court expressly directs entry of judgment on those claims.

This rule gives district courts control over whether and when to allow piecemeal appeals in complex multi-claim cases. Without a Rule 54(b) certification, the resolution of fewer than all claims remains interlocutory.

VII. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. A Clear Roadmap for Bankruptcy Appellate Practice

Brekelmans v. Salas provides a highly structured roadmap for practitioners in bankruptcy appeals within the Sixth Circuit. In effect, it answers the question: “How do I get from a bankruptcy court’s ruling to the Sixth Circuit?” The answer is:

Appeal first to the district court (or BAP) under § 158(a), unless a direct appeal is certified under § 158(d)(2).
After the district court rules, the case is appealable to the Sixth Circuit only if:
- The district court’s decision is final under § 1291 or § 158(d)(1); or
- There is proper certification under § 1292(b) or § 158(d)(2); or
- The district court has certified a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b).

Anything short of that is not enough. Counsel cannot simply assume that because a district court entertained an interlocutory appeal from the bankruptcy court, a further appeal automatically lies to the court of appeals.

B. Reinforcing Limits on Piecemeal Appeals

The decision reaffirms a central policy choice in federal appellate structure: the strong presumption against piecemeal review. Especially in bankruptcy, where a single case can generate numerous potentially appealable issues, this presumption is critical to:

Preventing fragmentation of litigation;
Conserving appellate resources; and
Avoiding derailment of ongoing proceedings by repeated, premature appeals.

By insisting on strict compliance with finality and certification rules, the Sixth Circuit contributes to a stable, predictable appellate framework.

C. Consequences for the Parties in This Case

For the plaintiffs, the immediate consequence is significant delay: their challenge to the bankruptcy court’s partial summary judgment rulings will not be heard by the Sixth Circuit at this stage. Instead, they must:

Return to the bankruptcy court;
Litigate the remaining claims in the adversary proceeding; and
Await a fully final resolution (or obtain proper certification) before pursuing further appellate review.

This underscores a practical lesson: jurisdictional missteps can cost time and money even when the underlying legal arguments may be substantial.

D. Guidance for Future Litigants

Future litigants should:

Carefully distinguish between:
- Interlocutory appeals from bankruptcy court to district court; and
- Further appeals from the district court to the court of appeals.
Explicitly request:
- § 1292(b) certification by the district court if they wish to seek interlocutory review in the court of appeals; and/or
- § 158(d)(2) certification from the bankruptcy or district court (or by joint motion); and/or
- Rule 54(b) certification if only some claims are resolved.
Monitor and comply with strict time limits, especially the ten-day window under § 1292(b).

In short, Brekelmans warns practitioners that jurisdictional planning must be part of their appellate strategy from the outset of a bankruptcy dispute.

E. Doctrinal Consolidation Rather Than Radical Change

Doctrinally, the opinion does not create a novel standard; instead, it consolidates and applies existing Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedents:

Catlin and Page Plus for ordinary finality;
Germain on district courts acting in any capacity under § 1291;
Ritzen Group and Wohleber on bankruptcy finality and discrete disputes;
Settembre on ministerial remands;
Lindsey and Rule 54(b) on partial final judgments; and
Bullard on § 158(d)(2) certification and discretion.

Its significance lies less in doctrinal innovation than in its clean, integrated explanation of how all these doctrines interlock in a concrete setting.

VIII. Conclusion

Brekelmans v. Salas stands as an instructive precedent on appellate jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases within the Sixth Circuit. It teaches that:

The court of appeals has a non-waivable duty to examine its jurisdiction, even absent party objection.
A district court order reviewing a bankruptcy decision is not appealable to the court of appeals unless:
- It is final under § 1291 or § 158(d)(1), taking into account bankruptcy’s relaxed finality; or
- It is properly certified and accepted under § 1292(b) or § 158(d)(2); or
- It is transformed into a final judgment under Rule 54(b).
Remand orders to bankruptcy court are final only if they are purely ministerial; substantive remands are not.
Certification is not a one-time ticket that travels with the case; each appellate step (from bankruptcy court to district court, and from district court to court of appeals) must satisfy its own jurisdictional and certification requirements.

In an area as procedurally intricate as bankruptcy, this decision provides a valuable, structured guide for courts and practitioners alike. It reinforces the fundamental principle that appellate jurisdiction is conferred by statute and rule—not by equitable concerns or the importance of the underlying issues—and that strict adherence to those jurisdictional prerequisites is essential, even in the face of tragic facts and high-stakes litigation.