Aggregate Hardship, Exhaustion, and the High Bar for Non‑LPR Cancellation: Commentary on Pablo‑Ventura v. Bondi (6th Cir. 2025)

Aggregate Hardship, Exhaustion, and the High Bar for Non‑LPR Cancellation: Commentary on Antonio Pablo‑Ventura v. Bondi (6th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Antonio Pablo‑Ventura v. Bondi, No. 25‑3071 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025), sits squarely within the post‑Wilkinson v. Garland landscape of judicial review over cancellation‑of‑removal hardship determinations. Although “not recommended for publication” and therefore non‑precedential, the opinion is instructive in several important respects:

  • It applies the Supreme Court’s recognition in Wilkinson that “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a reviewable mixed question of law and fact.
  • It reinforces the extremely demanding nature of the hardship standard under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
  • It clarifies how little is required from an Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to satisfy the requirement of “cumulative” or “aggregate” hardship analysis.
  • It underscores the importance of issue exhaustion in immigration proceedings—particularly with respect to hardship theories such as “lack of immigration options.”
  • It reiterates that due‑process claims cannot be used to repackage mere disagreement with the agency’s weighing of hardship evidence.

This commentary provides a structured, detailed analysis of the decision, placing it in the broader doctrinal framework of non‑LPR cancellation of removal and examining its implications for practitioners and future litigants.

II. Background of the Case

A. Factual Background

Antonio Pablo‑Ventura is a native and citizen of Mexico who first entered the United States without admission or parole in 1999. He departed once in 2005 to visit family in Mexico and re‑entered in 2006, again without inspection. Since then, he has resided in the United States without lawful status.

At the time of his application for cancellation of removal:

  • He was married and had three children.
  • Two of those children (ages 10 and 12) were United States citizens—his qualifying relatives for purposes of § 1229b(b).
  • He was the sole breadwinner, earning approximately $1,300–$1,400 per week.
  • The family had around $34,000 in assets.

If removed, he testified:

  • His family would likely accompany him to Mexico, though his wife testified the choice would be difficult.
  • He feared violence in his hometown but acknowledged the family could potentially relocate elsewhere in Mexico.
  • He anticipated difficulty obtaining well‑paid employment but thought he might work with his father’s construction business or use his welding skills.
  • He believed schooling and other expenses in Mexico would be substantial.
  • He was concerned about his children’s limited Spanish and their need to adjust academically and culturally.

His wife corroborated much of this testimony. She:

  • Did not work and doubted she could remain in the United States without him.
  • Confirmed that the U.S.‑citizen children had never been to Mexico.
  • Expressed fear about conditions in their hometown in Mexico.
  • Testified that the children spoke some Spanish and were practicing to improve.

B. Procedural History

  1. Notice to Appear (2018): DHS served a Notice to Appear (NTA) charging Pablo‑Ventura as removable as a noncitizen present in the United States without admission or parole. He conceded removability.
  2. Application for Cancellation of Removal: He applied for non‑LPR cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), relying on alleged “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his two U.S.‑citizen children.
  3. Hearing before the IJ (Cleveland, March 17, 2022): The IJ found both Pablo‑Ventura and his wife credible but denied cancellation, concluding that the hardship to the qualifying children did not meet the statutory threshold. The IJ granted post‑conclusion voluntary departure.
  4. Appeal to the BIA: The BIA dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the statutory hardship standard was not met.
  5. Petition for Review to the Sixth Circuit: Pablo‑Ventura petitioned for review, alleging that the IJ and BIA committed multiple “legal errors” in applying the hardship standard and raising a due‑process claim.

C. Issues Before the Sixth Circuit

On petition for review, Pablo‑Ventura advanced several intertwined contentions:

  • The IJ failed to conduct a proper cumulative or aggregate analysis of hardship factors.
  • The IJ improperly considered certain hardships in isolation and neglected others, including:
    • Lack of immigration options (“absence of visa pathways”), and
    • Language barriers, especially his 10‑year‑old daughter’s limited Spanish.
  • The IJ inadequately evaluated the hardship his children would suffer if they relocated to Mexico.
  • The IJ allegedly overemphasized the children’s lack of medical issues, implying that serious medical problems were required for relief.
  • The IJ supposedly applied an “unconscionable” hardship standard, which is more stringent than the correct legal standard.
  • He also asserted a due‑process violation, essentially arguing that the IJ and BIA failed to consider all relevant evidence and factors.

The Sixth Circuit was thus asked to decide:

  • Whether the IJ and BIA correctly applied the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard to the undisputed facts.
  • Whether they satisfied the requirement to analyze hardship in the aggregate.
  • Whether any alleged omissions or misapplications rose to the level of legal or constitutional error warranting remand.

III. Summary of the Opinion

Judge Karen Nelson Moore, writing for a panel that included Judges Clay and White, denied the petition for review.

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

Relying on Moctezuma‑Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416 (6th Cir. 2024), itself grounded in Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024), the court reaffirmed that:

  • The question whether a petitioner has established “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a reviewable mixed question of law and fact.
  • The court reviews the BIA’s decision as the final agency decision, while also reviewing the IJ’s decision to the extent it is adopted or relied upon by the BIA. See Harmon v. Holder, 758 F.3d 728, 732 (6th Cir. 2014); Skripkov v. Barr, 966 F.3d 480, 486 (6th Cir. 2020).

The parties disputed the precise standard of review:

  • Pablo‑Ventura advocated for de novo review as to the mixed question.
  • The Government argued that the “compelling evidence” standard in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) applied.

The court expressly declined to resolve this dispute, holding that “under any level of deference, the IJ and BIA adequately supported the conclusion” that Pablo‑Ventura had not met the hardship standard.

B. Application of the Hardship Standard

The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed that “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” under § 1229b(b) requires hardship to qualifying relatives that is:

“significantly different from or greater than the hardship that a deported alien’s family normally experiences.” (Moctezuma‑Reyes, 124 F.4th at 422, quoting BIA’s Monreal‑Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (B.I.A. 2001)).

Applying this standard, the court held that:

  • Economic hardship, lower standard of living, and reduced opportunities in Mexico, though real, are “natural” and expected consequences of removal and do not ordinarily meet the standard.
  • Difficulties in adjustment, language barriers, and emotional strain from family separation or relocation are also typical consequences of removal.
  • Country‑conditions concerns (violence in the hometown) did not rise to the required level, especially since the family could move elsewhere in Mexico.
  • The children’s good health, while not a prerequisite to denial, was properly considered as just one factor among many.

C. Rejection of Alleged Legal Errors

The court addressed Pablo‑Ventura’s specific legal arguments as follows:

  • Cumulative/aggregate analysis: The record showed that both the IJ and BIA expressly stated they had considered the hardships “in the cumulative” and “in the aggregate.” The court deemed this sufficient and found no failure to aggregate.
  • Omitted factors:
    • Lack of immigration options: The court held that Pablo‑Ventura had not raised this issue before the IJ, so the IJ had no obligation to address it, and the court lacked jurisdiction to review it, citing Fernandez‑Villafan v. Garland, 2023 WL 8651267, and Tolentino‑Hernandez v. Garland, 2021 WL 4782689.
    • Language barrier & daughter’s Spanish: The IJ explicitly addressed concerns about the youngest child’s limited Spanish, along with testimony that all the children could speak some Spanish and were practicing to improve. The argument that this was ignored was “belied by the record.”
    • Mental‑health risk and suicide risk: The IJ acknowledged a psychotherapist’s report, characterizing it as addressing concerns about the family losing their community and stability. The court found no error in the IJ’s handling of this evidence.
  • Alleged “unconscionable” standard: The IJ specifically stated that the law does not require proof that hardship would be “unconscionable,” and neither the IJ nor BIA used that standard. The claim that the wrong standard was applied was rejected.
  • Separation vs. relocation hardships: The IJ carefully addressed both scenarios (family accompanying him to Mexico or remaining in the United States) and correctly concluded that neither scenario produced “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship on these facts.

D. Due‑Process Claim

The court rejected the due‑process argument as an impermissible attempt to “repackage” disagreements with the merits of the hardship determination as constitutional claims. Citing Fernandez‑Villafan and Araujo‑Padilla v. Garland, 854 F. App’x 646 (6th Cir. 2021), the panel reiterated that such re‑labeling does not create an independent due‑process violation.

Having found no legal or constitutional error, the court denied the petition for review.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Doctrinal Framework

1. Non‑LPR Cancellation of Removal (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b))

Section 1229b(b) allows the Attorney General to cancel removal of certain non‑permanent residents who:

  1. Have been continuously physically present in the United States for at least ten years;
  2. Have been persons of good moral character during that period;
  3. Have not been convicted of specified criminal offenses; and
  4. “Establish[] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [a qualifying] spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”

The hardship inquiry focuses on qualifying relatives—here, Pablo‑Ventura’s two U.S.‑citizen children. Hardship to the applicant himself is relevant only insofar as it bears on hardship to those relatives (e.g., if his mental health severely affects his children).

2. BIA’s Interpretation: Monreal‑Aguinaga

In In re Monreal‑Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (B.I.A. 2001), the BIA interpreted “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” as:

Hardship that is “substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected from the deportation of an alien with close family members here.” (Id. at 65).

This is a higher standard than “extreme hardship” found in other immigration provisions. The BIA’s formulation has been repeatedly approved by the federal courts and is explicitly quoted and embraced by the Sixth Circuit in Moctezuma‑Reyes and again in Pablo‑Ventura.

3. Supreme Court’s Framework: Wilkinson v. Garland

Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024), resolved a long‑standing jurisdictional ambiguity: Are hardship determinations for non‑LPR cancellation insulated from judicial review by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), or are they reviewable as “questions of law” under § 1252(a)(2)(D)?

The Supreme Court held:

  • The application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard to established facts is a mixed question of law and fact.
  • Such mixed questions are reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D), which preserves judicial review of “questions of law.”

At the same time, the Court emphasized that hardship determinations are “primarily factual” and therefore entitled to deferential review.

4. Sixth Circuit’s Implementation: Moctezuma‑Reyes and Progeny

In Moctezuma‑Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416 (6th Cir. 2024), the Sixth Circuit:

  • Confirmed the court has jurisdiction over hardship determinations as mixed questions of law and fact, following Wilkinson.
  • Stressed that the hardship standard is “difficult” to satisfy and that many severe consequences of removal are “expected,” not rare.
  • Reaffirmed that qualifying hardship must be “significantly different from or greater than” the usual hardships of deportation.

Subsequent unpublished decisions, such as:

  • Ceniceros v. Bondi, No. 24‑3345, 2025 WL 1012712 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2025),
  • Garcia Contreras v. Bondi, No. 24‑4051, 2025 WL 3094136 (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 2025),
  • Trinidad‑Contreras v. Bondi, No. 22‑3352, 2025 WL 2732495 (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 2025),

have built out a consistent pattern: the court will exercise jurisdiction but will rarely disturb the agency’s hardship determinations unless a clear legal misapplication or failure to consider critical categories of hardship is shown.

B. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024)

The Pablo‑Ventura opinion cites Wilkinson (via Moctezuma‑Reyes) to ground its jurisdiction. The key contribution of Wilkinson for this case is:

  • Hardship determinations in cancellation cases are reviewable mixed questions.
  • Nevertheless, the Court emphasized their fact‑intensive nature and urged deference to agency fact‑finding.

In Pablo‑Ventura, the panel adopts this framework but deliberately sidesteps the unresolved question of precise standard of review (“de novo” versus “compelling evidence”/substantial evidence), stating that the result would be the same “under any level of deference.”

2. Moctezuma‑Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416 (6th Cir. 2024)

Moctezuma‑Reyes supplies:

  • The working definition of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” as requiring hardship “significantly different from or greater than” the ordinary consequences of removal.
  • The acknowledgment that many serious hardships—financial strain, emotional distress, disruption of schooling—are “expected” and thus typically insufficient on their own.
  • The recognition that review is deferential because the inquiry is “primarily factual.”

In Pablo‑Ventura, this standard is applied in a textbook manner:

  • Financial and employment challenges in Mexico are deemed typical.
  • Educational disruption and language barriers are treated as common features of international relocation.
  • Emotional hardship and adjustment difficulties are recognized but characterized as ordinary effects of removal.

3. Sixth Circuit Immigration Review Framework: Harmon, Skripkov, Karimijanaki, Singh

The opinion also cites standard procedural precedents:

  • Harmon v. Holder, 758 F.3d 728 (6th Cir. 2014): The court reviews the BIA’s decision as the final agency decision, but also reviews the IJ’s decision where the BIA adopts or relies on it.
  • Skripkov v. Barr, 966 F.3d 480 (6th Cir. 2020) and Karimijanaki v. Holder, 579 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2009): Reiterate the same principle.
  • Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142 (6th Cir. 2021): Cited for the generally deferential approach to factual review in immigration cases.

4. Exhaustion and Unraised Issues: Fernandez‑Villafan & Tolentino‑Hernandez

A notable aspect of Pablo‑Ventura is its reliance on two unpublished decisions to reject hardship arguments not raised before the IJ:

  • Fernandez‑Villafan v. Garland, No. 23‑3223, 2023 WL 8651267 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2023): Held that since the petitioner did not raise “whether he could legally immigrate” before the IJ, he could not fault the IJ for not addressing it, and the court lacked jurisdiction.
  • Tolentino‑Hernandez v. Garland, No. 20‑4021, 2021 WL 4782689 (6th Cir. Oct. 13, 2021): Similarly rejected review of a hardship theory (no lawful means of immigrating) that had not been raised below.

Pablo‑Ventura uses these decisions to reinforce the principle that a petitioner:

“should not have expected the IJ to consider” hardship theories he did not affirmatively raise, particularly “lack of immigration options.”

The opinion thus underscores the centrality of administrative exhaustion under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).

5. “Unconscionable” Hardship & Proper Standard: Pinales‑Salas & Diaz‑Roblero

In rejecting the argument that the IJ applied an “unconscionable” standard, the panel cites:

  • Pinales‑Salas v. Garland, No. 23‑3675, 2024 WL 1510662 (6th Cir. Apr. 8, 2024) and
  • Diaz‑Roblero v. Garland, No. 23‑3873, 2024 WL 3596873 (6th Cir. July 31, 2024)

These decisions reaffirm:

  • The correct standard is “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” not “unconscionable hardship.”
  • It is permissible for IJs to note that hardship is a high bar while still expressly rejecting any “unconscionable” requirement.

In Pablo‑Ventura, the IJ explicitly stated that an applicant “need not show that ... hardship would be unconscionable,” and the Sixth Circuit treated that as conclusive evidence that the correct legal standard was applied.

6. “Typical Hardships” & Adjustment: Trinidad‑Contreras and Garcia Contreras

To characterize diminished employment opportunities and adjustment difficulties as insufficient, the panel cites:

  • Garcia Contreras v. Bondi, No. 24‑4051, 2025 WL 3094136 (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 2025): Financial hardship and reduced opportunities are typical results of removal.
  • Trinidad‑Contreras v. Bondi, No. 22‑3352, 2025 WL 2732495 (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 2025): A child’s need to adjust to a new country is “not unusual; it attends most moves to a foreign country.”

These cases reinforce the theme that many serious and distressing consequences of removal remain legally ordinary and hence insufficient under the high hardship threshold.

7. Due Process as “Repackaged” Merits: Fernandez‑Villafan & Araujo‑Padilla

Finally, Pablo‑Ventura leans on:

  • Fernandez‑Villafan (2023 WL 8651267), and
  • Araujo‑Padilla v. Garland, 854 F. App’x 646 (6th Cir. 2021)

to reject due‑process arguments that do no more than contest the agency’s factual weighing. The court reiterates that labeling a disagreement as “due process” does not transform it into a cognizable constitutional claim.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Depth

1. Jurisdiction and the “Any Standard of Deference” Approach

Post‑Wilkinson, it is settled that the Sixth Circuit has jurisdiction over cancellation‑of‑removal hardship determinations as mixed questions of law and fact. What remains less clear is the level of deference owed in reviewing those questions.

In Pablo‑Ventura:

  • The petitioner urged de novo review of the mixed question.
  • The Government advocated for the “compelling evidence” standard of § 1252(b)(4)(B), akin to substantial‑evidence review of factual findings.
  • The panel expressly declined to resolve the issue, deciding instead that the BIA’s decision would be affirmed under either standard.

Functionally, this approach:

  • Avoids prematurely choosing a side in an unresolved doctrinal tension.
  • Signals that, in practice, the court will almost always uphold agency hardship determinations absent an obvious legal misstep, because the underlying factual findings are not clearly disputed.

2. Aggregate/Cumulative Hardship Analysis

A central theme of Pablo‑Ventura’s petition was that the IJ allegedly failed to consider all hardship factors “in the aggregate” and instead evaluated each in isolation.

The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument by pointing to explicit language in the immigration decisions:

  • The IJ’s order:
    “[T]he record here does not establish that the hardships [the children] would experience in the cumulative would amount to the exceptional and extremely and [sic] unusual hardship level.” (AR at 62).
  • The IJ’s addendum:
    “All relevant factors, even if not extreme individually, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether exceptional and extremely unusual hardship exists.” (AR at 52).
  • The BIA’s decision:
    “Considering all relevant factors in the aggregate ... the respondent did not demonstrate that his children's hardship would be substantially beyond the hardships that family members commonly experience when a loved one is removed.” (AR at 4).

The panel treated these declarations, combined with the substantive discussion of various hardships, as sufficient proof that the IJ and BIA had complied with their obligation to conduct a cumulative hardship analysis.

Implicitly, the court adopts a presumption of regularity:

  • When the IJ and BIA state that they considered “all relevant factors in the aggregate,” the court will ordinarily accept that statement at face value, absent evidence to the contrary.
  • Appellants arguing that the agency evaluated hardships “in isolation” must point to a concrete, material hardship factor that was ignored or misstated, not merely minimized.

3. Treatment of Specific Hardship Factors

a. Economic Hardship and Employment Prospects

Pablo‑Ventura argued that his removal would impose severe financial hardship on his U.S.‑citizen children because:

  • He was the sole breadwinner.
  • It would be difficult to secure a good job in Mexico.
  • Schooling and related expenses would be costly.

The IJ and BIA acknowledged these concerns but noted:

  • He has employable skills (welding) and potential work with his father’s construction business.
  • The family has $34,000 in assets that could help offset relocation costs.
  • While the standard of living and economic opportunities would likely be lower in Mexico, this is a common consequence of removal.

The Sixth Circuit agreed, reiterating that:

“Diminished employment opportunities and financial hardship are typical results of removal and do not generally support a finding of requisite hardship.” (Garcia Contreras, 2025 WL 3094136, at *6).
b. Language Barriers and Educational Disruption

One key hardship claim was that the children, especially the younger one, would face serious difficulties in Mexican schools due to limited Spanish proficiency and different educational standards.

The IJ:

  • Recognized that at least one child had limited Spanish.

The Sixth Circuit concluded that the IJ and BIA:

  • Did not ignore the language barrier; rather, they found it not extreme enough, when combined with other factors, to satisfy the high hardship bar.
  • Properly characterized the need to adjust linguistically and academically as an ordinary hardship of relocation.
    See also Trinidad‑Contreras, 2025 WL 2732495, at *5 (“[A]djustment is not unusual; it attends most moves to a foreign country.”).
c. Safety and Country‑Conditions Concerns

Pablo‑Ventura raised concerns about violence and danger in his hometown in Mexico. The IJ and BIA:

  • Accepted that there were safety concerns.
  • Noted, however, that the family would not be compelled to live in that specific town and could relocate elsewhere in Mexico.

The Sixth Circuit found this reasoning sufficient to avoid elevating the harm to the level of “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship for his children.

d. Children’s Health and Alleged Over‑Emphasis on Lack of Medical Issues

Pablo‑Ventura argued the IJ “overemphasized” his children’s lack of medical or special‑needs issues, effectively treating serious medical conditions as a prerequisite to relief.

The record showed that:

  • The IJ mentioned the children were in “general good health” only briefly as one factor among many.
  • The IJ did not state or imply that medical hardship was a necessary element; rather, he balanced it with economic, educational, and emotional factors.

The court held there was no misapplication of the standard. Mentioning the absence of extraordinary medical problems is permissible; it does not transform the statutory standard into a purely medical one.

e. Mental‑Health Evidence and the Psychotherapist Report

Pablo‑Ventura also relied on a psychotherapist’s report addressing his mental health, including a claimed risk of suicide if removed. He argued the IJ failed to give this adequate consideration.

The IJ explicitly referenced:

“a psychotherapist report addressing concerns with the family losing their current community and stability.” (AR at 62).

The Sixth Circuit viewed this as sufficient acknowledgment and treatment of the report. Importantly:

  • The hardship relevant under § 1229b(b) is the hardship to qualifying relatives, not to the applicant per se.
  • To carry weight, mental‑health evidence must show a —for example, a parent’s mental illness making the child’s situation significantly worse than typical post‑removal adjustment difficulties.
  • The panel evidently concluded that, as presented, the report did not compel a finding of exceptional hardship or demonstrate legal error in the IJ’s weighing of the evidence.
f. Separation vs. Relocation Scenarios

The IJ considered both primary scenarios:

  1. Family relocates to Mexico together:
    • Economic downgrade, educational disruption, language challenges, country‑conditions risks, and loss of community in the U.S. were all evaluated.
    • The IJ concluded these hardships, while substantial, were not beyond what is normally expected in removal cases.
  2. Family remains in the U.S. while Pablo‑Ventura is removed:
    • His wife does not currently work but acknowledged she would have to seek employment.
    • The children would experience emotional hardship and separation from their father.

The BIA and Sixth Circuit agreed that neither scenario produced hardship that rose to the statutory threshold.

4. Exhaustion and “Lack of Immigration Options”

Pablo‑Ventura argued on appeal that his children would suffer additional hardship because he had no viable pathway to lawful status (“absence of visa pathways”).

The Sixth Circuit dismissed this argument on two bases:

  • Failure to raise before the IJ: The record did not show that Pablo‑Ventura advanced this specific “no immigration options” theory as a hardship factor at the IJ level.
  • Jurisdictional bar: Relying on Fernandez‑Villafan and Tolentino‑Hernandez, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to review an alleged hardship factor not properly exhausted before the agency, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).

This aspect of the decision is significant: It confirms that each specific hardship theory a petitioner wants the court to consider must be clearly raised and developed before the IJ. Merely introducing background facts is not enough; counsel should explicitly link those facts to a hardship theory on the record.

5. Due Process as “Repackaged” Merits

Finally, Pablo‑Ventura’s due‑process argument—essentially that the IJ and BIA failed to fairly consider all hardship factors—is dismissed as an attempt to re‑litigate the merits.

Citing Fernandez‑Villafan and Araujo‑Padilla, the court reiterates:

  • Due process in removal proceedings guarantees a full and fair hearing, notice, and an opportunity to be heard.
  • It does not guarantee a favorable weighing of evidence or a particular level of detail in the agency’s written decision.
  • If the claim is simply “the IJ under‑valued my evidence,” that is a merits dispute, not a constitutional violation.

V. Impact and Practical Implications

A. The Ongoing Strictness of the Hardship Standard

Although unpublished, Pablo‑Ventura aligns tightly with the Sixth Circuit’s broader pattern:

  • It confirms the very high bar non‑LPR applicants face in proving “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”
  • It categorizes several common types of hardship as “typical” and expected:
    • Reduced income and standard of living abroad.
    • Loss of educational and economic opportunities.
    • Language barriers and academic adjustment difficulties.
    • Emotional distress and disruption of community ties.

Practically, non‑LPR cancellation will likely remain reserved for cases where qualifying relatives face truly exceptional circumstances—for example, serious medical conditions, severe disabilities, or a combination of multiple, compounding hardships that are demonstrably rare.

B. Aggregate Analysis and the “Magic Words” Problem

One subtle but important implication of the decision is its acceptance of relatively formulaic statements by IJs and the BIA as sufficient proof of cumulative analysis. When an IJ writes:

“All relevant factors, even if not extreme individually, must be considered in the aggregate,”

and then briefly references multiple categories of hardship, the Sixth Circuit is inclined to:

  • Presume the IJ properly complied with its obligation to aggregate factors.
  • Reject arguments that the IJ considered hardships “in isolation” unless the record clearly shows a material factor was wholly ignored.

For practitioners, this raises the bar for successful hardship appeals. Going forward, allegations of inadequate aggregate analysis must identify:

  • Specific categories of hardship the IJ did not mention or discuss, and
  • Why those omitted categories are material enough to potentially change the outcome under the governing standard.

C. Issue Preservation: Raise Every Hardship Theory Explicitly

The treatment of “lack of immigration options” underscores a critical practice point:

  • Counsel must clearly articulate each hardship theory before the IJ, not assume it will be inferred.
  • This includes:
    • Lack of lawful pathways.
    • Special vulnerabilities of qualifying relatives (disability, trauma, etc.).
  • Failure to do so may not only prevent the IJ from addressing those factors but also strip the court of appeals of jurisdiction to consider them on review.

D. Limited Utility of Due‑Process Framing

Pablo‑Ventura adds to a growing body of Sixth Circuit authority warning that:

  • Recasting a merits disagreement as a “due‑process violation” is unlikely to succeed.
  • Constitutional arguments must point to:
    • Actual procedural deficiencies (e.g., denial of the right to present evidence, bias, lack of notice), or
    • Legal errors that affect the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.

Arguments that the IJ “gave insufficient weight” to certain factors or “failed to write more extensively” will normally be treated as non‑constitutional disputes over discretionary or factual determinations.

E. Non‑Precedential but Indicative

While marked “NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION,” Pablo‑Ventura still carries several types of significance:

  • It is part of a consistent, post‑Wilkinson line of Sixth Circuit decisions, reinforcing how the circuit is applying its new jurisdiction over hardship questions.
  • It provides a practical roadmap for what does not meet the “exceptional and extremely unusual” standard.
  • It illustrates the court’s practical approach to:
    • Aggregate analysis (accepting concise, formulaic acknowledgments), and
    • Exhaustion (strictly enforcing requirement to raise theories below).

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What Is “Cancellation of Removal” for Non‑Permanent Residents?

“Cancellation of removal” is a form of discretionary relief that, if granted, cancels a removal order and allows the person to remain in the United States, often with a path to lawful status.

For non‑permanent residents (non‑LPRs), the key statutory requirements under § 1229b(b) include:

  • At least 10 years of continuous physical presence in the United States.
  • Good moral character during that period.
  • No disqualifying criminal convictions.
  • Proof that removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying U.S.‑citizen or lawful‑permanent‑resident spouse, parent, or child.

B. What Does “Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship” Mean?

This phrase is intentionally demanding. It does not mean:

  • Any serious hardship, or
  • Hardship that is simply above average.

Instead, it requires hardship that is:

  • Substantially different from, or beyond what typically happens when a family member is deported.
  • Assessed from the perspective of the qualifying relatives (e.g., U.S.‑citizen children) rather than the immigrant alone.

C. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact

A “mixed question of law and fact” asks whether the established facts satisfy a particular legal standard. Here:

  • Facts: What are the family’s economic circumstances, language skills, health conditions, etc.?
  • Law: What does “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” require?

Determining whether the family’s situation crosses the statutory threshold requires applying law to facts—a mixed question.

D. Standards of Review: De Novo vs. “Compelling Evidence”

  • De novo review: The appellate court gives no deference to the agency’s application of law to fact and decides the issue anew.
  • “Compelling evidence”/substantial‑evidence review: The court must uphold the agency’s factual findings unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.

In Pablo‑Ventura, the Sixth Circuit declined to decide which standard applies to hardship mixed questions, stating that the agency’s decision would be affirmed under either approach.

E. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Exhaustion means:

  • You must raise an issue before the agency (IJ and BIA) before you can ask a federal court to review it.
  • In immigration cases, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) makes exhaustion a jurisdictional prerequisite.

If a hardship theory (for example, “I have no lawful way to immigrate”) is not explicitly presented to the IJ, the court of appeals may:

  • Treat it as waived or forfeited, and
  • Hold that it has no jurisdiction to consider it.

F. Non‑Precedential (Unpublished) Opinions

When a decision is “not recommended for publication”:

  • It generally does not create binding precedent for future cases in that circuit.
  • It may still be cited for persuasive value or to show how the court is likely to treat similar issues.

Pablo‑Ventura thus reflects the Sixth Circuit’s current approach but does not formally bind future panels.

VII. Conclusion

Antonio Pablo‑Ventura v. Bondi confirms and clarifies several key features of cancellation‑of‑removal jurisprudence in the Sixth Circuit:

  • The court has jurisdiction to review the application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard, but exercises that review with considerable deference.
  • The hardship standard remains extremely demanding; financial, educational, and emotional difficulties that are severe in everyday terms may still be legally “ordinary.”
  • An IJ’s and BIA’s explicit statements that they have considered all hardship factors “in the aggregate” will generally suffice to defeat claims of piecemeal analysis.
  • Hardship theories must be explicitly raised before the IJ to be preserved for judicial review; otherwise, they may be jurisdictionally barred.
  • Due‑process claims cannot be used to disguise disagreements with the agency’s weighing of evidence.

Though unpublished, the decision fits into a coherent post‑Wilkinson trend: the Sixth Circuit will review hardship determinations but will rarely disturb them. For practitioners, the lesson is clear: meaningful success in non‑LPR cancellation cases will depend on developing a robust, well‑documented record of truly extraordinary hardship to qualifying relatives, articulating every relevant theory at the IJ level, and recognizing that many hardships, while deeply real to families, will be deemed legally “typical” and insufficient to satisfy this rigorous standard.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Comments